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A SLOVENE HISTORY

SOCIETY – POLITICS – CULTURE
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THE TERRITORY

The geographic position of present-day Slovenia, squeezed between the Alps and the Adriatic Sea, has exposed this territory to the tides of history. It has always been a place of transition, a borderland and a crossroads, but also a bridge between different cultures, people, nations and states. Although small in size – the modern Slovene state measures just 20,000 km² – four major European geographical regions meet in its territory: the Alps, which cover the north-west, the Pannonian Plain, also known as the Great Hungarian Plain, to the east, the Dinaric Alps, known also by the ancient toponym of the Karst (Kras), which covers the southern part of Slovene territory, and the Mediterranean, which, as the Adriatic, makes its most northerly encroachment into continental central Europe in the Gulf of Trieste.

The geography of Slovene territory has also made it a European transport hub. According to geographers, along the entire stretch of the Mediterranean basin from southern France to Istanbul, the most convenient, shortest and easiest route across the imposing ring of mountains, from the Alps and Dinarics to the Balkan Mountains that hem it in to the north, passes through Slovene territory. This is where the Pannonian Plain reaches its closest point to the Mediterranean, and the highest Karst passes between Ljubljana and Trieste lie no higher than 600 m above sea level for a radius of 30 km in the Postojna or Adriatic Gate, also known as the Italo-Illyrian Gate. All traffic heading towards Italy and the Mediterranean from the western Balkans, Pannonian Plain, eastern Alps and the Czech territories passes through Slovene territory. Two historical witnesses to the geopolitical importance of Slovene territory are the Amber Road, which linked the Baltic coast to the northern Adriatic, and the legend of the Argonauts, in which Jason's band of sailors travel along the Danube, Sava and Ljubljanica rivers to Nauportus (Vrhnika), where they dismantle their ship and carry it over the Karst to the Adriatic Sea, before sailing back to Greece. The convenient Karst passes reach towards Italy along the 40-km Vipava valley, which stretches from the Soča (It. Isonzo) river into the mountainous continental interior, opening a path towards rich northern Italy for those arriving from the east. At the end of the eighth century, Paul the Deacon, historian of the Lombards, wrote that all Italy is “surrounded by the waves of the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic seas, but to the west and north it is so closed in by the Alps that there is no entrance to it, save via narrow passes and over the lofty summits of the mountains. Yet from the eastern side, where it is joined to Pannonia, it has an approach that lies open, broad and quite level.” The Romans were well aware of the strategic importance of this territory to the defence of Italy's most vulnerable border, through which numerous tribes, peoples and armies entered the Italian
peninsula throughout history, and they built a special defensive system, the *claustra Alpium Iuliarum*, creating a network of important roads spreading out from Aquileia towards the central Danube region, Pannonia, and western Illyricum.

Slovene territory is not just the meeting point of geographic elements, but also a point at which different cultures have overlapped: horse people from the eastern Steppes and barbarians from the west, north and east of Europe; Slavs, Germans, Romans and Finno-Ugric Hungarians; the western European Empire and Byzantium from the east. It has long been a place of immigrant mobility and indigenous tenacity. This great diversity has left its mark on this small territory, and has been preserved as part of the region’s rich history and tradition. This is the invaluable heritage of the Slovene territory, which should be recognised, cared for, and preserved for future generations. The history of a territory and its inhabitants – and this applies very much to this work – cannot simply be reduced to the history of one nation, particularly if, like the vast majority of European nations, it only coalesced as a political nation in the nineteenth century. Of course, this is by no means a uniquely Slovene problem. Elsewhere in Europe, historians talk of countries and nations in periods when neither had yet come into being. When the French talk of their first dynasty, they are likely to be thinking of the Frankish Merovingians. Equally, German and Austrian works on their own lands in the Early Middle Ages are often anachronistic, creating an image of something that never existed politically. So, just as it would be out of place to speak of Ljudevit Posavski (Louis, prince of Lower Pannonia) as a Croat prince, it would also be misleading to refer to Carantanian prince Borut as a Slovene prince and Carantania as the first Slovene state. At that time, the inhabitants of part of the later Slovene ethnic territory were only identified as Carantanians, or at best as Slavs. Slovenia and Slovenes have not always existed and using these two terms to describe the Early Middle Ages is an attempt to exploit the past to benefit current interests and ideas. One such idea is the assertion found in all the Slovene history textbooks that Slovenes settled in an area stretching north to the Danube, and that a process of Germanisation led to them losing two-thirds of their national territory. Yet this approach always neglects to provide any grounds for the claim that the Slavs living along the Danube in the Early Middle Ages were Slovenes.

A history of the Slovenes therefore only relates to recent centuries, but that does not mean that Slovene history, understood as the history of the land where present-day Slovenia is located and its people, is any the less for this distinction, only that it has been more accurately defined. To discuss only the history of Slovenes or the history of the Slovene nation – as the titles of previous histories have implied, though fortunately their content has been broader –
strictly understood would mean nothing less than renouncing part of the Slovenes’ own history. It would mean, for example, disregarding the noble dynasties from elsewhere that made the territory their homeland, and who did so much for its progress and prosperity. It would mean ignoring the many western European monks who culturally and spiritually enriched the region and whose codices Slovenes are today so proud of. It would also mean renouncing the celebrated polymath, Johann Wiechard Valvasor, an Italian by origin, and discounting an important section of the burgher class and culture, as well as all those who lived here but who were not linguistically or ethnically defined as Slovenes. There is no reason for renouncing or disregarding this heritage, so the best approach may well be to present things as they were, and to give them their correct names.

FROM PREHISTORIC CULTURE TO CIVILISATION

The prehistoric period in Slovene territory is characterised by a wealth of archaeological culture and social manifestations. This is due to the variety of geographical and landscape types in the lands between the Alps and the Adriatic Sea, and between the Pannonian Plain and Venetia. These differences were particularly noticeable in the most ancient eras, when people were so much more dependent on their natural environment. The archaeological material bears witness to the fact that the majority of known cultures occupying this territory until the Early Iron Age (around the eighth century BC), when the first clear elements of material and spiritual culture are found, were on the periphery of most migratory and cultural centres in the Danube and Adriatic regions. The incorporation of present Slovene territory into the Roman world was a historical turning point, comparable to its inclusion in Carolingian western Europe almost a millennium later. Slovene territory became part of the then civilised world, incorporated into a state with developed and regulated public life and a state apparatus. The Roman Empire, which later provided the model and political programme for numerous medieval kings and emperors, was very much a supra-regional political formation, into which local identities were subsumed.

The earliest signs of human activity in Slovene territory, the two stone tools from the Jama v Lozi site near Orehek, reach back around 250,000 years, the Lower Palaeolithic (Old Stone Age), although one can only begin to speak of Ice Age human culture and settlement in the Middle Palaeolithic, when Neanderthals moved across Europe. Evidence of the presence of this ‘Mousterian culture’ has been discovered in over 15 sites in present-day Slovenia. The remains of a human who lived at that time were discovered near Krapina, in the Croatian region of Zagorje. The Postojna and Pivka Karst and the Soča (Isonzo) river basin, with its
many caves (the most archaeologically important being Betalov Spodmol and Divje Babe, source of the oldest musical instrument ever found, a 40,000-year-old flute) was the first part of the region that was significantly settled by prehistoric humans. Settlement was even more intense in the Upper Palaeolithic. Modern humans came to the fore, completely displacing Neanderthals. The temperate climate in a warm interglacial period lasting over 10,000 years saw them settle Alpine highlands that had previously been icebound and inaccessible to the animals they pursued for food. Evidence for this was found at the most important site from this period in present-day Slovenia, the Potočka Zijalka cave on Olševa, a mountain in the eastern Savinja Alps, 1,700 m above sea level. The cave has lent its name to the entire Upper Palaeolithic culture in the eastern Alps, which is known as ‘Olševien’. The site has been dated to between 45,000 and 32,000 BC. Excavations found numerous stone tools and over 100 bone artefacts, mainly pointed, with a bone needle and simple flute among the most significant finds. Bone tools appearing alongside stone tools indicate that the society was undergoing major changes in its economics and its life. Humans did not just pursue wild animals but became hunters; the needle indicates mastery of sewing (clothing, coverings, bags), which also significantly improved life. The flutes and simple, ornamental carving in numerous bones represent the first signs of human art found in Slovene territory. The last glacial period, the most severe of all, brought the flowering of the Olševien culture to an end.

After the Mesolithic or Middle Stone Age period, for which sites are low in number and poorly researched, indicating significant gaps and a decline in the material and spiritual culture in prehistoric development in Slovene lands, a significant transformation occurred in the Neolithic or New Stone Age, which is dated between the fifth and second millennia BC. While in Palaeolithic times humans lived exclusively from hunting and gathering, in the Neolithic growing crops and rearing domesticated animals came to the fore. At that time, people used grinding techniques to achieve a highly-finished stone, which remained the main source of tools for chopping and cutting. They also invented pottery, simple methods for making fire and boring stone, looms for weaving fibres, and the bow and arrow. The economic change that enabled people to stop continually following their prey and to create settlements also led to major changes in the social structure. Demographic growth occurred, and new divisions of labour, and the first forms of social stratification, probably began to appear. The start of husbandry and agriculture in the Neolithic laid the long-term foundations for human development, and the subsequent complex forms of human society.

The major centre of Neolithic development in Slovene territory was the Triestine Karst. The archaeological material, mainly from cave sites, represents three separate and
successive Neolithic cultures from the Mediterranean region, known as the ‘Impresso’, ‘Danilo’ and ‘Hvar’ cultures. Neolithic remains from present-day central and eastern Slovenia present a significant contrast to the Karstic world: settlements, largely on the plain, were connected to the ‘Lengyel’ culture of the central Danube region. Most Neolithic sites in continental Slovenia are from the Late Neolithic, such as the settlement at Rifnik above Šentjur by Celje, which was inhabited almost continually until the Early Middle Ages. The Resnikov Prekop settlement near Ig, which dated back to this time, was a forebear of the specific pile-dwelling culture of the Ljubljana Barje marshlands, which reached its peak in the Copper Age (Aeneolithic).

The group of over 15 pile-dwelling settlements on the Ljubljana marshlands is of note because of its complexity and rich material culture, and is one of the most interesting Copper Age sites in this part of Europe. The building of durable pile dwellings tied humans to a specific area, to which they also adapted their economy. Pollen analysis indicates the existence of tilled land, pastures and meadows on the edge of the marshlands. Livestock were an important part of the marsh-dwellers’ economy, with hunting and fishing also playing a major role. The first metal to be used in Slovene territory appeared at this time: copper. Copper tools, which the marsh-dwellers produced themselves and which originally copied their stone precursors, soon became far more diverse, improving the quality of timber production, as is seen in the later pile dwellings. Ceramic production was also high quality, finding expression in votive statuettes. The schematic, flat-bodied female idols have a distinctive ‘violin-box’ form, an emphasis in great contrast with the previous conception of the female figure, which also reflected a change in spiritual content. Evidence of social changes can also be observed. The previous social and clan connections grew weaker in a pile-dwelling culture where each family had its own house, with closer blood ties and nuclear family loyalty being strengthened. This more fractured lifestyle, with separate buildings for individual community cells, led to the introduction of new, previously unknown norms of behaviour to inter-family and community relations.

With the exception of the Late Bronze Age and the so-called Urnfield culture, in terms of settlement the Bronze Age, which covers the second millennium BC, is a less important period in the history of the Slovene territory. It could also be seen as a time of stagnation, with reduced settlement leading to demographic decline. The disappearance of ceramic ornaments from the records at this time also indicates a possible spiritual crisis. Of course, this was also the period in which bronze, an alloy of copper and tin that is much more useful than copper due to its hardness, arrived in Slovene territory. The new material saw the introduction of new
forms – broad axes, swords and daggers – that could never have been made from stone. People could shape bronze to form weapons deliberately designed to kill their animal prey and human rivals. Taken together with arrows, belt buckles and fasteners, these new products support the idea that horsemen were already taking their place in military formations. The concept of warriors as a new social stratum can be traced back to the Copper Age, when the first clear distinctions between weapons and tools appeared. The fear of enemies with new and more potent weapons forced groups to build fortified shelters and dwellings. These fears were behind the *kaštel* culture (*kašteli* from Lat. *castellum*) were small settlements, fortified to some degree, and also protected by their location) on the Karst plateau and in Istria, and the high-altitude settlements in the centre and east of present-day Slovenia during the Middle Bronze Age. The fortified *kašteli* created an inhabited landscape still recognisable in Istria today, and high-altitude settlements – often in the same locations – were the typical form of settlement in Slovene territory in Late Antiquity.

The Late Bronze Age, from the thirteenth to eighth century BC, is characterised by the Urnfield culture, named after the custom of cremating the dead and burying them in urns in fields. The cremation of the dead constitutes a significant difference from the previous custom of skeletal remains under barrows, which can only be a response to the significant social, spiritual and cultural changes that people of that time were going through. Cremation, in which the body loses its material essence, renders people of different status equal after death, and suggests a higher value being placed on the soul than the body. The addition of grave gifts indicates a belief in the immortality of the deceased’s soul. Funeral rituals in the Urnfield culture must be understood as a response to fundamental changes in the social and cultural basis of society. The great changes relating to the appearance of the supra-regional Urnfield culture (which covered large areas of Europe) can at least in part be explained by the arrival of new tribes, and new ethnic identities acting as the bearers of new material and spiritual culture. In Slovene territory, they were largely linked to the (proto-) Illyrians and Veneti, but it is not possible to provide a clear ethnic definition of the Urnfield culture. The bearers of this culture mastered a technique to forge sheet bronze. This allowed them to make objects that casting could not produce. Defensive military equipment, such as breastplates, shields and helmets, the concepts for which came from the Aegean, were the direct result of new knowledge and a means of demonstrating prestige and social status. The production of bronze products was on a mass scale at this time, as evidenced by depot sites such as the Mušja Jama cave near Škocjan (which probably had a cultish significance) with over 200 spear points, 20 axes, 12 swords, at least 6 helmets, knives, sickles and pieces of bronze sheet, all of which
typify the earlier period of Urnfield culture in Slovene territory. Ceramic production was also on a much larger scale and of better quality than in the Early and Middle Bronze Age. The number of archaeological sites from the period reflects the increased settlement and gradual expansion of cultivated land (cultural landscapes) due to crops and domestic animals. By the subsequent period, the Early Iron Age, this increase had already formed, in some parts of present-day Slovenia, the pattern of settlement and cultivation that the Slavs were to inherit on their arrival in the region.

The Early Iron Age (or Halstatt period) lasted from the eighth to the fourth century BC in Slovene territory, which is somewhat longer than in the rest of central Europe. The start of this period represents a major cut-off point in European prehistory, linked to the incursion of Thraco-Cimmerians into the Pannonian Plain. This led to the rise of a new metal, iron, brought from Asia Minor and accepted into the ‘Halstatt’ culture in central Europe, in which Slovene territory held a special place. The archaeological map of Halstatt sites indicates that the centre of settlement moved during that period from the two main river valley systems, the Sava and Drava and their tributaries, to the pre-Alpine highlands. The number of inhabitants increased with the arrival of new settlers, and settlement types also underwent a change. The high-altitude forts became more established, some of which, such as Stična, can already be described as ‘proto-urban’ agglomerations, which played the role of political, craft and trading centres. The forts were home to larger communities. Society at the height (sixth and fifth centuries BC) of the Halstatt period in Slovene territory, defined as a ‘prince-led’ society or culture, was characterised by a pyramid social structure with a princely (warrior) aristocracy at the head and a series of clients at lower levels. A new grave ritual appeared. The main feature of this was skeletal burial in family barrows, though this is neither general nor uniform throughout the Slovene territory. In the Soča (Isonzo) river basin, non-tumulus burials of cremated ashes in urns predominated. The social changes largely depended on the influx of iron, mastering the technology to work it to make tools, weapons and jewellery. In contrast to bronze, iron ore did not need to be imported, but was accessible from daily excavations, which enabled the development of domestic metallurgy. Related craft skills were particularly pronounced in Slovene territory, for example in the production of metal vessels, among which situlae are significant due to the figurative decorations they frequently feature. Situla art is characteristic of the Halstatt culture in Slovene territory. In the classic and most developed form, represented in famous situla from Vače (a place in the centre of present-day Slovenia), reached the Halstatt culture its highest artistic expression. Defensive weapons also display a characteristic form: breastplates, shields and particularly helmets, which were produced in
varied, clearly chronologically-defined forms; significant amounts of horse tack were received from Thraco-Cimmerian and later Scythian circles.

These briefly described characteristics sketch out the core features of Halstatt culture in Slovene territory, yet if looked at in greater detail, they hide significant differences within their features, particularly regarding the burial method. Halstatt culture in the wider Slovene territory can be divided into six regional groups: Dolenjska (Lower Carniola), Notranjska (Inner Carniola), Štajerska (Styria), Koroška (Carinthia), Istria and the Sveta Lucija (St. Lucia, present-day Most na Soči) group. The Dolenjska group, the most densely settled, is the most visible and most typically representative of the southeast Halstatt culture. The question of the ethnic affiliation of the bearers of Halstatt culture on Slovenian lands is complex and remains largely open. The numerous new forts that appeared at the start of the Halstatt period were planned on a large scale – as seen at Stična in Dolenjska – which indicates a strong influx of a new population that was culturally varied. The Dolenjska Halstatt group was Illyrian, a definition based on a connection with Glasinac and the associated cultural group in the central Balkan region, although the Balkan region was by no means culturally uniform in terms of the settlement of Illyrian tribes, and there were large differences between central and western parts. The west of present-day Slovenia was more closely connected with the latter. The close links with the northern Italian area (Este) means that one can also speak of a Veneti component in the ethnic makeup of the St. Lucija (Most na Soči) group; other Slovene Halstatt groups are ethnically more difficult to identify. Without doubt, the Slovene territory reached the peak of its prehistoric development in the Early Iron Age, when otherwise rare and original features of material and spiritual culture were to be found in the region.

Archaeologically, the Late Iron Age is largely associated with the Celtic culture known as ‘La Tene’, which lasted for the final three centuries BC in Slovene territory and marked the transition from prehistory to the historical period. This period produces the first written sources, literary and epigraphic, to throw significant light on the historical picture, and the first known ‘state’ formation of tribes in the eastern Alpine region. Judging by literary sources, the area was subject to the wide Celtic migration that took place from the fourth century BC, which extended well into the south of the Balkan peninsula, and even into Asia Minor. The best known of the numerous Celtic tribes in the Alpine-Danube region was the Norici. They established the first organised state in the eastern Alpine region in the last third of the second century BC, the Norican kingdom (*Regnum Noricum*), which consisted of a number of tribes including the Taurisci, Latobici and Ambisontes, who inhabited present-day Slovene territory. The question of whether the Norican kingdom was created by a union of
equal tribes under their own princes or kings, whose names appear on coins, or whether the Norici and their king held hegemony over the other tribes in the region remains unanswered. The kingdom’s capital was perhaps a settlement excavated at Magdalensberg near Zollfeld in Carinthia. This was the first acknowledgement, later confirmed on many occasions, of the importance of the central Carinthian space for various politically organised states in the eastern Alpine region – from the Roman province of Noricum to the Slavic principality of Carantania and the Duchy of Carinthia. Celeia (Celje) was another centre of the kingdom of Noricum and in the first century BC home to a mint for silver Noric coins.

The Romans established good economic and political relations with the Celtic tribes of the Norican kingdom very early on. It is likely that Rome offered Noricum the status of public hospitality (hospitium publicum) as early as 170 BC. Noric steel (ferrum Noricum) from the region was highly prized throughout Italy, and was generally controlled by traders from Aquileia. The Romans founded this important trading centre in present-day northeastern Italy in 181 BC, in response to an unsuccessful attempt in 186 BC by one of the Celtic tribes to occupy the territory later known as Friuli, which the Romans considered as falling within their own sphere of interest: this was, approximately, to define Italy’s political border to the east from that time onward.

