Instrumentalizacija protikomunizma v delovanju predvojnih političnih elit

Avtor(ji): Godeša, Bojan
Jezik: slovenski
Vrsta gradiva: Video
Leto: 2017
Ključne besede: protikomunizem, anticommunism
Založnik(i): Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana
Soavtor(ji): Damijan Guštin (org. odb.), Jurij Perovšek (org. odb.), Jure Gašparič (org. odb.), Filip Čuček (org. odb.), Mojca Šorn (org. odb.)


  • Vsi metapodatki
    • dcterms:identifier http://hdl.handle.net/11686/38142
    • dcterms:title
      • Instrumentalizacija protikomunizma v delovanju predvojnih političnih elit
    • dcterms:alternative
      • "Communism, the greatest danger of our time" – The instrumentalisation of anti-communism in the Slovenian politics in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
    • dcterms:creator
      • Bojan Godeša
    • dcterms:subject
      • protikomunizem
      • anticommunism
    • dcterms:abstract
      • "V okrožnici o brezbožnem komunizmu nasvetuje papež Pij XI. sredstva, s katerimi naj se katoličani bore proti 'največji nevarnosti naše dobe'. (…) Stvaren prikaz najhujšega nasprotnika Boga in krščanske kulture nam more samo koristiti, ker tako šele prav spoznamo, da je 'skrivnost hudobije že na delu'. (…) kdor pa pozna nasprotnika, njegovo orožje in način bojevanja, se zlahka ne bo dal presenetiti, ampak se mu bo pogumno in razumno v bran postavil, posebno ko vidi, da ima v svojih rokah še učinkovitejše orožje kakor nasprotnik. Naše najboljše orožje proti komunizmu pa je resnica, pravica in ljubezen." Tako je Ivan Ahčin, glavni urednik Slovenca in eden vodilnih katoliških ideologov zapisal v uvodu knjige Komunizem največja nevarnost naše dobe (1939). Zunanjepolitični urednik Slovenca Alojzij Kuhar je češkoslovaškim diplomatom leta 1937 pojasnil, kako se počutijo "klerikalci", ko se jim je uspelo dokopati do oblasti v Dravski banovini: "Imamo svojo avtonomijo, kot smo si želeli, popolnoma obvladamo slovensko administracijo, v njej ne najdete nobenega Srba, in tukaj delamo, kar hočemo." Prvenstvo katoliškega tabora v slovenskem političnem življenju v drugi polovici tridesetih let ni bilo sporno kot tudi ne njegovo ofenzivno delovanje, ki je imelo za cilj rekatolizacijo slovenske družbe. Pri tem vendarle ne gre spregledati, da je bilo tako stanje predvsem posledica dejstva, da katoliški tabor v tem času pravzaprav ni imel prave opozicije oziroma tekmeca, ki bi ga lahko resneje ogrožal. Slovenski liberalci so iskali pot iz krize identitete in bili ob tem tudi politično razcepljeni, tako da so se predvsem borili za lastno politično preživetje. Slovenski komunisti so se v drugi polovici tridesetih let, ko je bila ustanovljena KPS (kot del KPJ), s svojo politiko in zahtevami na nacionalnem področju (narodnoobrambni protifašizem, zahteve po demokratizaciji družbe) prilagodili stvarnim razmeram in se približali nekaterim skupinam prebivalstva (študenti, izobraženci). S tem so komunisti sicer uspešno prebrodili osamo, v katero so jo pahnili pregoni in ideološki ekskluzivizem, a ljudskofrontno protifašistično in narodnoobrambno delovanje slovenskim komunistom v smislu strankarskega povezovanja ni prineslo trajnejših rezultatov. KPJ na Slovenskem je neprekinjeno delovala od sredine tridesetih let, a o nepretrgani številčni rasti lahko govorimo šele od ustanovitve KPS leta 1937, ko je v času priprav nanjo štela 250 članov. Čez tri leta, junija 1940, je število komunistov znašalo 650, oktobra istega leta pa nekaj čez 800 ali morda okoli 900. Trend rasti se je še stopnjeval in tako se ocene o številu članstva KPS ob napadu sil osi na Jugoslavijo gibljejo med 1200 in 1300 člani. Slovenski komunisti so bili v tem času bili bolj ali manj na obrobju tedanjega političnega dogajanja. In tako so se v času pred izbruhom druge svetovne vojne slovenski komunisti tudi počutili, kot je razvidno iz korespondence komunista Dušana Kermavnerja, ko je Lojzetu Udetu zapisal: "Pred dobrim desetletjem, in vse desetletje odtlej se je marsikomu zdelo, da je ta orientacija oprta na neko himero, da je njena ideja brez moči, tako malo praktična je bila videti: Bog visoko, a Rusija – daleko." V takih