Yugoslavia, like other European countries, recorded an enormous indebtedness by the peasantry during the years of the Recession. This indebtedness, which put a large percentage of the population under the threat of bankruptcy, was unbearable economically, socially and, not the least, politically. Although the Yugoslav government introduced counter measures contemporaneously with some other European countries it had taken four and a half years from the declaration in 1932 of a moratorium on peasant debts, before the problem of peasant indebtedness was finally solved. The Yugoslav method of releasing peasants from their debts and of rehabilitating financial institutions through conversion had already been adopted as a principle in 1932 and was, in essence, no different from other European models. It is, therefore, difficult to understand the delay in its execution which had manifold negative consequences on the "domestic courtyard".

Kakor drugod po Evropi so tudi v Jugoslaviji v letih velike gospodarske krize beležili enormno zadolženost kmečkega življa, ki je grozila povzročiti gospodarski propad znatnega dela prebivalstva. To je bilo nevzdržno tako iz gospodarskih, socialnih in nenazadnje tudi političnih ozirov. Čeprav so jugoslovanske oblasti pričele ukrepati sočasno z drugimi primerljivimi evropskimi državami, pa je do končne rešitve vprašanja kmečke zadolženosti prišlo šele po preteku štirih letih in pol od razglasitve moratorija za kmečke dolgove v letu 1932. Razdolževanje kmetov in sanacija denarnih zavodov po jugoslovansko, ki je imela obliko konverzije in je bila kot načelo sprejeta že v letu 1932, se vsebinsko ni v ničemer razlikovala od evropskih vzorov. Zato je pravzaprav nerazumljivo tako dolgotrajno odlašanje pri njeni izvedbi, kar je imelo veliko negativnih posledic na domačem dvorišču.