However, Slovene territory in the Late Iron Age was not completely occupied by Celts. The Taurisci and somewhat later the Latobici had an impact on the former Halstatt cultural centres of Dolenjska, Štajerska and Koroška (the settlement area of the Latobici is particularly well documented in the names of two Roman settlements: Municipium Flavium Latobicorum Neviodunum (Drnovo pri Krškem) and Praetorium Latobicorum (Trebnje) in northeastern Dolenjska), but not those in Notranjska, the Soča river basin, and Bela Krajina. Archaeological material and written sources indicate that these were home to the Japodi and Carni tribes. Excavations at Stična have shown that a large indigenous population of Illyrians remained in Dolenjska.

Roman encroachment into the territory of the Celtic and Illyrian tribes started in the second century BC. Soon after the founding of Aquileia, the Romans expanded their influence to Istria and its inhabitants, the Histri. The First Pannonian War took place in the 150s BC, and the Second Pannonian War in 119 BC. In 129 BC the Taurisci were defeated, in 115 BC the Carni, but in 113 BC the Roman army was defeated in battle near the as-yet-unlocated Noreia by the Germanic tribes, the Cimbri and Teutons, who had invaded the eastern Alpine Noric lands. The main phase of incorporating the eastern Alpine and northwestern Balkan region into the Roman state followed in the final decades BC, when, from 35 to 33 BC, Rome
subjugated the Delmatae, Pannonii and Japodi, extending its border far to the east. The area up to the central Danube region was only fully incorporated into the Roman state after the Pannonian War, between 16 and 9 BC, and after the Pannonian-Delmatae revolt had been put down in 6 to 9 AD, when Istria was incorporated into Italy. The eastern Alpine Norican kingdom, the last major organised Celtic polity in continental Europe, was incorporated into the Empire without war around 10 BC, probably in part due to the friendly relations between Rome and the Norici. Three honorific inscriptions dated to that time have been found at Magdalensberg, in which eight Noric tribes pay homage to the ruling Augustan dynasty. The border of the Roman Empire had now moved from the edge of present-day Italy to the Danube. A similar expansion was to take place in the area eight centuries later, when Charlemagne defeated the Avars to significantly expand the southeastern borders of the Carolingian state.

**SLOVENIA ROMANA**

The Roman conquests that brought the independence of local tribes to an end were soon followed by administrative organisation of the region into provinces, incorporating it into the Roman state and legal order. The west of Slovenia, to Ad Pirum (Hrušica), was already fully considered part of Italy by the Augustine era (Regio X – Venetia et Histria). In around 10 AD, the province of Pannonia was created, the western parts of which reached to modern-day Posavje, along the Sava river. The eastern Alps, from the Danube in the north to the Savinja river basin (Celeia) in the south, was not incorporated into the Empire as a province Noricum until after the reign of Emperor Claudius, in the middle of the first century CE. With the exception of Pannonia, which was divided at the start of the second century, during the reign of Trajan, into westerly Pannonia Superior, and easterly Pannonia Inferior, these provinces remained unchanged until the middle of the second century. At that time, incursions by the Quadi and Marcomanni, which in 166 reached as far as Aquileia, led to the Italian border being moved eastward from Emona (Ljubljana) – to Atrans (Trojane). The last major reorganisation of provinces in the region was carried out by Diocletian at the end of the third century. Noricum was divided by the main Alpine ridge into a northerly part (Noricum Ripense), which covered the area along the Danube, and a southerly part (Noricum Mediterraneum). The latter included the modern-day Slovene region of Štajerska, comprising the areas centred on ancient Celeia (Celje) and Poetovio (Ptuj). Pannonia Superior, which included the southeasterly part of today’s Slovene territory, was divided into the northerly Pannonia Prima and southerly Pannonia Savia, which had its capital in Siscia (Sisak). This
included the modern-day region of Dolenjska.

Urban settlements known as *civitates* formed the internal structure of the provinces. In contrast to later towns founded in the Middle Ages, the surrounding area (*ager*) also came under their jurisdiction. For example, the *ager* of Tergeste included the entire Karst region up to Nanos and Javorniki, while the *ager* of Celeia covered approximately the entire Savinja valley and Kozjansko region, i.e. the area from Trojane to Sotla. Large farming compounds, known as *villae rusticae*, were developed in the hinterlands of such towns. Over 150 have been identified on Slovene territory. In areas where continuity from the Roman period to the Early Middle Ages prevailed, such as Poreč and Pula in the peninsula of Istria, traces of the cadastral division into *agri* have been preserved to the present day. The first Roman city founded on the territory of modern Slovenia was Emona (Ljubljana). It held the rights of a Roman *colonia*, and by 14 or 15 AD had already expanded beyond its city walls. The first colonists of Emona came primarily from cities in the Po valley and from Aquileia, accompanied by some veterans of the XV Legion. Around the middle of the first century CE, five Norican settlements – Aguntum (near Lienz), Iuvavum (Salzburg), Teurnia (near Spittal), Virunum (at Zollfeld) and Celeia – were granted the status of *municipium*, granting their inhabitants additional rights. Exceptional examples of provincial monumental art have been discovered at Šempeter, in a necropolis for the aristocracy and wealthy citizens of nearby Celeia. The same status was extended between 70 and 80 AD to Neviodunum (Drnovo) in Dolenjska region, which in the fourth century became a major river port and horse-changing station. The town of Poetovio developed from a settlement surrounding a legionary camp, and was awarded the rights of a colony by Emperor Trajan at the end of the first century. At the crossroads of the major routes that crossed the territory, and the location of the stone bridge over the Drava river, Poetovio, which developed into medieval Ptuj, was the most important urban settlement in Slovene territory for the first millennium and beyond.

Poetovio was also home to the first organised Christian community, a diocese, in today’s Slovene territory. Towards the end of the third century, during the pre-Constantine period before the granting of religious freedom, the bishop and martyr Victorinus of Poetovio (d. 304) lived here. His ecclesiastical writings make him the first known literary author from any of the Danubian provinces. The ecclesiastical organisation of dioceses reflected the administrative structure of the Roman provinces, with individual towns (*civitates*) being made the sees of bishops. There is evidence of a bishop of Emona from the second half of the fourth century, a bishop of Teurnia is mentioned in the fifth century, while bishops are recorded for Aguntum, Virunum and Celeia in the sixth. Around 530, the bishop of Celeia was Gaudentius,
now known for the exceptional verse of his epitaph at the church of St. Paul near Prebold. In 599, a Christian community with a bishop is mentioned in Koper (Insula Capritana) in Istria, where there were already another five dioceses: Pola, Cissa, Pedena, Parentium and Tergeste. Numerous Christian monuments from Late Antiquity have been preserved in modern-day Slovenia, such as examples of ecclesiastical architecture (churches, baptisteries), Christian inscriptions, liturgical artefacts and everyday objects featuring Christian symbols, testament to the powerful impact of the new faith. It was also in this region, between Ajdovščina and Vipava in the Vipava valley, that Emperor Theodosius, a Christian, defeated his pagan rival Eugenius in the Battle of the Frigidus river in 394. The Christian victory was ascribed to the miraculous occurrence of a fierce tempest. Ancient writers and, following their example, medieval writers recognised the battle as a turning point in world history – the final victory of Christianity over paganism.

The church in Aquileia was the seat of metropolitan authority over the dioceses mentioned above, and probably existed as a diocese from the middle of the third century – in contrast to legends that assert that the first bishop of Aquileia was St. Hermagoras, a disciple of Mark the Evangelist, who was martyred around 70 AD. Aquileia achieved metropolitan status in the middle of the fifth century. The title of patriarch for Aquileian metropolitan bishops is attested from 558/560, while more detailed information on the dioceses included in the metropolitan province dates back only to the late sixth century. For example, according to the bishops’ signatures in an ecclesiastical assembly in Grado, traditionally dated to 579, five dioceses in Istria, nine in Venetia and three in Noricum Mediterraneum came under the jurisdiction of the Aquileian metropolitan, as well as one each in Pannonia Prima and Raetia Secunda. The drastic deterioration in conditions in the fifth and sixth centuries, as barbarian peoples, such as the Goths and Lombards, started to attack and take control of the eastern borders and even the interior of the Empire, saw the Roman state begin to decline (the *Vita Sancti Severini*, written by Eugippius at the beginning of the sixth century is an excellent source addressing this process in the area of Noricum Ripense). Cities and other lowland settlements on the main traffic routes regressed and collapsed, and some researchers suggest that dioceses moved their sees to newly fortified settlements on higher ground, drawing back from the major traffic routes to less accessible locations (refuges). It is so suggested that the bishop of Celeia retreated to the fortified settlement of Ajdovski Gradec, above Vranje. These fortified hilltop settlements are the most common form of settlement from Late Antiquity found on modern-day Slovene territory, and archaeological excavations have uncovered numerous Christian churches, often more than one in a single settlement. Nevertheless, the
migration of the Slavs into the eastern Alps at the end of the sixth century led to the complete collapse of ecclesiastical organisation in the former provinces of Noricum and Pannonia.

Roman colonisation, and the related Romanisation of indigenous populations, who participated in Roman society with varying degrees of involvement and success, was initially related to military settlements and camps. In Emona, for example, the indigenous population were almost completely driven out, while in Celeia, Virunum and Teurnia, even the leading roles were predominantly filled by indigenous inhabitants. At the start of the first century, two Roman legions were stationed in modern-day Slovenia – Legio VIII Augusta, which had its winter camp in Poetovio, and Legio XV Appolinares, which was stationed near modern-day Ljubljana before being transferred to Carnuntum (Petronell) on the Danube, east of Vienna. Poetovio remained a legionary camp throughout the first century. It was there, in 69 AD (by which time the Legio XIII Gemina were at the camp) that Vespasian was declared emperor. The incursions of the Marcomanni and Quadi led to the creation of a camp for Legio II Italicae in Ločica, near Šempeter in the Savinja valley, but the legion was quickly transferred to Lauriacum (Lorch) on the Danube. As early as the third century, a new defence system was starting to appear on the passes of the Karst. Works included blocking valleys and constructing signal towers and fortifications, to protect Italy from the east. The defences stretched from Tarsatica on the Kvarner Gulf in the south to the valley of the Gail river in modern-day Austria to the north. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, the fourth-century officer and historian, it was known as the claustra Alpium Iuliarum. The defences were part of the larger system for Italy that ran from Liguria all the way to the Kvarner Gulf (tractus Italiae circa Alpes); the local operational command was probably located in Castra (Ajdovščina) and Ad Pirum (Hrušica). After the fourth century, the defences were only used occasionally, in individual sections.

The logistical requirements of the army meant that Roman occupation of the region was soon followed by a road system that expressed the geopolitical importance of the wider Slovene space. The starting point for this system was Aquileia; from there, the roads spread throughout the Danube, Drava and Sava river basins. The via Iulia Augusta went north from Aquileia to the Norican Alpine area. One branch of the road led through Aguntum to the upper valley of the Drava river and on towards Raetia, while another followed the Val Canale towards Virunum (at Zollfeld), the old Norican capital, before continuing to Lauriacum (Lorch), the capital of Noricum Ripense. Two roads led south towards Istria from Aquileia: the via Flavia, which passed through Tergeste (Trieste) to Pula, and another that led straight to Tarsatica (Trsat) and onward via Senia (Senj) to the main centre of Pannonia Savia, Siscia.
The main route across Slovene territory, the *via Gemina*, led east from Aquileia towards Ad Pirum, Emona, Celeia and Poetovio, connecting the eastern Po valley and Italian Adriatic to the central Danube river basin. From Poetovio, home to the main customs treasury for all Illyricum (*publicum portorium Illyrici*), one branch of the road led to northern Pannonia and Carnuntum on the Danube, while another led towards the capital of Pannonia Secunda, Sirmium (Sremska Mitrovica). There was a further road leading from Emona via Neviodunum and Siscia along the Sava to Sirmium, with a road branching north to Virunum somewhere between Emona and Celeia.

The barbarians heading into Italy in the fifth and sixth centuries also travelled along the main Emona-Aquileia road, finding plunder or a new home along its course. At the end of the fourth century, the Roman defence system along the Danube collapsed and the Visigoths, who had settled on lands within the Empire after their victory over Emperor Valens in the Battle of Adrianople in 378, were followed by other tribes such as the Huns, Suebi, Ostrogoths and Lombards, who steadily built up pressure on the northerly and easterly flanks. In 379 these events had already spilled over onto present-day Slovene territory, when the Visigoths sacked Poetovio and Stridon, the birthplace of St. Jerome, which lay somewhere along the border between Pannonia and Dalmatia (perhaps even in the Kvarner Gulf area). The Visigoths were also the first barbarian people to sack Rome; they broke into Italy in 409/410, along the route that Attila would follow in 452, when the Huns sacked and burned Aquileia, as well as towns and fortresses in present day Slovenia. At the end of the 480s, Theoderic the Great reached an agreement with the emperor in Constantinople to act as allies (*foederati*) of the Eastern Roman Empire, enabling him to lead the Ostrogoths into Italy. In the Battle of the Isonzo (the Soča river), in 489, Theoderic defeated Odoacer, who had deposed the last Western Roman emperor in 476. By 493, Theoderic had conquered Italy, which the Romanised Ostrogoths would rule for another half century. By 536, Noricum, Pannonia and Dalmatia all came within the Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy. Theoderic’s administrator for Noricum Mediterraneum was, in all probability that Ursus *v(ir)* *s(pectabils)*, who donated a notable mosaic with Christian symbolism in the ‘funeral’ church of the newer Norican capital of Tauria.

The Langobardi or Lombards entered Italy almost exactly 80 years after the Visigoths. They arrived just after Easter in 568, the last time that a wave of soldiers would migrate from a Pannonian homeland, taking their wives and children, equipment and animals on carts, on horses and on foot. The Lombards arrived in the present-day Lower Austria, south of the Danube, at the start of the sixth century. In 547/48, Emperor Justinian I made a treaty with
them, conceding “the Norican city and the Pannonian fortresses”, i.e. the former Gothic Pannonia and the part of Noricum south of the Drava, over which the Roman (Byzantine) emperor still had power. With the exception of the “Norican city” – which some historians understand as the urban area of Poetovio, others as Celeia – Noricum had then been ruled for over a decade by the Franks, who had also taken Venetia around 545. Lombard settlement then spread to upper Sava valley, as testified by a graveyard discovered in Kranj, where the older graves are Ostrogothic and the newer Lombard. The treaty of 547/48 had made the Lombards imperial fœderati, and their advance into the area south of the Danube was initially aimed against the Franks. In 567 King Alboin – who would later lead his people into Italy – and his Lombards destroyed the Gepids, who then ruled over Sirmium, largely because he had allied himself with the Avars, who had recently moved into the lower Danube area. Yet these new allies and neighbours would soon also represent a new enemy for the Lombards. The following year, the Lombards left Pannonia to the Avars, perhaps even by treaty. Soon, Slavic people joined the Avars in migrating to Pannonia. The migration of Lombards from Pannonia to Italy, which may have been encouraged by the embittered Byzantine general Narses, had two long-term consequences: first, the political unity of Italy came to an end for many centuries, and second, the Avars’ hegemony finally separated Pannonia, including most Slovene territory, from the Roman ecumene.

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SLAVS

The settlement of Slavic people – one cannot speak of Slovenes until well after the Early Middle Ages – in the eastern Alps and the basins of the eastern Alpine rivers culminated in the final decades of the sixth century, although the process had started before that and would only end at the beginning of the ninth century. As indicated by some Slovene dialectal reflexes, preserved to this day in the Gailtal dialect in Carinthia, and place and river names in present-day Austria south of the Danube, the first Slavic thrust into the eastern Alpine space came from the north, from the area of the western Slavic language group. The first wave seems to have turned south around 550, leaving present-day Moravia and crossing the Danube between Traun to the west and Vienna to the east, encompassing first the territory of Upper and Lower Austria, then gradually spreading into the interior along the Alpine river valleys up to the Karavanke mountain range, and then along the Drava river to the southeast. It seems that the diocese in Poetovio (Ptuj) collapsed before 577, during the waves of Slavic migration. A second wave of Slavic migration to the eastern Alps from the southeast came somewhat later and was very closely linked to the Avars. This nomadic people from the Steppes had
taken control of the Pannonian Plain after the Lombards moved into Italy in 568, and had then attacked the Byzantine state across the Danube and Sava rivers. In 582 they captured Sirmium, the former capital of Illyricum, and also started to move towards the northwest, accompanied by Slavs. The Slavic-Avar advance led to the collapse of ancient structures, including the ecclesiastical organisation. Based on the synodal records from the metropolitan church of Aquileia, which describe the fall of the ancient dioceses in this area (Emona, Celeia, Poetovio, Aguntum, Teurnia, Virunum, and Scarabantia), it may be possible to trace the stages of the Slavic-Avar advance into the eastern Alps. By 588, the upper Sava valley had fallen into their hands, and by 591 they had taken the upper Drava valley, where in the following years, skirmishes with northern neighbours, the Bavarians, began around present-day Lienz. In 592, the Bavarians were successful, but then, in 595, they were heavily defeated in a battle decided by the Avar leader (khagan) with his cavalry. These battles, which flared up once more around 626, led to the development and consolidation of a border area that divided the eastern Alpine area for centuries: a Frank-dominated western half separated from an Avar and Slavic east and southeast.