okoliščinah so privrženci katoliškega tabora mnogokrat samozadovoljno SLS kar enačili s celotnim slovenskim narodom in njenega načelnika dr. Antona Korošca naslavljali z nazivom "nekronani kralj Slovenije", kar pa je bila le varljiva podoba. Notranja trdnost in idejna enotnost v katoliških vrstah, značilna za prejšnja obdobja, je bila, kljub samozavestnemu nastopu in poskusom notranjega poenotenja, namreč močno načeta. Te niso mogli prikriti niti nekatere zunanje populistične množične manifestacije, niti visoka podpora na zadnjih predvojnih volitvah leta 1938. Čeprav glavna težava katoliškega tabora ni bila ogroženost s strani slovenskih političnih tekmecev, temveč neenotnost in idejna nejasnost v lastni vrstah, pa je zlasti po papeževi okrožnici Divini Redemptoris (1937) kot glavni sovražnik nastopal komunizem, ki je nadomestil upehani liberalizem. Nesorazmerje med dejanskim vplivom komunističnih idej v tedanji slovenski družbi in poudarjanjem protikomunizma si lahko razlagamo, da je izrazito napadalno protikomunistično delovanje predstavljalo predvsem poskus notranjega poenotenja katoliškega tabora z opozarjanjem na domnevno zunanjo ogroženost katolicizma. Brez pravih političnih tekmecev, a kljub temu politično in idejno nestrpen do drugače mislečih, katoliški tabor tudi ni imel jasno izdelanega enotnega koncepta družbenega modela. Zanj se je vedelo le, da mora biti v skladu s papeškimi okrožnicami na katoliških temeljih. Gospodarska kriza oktobra 1929, ki je do temeljev pretresla celoten svet, je namreč privedla skoraj do zloma kapitalističnega svetovnega gospodarstva. Tako sta v svetovnem merilu postali liberalno-demokratični ureditvi alternativa v sovjetski praksi na državni lastnini utemeljeno plansko gospodarstvo ter na drugi strani avtoritarni stanovsko-korporativističen model, ki se je v totalitarni obliki izrazil v fašistični Italiji in nacistični Nemčiji. V tridesetih letih se je v Evropi pričenjal proces spogledovanja ideologov katoliške desnice z ideologi evropskih totalitarnih in avtoritarnih režimov. Ideološko spogledovanje katoliške desnice z radikalno desnico je v Evropi potekalo v vrsti stičnih točk (odprava razrednega boja, kritiki liberalnega kapitalizma in socializma/marksizma, antikomunizmu itd.). Idejnopolitični razvoj na katoliški desnici v Sloveniji je sledil tem evropskim tokovom. V kakšni smeri je šel prevladujoč tok v katoliškem taboru, je razvidno iz priporočila nemškega veleposlanika v Beogradu, ki je poleg Koroščeve pripravljenosti za dolgoročno tesno sodelovanje z Berlinom, zaradi njegovega prepričanja v nemško zmago, prepoznal ravno v tedanjem ideološkem profilu slovenske katoliške stranke elemente, ki so ustrezali nacističnim načrtom pri uresničevanju rasističnega totalitarnega "novega reda". Viktor von Heeren je namreč v Berlin sporočil: "Ne glede na znane pomisleke, ki jih mi že dolgo imamo proti Korošcu kot voditelju slovenskih klerikalcev, bi se lahko podelitev mandata za sestavo vlade Korošcu izkazala kot danes koristna za nemške interese. Kajti če izvzamemo Stojadinovića, čigar povratek na mesto ministrskega predsednika bi že na hrvaški odpor vse preveč obremenil notranji položaj, je Korošec edini jugoslovanski državnik formata, ki z resničnim notranjim prepričanjem vodi boj proti Judom, framasonom in komunistom in ki bi tudi imel potrebno avtoriteto in energijo, da premaga odpor. " Zato je priporočil v Berlin, "da naj nemški tisk ne objavi ničesar, kar bi se moglo tolmačiti kot načelna odklonitev morebitnega Koroščevega mandata. " Takšen koncept pretežnega dela slovenskega katoliškega tabora, ki je izpostavljal kombinacijo antikomunizma, antiliberalizma in antisemitizma kot eno temeljnih družbenih vrednot, je z vojaškim porazom sil osi v svetovnem spopadu dokončno izgubil svojo družbeno legitimnost.