To the south, along the Soča (Isonzo) river and in Istria, which then reached to the Nanos massif and to Snežnik mountain, the border was established somewhat later. Following battles with the Friulian Lombards at the start of the eight century, the Slavs occupied the hilly land to the west of the Soča, up to the edge of the Friulian plain. This ethnic boundary has lasted, with minor changes, for over 1,200 years, up until the present day. The advancing Slavs moved into Istria from the northeast, via the Postojna Gate. First, until around 600, they settled the lands up to the peninsula’s natural threshold to the south of the Trieste-Rijeka road, where the Karst plain falls sharply down to the hinterland of Trieste and Buzet. At the end of the eighth century, for reasons of recruitment and economic need, the local Frankish authority organised the resettlement of Slavs from the continental part of Istria into the unpopulated urban territories in the peninsula’s interior, to counter the influx of armed Avar groups. It is not possible to reliably determine the number of Slavs that settled in the eastern Alpine and pre-Alpine areas. A population figure of 20,000 for the area of modern-day Slovenia, which covers 20,000 km² – acquired by taking the oldest statistical source for Slovene territory, the first urbarial record for the Freising Škofja Loka seigneury from 1160 and working backwards and generalising for the whole area – seems small but acceptable. It should be pointed out that the population density was certainly higher in some areas, such as the Klagenfurt Basin in Carinthia and around Kranj in Carniola, but settlement of an area that was far more forested than today would have been very uneven.
By the time the Slavs had settled the former provinces of Noricum and Pannonia, Roman citizenship had already disappeared from the area. It did survive for considerable time, despite the major upheavals of the fifth century, as long as the area was still administered as part of Italy. This era came to an end in western Noricum (where the death in 532 of the deacon Nonnosus, who had worked around Teurnia, was still dated by reference to the Roman consuls), with the Frankish occupation of 536/537. The eastern Norican and western Pannonian areas, which in 548 were ceded to the Lombards by the eastern Roman Emperor Justinian, were separated from the Roman ecumene by the Lombard migration to Italy in 568, and the establishment of the new Avar dominion in the central Danube area. This does not mean that the new arrivals did not assume the heritage of antiquity, at least in part. Older conceptions of the indigenous population completely abandoning the region or being forced out by the Slavs have long since been superseded. Numerous place names relating to the name *Vlah*, which the Slavs gave to the ‘Romans’ (e.g. Laško), as well as some fortified hilltop settlements – a typical form of settlement in this area in Late Antiquity – such as Rifnik, south of Šentjur by Celje, which were settled continuously until the seventh century, indicate the contact and cohabitation of the indigenous inhabitants with the Slavs. The Slavs also assumed numerous ancient place and river names, as well as some components of their everyday economic life, particularly Alpine dairy-farming. The further west one travels, towards Friuli and Italy, the more traces one finds of such contact. Even though the area newly settled by the Slavs had been cultivated since antiquity, there were many changes in its structure at this time. The most evident was the collapse of ancient urban centres. The province, which had previously been centred on its towns, now became completely rural in character. In the early medieval period, illiteracy replaced the ancient literacy of the area. The codified legal order and the state it supported was replaced by new legal forms. A different social structure grew up alongside a new form of arable farming. The ecclesiastical organisation of dioceses collapsed completely, but the Christian cult did not, with the indigenous ‘Roman’ population managing to preserve it, at least in some locations, such as Spittal an der Drau in Carinthia. There, the diocesan church of Teurnia was destroyed around 600, but the preservation of the gravestone of Deacon Nonnosus from 532 mentioned above in a monastical church from the end of the eighth century in Molzbichl indicates the continuity of the cult well beyond the initial period of Slavic settlement. The Carantanian mission of the eighth century would later explicitly associate itself with this core of local Christian tradition.
NEW IDENTITIES

By the end of the sixth century, today’s eastern Tyrol and Carinthia were already known as the ‘land of the Slavs’ (*Sclaborum provincia*), while the presence of an Avar khagan indicates that this mountainous Alpine world was included in the Avar dominions, the centre of which lay between the Danube and the Tisza river in Pannonia. The Avars first appeared in Europe around 560, on the borders of the Byzantine state along the lower Danube. In 567, they joined forces with the Lombards to destroy the Gepids. The subsequent Avar settlement of Pannonia, (from where the Lombards migrated into Italy in 568) reached its peak in 582 with the capture of the ancient capital of Illyricum, Sirmium. In a wider sense, the Avar name included everybody living under the authority of the khagan. The Avar name was used for a supra-regional political community that was rather unstable and subject to continual changes, which was characteristic of all the nomadic horse people from the Eurasian Steppes. The Avars formed a polyethnic alliance, which was always open to incoming groups, and in addition to the other peoples (*gentes*) of the Pannonian basin, the alliance also encompassed Gepids, Bulgars, Kutrigurs, and above all, Slavs. The Slavs settled across a large area of the Avar political entity, stretching from the Sudetes in the north to the lower Danube to the south. They were subordinate to their Avar masters, paying tribute and providing military service. Yet the attitudes and relations of the horse-bound Avar warriors to the various Slavic groups differed according to the time and geographical circumstances. Avar supremacy over the Slavs at the heart of the khaganate based around the lower Danube and Tisza river in Pannonia was undoubtedly more keenly felt than on the periphery, in the hilly and heavily forested eastern Alpine and northwest Balkan areas, which were less suitable for the life of nomadic horse people. In Slovene historiography, one finds the relationship described thus: “Nothing justifies the thinking that Carantanians all had their own Avar master. Months could pass without seeing an Avar-nomad, and in more remote places perhaps even a year. Yet if a band stopped in their village, the situation was completely lawless, as described so movingly by Fredegar and Nestor, and as even the mighty Goths experienced under the Huns.” Traces of the Avar presence in Carantania may be preserved in the place names of Faning and Fohnsdorf (Slovene: Baniče and Banja Vas) deriving from the word *ban* (from the Avar *bajan*). The Avar rule described above lasted until the mid-620s, when two not entirely unconnected events – the start of Slavic resistance to Avar supremacy under Samo in 623 and the failed Avar siege of Constantinople in 626 – ushered in major changes in the region.

Before 626, barbarian peoples had already reached the walls of the great city on the
Bosphorus, but the Avars’ was the first genuine attempt to conquer Constantinople, in alliance with the Persians and with their subjugate Slavic warriors. The failure of this siege proved a disaster for the Danubian khaganate, almost precipitating its complete collapse. The defeated Avars, torn by internal disputes because of the greatly weakened khagan, effectively fell out of sight for several decades for Byzantine writers, who were becoming more concerned with decisive clashes with the Persians and soon after that with Arabs.

The catastrophe of 626 also gave considerable succour to the position of Slavs who joined the uprisings under Samo. According to the Fredegar Chronicle, which does not seem entirely reliable in terms of chronology, Samo joined the Slav revolt in the territory of today’s Czech Republic and Slovakia in 623, which would mean that the breakaway of the Avar khaganate’s western flank began before the great crisis of 626. Samo, a Frank by birth and probably a weapons trader, exploited the opportunity to take the fight to the Avars and become ruler (king, until his death in 658) of a central European union, the first Slavic polity known to history. Its centre was north of the Danube, but it included the area of the Eastern Alps later known as Carantania. In 630, the Frankish king, Dagobert I, organised an unsuccessful attempt to destroy Samo’s realm, uniting Frankish and Alamannian warriors with Lombards, who could only have acted against their Alpine Slav neighbours. Around 623 to 626, the Friulian Lombards had already wrested control of “the district of the Slavs, called Zellia” in Val Canale. This was the first time that Slavic lands were brought into dependence on Friuli, and the Slavs there were to pay tribute to the Lombard duke in Cividale del Friuli until around 740. Probably not without reason, the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum (The Conversion of the Bavarians and Carantanians) – a text dating back to 870 in Salzburg and the most important historical source for the eastern-Alpine and Pannonian region in the eight and ninth centuries – also links Samo with the very earliest Carantanian history.

At that time, the Alpine Slavs, called also Vinedi, who were part of Samo’s political union, also had their own prince known as Vallucus, who ruled the border area known as the ‘March of the Wends’ (Marca Vinedorum). This name, attributed by a contemporary Frankish chronicler, bears indirect witness to the fact that the Slavic eastern Alpine area between the Bavarians and Lombards was the border region of something greater, i.e. Samo’s political community. Prince Vallucus and his Slavs were joined around 631/632 by a group of Bulgars led by Alzeco (Alciocus). He was one of a group of Bulgar pretenders who had wanted to exploit the crisis in the Avar khaganate that followed the catastrophe of 626 by taking control. However, the group suffered a defeat and fled from Pannonia with 9,000 men, together with women and children, to the Bavarians who, after an initial welcome, murdered several
A thousand of them on the orders of the Frankish king Dagobert I – an early Bavarian precursor of the Saint Bartholomew massacre. Only Alzeco’s group escaped, and fleeing once more were received by Vallucus. Alzeco’s Bulgars remained with the Alpine Slavs for around thirty years, a generation, in the nascent Carantania, before migrating after 662 to Benevento, in Lombard Italy.

After Samo’s death in 658 the Avars renewed their supremacy of most of Slavic central Europe, but not over the Carantanian Slavs, who as the Alzeco episode indicates, were independent of all their neighbours: the Bavarians and Franks; and the Lombards and Avars. Only eight decades later, in around 740, did Avar pressure grow so much that the Carantanians, under their prince, Borut, were forced to recognise Bavarian overlordship in return for their aid against their eastern neighbours.

The Avars also restated their supremacy south of the Karavanke mountains after the middle of the seventh century – if indeed it had ever been broken – and the khaganate once more stretched to the borders of Friuli in Italy. Around 664, at the behest of the Lombard king Grimoald, the Avars attacked Friuli and defeated and killed the usurping duke of Friuli, Lupus, probably near Ajdovščina, at the Hubelj river (*fluvius Frigidus*) in the Vipava valley, approximately where Emperor Theodosius (a Christian) had defeated Eugenius, his pagan rival, in 394. Paul the Deacon, a Lombard by birth from Cividale, who wrote of these events at the end of the eighth century, also reports that Arnefrit, son of the defeated usurper, fled in fear of Grimoald “to the tribe of Slavs in Carnuntum, which is erroneously called Carantanum” (*ad Sclavorum gentem in Carnuntum, quod corrupte vocitant Carantanum*).

Although the term Carantanum does not belong to the time that Paul was describing, but to the end of the eighth century, when he wrote his History of the Lombards, this is the oldest undisputed reference to the name. The educated Friulian historian – like many writers of the time – maintained ethnographical traditions and described new facts in ancient terms. He therefore explains Carantanum as a popular, erroneous, rendering of the ancient name Carnuntum, (an ancient fortress east of Vienna on the Danube, known today as Petronell), which actually had no connection with Carantania. Paul’s report clearly shows that the Carantanians’ tribal name – probably first mentioned by an anonymous cosmographer from Ravenna as Carontani – was derived from the local or regional name for the area in which they lived. The name was originally connected with the area around Zollfeld (Carentana) and Ulrichsberg (Mons Carentanus), where the civitas Carantana (Karnburg) and ecclesia sanctae Mariae ed Carantanam (Maria Saal) stood. The name came to refer to the entire area ruled by the prince from Karnburg. The name is not only pre-Slavic, but also of pre-Roman origin;
etymologically the name Carantanians probably means ‘people from Caranta’. The root Kar-
is typical of the wider Alpine-Adriatic area, and is also found in names such as Carnia and its
derivative Carniola, as well as the name Karst.

CARANTANIA

The basic unit of political, social and legal life, as conceived in the Early Middle Ages,
was the tribe, also referred to as ‘people’ (gens, rod’, ethnos). A tribe was by no means a
simple structure, but in fact a very complex formation. Over the past decades, extensive and
detailed research into Germanic, Slavic and steppe-nomadic ethnogenesis clearly indicates
that the peoples of the Early Middle Ages were not communities of shared origin, but
polyethnic communities identified not by the same blood, but by shared “nuclei of tradition”
and customs that these heterogeneous groups participated in, and recognised as their own.

The tribe of the Carantanians was a polyethnic unit too. Without doubt they were a
Slavic tribe – which means that their nucleus of tradition within this polyethnic union was
defined as Slavic. The contemporaries of the Carantanians also saw them as Slavs; for
example, the unknown author of the Conversio wrote of “Slavs, called Carantanians” (Sclavi
qui dicuntur Quarantani), who comprised two Slavic groups which, at the end of the sixth
century, migrated to the eastern Alps from the north and south, as well as Croats and Dulebs
and indigenous ‘Romans’, evidence for which is found in numerous place names. Nor should
the possibility be rejected that there were also small numbers of Avars, Bulgars and Germanic
people among them.

The principality of the Carantanians was the oldest early medieval tribal polity formed
in the eastern Alpine region. However, the Carantanians cannot simply be equated with the
Slavs who settled in the eastern Alps at the end of the sixth century. At that time, today’s east
Tyrol and Carinthia were generally referred to as ‘Sclaborum Provincia’, the land of the
Slavs. In the second quarter of the seventh century, the ‘Marca Vinedorum’, the March of the
Wends or Slavs, under its prince, Vallucus, represented a more developed level of political
organisation. A clearer indication of a specific ethnic identity and political organisation is
given by the geographical term that Paul the Deacon used in 664, Carantanum, where a
specific Slavic tribe lived (gens Sclavorum). In any case, the Carantanian ethnogenesis came
to an end before the middle of the eighth century, and probably around 700; in approximately
740, the Carantanians passed into history in dramatic circumstances with decisive impact on
the future.

At that time their prince was Borut and the Carantanians were seriously threatened by
the Avars, and were in need of assistance. Turning to the Lombards in Friuli was not a genuine option as the Slavs in Val Canale, where Friulian and Carantanian territory met, had recently ended over a century of paying a tribute to Ratchis, the duke of Friuli. Just before that, perhaps due to a perceived threat from the Slavs, the bishop of the exposed town of Iulium Carnicum (Zuglio in Carnia) had withdrawn to Cividale. Another indication of this general deterioration in Lombard-Slavic relations was the military incursion of Ratchis, between 737 and 744, into the “Slavic homeland of Carniola” (Carniola Patria Sclavorum), which then was within the Avar khaganate. Finding himself in a difficult position, Borut turned to the Bavarians and their duke, Odilo, for aid. The Slavs’ position was weakened by only a decade having passed since (in around 730) the Carantanians, described as “wild pagans”, had destroyed Maximilian’s monastic cell in Bavarian Bischofshofen, in the Salzach river valley. Nevertheless, the Bavarians responded to the call and, together with the Carantanians, defeated the Avars, though at the price of forcing the Carantanians to submit to the lordship of (Frankish) kings. Carantanian loyalty was guaranteed by hostages, including Borut’s son Cacatius (Gorazd) and his nephew Hotimir, who were taken to Bavaria and raised in the Christian faith. These fateful events took place before 743, as by then Carantanian warriors were already marching in the Bavarian army against the Franks.

In 749, after the death of Borut, the Bavarians acquiesced, having sought Frankish permission, to Carantanian requests for Gorazd to be sent home and made their prince. But three years later Gorazd died and was succeeded by his cousin, Hotimir. He was accompanied to Carantania by the first Salzburg priest to come to the territory, who was particularly close to Hotimir by virtue of being the nephew of Hotimir’s godfather. Pope Zachary had already confirmed Carantania’s ecclesiastical subordination to Salzburg, and its related right to missions, during the time of Prince Borut, and perhaps even before 743. Yet the mission only really began during Prince Hotimir’s time, and as with previous events, the mission to Christianise the Carantanians was inextricably linked to the political situation. Close cooperation between a prince and the people close to him responsible for the mission was essential for success. Hotimir committed himself to participating at a mass in Salzburg every year “and there he accepted the doctrine and Christian duty.” The bishop of Salzburg at that time was the erudite Irishman Virgilius (746/47 or 749 to 784). Hotimir turned to him personally, requesting that he come on a missionary to Carantania, but, instead, he sent the regional bishop, Modestus, as his envoy (episcopus missus). A large number of churches were consecrated in Carantania during the Salzburg mission, which lasted towards the end of the eighth century, although only three churches consecrated by Modestus can be specifically
named. All three were linked to established centres and the traditions of ancient Noricum. The church dedicated to Mary at Maria Saal was near the ancient capital of Noricum, Virunum, and, together with the castle Karnburg standing opposite it, was the political and religious centre of the Carantanians. Popular tradition states that Modestus’ grave lies here. Another church lay in the *ager* of the more recent Norican capital, Teurnia, near Spittal an der Drau, perhaps in Molzbichl or its surroundings. The third church, *ad Undrimas*, was consecrated near the upper Mura river, in the surroundings of Judenburg, where a Roman continuity is also attested. Modestus remained in Carantania until his death in 763. Yet his death unleashed the first reaction from Carantanians opposed to the Christian faith and the prince so closely associated with it. This may also have been a response to the contemporaneous revolt and rejection of fealty by the young duke of Bavaria, Tassilo III, against the Frankish king, Pippin. In 765, the revolt rose once more, but again Hotimir quickly crushed it. His death in 769, which may have been connected to a change in the princely dynasty, led to the third and most violent revolt, and for many years to come there were no longer any priests in Carantania. It was only by the direct military intervention of the Bavarian Duke Tassilo III, in 772, that the Carantanian rebels were crushed and the previous order restored. This was an event with repercussions far beyond the local region, and contemporaries compared Tassilo’s victory to Charlemagne’s destruction of the *Irminsul*, the Saxon sanctuary.

However, Tassilo had initially intended to resolve matters peacefully. To that end, in 769, he established a monastery in Innichen at the source of the Drava, on the border with Carantania. The monastery had the expressly missionary purpose, “that the faithless Slavs be brought to the path of truth.” Co-operation in the Christianisation of the Carantanians has sometimes erroneously been attributed to a monastery in Kremsmünster, between Traun and Enns in today’s Upper Austria, which was founded in 777 by Tassilo III, and the founding charter of which includes the first written mention of the Slavic term *jopan* (*župan*). However, the recent archaeological discovery of the oldest Carinthian monastery at Molzbichl, near Spittal, needs to be ranked alongside Innichen, where there are good grounds for dating its founding to the time after Tassilo’s victory over the Carantanians in 772. The extremely rare dedication to St. Tiburtius, shared with a monastery in Pfaffmünster (near Straubing in the Bavarian diocese of Regensburg) where a group of Irish monks operated, probably also indicates the identity of the monks who came to Carantania. An Irish name Dublittir (Dupliterus) also had a priest operating as a missionary in Carantania around 775, without even giving particular emphasis to the Irish origin of Virgilius (Fergil), the bishop of Salzburg. The personal names of missionaries reported in the *Conversio Bagoariorum et
Carantanorum, a source that, despite its pro-Salzburg bias, offers us priceless information from earliest Carantanian history, also reveal the important role played in the Carantanian mission by ‘Romans’ from the Salzburg area.

The victory by Tassilo III in 772 brought the longstanding political crisis in Carantania to an end. Carantania’s new prince was Valtunc, now even more closely linked to Bavaria, and was probably chosen in a similar manner to Borut’s successors. The links with Salzburg were re-established, and by the time of Virgilius’ death, in 784, six groups of missionaries had come to Carantania. Virgilius’ successor, Arno, initially continued the same policy. One of the missionaries to Carantania at that time was a priest called Ingo, who for a long time was taken to be a legendary prince of Carantania. Another figure increasingly seen as having been a historical person is Domicianus who, according to legends that arose around the start of the fourteenth century, was the Carantanian prince who converted his people to Christianity and founded a church in Millstatt. Arno’s policy changed after his elevation to archbishop in 798, and in 799, together with Gerold, prefect and brother-in-law of Charlemagne and the most powerful man in Bavaria, he appointed a regional bishop, Theoderic, to hold office in “Sclavinia”. This restored the institution of regional bishop to Carantania, to which Virgilius had appointed Modestus, and which was maintained until the mid-tenth century, with an interruption in the third quarter of the ninth century. The institution also served as a model to Gebhard, the archbishop of Salzburg, in the founding of the first Carinthian diocese, in Gurk, in 1072.

Salzburg’s role in the Christianisation of the Carantanians was decisive, but not unique. The pro-Salzburg source, the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum suppressed the role of other ecclesiastical centres, such as Aquileia, Regensburg and Freising, in this undertaking. Freising in particular was closely linked to Carantania in the eighth and ninth centuries. The Freising mission, which was characterised by an expansion down the Drava river into Upper Carinthia, where the diocese already had an estate near the former city of Teurnia in the ninth century, took Innichen as its starting point. As early as 822, a Carantanian Bavarian by the name of Matheri bequeathed his lands between Trixen and Griffen to the monastery in Innichen. The first mention of the Freising church of Sts. Primus and Felician at Maria Wörth, near the lake of Wörthersee, dates from the ninth century. And finally, the most convincing arguments suggest that Freising’s upper Carinthian properties were also the place where, around the turn of the millennium, three short but truly invaluable religious texts were written, the texts now known as the Freising Manuscripts (Slov. Brižinski spomeniki).

The missionaries undoubtedly propagated the new faith in the vernacular, so a Slavic
Christian terminology began to develop among the Carantanians, the first Slavic people to be Christianised from the west. This also led to the development of a ‘cultural language’, which was of global and inter-tribal character because of the widespread missionary work. A trace of the cultural traditions from the very earliest Christianity among Slovenes was preserved in a number of religious formulas that were transmitted orally from generation to generation and only written down in the late Middle Ages. The Lord’s Prayer formula recorded in the second half of the fourteenth century in the Rateče manuscript (also known as the Klagenfurt manuscript), and in the Stara Gora manuscript at the end of the fifteenth century, therefore goes back to the very earliest period of the mission, perhaps as early as the end of the eighth century, and certainly to the ninth century. The prayer *adveniat regnum tuum* (your kingdom come), which is written in both the medieval manuscripts in the form *pridi bogastvo tvoje* (literally: your riches come) could only have been formulated before the language of the Alpine Slavs included the word *kraljestvo* (kingdom). The word *kralj*, meaning king, is derived from the personal name of Charlemagne (Carolus, Karl, Karel).

Without doubt, the Freising Manuscripts are the most important evidence of the Slavic mission. These are three preserved Slavic texts (referred to below as FM I, FM II, FMS III) written in Carolingian minuscule in a single Latin codex, and today kept in Munich. They are the oldest Slavic texts in the Latin alphabet and were a component part of a pontificale, the liturgical book used by a bishop at mass. FM I was probably written over the period 972–1022/39, while FMS II and FM III, which were produced by a different hand, have been dated to after 977, in the time of Bishop Abraham (died 994), who acquired estates for the Freising church in Carinthia and the large Škofja Loka seigneury in Carniola. The place in which the manuscripts were written has not been identified, but the main candidates are upper Carinthia and Freising itself. Modern linguists sometime refer to the language of the manuscripts as Old Slovene, while contemporary writers referred only to the Slavic language (*lingua Sclavanisca*). In terms of content, FM I and FM III are general confessional formulas, while FM II is a rhetorically complex sermon on sin and a call to repentance and confession. The form of the manuscripts known today is the product of dictation or copying, while the originals of the texts go back at least to the middle of the ninth century. However, the various theories or hypotheses on the origin and sources of these manuscripts differ significantly. This is primarily because there exist similar texts in the Old Church Slavonic tradition of Constantine and Methodius, and because they also link the Friesing texts to older Old High German Bavarian confessional formulas. The perception exists that at times in the history of these Slavic texts, the national origin of researchers has been projected onto the documents in
deciding between Carantanian-Pannonian, Pannonian-Moravian, Moravian-Slovakian or Croatian territory as the probable place of origin. Although it cannot be explicitly proven, there are good reasons for assuming that the texts grew out of the Carantanian mission and the Christian tradition of the region, which Slavic immigrants also took with them to the Pannonian realm of Kocel. Like Carantania, this also fell under Salzburg’s ecclesiastical sway, and the brother saints Constantine and Methodius also worked there for some time. However, regardless of all the hypotheses about the texts, the indisputable fact remains that the preserved version was only used among the predecessor of Slovenes, and represent their learned culture at the turn of the millennium.

One cannot conceive of the ethnic identities expressed in the name of a tribe existing without some constitutional forms and legal norms, however rudimentary those may have been. As with other early medieval tribes, Slavs lived according to their own tribal law. In contrast to the written and codified laws of their western, Germanic neighbours, the law of Slavic tribes were retained unwritten in the form of customs. ‘Tribal rites’ (*ritus gentis*), ‘laws and customs’ (*leges et consuetudines*) or ‘Slavic rites’ are terms from ninth-century sources for the law under which the Slavic ethnic principalities lived. With a few exceptions, evidence of this tribal law has not survived to the present day. Political changes related to Frankish expansion led more and more to the exercising of new legal norms, in additional to tribal law. The middle of the eighth century saw a great change in the life of the Carantanians, with the arrival under Frankish overlordship and the start of the mission, which undoubtedly led to reorganisation of the tribe. The administrative reform that covered the southeast of the Frankish sphere of influence in the third decade of the ninth century was to have even more profound consequences. At that point, tribal rule was replaced by the administration of a count. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the eleventh century, in the notice marking the founding of the convent St. Georgen am Längsee in Carinthia, there is still a distinction made between witnesses dealt with according to Bavarian tribal law, who were symbolically “pulled by their ears” (*testes tracti per auers*), and witnesses subject to Slavic tribal law (*Sclauenicę institutionis teste*). The Slavic tribal law mentioned here is a relic of the former tribal constitution of Carantania.

By the very beginning of the eighth century at the latest, Carantanian society was organised under the lordship of a prince. In terms of their position, tribal prince of this kind, which Frankish sources generally refer to as *dux gentis*, was king (*rex gentis*). This is supported by the Slavic word *knjaz* (knez in Slovene), which refers to a Slavic tribal prince of the Early Middle Ages, and which derives from the Germanic *kuningaz*, meaning a tribal
king who ruled over a “small area”. Eight princes of the Carantanians from the second half of the eighth century and first third of the ninth century are known to us by name. At that time, Carantania was already subject to the Franks or Bavarians as a tributary or client principality, one of many that lined the eastern Frankish border. Internally, the principality retained its tribal constitution, one of the clearest examples of which was the oldest part of the installation ceremony of the prince of Carantania. It was the Carantanians (or the class responsible for political decisions, *populi*) themselves, albeit with the permission of their Frankish king, who made Gorazd and then Hotimir their prince. The first three Carantanian princes known by name were related, and princely authority was therefore, with respect to the (at least formal) elections, hereditary within a ruling dynasty. The Carantanian prince was installed in all his dignity with a ceremony that involved him being placed on the Prince’s Stone, which once stood in the military camp at Karnburg. The Prince’s Stone – actually the base of an ionic column turned upside down – is today displayed in the Klagenfurt, and is the oldest preserved symbol of power in the entire eastern Alpine region. It was therefore at a very early stage (the mid-eighth century) that the Carantanians established a constitutional model, combining their tribal customs with the authority of the Frankish king, which would become widespread in the ninth century among Slavic tribes along the eastern and southern Frankish border.

In addition to the prince and his dynasty, there was another high-ranking social class, the nobility. Informations dating from a somewhat later period, in sources from Salzburg, Freising and Brixen, are particularly informative and specific about the Carantanian and wider Alpine Slavic area. These sources indicate the existence of Slavic nobility before the end of the eighth century, and provide significant evidence of its survival into the Frankish period. For example, in 830, a certain Baaz from Slavic Carantania (*de genere Carontania Sclavaniorum*) bequeathed properties he had held in Bavaria to the church of Freising. There are many reasons to support the idea that Baaz was the descendant of one of the ‘noble’ hostages who had accompanied the son and nephew of the Carantania prince to Bavaria in 743. This and other similar examples – e.g. the marriage around 860 of a Carantania Slav with the Greek name Georgius, which was probably acquired at baptism, into the noble line of Witigowo, a count in Carantania – indicate that groups existed within the Slavic community that were considered by neighbouring nobility to be of sufficient standing for acceptance into their ranks and even their families. To apply a modern term, one could say that even in the Early Middle Ages, the nobility, and particularly the high nobility, were international, just as in later times.

A specific, very sensitive, and as yet unresolved, issue within the social history of the
Alpine Slavs is presented by the group known as kosezi. The group was a specifically Alpine Slav feature, as the places in which they lived, or the settlements with names relating to them, are found between the upper Enns river to the north and the Kolpa river to the south, i.e. within the area of Alpine Slavic colonisation. They appear relatively late in written sources, with the oldest mention (Koséntzes) dating from the mid-tenth century. According to Croat tradition, recorded in De Administrando Imperio, the work of the Byzantine Emperor Constantinus Porphyrogenetus, Koséntzes was the name of one of the brothers who led the Croats to the hinterland of the Dalmatian cities. The Germans called this social class Edlinger (noble people), while Aquileian writers, connecting themselves to the Lombard tradition in Friuli, referred to them with the term arimanni, which the Lombards used to describe a special military class. Both terms indicate that it was some form of privileged social group. However, the evidence available that can be followed in sources from the Central Middle Ages onwards suggests that the group’s social status continually declined. In documents from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the kosezi are still equal to the ministerial class, but by the Late Middle Ages they were merely peasants with some special privileges. The peasant charged with installing the duke of Carinthia in the Late Middle Ages, was a kosez. At the same time, there is no doubt that the kosezi class goes back to the Early Middle Ages. The origin of the kosezi name – on which there are many theories – is not Slavic, despite their being an Alpine Slav phenomenon. It is not possible to determine whether it was just the name that was imported into the eastern Alpine area, or also the group that bore it. The name precludes a Germanic etymology, nor can kosez be a new formation derived from Edlinger. The kosezi therefore already existed when the Bavarians took them to be nobles, during their first contacts with the Alpine Slavs. Furthermore, the ceremony in which a kosez peasant on the Prince’s Throne symbolically handed over power in the Duchy of Carinthia to a new duke dressed in peasant clothing – therefore symbolically the same as him – could only have its origin in pre-feudal times. The direct contact between the kosezi and the Carantanian prince or/and later Carinthian duke, and their connection with military services, makes the theory that they were a form of military retinue for the Carantanian prince very attractive, and quite acceptable. Of course, many other possible explanations exist.

CARNIOLA

The polyethnic, but predominantly Slavic, principality of the Carantanians was not the only tribal union to form in the Early Middle Ages within the Slavic settled area in the eastern
Alps. Its borders very approximately reached the border of the province of Noricum Mediterraneum from Late Antiquity. This means that almost all the Slavic-settled area of modern Slovenia – with the exception of the Slovene Drava valley, the most open route to the principality, which in all probability fell at least partially within the Carantanian sphere – remained outside the borders of Carantania. This was particularly the case for the Sava valley, which was separated from the Carantanians by the Karavanke mountains. Only during the time of the Ottonian dynasty, in the second half of the tenth century, when one can no longer talk of Carantania but rather of Carinthia as a duchy within a German state, was the geographical barrier overcome politically when the Carniolan margrave became subject to the authority of the Bavarian or Carinthian duke.

The Slovene Sava valley as an area was known in the Early Middle Ages by the name Carniola. The name, derived from the territorial name Carnia, means nothing more than Little Carnia. The ancient homeland of the Carnians, patria Carnium, lay on the other side of the continental watershed, in the mountainous world north of the Friulian plain. It is no coincidence, then, that a Friulian Lombard, Paul the Deacon (writing at the end of the eighth century but describing events around 740), was the first to use the term Carniola, derived from Friulian geographical terminology, to describe the Slavic land (patria Sclavorum) to the east of Friuli. The tribal name Carniolans (Carniolenses) derives from the territorial name, and its only recorded use is in 820 in the Royal Frankish Annals (Annales Regni Francorum). All Early Medieval sources – though few in number – that mention Carniola and the Carniolans, clearly distinguish between two separate Slavic communities, north and south of the Karavanke mountains.

The mention of the Carniolans in the Annals of 820 was not a passing reference, but a detailed picture of the great process of social and ethnic stratification developing in the former Avar territory. Individual Slavic peoples were starting to form during this period among most of the Slavs in the former Avaria – as attested by the appearance of new Slavic tribal names (Czechs, Moravians, Guduscans, Timocians, Abodrites, Croats) around the borders of the former khaganate – and similarly, judging by the name Carniolenses, a separate Slavic tribe began to form in the upper Sava valley by the end of the eighth century at the latest, taking its name, like the Carantanians, from the area in which it lived. “Carniola, land of Slavs,” where the Carniolans lived, very probably had a tribal constitution. And because the term dux is associated with patria and gens, the enigmatic figure of Slav Vojnomir (Wonomyrus Sclavus) from the Royal Frankish Annals of 795 can perhaps be linked to this picture of a tribal principality of Carniolans, as their dux gentis, though the explanation could be quite different.
The principality of the Carniolans was a further Slavic tribal territory in the eastern Alpine area, alongside that of Carantania. As the direct eastern neighbour of Friuli during the Frankish-Avar wars, Carniola recognised Frankish overlordship, perhaps as early as 791, and certainly by 795–796. Later developments indicate that it retained its tribal constitution, and was included in a new, expanded March of Friuli.

FRANKISH EXPANSION TO THE SOUTHEAST

Following the subjection and annexation of the Lombard state in 774, which was finally completed with the quashing of a Lombard uprising in Friuli two years later, the Franks gained a direct border with the Avars for the first time. The border, which at the time was not defined by a clear line of demarcation, but rather by a wide tract of no man’s land, ran approximately along the watershed between the Sava and the Soča (Isonzo) rivers, and the expansive forests that formed a formidable barrier between the Ljubljana Basin and the Karst. The lower Vipava valley, and the hilly and mountainous world of the Soča’s middle and upper course, still belonged to Friuli. Twelve years later, in 788, when Tassilo III, the last Bavarian tribal prince, had been deposed by Charlemagne, subjecting both the Bavarians and the Carantanians to his direct rule – with Byzantine Istria coming under Frankish authority at the same time –, the two powers faced each other along a line stretching from the Danube to the Adriatic. The same year saw the end of almost half a century of peace between the Avars and their western neighbours following their unsuccessful Carantanian campaign. Battles between Franks and Avars, in the north along the Lower Austrian Danube, and in the south in Friuli, resulted in a number of Frankish victories. These two areas were the strategic springboards for a large offensive in 791, which officially began a war in which the Frankish plan was to crush the Avar forces. The main Frankish thrust, personally commanded by Charlemagne, moved along the Danube to the Raab river, while the southern battlefront, where the Franks pushed into the upper Sava valley, was a secondary theatre, in contrast to later events, when Friuli was the starting point for a wide offensive towards the very heart of the Avar dominion in 795 and 796. The Franks’ decisive military success came in 795, when Erik, the duke of Friuli, sent his army, led by Vojnomir the Slav (Wonymyrus Sclavus), who was – perhaps – a Slavic prince of the Carniolans in the upper Sava valley, into Pannonia between the Danube and the Tisza river, where they pillaged the centre of their opponents’ dominions, the Ring of the Avars. The fate of the Avar khaganate was finally sealed, in 796, by another Frankish military expedition into central Pannonia, led by Charlemagne’s son, Pippin. Frankish power was
extended far to the east, to the central Danube and Syrmia, where the mountain Fruška Gora bears their name to this day. However, the victory did not lead to the immediate pacification of the newly conquered areas. In 799, Gerold and Erik, the two prefects on the Franks’ eastern flank, fell – in modern terms, it was the loss of a four- or five-star general. The former, responsible for Bavaria and the northern border, met his death somewhere in Pannonia, and the second, responsible for Friuli, and the southern section of the border, died in an ambush near the town of Trsat in Liburnia, not far from today’s Rijeka in Croatia. In 803 and 811, the Frankish army again had to intervene in Pannonia.

As suddenly as they had arrived, the Avars disappeared from history. An Old Russian proverb: “They disappeared like the Avars, who have neither ancestors, nor descendants,” cited in the Chronicle of Nestor illustrates this feature of ethnogenesis, which is so characteristic of the Steppe nomads. However, this does not mean that the people who had identified themselves (or been identified) with the Avar name disappeared. Effectively, only the name disappeared; after the Frankish conquests, Slavic pressure, advances by the Bulgars and civil wars it lost its meaning and reputation. In the case of the Avars, these were both very strongly linked to the khagan. The supra-regional and polyethnic community that lived under the Avar name included significant levels of stratification. In the ruins of the Avar khaganate, which experienced more of a political than a physical collapse, Slavic and other peoples grouped together in new local and regional communities, in a new process of ethnogenesis. In 805, with Charlemagne’s permission, some of the Avars were consolidated into an Avar client principality on Frankish soil, in upper Pannonia between the Danube and the Raab. This retained an internal tribal constitution, but its Christianised prince only retained the authority and honour of a khagan with the express permission of Charlemagne. The last mention of these ‘Frankish’ Avars as a political people is at the same time as the mention of the Moravians, in 822. One ethnogenesis came to an end, while another began.

The large swathes of new Frankish territory had to be organised administratively and ecclesiastically. The ecclesiastical issue was originally focused on a rapid and successful mission. As early as summer 796, in a Frankish military camp on the Danube in Pannonia, a group of bishops from Pippin’s retinue were already in discussion at a special synod, even while the military advance was underway. This group included Paulinus, the patriarch of Aquileia and Arno, the bishop of Salzburg. The main guidelines for the Christianisation of the Avars and the Slavs who had lived in the Avar dominions were influenced by the politico-religious ideas of the erudite Anglo-Saxon, Alcuin of York, a personal friend of Patriarch Paulinus and Bishop Arno, which were intended to avoid the errors committed in the violent
Christianisation of the Saxons. The aim was to win souls not tithes. A special Slav tithe, which prevailed in Carinthia well into the Central Middle Ages and was significantly lower than the true canonical tithe, represents part of the tradition established by these moderate Anglo-Saxon/Irish missionary methods. Pippin took this opportunity to define the Drava river as the border between the Salzburg and Aquileian missionary spheres in Pannonia, and this was confirmed by his father Charlemagne in 803. In 811, Charlemagne also defined the Drava as the ecclesiastical border in Carantania. This division formed the basis for the ecclesiastical organisation of Slovene territory for almost one thousand years, until the church reforms in the middle of the eighteenth century.

In contrast to the Salzburg church, which had energetically set about its new tasks (as seen from its appointment of Theoderic in 799 as regional bishop to Sclavinia), the Aquileian church only really committed itself to missionary activity after Paulinus’ death in 802, during the time of the patriarchs Ursus and Maxentius. It seems also that the Aquileian mission was much more focused on the nearby Slavic regions than on Pannonia. It was there, in around 800, that Blancidius worked, the only Aquileian missionary known by name (and even here there is some uncertainty, in contrast to the many missionaries from Salzburg whose names are recorded). In the mountainous land of the Slavs, whose language he did not know, Blancidius felt like a “croaking frog in a marsh” and a “chirping nightingale”, and called himself Noricus to his ‘Roman’ friends. It is possible that the oldest phase of construction of the church dedicated to Mary on the island in Lake Bled dates back to this time, which would make it the oldest ecclesiastical building in the Aquileian missionary area. After a brief crisis brought about by the uprising led by Louis, prince of Lower Pannonia (Ljudevit Posavski) – which was supported by Fortunatus, the patriarch of Grado and opponent of Aquileia, to whom the bishops of Istria were suffragan – and by the temporary Bulgar occupation of Pannonia in 827/28, a substantial part of the Aquileian missionary territory had been Christianised by the arrival in Pannonia of Constantine and Methodius, in around 960. However, the ascendancy of the Christian faith within the area would not be complete for a long time to come, as indicated by continuing mentions of pagans well into the Central Middle Ages.

The large swathes of newly acquired Frankish territory also required organisation and administration. The rough framework of this structure had already been suggested by the two main routes of the Frankish military offensives against the Avars, which set out from Bavaria and Friuli. This was the manner in which the eastern march of Bavaria and Friuli was formed. Numerous questions in this field have yet to be answered, but the overall sense of the
Frankish organisation of their southeast flank was as follows. By no later than 803, there were two prefectures to the north of the Danube: Bavaria and the Bavarian eastern march (plaga orientalis). The latter encompassed Pannonia as far as the Raab river (and perhaps further), as well as the Traun in Old Bavarian lands, and Carantania. To the south, the administrative domain of the duke of Friuli covered a huge area, from Friuli across Istria and modern-day Slovenia, stretching far to the east between the Drava and Sava, perhaps even as far as Syrmia. It also incorporated the wider area of Sisak and the western Dalmatian hinterland. It is not clear where the border between the Bavarian and Friulian eastern marches lay. What is clear is that the ecclesiastical and administrative borders were not the same. The Drava formed the ecclesiastical border between Salzburg and Aquileia along its entire length, but may only have been taken as the administrative border in Pannonia, though even that is not certain. During the uprising of Ljudevit Posavski, or Louis, prince of Lower Pannonia (819–823), Baldric, the duke of Friuli, who was charged with putting down the uprising, extended his command over Carantania, parts of which had joined the rebellion. In addition to territories coming directly under the administration of the two march-prefectures, there were many client principalities throughout this large region which retained a relative amount of internal independence under Frankish overlordship, while also providing the first line of defence for the Carolingian state. Examples of this in the Bavarian eastern march were the principalities of the Carantanians and, from 805, of the Avars between the Danube and the Raab. In the March of Friuli, there were Carniolans living in the upper Sava valley, Guduscans along the Gacka river in Lika and the Slavonian Slavs ruled by the aforementioned prince Louis (Ljudevit Posavski) from Sisak at the confluence of the Kolpa and Sava.

In 818, prince Louis of lower Pannonia (Ljudevit Posavski) sent emissaries to Emperor Louis the Pious to bring charges of “cruelty and intolerance” against Cadaloh, Prefect of the March of Friuli, and successor of Erik (who had been killed in 799). The following year, the duke began an open rebellion (rebellio Liudewiti), which soon became a war (bellum Liudewiticum), in which he initially had the upper hand. Louis’ tribal union, backed by the military successes, had an integrating impact on neighbouring peoples, bringing together Carniolans, some of the Carantanians and the Timokians, whose attachment to the rebellion represented a change in their original plan to abandon the Bulgars and join the Franks. Even the rather unfortunate patriarch of Grado, Fortunatus, whose ecclesiastical province in Istria and Venetia was divided across two states in 812 by a Frankish-Byzantine treaty, sent craftsmen and masons to prince Louis to build fortifications, perhaps doing so at the behest of the Byzantines. Louis inflicted significant damage against the Frankish ally
Borna, a prince in Dalmatia and Liburnia, but also suffered major defeats himself after Frankish attacks on three sides, the aim of which was to destroy the economic foundations of his power. Finally, he was forced to flee to western Dalmatia, where he was killed in 823.