      • "In his encyclical on godless communism, Pope Pius XI recommends the means that the Catholics should employ in order to fight against 'the greatest danger of our time'. (…)The realistic depiction of the worst enemy of God and the Christian culture can only benefit us, because only in this manner can we realise that the 'mysterious malice is already at work'. (…)and those who know their opponents, their weapons and way of fighting, will not be easily surprised, but will be able to stand up to them bravely and rationally, especially when they see that they possess weapons even more effective than their opponents. Our best weapons against communism are truth, justice, and love." This is what Ivan Ahčin, editor-in-chief of the Slovenec newspaper and one of the leading Catholic ideologues, wrote in his introduction to the book Komunizem največja nevarnost naše dobe (Communism, the Greatest Danger of Our Time, 1939). In 1937 the foreign-political editor of Slovenec, Alojzij Kuhar, explained to the Czechoslovak diplomats how the "clericalists" felt when they finally managed to assume power in the Drava Banate: "We are autonomous, like we wanted; we have complete control of the Slovenian administration, and you will not find a single Serbian in it; and we do what we want here." The primate of the Catholic camp in the Slovenian political life in the second half of the 1930s was not disputable, and neither were its aggressive activities aimed at the recatholicisation of the Slovenian society. In this regard it should nevertheless not be overlooked that such a situation was largely caused by the fact that at this time the Catholic camp did not actually face any real opponents or competitors that could be seen as seriously threatening. The Slovenian liberals underwent an identity crisis as well as the consequent political schism, and thus they focused primarily on their own political survival. In the second half of the 1930s, when the Communist Party of Slovenia was established (as a part of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia), Slovenian communists with their policy and demands in the national area (the national defence against fascism, the demands for the democratisation of the society) adapted themselves to the actual circumstances and approached certain groups of the population (students, intellectuals). Thus the communists successfully weathered the isolation that they were exposed to due to the persecution and ideological exclusivism. However, the People's Front anti-fascist and national defence activities failed to bring any permanent results for them in the sense of the Party consolidation. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was active in Slovenia as of the middle of the 1930s. However, any growth in terms of its numbers can only be discussed after the establishment of the Communist Party of Slovenia in 1937, which had 250 members during the preparations. Three years later, in June 1940, the number of communists amounted to 650, while in October of the same year there were a little over 800 or perhaps around 900 of them. This trend kept becoming more obvious, and thus the estimates with regard to the membership of the Communist Party of Slovenia at the moment when the Axis Powers invaded Yugoslavia range between 1200 and 1300 members. At this time the Slovenian communists were more or less at the brink of the contemporaneous political developments. This is how the Slovenian communists also felt in the time before World War II broke out, as this is evident from the correspondence between the communist Dušan Kermavner and Lojze Ude: "Well over ten years ago and for the whole decade since then, many people have believed that this orientation is based on a chimera of some kind – its idea appeared to be so impractical that it seemed to be powerless: while God is up high, Russia is far away." In such circumstances the adherents of the Catholic camp would often equate the self-satisfied Slovenian People's Party with the whole of the Slovenian nation, while they would refer to this party's leader Dr Anton Korošec with the title of "the uncrowned King of Slovenia". However, appearances were deceptive. The internal strength and ideological unity in the ranks of Catholics, characteristic of the previous period, had been severely destabilised despite the self-confident attitude and attempts at internal unification. This weakness could not be concealed, not even by the certain external populist mass