Louis’ Carantanian and Carniolan allies actively engaged in the battles against the Franks. In 819 and 820, the Carantanians frequently – though without success – faced the Frankish army along the Drava. In 820, after almost one hundred years, the “godless Slavs” again razed Maximilian’s monastic cell in Bischofshofen in Bavaria. The same year, Baldric, the duke of Friuli, who had succeeded Cadolah on his death in 819, again brought the Carantanians and Carniolans “who live along the Sava river” under his authority. When some Carantanians sided with Louis, the authority (cura) of Duke Baldric, to whom the emperor had clearly delegated supreme command over all the rebellious territories, was extended over Carantania, while Pannonia north of the Drava also came under his command. When Bulgars from the Syrmia area along the Drava advanced north of the river into Pannonia in 827 and “banished Slavic princes, replacing them with Bulgar rulers,” the blame for this serious blow was laid at Baldric’s door at a diet in Aachen (in 828) and he was removed. The immense area under his authority was divided between four counts.

The Royal Frankish Annals, which describe these events, do not give the names of the four powerbrokers in Baldric’s former realm, so there has been considerable speculation and a range of suggestions as to the identity of the four counties. The reform of 828 signalled the end of a process that had been ongoing for some years, which also led to changes in the Frankish administrative structure in the southeast of their state. During the first phase of Carolingian authority, the concept of the administration and the related defence of the eastern and southeastern border was to surround the state territory with a line of primarily Slavic, client tribal principalities, which would retain a relative level of independence under Frankish overlordship, while also providing the first line of defence for the Carolingian state.

The rebellion of Louis, who was rapidly joined by a number of the Slavic gentes that had recognised Frankish overlordship, clearly indicated the weaknesses of this model, as the Slavic tribes were too independent and made unreliable partners. The consequence was that the Frankish administrative structure along the border began to change in the 820s. At that point, administration by counts began to replace tribal rule. This entailed a Frankish count (comes) being given a mandate by the Frankish ruler and ruling in his name, and thus replacing the tribal prince (dux) and the related tribal constitution. Two counties were created on the territory of the Avar’s tributary khaganate between the Raab and the Danube. In Carantania, the last indigenous prince, Etgar, was replaced by the Bavarian count, Helmwin.
Mention is already made in the 830s of Salacho, a Frankish count from Bavaria, in the tribal lands of the Carniolans along the upper Sava valley. Even the Slavs in Pannonia did not escape this cull of indigenous princes, falling under the rule of the Bulgars in 827, who replaced their princes with their own rulers. When the Franks regained this territory, they made Pribina count of Pannonia (north of the Drava) in 847, continuing the process the Bulgars had started.

The 828 reform abolished the March of Friuli, the territory of which was also significantly reduced to the benefit of the Bavarian eastern prefecture. This was now entrusted with the defence of the entire southeastern border. It also incorporated (the county of) Carantania, as well as the upper Sava valley and Pannonia north of the Drava. This meant that the Italian border was once more moved to the Karstic passes, as in the time before the fall of the Avars. The introduction of these counties did not affect the Slavs under Frankish lordship in Dalmatia and Slavonia, as their tribal princes are recorded well beyond this period.

**ISTRIA AND FRIULI**

Around 788, Istria, a bridge between east and west, transferred from the Byzantine political sphere to the Frankish. In the Early Middle Ages, Istria was considerably larger – if one assumes that the northeastern border of the Triestine diocese also represented the political boundary of the peninsula – than it is today. The continental border ran from the most northerly part of the Gulf of Trieste, at the Timavo river (the Timavus of antiquity) near Duino – which is also the location of the monastery of St John (S. Giovanni/Štivan) – via the Karst to Nanos and on to Javorniki. From Mount Snežnik, it led to Kastav above Rijeka, then to Učka mountain and back to the sea at Plomin Bay.

Between 535 and 544, during the restoration of Emperor Justinian I (*renovatio imperii*), Istria came under the Byzantine rule, where it remained uninterruptedly for the next two centuries. Administratively, it became the Byzantine province of Istria, governed by a *magister militum*, subject to the exarch of Italy, who had his seat in Ravenna. The migration of the Lombards from Pannonia to Italy, in 568, split Venetia and Istria into two parts for the first time since Augustus had made them the tenth region of Italy: the Byzantines retained control of Istria and the lagoon area of Venice, while the Lombards held continental Venetia. The Three-Chapter Schism, which Pope Gregory I (Gregory the Great) referred to directly at the end of the sixth century as the Istrian schism (*Histricorum scisma, separatio*), further divided the northern Italian split. For a short time – most commentators agree on the dates 751 (the time of the Lombard occupation of the Ravenna exarchate) to 774 (the end of the
Lombard state) – the Lombards interrupted Byzantine rule in Istria, which otherwise lasted until 788. The first evidence of the new political situation is the mention three years after of a duke of Istria (dux de Histria), who participated in a military expedition against the Avars as a Frankish vassal (vassus).

This unnamed duke can perhaps be identified as the Duke John against whose regime representatives of Istrian towns and castles protested to emissaries (missi) of Charlemagne and his son Pippin. The record of this judicial diet, which took place near the Ržana river in the hinterland of Koper – and hence is also known as the Diet of Ržana (placitum) – is not only the most important historical document from Istria in the Early Middle Ages, but also has a wider significance in the whole context of Europe, as it illustrates the institutional, socio-economic and ethnic changes related to the transfer of a territory from Byzantine authority into the Frankish sphere and system of government. The Istrians’ main complaints against Duke John were that he was taking control of the taxes the towns were paying to the state, that he was forcing free citizens into socage and giving them extra duties, that he had brought Slavs into urban territories who were now grazing their animals and cultivating their fields, and that he had introduced new administrative forms and appointed his own military commanders (centarchs). At the Diet of Ržana, John had to undertake to repeal his innovations, and to ensure that the Slavs remained where they would not harm the towns. The Diet of Ržana not only provides us with evidence of the settlement of Slavs in the Istrian interior, but also gives a detailed view of the administrative structure of provincial Byzantine jurisdictions.

The changes in Istria under the new Frankish jurisdiction, and consequent dissatisfaction of the local population, were largely the consequence of war between the Franks and Avars. Lasting for over ten years (791–803), the war dictated the tone of events between Italy and the mid-Danube region: living with and living for war exhausted the people and landscape, demanding all available strength, the adaptation of the economy and the centralisation of power. Even Istria could not avoid these changes, and the measures that were so unpopular with its inhabitants were largely the result of adapting the local institutions and economy to the demands of war. However, as Charlemagne came into conflict with the Byzantines as Frankish influence in Venice increased, the growing dissatisfaction in Istria would have destabilised the entire region, harmed Frankish plans for Venice, and perhaps even harmed their status in Istria itself. In the context of the Frankish policy on Venice, resolving the problems in Istria became one of Charlemagne’s priorities for the northern Adriatic, and removing many of Duke John’s measures, at the Diet of Ržana in 804, calmed
relations in the peninsula. One consequence of the return of old institutions and customs was it took a very long time for the new Frankish order to establish itself. Mentions of *tribuni*, *locisalvatores* and *vicarii* in the oldest known private Istrian document, the will of a Triestine nun named Maru (dated to 847), indicates the survival of the Byzantine administrative structure into the Frankish period.

In the first phase of migration, around the end of the sixth century, Slavs only settled in Istria as far as the large Karstic ridge just south of the Trieste-Rijeka road. Slavic, Avar, and Lombard plundering of the peninsula during that period led the population to retreat behind the walls of fortified towns and castles. Some areas were abandoned economically. The curtain had been drawn on the wealth of the sixth century described by Cassiodorus in his letters – praising a peninsula rich in wine, oil and grain, and relating that Istria was rightly known as *Ravennae Campania*, in the sense that it was as important to the royal Ostrogoth city of Ravenna as Campania had been to imperial Rome. When the Franks assumed control of Istria at the end of the eighth century, Slavic immigration was strongly encouraged. For economic and probably military reasons, Slavs were now arriving in numerous areas that had only been extensively used since the beginning of the seventh century, to make better use of them as arable land, and to increase the income that was partially destined for royal coffers. These areas had once belonged to the towns (*civitates*), which were also bishops’ sees, as well as to smaller castles (Lat. *castella*, Slav. *kašteli*), which, with their surrounding lands, created the peninsula’s basic administrative network. This organisation in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages is vital to an understanding of Istrian history, even in later times: the political border between Habsburg and Venetian Istria in the Late Middle Ages and the early modern period followed the boundary between the two main forms of organisation in public life and authority there, i.e. between the urban communes along the wider coastal belt, and the seigneuries in the interior.

The Lombard occupation of the peninsula in the third quarter of the eighth century meant that the Istrian bishops found themselves in a different state to their metropolitan bishop, the patriarch in Byzantine Grado. The Lombards prevented the patriarch from ordaining his Istrian suffragans. This led to the Istrian bishops ordaining each other and existing for some time as an autocephalous church. The Lombard migration into Italy in 568 had already led to a division in the metropolitan province of the Patriarchate of Aquileia between two states, Byzantine and Lombard. At that point, the patriarch of Aquileia, Paulinus I, withdrew to the nearby lagoon castle of Grado, which remained in Byzantine hands. This division between states led to the patriarchate splitting in 607 into the Grado and Aquileian
patriarchates. The former covered Byzantine territory in the northern Adriatic, while the latter operated on Lombard territory. Like the Lombard occupation in the third quarter of the eighth century, Frankish occupation of the peninsula, which was finally confirmed in the Peace of Aachen (812) between Charlemagne and the Byzantines, led to a split in the metropolitan province of Grado. The Mantua synod of 827 attempted reconciliation between the state and ecclesiastical administration, and recognised the ecclesiastical authority over Istria of the Aquileian Metropolitan, in Frankish Friuli. But supported by the doges of Venice, the patriarch of Grado, who was later to transfer his residence to the Rialto and become the patriarch of Venice, continued the dispute with Aquileia, which ran on sol centuries before reaching resolution in 1180. Only then did the patriarch of Grado give up the claim of ecclesiastical authority over Istria.

In 840, the Frankish emperor Lothair and the doge of Venice agreed the first known treaty between Venice and its Frankish neighbours – with the Istrians and Friulians mentioned first. The Venetians committed themselves to helping the emperor “against the inimical Slavic tribes,” which allowed them to trade with towns in the Frankish Kingdom of Italy. Conflicts between the Venetian fleet and Croat pirates, who were looting the towns of western Istria during the reign of Doge Orso I (864–875), undoubtedly stand in the tradition of the above-mentioned Pactum Lotharii. The pact (promissio) in 932, with which the people (populus) – i.e. the political class – of Koper committed themselves to an annual supply of wine in exchange for permit to trade in Venetia, provides a clear picture of the gradual extension of Venetian influence across Istria. The next year, the Venetians agreed a treaty with the Istrian margrave, and representatives of Pula, Poreč, Novigrad, Piran, Koper, Muggia and Trieste (all previously sources of attacks on Venetian property, ships and people in Istria), which allowed Venice to trade in its Istrian possessions without hindrance. The effective weapon used by the Venetians to achieve this agreement was a trade embargo – economic ties between Istria and Venice were already that important to life in the towns of Istria in the first half of the tenth century. Thus began the developments that led to all the western Istrian towns (except Trieste) coming under the rule of the Republic of St. Mark in the Late Middle Ages and to a political division of the peninsula that would last until the fall of the Venetian state, in 1797.

The name Friuli derives from the name of Roman town of Forum Iulii; the modern Italian and Slovene names of that town – Cividale, Čedad – are derived from the Latin civitas. The region has always had ties with its neighbouring regions to the east. Aquileia, founded in 181 BC, was the starting point of the important routes connecting Italy with the central Danube area. The region maintained its ties with the east during the Early Middle Ages and,
of course, much later too. In 568, the Lombards migrated from Pannonia into Italy, and founded their first, and initially most important, duchy in Friuli. The Lombard Friulian dukes often led a very independent policy, revolting against the central authority of the kingdom in Pavia; some of them also occupied the Lombard throne themselves. Despite the political border separating the Friulian Lombards from Slavs and Avars, their interest in the east did not fade. It is this interest we have to thank for a great deal of information of inestimable value to Slovene history, recorded by Paul the Deacon (of Cividale) in his *History of the Lombards*. Yet it was more than just an interest that remained; there were also tangible contacts connecting the two areas. In 611, the Avars sacked Cividale, taking many women and children with them. One of these was an ancestor of Paul the Deacon, who later managed to escape Avar captivity and, coming exhausted into Slavic territory on his way home, was helped by an old woman. In 664, Arnefrit – son of Lupus, the rebel duke of Friuli, who was probably killed near Ajdovščina – found political refuge among the Slavs of Carantania. With their assistance, he even hoped to return to power in Friuli. Around 737, the deposed Friulian duke, Pemmo, wanted to flee to the Slavs to the east. Lombards who participated in the quashed Friulian uprising against Charlemagne’s new Frankish authority of 776 also found political exile with neighbouring Avars and Slavs. One of the most prominent of these fugitives was Aio, who was later present at the Diet of Rižana (804) as Charlemagne’s count emissary (*missus*). Pippin ‘found’ Aio on his campaign in Avaria in 796, and succeeded in winning him to the Frankish cause. The political unification of the two areas under Frankish rule, the expansion of the Friulian prefect’s authority far to the east and the start of the Aquileian mission were all to further link connections between Friuli and its Slavic neighbours.

However, while soldiers and missionaries were travelling east, pilgrims were travelling to Friuli. The aim of the pilgrimage, according to recent researches, was the monastery in San Canziano d’Isonzo, east of Aquileia, where, in Frankish times, a gospel was kept that was thought to contain an autograph of St Mark the Evangelist. In the margins of pages of this codex, known today as the Gospel of Cividale, after the place it is now kept, are written the names of numerous pilgrims from the second half of the ninth and the first half of the tenth century, “who came to this monastery” from all over the Alpine-Adriatic-Danube region. Among the many distinguished names of pilgrims so clearly illustrating Friuli’s connecting role in the Early Middle Ages, we find, for example, Witigowo, a count in Carantania around 860, Pribina from Lower Pannonia, and Pabo, Richeri and Engilschalk, who were significant leaders in the Eastern Prefecture at the same time. The codex includes
names from Bulgaria, including Michael – the Bulgarian Khan Boris – who assumed the
name of his godfather, the Byzantine Emperor Michael III, when baptised in Constantinople
in 864. We also find the names of the emperors Louis II (850–875) and Charles III (the Fat).
In 884, Charles the Fat, after reaching a peace treaty with the Moravian king Svatopluk at
Tulln (on the Danube in modern day Austria), travelled via Carantania and Friuli to Pavia,
which may well be the occasion on which he entered his name. The same applies to Braslav,
who was a Slavic prince between the Drava and Sava at the end of the ninth century; his name
was also written in the gospel book, and he too had been at Tulln in 884. From the Dalmatian
area, the name of Trpimir (from the middle of the ninth century), the first attested prince of
the Croats, was also written on a page of the gospel.

PANNONIA

Following the reform of 828, the permanent conquests the Franks had gained in their
wars with the Avars became part of the Bavarian Eastern Prefecture, and hence also part of the
Bavarian kingdom (regnum) of Louis the German, grandson of Charlemagne and son of Louis
the Pious. The basis of this kingdom, within which Louis was constantly working and
politicking to increase his dominions, was the law dividing the Frankish state between the
emperor’s three sons (the Ordinatio Imperii) in 817. The law gave Bavaria to Louis the
German, along with the territories, with predominantly Slavic tribes, to the southeast of
Bavaria. Along with Bavaria itself, it was Carantania that provided the power base within the
Eastern Prefecture that enabled first Louis’ son Carloman (in 876), and then his grandson,
Arnulf (in 887) to claim the title of Eastern Frankish king.

It was into this Eastern Prefecture, which had been vastly expanded in 828, that
Pribina, a Slavic prince from Nitra, fled in 833 from north of the Danube with his son Kocel
and a large military entourage. His flight should be understood as part of the tribal
consolidation of the Moravians – first mentioned as an ethno-political community as late as
822 – connected firstly with the establishment of a new dynasty of princes, embodied by
Mojmir I, secondly by the incorporation of periphery centres of power, such as Nitra, and
thirdly by conflicts between powerful claimants for authority. The fleeing Pribina was allowed
to enter the Frankish state by the prefect of the Bavarian Eastern March, Ratbod, who
presented him to the Eastern Frankish ruler, Louis the German, in Regensburg. On his orders,
the Slavic prince was baptised in Traismauer, which came under the Salzburg archdiocese.
Pribina’s excellent relations with Bavaria’s Frankish aristocracy, and his contacts with the
Salzburg church went back to his time as (pagan) ruler of Nitra. Many details – such as the
name of Pribina’s son, Kocel, which is an abbreviated form of the Bavarian-Frankish name, Cadaloh – indirectly indicate that Pribina’s wife came from the Bavarian counts family of Wilhelminian. It may well have been to meet her needs that the archbishop of Salzburg consecrated a church in Nitra in around 827/828. This is the first known church on Slavic territory north of the Danube.

However, Pribina’s desire to exercise his own political power and lordship soon brought him into contention with the powerful Ratbod, and he was forced to continue his flight. Together with his son and entire retinue, he now fled to the Bulgars – probably to Syrmia. From there, his path was soon to lead him to the Slavic prince, Ratimir, successor to the rebellious Louis (Ljudevit Posavski), the prince of Lower Pannonia. This meant he was once more on territory controlled by the Franks and under the jurisdiction of Ratbod, the prefect. Ratbod took up arms in 838 against Ratimir, who withdrew, while Pribina’s group moved northwest, crossing the Sava into the land ruled by Count Salacho, i.e. Carniola, which in 828 was part of Bavaria’s Eastern Prefecture. Pribina’s lengthy odyssey ended when a reconciliation with his overlord, Ratbod, was arranged by Salacho. Pribina finally found his homeland in Pannonia in 840 when Louis the German granted him a large territory, west of Lake Balaton along the Zala river, as a fief.

After the victorious conclusion to the Avarian wars, Pannonia up to the Danube formed the ‘wild east frontier’ of the Frankish realm – a land offering unlimited opportunities for personal affirmation. And Pribina was one of those who exploited those opportunities. He built his capital at the point where the Zala river flows into Lake Balaton, which lay – like Nitra before it – on an important geographical and traffic route, at the meeting point of already ancient roads. The marshy environment and fortified nature (munimen) of the settlement were the source of its name, which contemporary sources report in Slavic, German and Latin forms: Blatenski Kostel, Moosburg, and Urbs Paludarum. Blatenski Kostel (which translates as Fortress on the Marsh) became the centre of Pribina’s seigneur, which began “to gather tribes from all around and multiply them on that land.” As well as the groups of Avars, Slavs and even Gepids already settled there, who had survived the collapse of the Avar khaganate, numerous new colonists began to arrive in Pannonia from Carantania, from the Slavic world to the north of the Danube, and from Bavaria. Central Pannonia, between the Raab, Drava and Danube rivers had become a melting pot, home to the ethnogenetic process of mixing between ethnic groups called colluvies gentium. Slavs must have predominated in this mix of peoples, otherwise it would not be possible to explain the exceptional appeal of Constantine and Methodius’ Slavic liturgy in the area.
Only after Pribina’s position had been consolidated, and the structures of power and administration in Pannonia established, were the doors to the region opened to Salzburg, which had officially held ecclesiastical power over it since 796. At least seventeen churches were consecrated in Pribina’s ‘principality’ during Archbishop Liupram’s reign alone (836–859). Pribina built three churches in Blatenski Kostel itself, using painters, masons, smiths and carpenters sent from Salzburg. The locations of most of these churches cannot now be identified, but those that can be indicate that Pribina’s authority stretched from the Raab river to the north, to Pécs to the southeast, and to Ptuj to the west. During the Middle Ages, Ptuj, a town with a rich ancient tradition, was also one of the most important places on the territory of modern-day Slovenia. Particular importance derived from the stone bridge over the Drava, which had stood there since Antiquity on the major route between Italy and Pannonia. In 874, the Salzburg archbishop, Theotmar, consecrated a second church in Ptuj, which Kocel had ordered to be built, and which may well have stood on the site of the later provost (parish) church, which still exists today.

The reward for Pribina’s successful work in consolidating Frankish Pannonia, and for his “zeal for the work of God and king,” came in 847 when Louis the German granted Pribina lordship over all the lands he had previously held as a fief, at the same time making him a count, which made him an agent of state authority. Only the Pannonian possessions of the Salzburg church were exempt from his rule, because of the immunity the church enjoyed. This special dual position – similar to the status of tribal princes in Brittany, who were also the counts of the Breton March – was to characterise Pribina’s position in Pannonia from that time. In addition to the office of count, he continued to be the prince of his tribe. In a document of Louis the German from February 860, in which Pribina makes his last documented appearance alive, he is described as prince (dux), and his territory as a principality (ducatus). Sources from this time also use dual titles to refer to his son, Kocel, who succeeded his father as count and as prince. He is referred to as the count of the Slavs (comes de Sclauis) and a Pannonian prince (knaz’panon’sky).

Pribina was killed in around 861 by the very Moravians he had fled many years before. It seems his death related to turbulent events then shaking the Bavarian Eastern Prefecture. In 854, the powerful prefect Ratbod was deposed due to disloyalty. Two years later, Louis the German replaced him with his son Carloman. Carloman took charge of the Eastern March (marchia orientalis), as the Bavarian east between the Danube and Sava began to be known, applying a vigorous and very independent policy: In 858, he made peace and formed an alliance with the Moravian prince, Rastislav, whose territory lay north of the
Having protected his rear, Carloman began to openly resist his father. In order to create a completely independent realm (regnum), between 857 and 861 he drove all the counts still loyal to Louis the German out of the Eastern March and occupied the “Pannonian and Carantanian border” with his own supporters. The first victim of this policy was Pabo, the Carantanian count, who was forced to flee to Salzburg. His fellow counts (socii comites) did not fare any better. Those fleeing included Count Witigowo, also from Carantania, Richeri, count of the Szombathely region, and probably also Kocel, who is mentioned as present in the royal city of Regensburg in spring 861. The worst fate was reserved for Louis the German’s ever-loyal Pribina, who was killed.

As part of Louis the German’s first attempts to regain the lost territory, he undoubtedly granted extensive holdings within the territory of his rebellious son to the Bavarian church and to nobles. The most important of these gifts was that which the Salzburg archdiocese received from Louis in November 860. With this ‘Magna Carta’, Salzburg gained numerous manors (curtes) – i.e. estates organised for economic use – which extended from Melk on the Danube via modern-day Lower Austria, Burgenland and the Hungarian lands west of Lake Balaton, to the old Carantania lands, including Maria Saal. This document also bears witness to the growing economic and political importance of Carantania within the Eastern March, which was expressed by the Carantanian name becoming synonymous with the entire march. Carloman, and then Gundachar, who held the position of prefect of the entire Eastern March, were said to have been placed in charge of the Carantanians. Carloman’s efforts to achieve political independence were accompanied by an (unsuccessful) attempt by Oswald, a regional bishop of Carantania, to carve out an ecclesiastical province independent of Salzburg, or at least this may be inferred from letters that were addressed directly to Pope Nicholas I (858–867) in order avoid his superior, the archbishop of Salzburg. Despite the failure of Carloman’s effort – in 865 the rebellious son was finally brought back into the fold by his father – there remained strong emphasis on the special status of Carantania under the Carolingian lordship of Carloman, and later his son, Arnulf. Under Arnulf, who assumed authority over Carantania and Pannonia by 876 at the latest, Carantania was indicated in documents as a regnum – an area subject to a particular kind of lordship.

Adalvin (the archbishop of Salzburg), and the count and prince of Pannonia, Kocel, both of whom were loyal throughout to Louis the German, celebrated Christmas 865 together in Kocel’s capital. This is a clear sign that the political situation in the east had calmed, but it was not to last. Since 863, two eminent Byzantine missionaries, the brothers Constantine and Methodius from Thessaloniki, had been working north of the Danube in Moravia. Both higly
educated brothers had already proven themselves as missionaries in Khazaria in the Crimea, and were familiar with the Slavic language of their Macedonian homeland. This led Constantine to create a Slavic alphabet, the Glagolitic, which they used to write their translations of liturgical texts. In Moravia, they instituted a Slavic liturgy, but resistance from the Franks’ Latinate priesthood led to Constantine and Methodius withdrawing, by the beginning of 867 at the latest, from Moravia via the Danube to Kocel, “who took great liking to Slavic books.” From there, in the same year, they left for Venice, at the invitation of Pope Nicholas I, probably along the old road leading through modern Slovene territory via Ptuj, Celje, Ljubljana and the Vipava valley that connected Pannonia and Italy, before making for Rome, where they were received by a new pope, Adrian II (867–872). The interests of the two brothers matched the new eastern policy of the Roman Curia. Rome demanded unrestricted ecclesiastical jurisdiction over all of the former Illyricum, which included Pannonia, and supported the separation of a special Pannonian archdiocese directly subordinate to the pope from the Bavarian-Carantanian-Pannonian metropolitan province, with its seat in Salzburg. In relation to Pannonia north of the Drava, the Salzburg archbishop could only refer to the missionary activity of its church from the end of the Avar wars onwards, but not to any relevant papal privileges, which it did not have at its disposal. In February 869, Constantine, who went in monastery and took the name Cyril, died in Rome. The same year, the pope sent Methodius to the princes Rastislav, Svatopluk and Kocel as his legate “to the Slavs” and as a bishop. The old enemies united on the question of an independent Bavarian Slavic church. Methodius visited only Kocel, who sent him once more to Rome; the pope then made him archbishop of Pannonia north of the Drava and Moravia, granting him the title of Metropolitan of Sirmium. Sirmium, which was razed by the Avars in 582, and had once been the political and ecclesiastical capital of western Illyricum, was now in Bulgar hands.

The success of Methodius’ work as archbishop and that of his followers in Kocel’s Pannonia was so notable in such a short time (869/870), that the Salzburg church had to withdraw despite a presence lasting over three-quarters of a century, as Methodius “supplanted the Latin language and Roman teaching and well-known Latin letters.” This could not have happened without Kocel’s overt political support. The prince’s decision to support Methodius represented a complete break with his father’s pro-Frankish policy, and it was exclusively down to Kocel that the Slavic mission remained alive despite serious threats from 870 to 873. In 870, Methodius’ episcopal opponents in Bavaria took him captive and, at a synod held before Louis the German at Regensburg, found him guilty of intruding into a foreign diocese. This was probably the occasion that led to the composition of the work on the
Conversion of the Bavarians and Carantanians (Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum), a reminder of what the Salzburg church had achieved in the region, and at the same time a dossier making the case against Methodius. Since the status of the Bavarian metropolitan province in Carantania was steadfast, given that three popes in the second half of the eighth century had confirmed Salzburg’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the area, the document was an attempt to portray the Pannonian mission as the continuation of the Carantanian mission, in order to give legitimacy to Salzburg’s Pannonian aspirations. The Conversio, though it also provides priceless information as the oldest history of Carantania, was therefore a means for Salzburg to achieve its objectives in Pannonia. Methodius’ capture coincided with changes in the political climate, as Svatopluk gradually moved over to Carloman’s side and betrayed his uncle, Rastislav, to gain lordship over the Moravians. It was only by the vigorous intervention of Pope John VIII that Methodius’ release was secured in 873. He had spent time with Kocel, who was therefore subject to threats from Bavarian bishops. Probably after 874, when the previously hostile Franks and Moravians reached a modus vivendi with the peace of Forchheim, Methodius moved to Moravia, where he worked until his death in 885. Kocel could not maintain his position within Frankish Pannonia. He is mentioned for the last time in 874, when archbishop Theotmar of Salzburg consecrated his church in Ptuj. By 876 he has disappeared from the historical record and Carloman’s son Arnulf had assumed control of Pannonia. A forged document, supposedly by Arnulf and intended for Theotmar, that was fabricated in Salzburg around the end of the tenth century, alleges that Kocel was convicted of high treason.

The Pannonian episode directly tied the work of Constantine and Methodius to Slovene territory. It was only in Kocel’s Pannonia between 867 and 874 that the Slavic prayer formulas of the Carantanian mission could have come into contact with and influenced the Old Church Slavonic texts of Constantine and Methodius or their followers. In this manner, Slovene features had an influence on the form (especially at the level of vocabulary) and content of Old Church Slavonic literacy. This connection is perhaps even clearer in the oldest Slavic legal code, the Zakon Sudni Ljudem, which was probably drawn up to meet the needs of Kocel’s Slavic polity in southern Pannonia. The code, probably the work of Methodius, combines Byzantine and Bavarian legal norms, the latter spreading in the ninth century, particularly, because of contact between Carantanian and other Slavs in the Bavarian eastern prefecture. It seems most natural to link this exceptional legal artefact with Pannonia, although various researchers have placed its point of origin in Bulgaria and Moravia.
THE CAROLINGIAN DECLINE

In 871, Louis the German placed the administration of the Danube counties on the Moravian border in the hands of the margrave Aribo. This changed the power structure that had been in place since 828, when government of the entire Eastern March had been united in the hands of a prefect or a royal prince. By 876 at the latest, after Louis the German had died, Arnulf had assumed the lordship of his father Carloman’s eastern dominions. It included Carantania, Carniola and the parts of Pannonia north of the Drava (Kocel’s Pannonia), as well as south of the river, where the Slavic prince and Frankish vassal Braslav – equating himself with the tradition of Louis, duke of Lower Pannonia, and Ratimir – had his regnum. The counties along the Danube were excluded from this complex. By 884, according to the Annals of Fulda these lands were known as “Arnulf’s kingdom”. Carantania represented the centre of Arnulf’s power. The division of royal land, which started to increase from the middle of the ninth century onwards, led to the establishment and development of economic infrastructure (seigneuries) and increased the wealth of the region. From this point, Arnulf managed to acquire not only lordship over Bavaria (after 880), but also, in 887 – with military aid from “Bavarians and Slavs” – lordship over the Eastern Frankish kingdom. Even after that date, Arnulf remained closely connected to Carantania. He celebrated Christmas 888 in Karnburg, the former capital of the Carantanian prince, which is the only documented Carolingian residence of Frankish rulers in the eastern Alpine and Pannonian area. In 983, it was explicitly named as a regalis sedes – a royal seat. According to many researchers, the beginnings of the Duchy of Carniola can be linked to developments during Arnulf’s time, when perhaps the duke’s throne was placed in Zollfeld, which led to the change and feudalisation of the installation ceremony of Carantanian princes (Carinthian dukes), also known as dukes. The renewal of the regional episcopate for Carantania carried out by Theotmar, the archbishop of Salzburg, after 873, perhaps also must be seen in this context. Arnulf’s close links to Carantania led to him being identified as Arnulf of Carinthia in eleventh-century literature. After 887, when Arnulf became king of the Eastern Frankish Kingdom, members of the Bavarian high nobility assumed power over Carantania as counts. These included Luitpold, a relative of Arnulf’s on the maternal side, and the founder of the Bavarian ducal dynasty, the Luitpoldings. He is first mentioned as a margrave in Carantania in a reference to a gift of 895, with which Arnulf transformed the land of Waltuni – an ancestor of Saint Hemma – in modern-day Austrian Carinthia and Styria, and possibly Carniola, from a feudal into an allodial possession.
In 828, administration by Frankish counts replaced the Carniolan tribal constitution. Around 838, the area, which formed part of the Bavarian Eastern Prefecture, was governed by the (Bavarian) Count Salacho. However, it is only his successor, Ratold, in the final decade of the ninth century, who is considered to have acted as a count with jurisdiction over the Slovenian Sava river basin, where in 895 Waltuni also had two estates, comprising three royal mansi (regales mansus) in the Brestanica area (Richenburch, the name of which suggests ‘strong fortress’) on the left bank of the Sava river, and the Krško estate (Gurcheuelt) on the right bank, both of which lay in the March along the Sava (Marchia iuxta Souwam). However, the latest researches indicates that this section of the document from King Arnulf, which could offer the first tangible evidence of feudalisation on Slovene territory south of the Drava, was forged, and therefore of no real value. Brestanica (Rajhenburg) Castle, which controlled the Sava crossing and road along the river, was therefore probably only founded after the end of the Magyar incursions, after the mid-tenth century.

In the final quarter of the ninth century, Pannonia north of the Drava, where the feudalisation process had started during Pribina’s time, underwent a difficult and unhappy period. A bloody war broke out for three years (882 to 884) between Arnulf – whose regnum included the former Pannonian territories of Kocel – and Svatopluk of Moravia. In this, Pannonia and places along the Danube suffered the most. There, Svatopluk “slayed murderously and fiercely like a wolf, destroyed much with fire and sword.” After this, the annalist reporting these events speaks only of “once happy Pannonia” (quondam Pannonia felix). The peace that Arnulf reached with Svatopluk (885) assisted him in assuming power over the Eastern Frankish Kingdom (887). Five years later, Arnulf decided to attack Svatopluk, and, in the summer of 892, he pillaged Moravia with Frankish, Bavarian and Alamannian contingents. He was also supported by the nomadic Magyars, who were seen in the west as the new Avars.

Western (Frankish) sources first record the Magyars – the antecedents of modern-day Hungarians – in 862, when they were probably involved in the turbulent events in the Danube river basin relating to the Carloman uprising and Rastislav’s moves towards independence. They had definitely entered the region by 881, when they battled a Bavarian army at Vienna (Wenia) – the earliest mention of this major city. In 894, the year in which the Moravian prince Svatopluk died, they broke over Danube and “devastated all Pannonia unto destruction.” This changed the Magyars from Arnulf’s allies to enemies, threatening the very existence of Frankish Pannonia. The situation became critical soon after, when the Magyars occupied the Pannonian basin between the Tisza and the Danube. In 896, Arnulf strengthened
the defence of the southeastern Frankish border by handing Pannonia and Blatenski Kostel to Braslav, a Slavic prince and Frankish vassal, who held land between the Drava and Sava in modern-day Slavonia. This brought a huge territory, reaching from Sisak in the south, to the Danube to the north, under the command of this ardent Arnulf loyalist, who had already participated in preparations for the war on Moravia in 892. The present-day Slovak capital city Bratislava is probably first mentioned in 907 as Brezalauspurc (Braslav’s castle). Yet Braslav’s activity, and Arnulf’s defence measures, did not stop the Magyar horsemen. Their main objective was Bavaria and rich northern Italy, which they first reached in 899. The following year, they also pillaged Bavarian territory to the west of the Enns river, and Carinthia soon afterwards. At that time, they had probably already occupied Frankish Pannonia, around Blatenski Kostel, while the Bavarian-Frankish administration stood firm in the Danube area west of Mautern near Krems. This was the furthest extent of the customs regulation inaugurated (between 904 and 906 in Raffelstetten, near Sankt Florian), on the orders of Louis the Child, Arnulf’s son and the last Eastern Frankish Carolingian ruler.

However, the devastating Bavarian defeat at Bratislava at the beginning of July 907, when Margrave Luitpold and Archbishop Theotmar of Salzburg fell on the battlefield along with many of the Bavarian elite, led to the fall of Carolingian power in the southeast. The Pannonian-Danube area up to the Enns and Carantania came under Magyar control, while Slovene territory along the old Italo-Pannonian road became a place of transit for Magyar raids into Italy and descended into turmoil. Magyar horsemen crossed Slovene territory over twenty-five times, before suffering the decisive defeat at Augsburg (in 955) that signalled the end of their pillaging and the start of their adaptation to western forms of life. The settlement of Vogrsko, near modern-day Nova Gorica, is a reminder of the Magyars (known also as Ogri), a Slavic version of one of the names for the Magyars. Similar toponyms, such as Ungarina, have been retained in Friuli, which was on the Magyars’ incursion routes (in 967 it had already been referred to as the via or strata Hungarorum) and which was also destroyed in their attacks. In spring 1001, Emperor Otto III made a grant to the Aquileian patriarch of “half of the castle, called Solkan and half of the village known in the Slavic tongue as Gorica (Gorizia),” specifically mentioning the damage caused by the Magyars. The other half was granted to Count Werihen the same year. In the second half of the tenth century and, more particularly, in the eleventh century, a period of great renewal in Friuli, carried out under the leadership of the Aquileian patriarchs, saw numerous Slavic colonists arriving in Friuli from Carniola and probably from Carinthia too. The first evidence of the new immigrants is from 1031, when the settlement Mereto di Capitolo near modern-day Palmanova was referred to as
the “village of Slavs” (*villa Sclavorum*). The predominant Roman majority had assimilated these colonists by the end of the Middle Ages, but traces of them remain in Friuli in place names such as Sclavons or Belgrado.

A NEW ORDER AND NEW STRUCTURES

The years of peace after the Battle of Augsburg in 955 enact a new developmental policy in the southeast of the restored Roman-German empire, which was expressed in new organisational structures in the 970s. As early as 952, Otto I placed the March of Verona and Friuli and the March of Istria under the jurisdiction of the duke of Bavaria, expanding his sphere of control beyond Bavaria and Carinthia. This created a massive political entity that controlled the Alpine passes, and hence the routes between Italy and Germany. It was the summit of medieval Bavarian rule. But the uprising by the duke of Bavaria, Henry II the Quarrelsome, led Otto II to separate, in 976, the Duchy of Carinthia from the over-large and over-powerful Duchy of Bavaria, which was combined with the border marches from Verona in the west, via Istria and modern-day Slovenia to Semmering in the east. This brought to an end the political union that had linked Carantania to Bavaria since the second half of the eighth century (though Carinthia would twice be brought back into personal union with Bavaria before 1002). The newly created Duchy of Carinthia – the first in the eastern Alps – formalised something that had been intrinsic to the development of Carinthiaan area until that time: the acknowledgement of a certain amount of independence and autonomy, despite the connection to Bavaria, based on the political tradition of the old Slavic principality of Carantania. The fact that Carinthian dukes ruled over the March of Verona until the middle of the twelfth century underlines the strategic importance of the new duchy, at the heart of a vast network of communication routes. The Duchy of Carinthia was larger than the former principality of Carinthia, and was also much larger than the later *Land* of Carinthia. It is a paradox of historical development, then, that the territory in the eastern Alpine area with the oldest tradition of independent statehood, and the first in the region to become a duchy in the medieval German state, only became a political whole (as a *Land*) at the end of the Middle Ages.

For defence against the Magyars, the territory to the east and south of Bavaria and Carantania were organised into smaller border regions or margravates, which were related to the tradition of Carolingian border marches. To the north, along the Danube between the Enns and the Viennese forests, the Eastern March connected to Bavaria was given the name *Ostarrîchi* (i.e. Österreich, Austria) for the first time in 996. A special march along the middle
course of the Mura, between Bruck to the north and Radgona to the south, received its first mention in 970. The name Carantanian March (marchia Karentana), attested somewhat later, clearly expresses its connection with the Duchy of Carinthia. To the south was the March of Drava, first mentioned in 980. The sources refer to it as the “march beyond the forests” (marchia Transsiluana), that is the march beyond the Drava forest between Pohorje and Kozjak, in relation to Carinthia. Another name, the March of Ptuj (marchia Pitoulesi) is also attested, though it did not last long. In 980, we first read of the March of Savinja (Sovuina), which included the Savinja river basin, and extended south of the Sava to the Krka river. This lower part of what was to become Carniola later gained the name of the Slovene March (Marchia Sclavonica, que vulgo Windis march dicitur). Carniola included the upper Sava valley (Gorenjska or upper Carniola) and Notranjska (inner Carniola). It was first mentioned in 973, as “Carniola, known locally as the march of Creina.” It was centred on the “castle in the march” (Chreina, Chrainburch) i.e. Kranj. Although of different etymological origin – the name Kranj derives from the Celto-Roman Carnium, while Creina is of Slavic origin – the similar-sounding names of the region and its centre overlapped and influenced each other so that locally it was the Slovene name Kranjska, rather than Carniola, that was applied to the region. The Germans also used the Slovene term, in the form Krain. Carniola was bordered to the west by Friuli – which reached east as far as the upper Soča river valley and the lower Vipava valley – and Istria, which incorporated the upper Karst to the Nanos massif and Javorniki. Surrounded and extended by these march regions, the Duchy of Carinthia gained the misleading name of Great Carantania in Slovene historiography. However, at the beginning of the eleventh century, probably in 1002 – after the final dissolution of the personal union between the duchies of Bavaria and Carinthia – this large political formation fell apart, and the marches from the Mura to the Sava became directly subordinate to the crown. In 1012, when Adalbero, the margrave of the March on the Mura, became the duke of Carinthia, the Carantanian March was brought back into the duchy, though for a long time this union did not seem to have any prospects. After the eleventh century, when the Otakar, or Traungauer, dynasty assumed control as margraves, the Carantanian March became the centre and starting point of developments that led to the creation of the new Duchy (and Land) of Styria (Steiermark, Štajerska). The same Duke Adalbero had to renounce any public jurisdiction over the Aquileian church in Friuli in 1027.