manifestations or the considerable support at the last pre-war elections in 1938. Although the main problem of the Catholic camp was not any endangerment by its Slovenian political competitors, but rather the disunity and ideological confusion in the Catholic camp's own ranks, communism that replaced the exhausted liberalism soon became the main enemy of the Catholic side, especially after the Pope's Divini Redemptoris encyclical (1937). With regard to the imbalance between the actual influence of the communist ideas in the contemporaneous Slovenia society and the emphasis placed on anti-communism we can speculate that the exceedingly aggressive anti-communist actions stemmed predominantly from the attempt at the internal unification of the Catholic camp by underlining the supposed external threat against Catholicism. In the absence of any real political competitors, but with what was nevertheless a political and ideological intolerance for different opinions, the Catholic camp also lacked a clear and single social model concept. It was only known as something that had to be in accordance with the papal encyclicals and based on the Catholic foundations. The economic crisis of October 1929, which shook the whole world profoundly, almost resulted in the demise of the global capitalist economy. Thus planned economy, based on the Soviet practice of state property, and on the other hand the authoritarian corporatist model, expressed in its totalitarian form in the fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, became the global alternatives. In the 1930s the process of the approximation between the ideologues of the Catholic rightists and the ideologues of the European totalitarian and authoritarian regimes began in Europe. The ideological flirtation of the Catholic right with the radical right in Europe had a number of common points (the abolishment of the class struggle, the critique of the liberal capitalism and socialism/Marxism, anti-communism, etc.). The ideological-political development of the Catholic right in Slovenia followed these European trends. The recommendation of the German ambassador to Belgrade clarified the direction taken by the dominant wing of the Catholic camp: besides Korošec's preparedness to engage in long-term close cooperation with Berlin due to his belief in the German victory, the ambassador identified the elements that corresponded to the Nazi plans with regard to the implementation of the racist totalitarian "New Order" precisely in the ideological profile of the Slovenian Catholic party. Viktor von Heeren communicated the following to Berlin: "Regardless of the familiar reservations that we have for a long time had about Korošec as the leader of the Slovenian clericalists, giving him a mandate to form a government could now turn out to be beneficial for the German interests. If we exclude Stojadinović, whose return to the position of Prime Minister would be far too detrimental for the internal situation in Yugoslavia due to the Croatian opposition, Korošec is the only Yugoslav statesman capable of leading the struggle against Jews, freemasons and communists with an honest personal conviction as well as the authority and energy crucial for the victory against the resistance." Therefore his recommendation to Berlin was "that the German press should not publish anything which could be interpreted as a principled refusal of a potential Korošec's mandate." Such a concept of the majority of the Slovenian Catholic camp, which emphasised the combination of anti-communism, anti-liberalism and anti-Semitism as fundamental social values, ultimately lost its social legitimacy with the military defeat of the Axis Powers in the global conflict.
    • dcterms:publisher
      • Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana
    • dcterms:contributor
      • Damijan Guštin (org. odb.)
      • Jurij Perovšek (org. odb.)
      • Jure Gašparič (org. odb.)
      • Filip Čuček (org. odb.)
      • Mojca Šorn (org. odb.)
    • dcterms:type
      • Moving Image
    • dcterms:source
      • SISTORY:ID:38142
    • dcterms:language
      • slv
    • dcterms:isPartOf