The establishment of a stable, well-organised margravate placed Slovene territory within the medieval Roman-German empire, enabled the formation of the economic and social system typical of western Europe: feudalism. A clear expression of the new system’s
consolidation was the creation of seigneuries, which were the basic units of feudal economic organisation and judicial administration. With the exception of Carinthia, where the first seigneur is attested as early as 822, and partially of Istria, where the Diet of Řížana document from 804 already bears witness to the beginnings of feudalism, during the ninth century the Frankish state – as far as can be ascertained and deduced from preserved documents – did not generally encroach on the existing Slavic social and economic structures across most of modern-day Slovenia, and did not change them. A detailed microstudy of the Blejski Kot basin has indicated that the structure of old-Slavic župe was kept unchanged until the second half of the tenth century. Feudalisation and the related establishment of seigneuries largely occurred in the second half of the tenth and in the eleventh century on modern-day Slovene territory. The basic network of seigneuries developed from the granting of royal lands i.e. all lands not yet claimed, for which the right of disposal therefore fell to the monarch. There was an abundance of such land in the newly created marches. By granting royal lands in this way, the monarch was not only rewarding individual high-ranking ecclesiastical and secular feudal lords for their fealty and making payment for their services, but also significantly increasing the wealth of individual regions, as the establishment of seigneuries significantly increased the exploitation of natural resources. Seigneuries also developed the first power infrastructures in the marches. The centres of individual seigneuries – often these were the first castles on Slovene territory – also became hubs of administrative, judicial and military networks.

The first recipients of large estates, often several hundred square kilometres in size, included a number of dioceses. The diocese of Salzburg had owned a number of manors on lands occupied by ancestors of the Slovenes (particularly in Carinthia and Styria) since a grant made in 860. Perhaps even before the end of the ninth century, it had acquired extensive lands around Ptuj and, before the middle of the eleventh century, the Rajhenburg castle (Brestanica) in the Sava valley. Two gifts made by Emperor Otto II and centred on Škofja Loka in upper Carniola laid, in 973, the foundations for the seigneur of the Bavarian Freising bishops there. In 1062 and 1067, Henry IV granted the Freising bishops fisc lands in Istria, in Piran, and in Novigrad and seven villages, including Kubed on a vital route into the Istrian interior. However, despite the probable desire of the diocese to obtain its own salt and olive oil from these estates, it was unable to keep them. North of the Škofja Loka seigneur, at the start of the eleventh century, another seigneur centred on Bled Castle grew from a royal land grant. The earliest mention of this is from 1011 (castellum Veldes). It was owned by the bishops of Brixen in modern-day South Tyrol. In 1001, the Aquileian patriarch received, from the crown,
half of a large complex of land between the Soča (Isonzo) and the Vipava and the Trnovska Planota plateau, with the castle of Solkan (castellum Siliganum) at its centre. In 1040, Henry III opened Carniola up to the patriarch, granting him Cerknica and a large belt of territory from Logatec to Lož, practically all of inner Carniola, which was part of the original Carniola.

Some of these grants were the consequence of bringing the church into the service of the state. The educated bishops provided a sound support to the crown, given that there was no possibility of them bequeathing the lands to heirs. In the Ottonian-Salic state church system, public authority was placed in the hands of individual dioceses. Bishops were bequeathed entire counties, becoming counts themselves and protectors of royal interests. These included control of the strategically important Alpine passes connecting Italy and Germany. Brixen on the Brenner route had a particularly important role in this regard. Having an alliance with the Brixen bishop meant access to this route. This led to the crown granting Brixen a county in the Inn valley in 1027 and a county in the Puster valley in 1091. On his first expedition into Italy in spring 1004, King Henry II granted Albuin, Bishop of Brixen, “his possession, known as Bled, lying in the region known as Carniola, in Watilus’s county of that name.” The Aquileian patriarchate played a similar geographic and strategic role between the Alps and the Adriatic, and its importance grew significantly when opponents of the emperor in the Lombard lowlands closed routes over the Alps. For this reason, until the middle of the thirteenth century, when the fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty signalled the end of the idea of an empire ruling Italy and Germany, the patriarchate was always subject to considerable attention from the crown, which was reflected in the grants mentioned above. In 1077, at the height of the Investiture Crisis, King Henry IV returned from his ritual humiliation before the pope at Canossa. On the basis of Ottonian-Salic traditions relating to the state church and the contemporary political situation, Henry IV in 1077 first granted the County of Friuli to Sigeard, his former chancellor, now the patriarch of Aquileia, which was soon followed by the March of Carniola and the County of Istria. The same year, Liutold of Eppenstein, another of the king’s supporters, became the duke of Carinthia and the balance of power in the Investiture Crisis in the eastern Alps temporarily moved towards Henry IV. For a short time, the patriarch of Aquileia became the principle holder of public office for nearly all the territory once ruled by the Frankish margraves of Friuli (Sigeard’s successor lost Istria and Carniola due to his pro-papal leanings; the patriarch of Aquileia only regained the title of margrave of Istria in 1209, and of Carniola in 1093).

The opportunity to grow exceptionally rich, to advance politically and socially, and, of
course, to gain the land bestowed so generously by the crown, which was more or less already divided in the core of the state, made the periphery of the empire very attractive to numerous members of the high nobility, who moved into these lands from the interior and linked their fate to them, and later often played an important role in their historic development. The noble house of Weimar-Orlamünde, which in the third quarter of the eleventh century ruled as margraves over Istria and Carniola, came from Saxony. Their original estate extended along the left bank of the Sava river in upper Carniola. The core of this house’s lands in the interior of Istria was formed by 20 royal mansi (germ. Königshube), granted by Henry IV in 1064. The houses of Eppenstein and Spanheim were both of Frankish origin, and both were hereditary dukes of Carinthia, the former between 1077 and 1122, the latter from 1122 to 1269. The core of the Eppenstein lands originally lay along the upper Mura, around Judenburg, where the Eppenstein castle from which they took their name stood, and in the Carantanian March where they were margraves. It was from there, in 1012, that Adalbero manoeuvred himself into the Carinthian ducal throne. In addition to other estates (particularly in Carinthia), the Spanheims also held land in the territory of modern-day Slovenia in the Radgona and Maribor area in the March of Drava. At the same time, they held the large Laško seigneury in the former March of Savinja and the then Great Carniola, as well as Kostanjevica on the Krka river of lower Carniola, and, most significantly, a large portion of the Ljubljana Basin, including Ljubljana itself.

Most of the noble families on Slovene territory originated in Bavaria. Apart from the counts of Vohburg and of Bogen, whose estates on Slovene territory are only attested for short periods in the eleventh and first half of the twelfth century, mention must be made of the counts of Andechs. They came to Carniola at the beginning of the twelfth century, inheriting the Weimar-Orlamünde lands in the east of upper Carniola, creating their Carniolan base in Kamnik. In the second half of the twelfth century, they were landgraves in Carniola and margraves in Istria where they assumed the title ‘Duke of Merania’ (Dux Meraniae) in northeastern Istria, known as Merania. Also of Bavarian origin were the Otakar or Traungauers, margraves of Carinthian March from the middle of the eleventh century, which developed into the Duchy of Styria under their rule (until 1192). The counts who settled on the Soča at the start of the twelfth century and named themselves after Gorizia also had their forebears in Bavaria. They came to prominence as the dynasties mentioned above had already fallen.

However, these higher noble houses were all outdone by the exceptional wealth of a family of nobles whose estates at the start of the eleventh century stretched from Friuli in the
west to the Sotla on the modern-day Croatian border to the east, and from the Danube in the north to the Sava and Krka river in lower Carniola to the south. Their centre of power was around Friesach in Carinthia, along the upper Mura on the modern-day boundary between Carinthia and Styria, and particularly in the March of Savinja, where their enormous allodial estates stretched to the borders of the march itself, including a contiguous belt from the Drava in the north via Slovenj Gradec, Celje, Rogatec, and Laško to the Sotla and the Sava, and further south to Kostanjevica and Višnja Gora. This enormous territory, which originated in gifts made by eastern Frankish rulers and Charlemagne’s successors, was united at the start of the eleventh century in one family called the “line of Hemma”, with the marriage of Hemma and Wilhelm II, although by the middle of the same century it had fallen apart. Hemma was likely related to the Bavarian ducal dynasty, the Luitpoldings, on her mother’s side, and her ancestors included Waltuni, who perhaps acquired Rajhenburg and Krško Polje in 895, Svatopluk and Mojmir. The Slavic names of the latter two testify to the Slavic origin of some of Hemma’s ancestors and indicate that the Slavic nobility, which rapidly assimilated in terms of language and lifestyle, joined existing German noble families to create a new ruling social class. Hemma’s husband, Wilhelm II, a count of Friesach and margrave of the March of Savinja, was related to the Bavarian Wilhelminian line, which in the second half of the ninth century had played an important role as counts in Traungau and along the Danube in struggles against the Moravians. In all likelihood, Pribina’s wife, the mother of Kocel, also belonged to this noble line. The genealogy of Hemma’s family is an apt example of the very international nature of noble families of the time. It was no different in later centuries as the familial ties of the nobility were not restricted to the medieval German state, but stretched even further afield. Yet, just as this means it would be incorrect to assign a national affiliation to such nobles, it would also be incorrect to proclaim Hemma as a Slovene saint.

In March 1036, Wilhelm II was killed by his greatest rival in the southeast of the state, Adalbero of Eppenstein, the duke of Carinthia, who had been removed from his position one year before. The widowed Hemma now held in her hands the territory of unheralded size mentioned above, making her one of the richest women of the day. As her two sons, Wilhelm and Hartwik, also died young – according to legend, murdered by rebellious miners – in 1043, Hemma founded a convent at Gurk in Carinthia and richly endowed it with land. Her possessions on the upper Enns, which she left to the archdiocese of Salzburg, were used three decades later by Archbishop Gebhard to found the monastery in Admont. The same archbishop had already dissolved the convent in Gurk and, in 1072, founded the first diocese in Carinthia. The founding of the diocese made Gurk – after Salzburg, Aquileia, Freising and
Brixen – the fifth big ecclesiastical landowner on Slovene territory. The centre of its lands, which had come from Hemma, lay in Kozjansko. The main fiefs (feuda principalia) of the Diocese of Gurk were Lemberg pri Dobrni, Planina, Rogatec, Podsreda and Kunšperk at Sotla. However, Hemma’s relatives, such as the powerful Asquinus, advocate of the Gurk monastery, or his nephew Starchand II – as margrave of Savinja he held the title previously held by Hemma’s husband, Wilhelm II – still had sufficient land, power and reputation to be described by a chronicler at the end of the eleventh century as “the most powerful lords in all Carinthia, who no mortal could contradict.” Only the victory of the papal party, with the archbishop of Salzburg first among them, in the Investiture Crisis in the eastern Alps led to them “losing all their previous power.” The Crisis in the first decade of the twelfth century also led to consolidation by the Spanheims. Numerous ruling noble families of the Central and Late Middle Ages in the wider eastern Alpine area either descended from the “line of Hemma” or benefited from their rich heritage. These include the noble Pris family of Puchs and their descendants the counts of Weichselburg (Višnja Gora), the counts of Haimburg, the counts of Plain and counts of Pfannberg, and perhaps also the Freiherren of Sanegg (Žovnek), the later counts of Cilli.

This was how the basic land-owning structure became established in modern-day Slovene territory by the end of the eleventh century, though of course it was subject to continual change. It was also at this time that the historical processes encompassed by terms such as colonisation, Germanisation, and assimilation, as well as feudalisation at the very lowest levels of society began to develop in Slovene territory. Their common feature was that they took place within seigneuries. The main tendency of these processes, which did not develop separately, but were continually interweaving, was for individual lords to increase the return on their extensive newly acquired estates, which were cultivated by the local Slavic population. The first step in this direction was the introduction in Bavarian and other German lands of the already tested mansus system (German: hube, hufe), which produced a larger return in combination with triennial fallow rotation. The establishment of farms in Slovene territory was related to the dismantling of the previous Slavic economic and social structures, which, according to the most acceptable hypotheses, took the following form: a Slavic higher nobility and lower nobility (kosezi) possessed manors and were recognised as nobles with private property even according to western, Frankish-Bavarian concepts, while the remainder of the population was organised into župe under župani. This was a much less formal concept of shared land that had developed differently from the western European model despite a very extensive economy; this land was not considered as under ownership, and hence was deemed
royal property. In contrast to Slavic manors, to which recipients of seigneurial territories had no rights, the wide sweeping process of establishing seigneuries incorporated the lands of the župe for which there was no recognised private ownership. The population of the župe had to submit to a new economic system, where the land was reorganised and returned to its previous users in the form of mansi. Since the local population was often too small to effect the desired colonisation, the seigneur brought settlers in from elsewhere, though generally from their own estates. The difference between the local and the introduced settlers largely tallied with the difference between Slovene and German-speaking settlers. However, this did not play any great role in the settlement, as initially the economically more advantageous areas with better climate, such as plains, valleys and hilly areas, were settled more intensely by both groups of settlers. Only later, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, did colonisation spread into the mountainous, harder to access, economically less attractive and more forested areas.

The colonisation-related migration of a German-speaking agrarian population also led to the Germanisation of a large part of the territory that had been settled in the tenth century predominantly by predecessors of modern-day Slovenes. Due to the fully understandable focus of colonisation on more favourable areas of settlement and living, Germanisation, which was the consequence of this economically based process of shaping the cultural landscape, did not expand from the ethnic border towards the interior, but rather German settlers ‘leapfrogged’ over the Slavic settlement areas in the mountainous areas of upper Carinthia and upper Styria into the basins and valleys of lower Carinthia and middle Styria. Only on that basis did two homogenous ethnic blocs (Slovene to the south, German to the north) develop in the Late Middle Ages, after the conclusion of higher altitude colonisation which largely spread from the nearest valleys, the previously ethnically mixed territory. A linguistic border developed between the two groups that remained essentially stable from the end of the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. It ran along the Gailtal Alps to the Dobratch Massif, turning past Villach to the Ossiacher Tauern, then north from Maria Saal to Magdalensberg, then forward to the Saualpe and Koralpe, and then tracing the north side of the foot of Slovenske Gorice to Radgona. Another concept that can be added to colonisation and migration is assimilation. This means that the ethnic element that quantitatively predominated in the older cores of settlement started to predominate across the entire region, which the continued existence of individual linguistic islands did nothing to change. However, the linguistic islands created by the later high-altitude colonisation (rovtarska kolonizacija) remained far longer than those in open countryside; not because they were settled later but
because they were more isolated. The Slovene name derives from the term *rovt*, a cleared area of forest in less accessible, higher altitude areas, which also gives its names to one of the major Slovene dialect groups. Specific terms relating to this colonisation and the related ethnic process are the Slavic and Bavarian *mansi* (*hoba sclavanisca, hoba bavarica*), which according to previous understanding expresses the two-tier nature of the settlers of the time – with Slavic *mansi* corresponding to those held by indentured servants (*hoba servilis*), and the Bavarian *mansi* to those held by freemen (*hoba libera*), which were also larger. In fact it is probably just an ethnic differentiation, existing only in areas with a mixed ethnic structure.

In order to gain a simpler and, above all, a more tangible insight into these complex processes, the Škofja Loka seigneury of the Freising bishops in Carniola serves as a sound example. The Freising Škofja Loka seigneury is the most suited of all seigneuries in the Slovene territory for studying a number of historical processes at the micro-level: the quality of the sources is very satisfactory and covers the span from the royal grants of the tenth and eleventh centuries via numerous documents to a continuing series of urbarial records from the Central and Late Middle Ages; in the historiography, the seigneury is treated in an exemplary and thorough manner; furthermore, the Škofja Loka seigneury was a unitary territory covering a notable 500 km², which is also quite representative of the Slovene settlement area in terms of its geographical structures.

The roots of the seigneury go back to 973 when Emperor II granted Abraham, the bishop of Freising – the same bishop in whose pontificale (a book of episcopal liturgy) the Freising Manuscripts were written – two gifts comprising a large, unitary territorial complex in the centre of Carniola. The continued consolidation and subsequent gifts that followed in the first half of the eleventh century enlarged the Freising Škofja Loka seigneury, combining separate estates into a cogent whole, such that later it experienced little change in terms of territory. The seigneury was essentially composed of very productive flatlands in the heart of upper Carniola, south of the Sava between Kranj and Škofja Loka and of two valleys that reached into the hilly, pre-Alpine world. The centre of the seigneury, Škofja Loka, developed at the confluence of the rivers flowing down the two valleys, at a point where the westerly hilly region opened up east towards the flatlands. These flatlands lay on the route (*via Chreinariorum*) leading from the Karavanke passes towards Pannonia and Croatia. It was also the meeting place for routes leading west via both valleys and via the passes to the watershed between the Sava and the Soča (Isonzo). Both were of some importance for traffic between Friuli (particularly Cividale) and the western regions. Although the seigneury was never exempt from the public jurisdiction of the margrave and hence of the prince of Carniola, the
Freising bishops had completely free reign within the seigneury in terms of economic and administrative measures. On this basis, the bishops could lead a systematic colonisation process, the purpose of which was to intensify the economy of the acquired territories. First, they had to replace the structure of very extensive arable farming established by the existing Slavic population with the more intensive mansus system. The land, particularly on the flatlands and wider parts of the two valleys was reorganised, returned to its previous users in the form of mansi and co-ordinated into new administrative units – probably based around the old centres of the župe – which were administered by supp ani (župani). Older Latin texts refer to such units as officia, while more recent German and Slovene texts use the terms Supp and župa. However, the local population was soon insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the new colonisation process, and so the Freising bishop brought in new settlers from other areas. The balance of this successful and intense 150 year-long effort is seen in the Noticia Bonorum de Lonka, the oldest urbarial record from modern-day Slovene territory (1160). By that time, the seigneury comprised over 300 mansi and similar units; the highest estimates put the total population of the seigneury at 2,300, though in all likelihood it was lower. Of these people, more than one third were from elsewhere. The local Slavs (Sclavi) occupied just under 160 mansi, largely in the two valleys. The bishop allowed settlers from Bavaria (Bauuari) – probably from the Friesing estates there – to settle in the flatlands, and to occupy over 90 mansi, which were later organised as a special Bavarian officium. A smaller group of settlers came from Carinthia (Carentani) and settled near the hillier ground on around 15 mansi. The Carinthian group largely comprised Slavs from Freising estates in Carinthia, probably around Wörthersee.

In less than 150 years, by 1291 when the next land survey was made on the Škofja Loka seigneury, colonisation had advanced so quickly that it was almost complete. All available land that could be cultivated had already been divided. The next two medieval land surveys – in 1318 and 1501 – indicate only minimal growth of new mansi compared to 1291. From 1160 to 1291, the number of mansi increased almost fourfold (from around 300 to 1,181). The flatlands where the Bavarians had settled were already so completely settled at that time, that there was not even space for one more mansus in the following centuries. This turned the colonising process towards the interior of the two valleys, and even into hills up to 1,200 m above sea level. The settlers involved in this remote high-altitude colonisation were usually recruited from the surplus valley population, so it did not lead to changes in the ethnic structure. This is also generally true of the Škofja Loka seigneury – with one exception. In the final quarter of the thirteenth century, the Freising bishop allowed farmers from Innichen in
the Puster valley, in modern-day East Tyrol, which had been in Freising hands since the end of the eighth century, to settle in the far western hilly edge of one of the two valleys (Selška Dolina). The mountainous and remote nature of this area undoubtedly played a decisive role in ensuring that the German community retained its linguistic identity into the nineteenth century. The older and more numerous Bavarian settlement on the flatlands of the Škofja Loka seigneury had succumbed to the process of assimilation early, although at the end of the sixteenth century the German population was still strong enough for the parish priest to be preaching in Slovene and German. Even the polymath Johann Wiechard Valvasor reports in the second half of the seventeenth century that in his time in Bitnje, a place founded and deliberately settled by Bavarians, people spoke a unique mix of Slovene and German. He offers the following sentence as an example: “Nim du mreža, ich die puša, wermer tiča fangen” (cf. Slovene: Ti vzemi mrežo, jaz pa puško, bova ptiče lovila) The meaning is “you take the net, I’ll take the rifle, and we’ll hunt birds,” where nim, du, ich, die, wermer and fangen are German words, the rest Slovene.

The most tenacious group was the Gotschee (Kočevje) Germans, descendants of German-speaking settlers who had deforested and settled the Kočevje region in the fourteenth century, who retained their cultural and linguistic identity until their ill-fated resettlement during the Second World War. This was the largest German-speaking agrarian colony in the Late Middle Ages in Carniola; it was founded under the leadership of the counts of Ortenburg, the seigneurs of the territory. They introduced the first settlers in the 1330s, from their estates in upper Carinthia. The initially small number of German settlements soon multiplied when, in around 1350, Emperor Charles IV granted the count of Ortenburg 300 families of rebellious Frankish and Thuringian farmers.

FROM MARCHES TO LÄNDER

The Middle Ages was a period without national consciousness and national identity in today’s understanding of those terms. Instead, in the early Middle Ages there was a very strong sense of identification with a specific tribe (gens) and later to a specific territory (terra), most accurately referred to by the German term Land (plural: Länder). Both kinds of identification were linked to the forms with which the law of a specific community was exercised. Under the earlier tribal law, the personal principle applied, with each individual carrying their own law with them. Later, as the Land and its law prevailed, the territorial principle developed, according to which a law applied to a specific territory, regardless of the
tribal identity of the individual, a principle that still applies today. For the people of the wider central European region during the Middle Ages, Länderei provided the framework within which their lives took place. This applied particularly to legal, political and military life, and to religious life too from the time of the Reformation. Since the Länderei developed from a base that was independent of ethnic or national identity, the consciousness of belonging to an individual Land, which was not generally an ethnically homogeneous unit, was much more important at that time than ethnic identity. A good illustration of this – though from a later period – is the polymath Johann Wiechard Valvasor: by birth his origins lay in Bergamo in northern Italy; in his writing he was above all a German; he spoke German and Slovene, and lived in a Land where most of the people were Slovene; and he identified himself as a Carniolan. Certain parts of his Latin correspondence with the prestigious group of scientists, the Royal Society of London, of which he was a member, are particularly illustrative in this regard. In 1685, he mentions the Idrija mine and Lake Cerknica “in my homeland, that is Carniola.” The following year, he wrote: “We have some animals, known in German as Bilch, and in our Carniolan language as polhi,” and the following year: “This lake was known to ancient writers as Lugea palus, more recently Lacus Lugeus, to today’s Latin writers it is Cirknizensis, to Germans Zirknitzer See, and to us Carniolans it is Cerkniško jezero.” Valvasor’s homeland – as well as the homeland of each and every upper or lower Carniolan peasant, both Slovene and German speaking – was Carniola. Valvasor created an impressive and lasting testament to Carniola in his historical and ethnographical work Glory of the Duchy of Carniola, the work that was to leave him bankrupt.

The formation of the Länderei in the Middle Ages is one of the most important results of historical development within the large area framed by the medieval Roman-German empire. The eventual result of this development can be seen in today’s German and Austrian constitutional federalism, while in Slovenia the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1918 and the establishment of a national state also signalled the end of the historical Länderei, though a powerful identification with the Land has remained to this day among Slovenes in the form of regional identity.

A Land was more of a political than a geographical concept, and as such is a category of constitutional law. The extent of the Land depended on the sphere across which its laws (the territorial law) applied i.e. the legal norms recognised by the nobility, the political stratum with decision-making power. The ruler of a Land, or prince, was a person who had succeeded in establishing judicial and military authority over the territorial nobility. The former was expressed by presiding over the territorial court of nobles (Landschranngericht), the latter
involved command of the army of nobles. The path to princely authority was neither short, nor simple. The starting point can be found in the large complexes of land held by individual feudal lords (counts, margraves, dukes). These figures, also known also territorial lords or seigneurs, exercised various forms of jurisdiction on their territory that would to modern understanding belong exclusively to the state. They were responsible for law and order, and exercised lower judicial authority, as well as the right to exercise high justice, or blood justice. They maintained their own armed forces, largely comprising lower nobility (ministerials and knights), and some also minted their own coinage and founded towns. This meant that a number of essential spheres of jurisdiction were not held by the state. Territorial seigneuries were, therefore, the main bearers of particular law, yet also the starting points for unification, as some territorial seigneurs, by fair means or foul, used the power at their disposal to eliminate all competitors for princely authority. If de facto jurisdiction over individual seigneuries was combined with the formal function of holder of public authority in a region delegated by the state (particularly via the office of margrave or duke), then this generally led to the faster transformation of a territorial seigneur into the prince of a Land.

Relations between the king and the nobility in each Land were embodied in relations between the prince and the territorial nobility, with the Länder essentially functioning as states within the state. In that sense, even the Habsburgs, who held the crowns of the Roman-German king and emperor almost without interruption from the mid-fifteenth century to the start of the nineteenth century, did not rule over the ‘Slovene’ Länder as kings or emperors, but as princes. It was therefore the Land – and not the Roman-German empire – which provided the framework within which the (early) modern state i.e. the state or polity of the Estates (Ständesstaat), appeared and was consolidated.

The appearance of the Länder was connected to a major social process that led to the appearance of a legally unified territorial nobility. Previously, in around the twelfth century, there were two main categories of nobility. On one side were the free lords (Freiherren), relatively few in number, including the dynasties of counts and dukes such as the houses of Andechs, Spanheim, Babenberg, Traungau, Gorizia, Ortenburg, and Haimburg, as well as houses such as those of Sanegg (Žovnec), Weichselburg (Višnja Gora), Scharffenberg (Svibno) or the original house of Auersperg (Turjak). The second, and far more numerous group, were the ‘unfree’, lower nobility, the ministerials and knights. These received noble estates from a free lord as a benefice, primarily for military service (ministerium). Their status was characterised by a personal dependence on their lord, which was expressed in ways such as ministerials and knights requiring their lord’s permission to marry. In relation to the
appearance of the Länder in the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth, only a few of the free noble houses succeeded in establishing princely authority – i.e. military and judicial authority over the entire nobility of a specific territory – regardless of their previous status. Now the entire nobility in a Land were equal in their relations with the prince, while the few free noble houses which had not died out, but which had failed to successfully achieve princely authority, retained their free status. In contrast, the wide set of privileges the ministerials and knights gained due to their importance as a social group gradually increased their personal freedom, making them equal with the older free nobility. In legal terms, a single, territorial nobility developed in relation to the prince, for whom the Slovene term deželani (deschelany) meaning ‘people of the Land’ is attested in the mid-sixteenth century. The territorial nobility formed the decisive core of the later Estates of the Land, and were the main bearers of Land identity.

Each Land developed in its own way, with major differences in main areas of development as well as the timescale of the change from fragmented territories into Länder. Nevertheless, the processes they underwent did share a common starting point across the wider Slovene region, which can be traced to the formation in the middle of the tenth century of the string of border marches to the east and to the south of the Duchy of Carinthia. This was to form the basis from which the individual historical Länder would develop.

Styria

In its later extent, the Land of Styria (Štajerska) spread across the March of Savinja, the March of Drava, and the March of Mura (Carantanian March), yet its origins are primarily connected to the latter. Between 970 and 1035, the Eppensteiners established themselves as the first margraves of the Carantanian March, which originally covered a relatively small band of territory along the middle course of the Mura river, from Bruck in the north to Radgona in the south. As duke of Carinthia (1012–1035) and margrave of the Carantanian March, Adalbero re-established the link between the duchy and the march that was inherent in its name (the Carantanian March). After his political defeat in 1035, the counts of Wells-Lambach took control of the Carantanian March, finally separating it from Carinthia. At the same time, four counties along the upper Enns and Mura rivers (later to be known as upper Styria) became more closely linked with the march. Between 1050 and 1056, the margravate passed to a new higher noble house, the Traungauers or Otakars. Like their ancestors, the Otakars also first ruled the march from Traungau. Their estates reached north as far as the
Danube from the centre of their power, Steyr castle (Styraburg) in the Traun river basin. It was due to this castle that the Otakars were also known as Styrian margraves (marchiones Stirenses). Although this referred to their margravate authority south of the Alps, in the march along the Mura’s middle course, over time it overshadowed their Carantanian name. The power the Otakars derived from their estates, castles and ministerial forces north of the Alps was far more important than the power derived from their office in the march. Only favourable circumstances connected to three successive, large inheritances, enabled this dynasty of margraves to forge a powerful territorial seigneury in the march itself, on the basis of which they were able to act as territorial princes. By far the most decisive and the richest inheritance in the house’s fortunate run of bequests were the lands received in 1122 when the Eppenstein line died out, the most valuable of which were the relatively unitary and contiguous areas along the upper Mura, and south of there around Judenburg, Voitsberg and along the Mürz river. This inheritance made Leopold the Strong (fortis, 1122–1129; though he may equally have been known as felix), who had inherited his father’s titles the same year, the most powerful lord in his margravate in terms of estates and military retinue. His new status allowed him to begin applying pressure to the free nobles in the march, subordinating them as his ministerials. His son and successor Otakar III (1129–1164) continued this policy with even greater success. In 1147, Bernhard (of Maribor), a Spanheim, died in Asia Minor on the Second Crusade. He was the founder of a monastery at Viktring, near Klagenfurt, which had a large estate along the Slovene Drava basin. His bequest brought Otakar important ministerial noble families on Slovene soil, and important seigneuries, including Radgona, Maribor and Laško. To the south, their lordship expanded to the Drava-Savinja watershed, while their Laško seigneury, which at the time was part of Carniola, reached as far as the Sava.

To the north, the Otakars inherited the county of Pitten, north of Semmering, from the Formbachs in 1158, where, two years later, Otakar III founded the special hospital at Spital am Semmering, which had the express task of improving the freight route there by turning it into a proper road. As the first prince of the medieval German state, he acquired regalian rights over mining that had previously only been held by the crown, and he also held the right to mint coins. It is probably not coincidental that, in the year the Formbach inheritance was acquired, Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa addressed Otakar III with the title princeps, prince. Otakar also wrote of the “march under my sway” (marchia mee ditionis). All these changes indicate that by 1160 the Traungauer had achieved the status of princes of the Land. This was strengthened by their enfeoffment in 1156 of one of last free noble houses, the lords of Stübing, who owned the castle and seigneury of Graz. It was in Graz that Otakar III founded a
new centre for the Land with a princely court, and judicial court for the nobles of Graz. The Land law used to adjudicate in the Graz territorial court was only written down at the end of the fourteenth century, yet its shaping in the form of customary law can be dated to the twelfth century, as it already mentioned in the Georgenberg Pact of 1186 (ius provincie). The original document, preserved to this day in Graz, is one of the basic documents of the Styrian constitution, and came about as part of the preparations to change the ducal dynasty. Otakar III was succeeded by his son Otakar IV, who was raised to the status of duke of Styria (dux Stirie) in 1180 and his territory to the Duchy of Styria (ducatus Stirie); the new duchy took its name from the Otakar’s principal castle in Traungau. However, the Otakars were not to be spared a typical medieval epilogue, and died out at the height of their power and fame (a fate that would strike Slovene territory again with the death of Ulrich II of Cilli in 1456, bringing an end of the counts of Cilli). The young duke of Styria was unable to have children due to the leprosy, and as part of the protocol introduction to the Georgenberg Pact indicates, he was well aware of his approaching death and the fact that he was the last of the Otakar line. He therefore named the duke of Austria from the Babenberg dynasty as his successor, while at the same time guaranteeing the rights of the ministerials he had raised to the highest ranks during the establishment of the Land in the Georgenberg Pact. Within the Duchy of Styria, acquired by the Babenbergs in 1192, and ruled until they died out in 1246, ministerials became part of the Land as they were entitled to the same rights as the nobles of the Land. Styria was the first and the quickest duchy to develop into a Land in the entire eastern Alpine region. This primacy over neighbouring regions is evidenced by the fact that the Land charters issued separately in 1338 for Carniola and Carinthia stated that the nobility of the two Länder should act according to the laws of the Styrian nobility in cases not defined by the two pacts. Styrian law therefore became an auxiliary source for the law of Carinthia and Carniola.
Carinthia

Carinthia’s development into a *Land* was very different from the process in Styria. Although Carinthia became a duchy over two centuries before Styria, it only developed into a *Land* towards the end of the Middle Ages, since as strong as the Duchy of Carinthia appeared in 976, it was also ephemeral. In the hundred years until 1077, when the Eppensteiners became hereditary Carinthian dukes, Carinthia had ten dukes and the office changed hands twelve times. Few of them, except Adalbero of Eppenstein (1012–1035), carried much weight in the ducy. Some had no contact with Carinthia, and not all had properties there. They did not generally issue documents as dukes of Carinthia, and some did not even visit ‘their’ duchy. The honour and title of duke of Carinthia served primarily to achieve the rank of imperial prince, and liberate their Frankish or Swabian estates from local ducal jurisdiction. The authority they did have in Carinthia was restricted by the *waltpoto*, who administered royal lands in the region, and in some ways also watched over the duke himself; the term itself, a colloquial form of the German *Gewalt-bote*, means exactly the same as the *missus domini regis* of the Carolingian period i.e. the king’s special envoy and plenipotentiary. The first holder of this office in Carinthia, attested between 965 and 1027, was Hartwik, who was also a Bavarian count-palatinate, and the closest confidant of Otto I and Otto II. The wealthy estate he acquired from this position passed via his two daughters to the counts of Haimburg on the one hand, and on the other to the Aribones, founders of abbeys at Göss in modern-day Austrian Styria (1020) and Millstatt (c. 1077) in Carinthia (the counts of Gorizia, who would later become the largest landowners in upper Carinthia also had familial ties with the Aribones). In Carinthia, the key positions of power were not held by dukes, but by the ecclesiastical and lay holders of royal land. Of the latter, the archdiocese of Salzburg and diocese of Bamberg were particularly important. During the Central Middle Ages, Salzburg, which had been making inroads into the district since the Carantanian mission of the mid-eighth century, controlled all the major routes leading north via the Felbertauern, Katschberg and Friesach. Friesach, Carinthia’s major town until the end of the thirteenth century, was so powerfully fortified that contemporary accounts are more reminiscent of a royal seat than an archbishop’s, and from the mid-twelfth century it minted the Friesach pfennig, which played a leading role in the currency circulating in the southeastern Alpine region.

The founding in 1007 of the Frankish diocese of Bamberg was equally important to Carinthian history. It was founded by King Henry II, who bestowed rich estates on the bishopric – the last of the crown lands on the territory of present-day Carinthia – with the
strategically important Villach being of particular value. A bridge over the Drava there is mentioned in 878, and in 979 a castle, manor and church are recorded in what remains to this day Carinthia’s most important traffic junction. It gave Bamberg control over the ‘diagonal passage’ via the Val Canale into Italy and the route between all of eastern Carinthia and the upper Drava and Gail valleys, and also the route to the upper Sava valley via the Wurzenpass. Henry IV’s grant of market rights in 1060 removed Villach from the jurisdiction of the Carinthian duke, and was one of the legal foundations for Bamberg retaining immediate status and extraterritoriality for all its Carinthian holdings till 1535. Like the Bamberg Carinthian possessions, the holdings of the counts of Gorizia in the then upper Carinthia centred on Lienz in present-day East Tyrol, were part of the Duchy of Carinthia, but not part the Land of Carinthia, as the duke of Carinthia had no jurisdiction over them as a territorial prince. The nobles there, in the ‘Outer County of Gorizia’, recognised the counts of Gorizia as their territorial lords. The county of Ortenburg on the middle course of the Drava, with its centre at Spittal, and the (titular) county of Sternberg, east of Villach, had the same status between 1436 and 1456. Both counties were inherited by the counts of Cilli when the Ortenburgs died out in 1418. Shortly before that, their seigneuries had become imperial fiefs. The counts of Cilli also acquired the Ortenburgs’ seigneuries in Carniola. When the Counts of Cilli were raised to the status of imperial princes in 1436, the counties of Ortenburg-Sternberg became part of the Cilli principality and Land, and were detached from the Land of Carinthia.

Given the role of the church and nobility as the predominate powers, the dukes of Carinthia had little opportunity to develop the strong territorial supremacy needed to later achieve jurisdiction over the duchy as territorial prince. Only in 1077, when the Eppensteiners became dukes of Carinthia once more (following Adalbero from 1012 to 1035), did a breakthrough in ducal power over Carinthia finally become possible and even probable. Liutold of Epenstein’s accession brought the title of duke of Carinthia to a higher noble house from the duchy, a house which also had significant holdings there, primarily in the east, in present-day upper Styria, where the castle after which they were named stood on the upper Mura. The Eppensteiners were the first dukes whose interests were primarily focused on Carinthia itself, which now gained a hereditary ducal dynasty for a lengthy period for the first time since becoming a separate duchy. Liutold was succeeded in 1090 by his brother Henry, who was already the margrave of Istria and advocate of the Aquileian patriarchate. A third brother, Ulrich, first abbot at the renowned St. Gallen, became the patriarch of Aquileia in 1086, and hence held jurisdiction as count in Friuli. In 1093, Emperor Henry IV granted him the March of Carniola, which he had entrusted to the patriarch in 1077, but which he had
“later, following the poor counsel of advisors,” taken back from the Aquileian church. This led to the Eppensteiner holding a considerable concentration of power in the southeast of the empire, but following the death, in 1122, of Duke Henry, the house died out. Their successors, the house of Spanheim, gained the title of duke of Carinthia due to their ties with the Eppensteiner. Duke Henry had been the godfather of the first Spanheim, also Duke Henry, and his house would remain in power for almost 150 years (until 1269). They did not, however, acquire the Eppensteiner lands that were inherited by the Otakars, margraves of the Carantarian March. It was this acquisition that opened the way to the Otakars gaining jurisdiction as territorial princes over Styria, and with that the former Carantarian counties along the upper Mura and Enns were lost to Carinthia forever.

Spanheim power in this reduced duchy was largely restricted to the central area within the Sankt Veit-Klagenfurt-Völkermarkt triangle. The Spanheims only acquired the district around Sankt Veit from Bamberg in 1176, but they made it their first ducal market town, developing it into the ducal residence in the first half of the thirteenth century, and seat of the ducal and territorial courts. This made it the Carinthian ‘capital’, although this court never had jurisdiction over the entire area of the duchy, or later of the Land of Carinthia. By the time Carinthia had completed its development into a Land during the sixteenth century, its centre was already Klagenfurt. In 1518 the prince of Carinthia – Emperor Maximilian I – donated the town to the Carinthian Estates, who moved their seat from Sankt Veit, where in 1515 the burghers had supported a peasant uprising. Klagenfurt became the second ducal market town, and began to establish its position during the long rule of Duke Bernhard (1202–1256). Klagenfurt is first mentioned as a town (civitas) together with Völkermarkt, the third ducal market, in a document from 1252. Bernhard was the first Spanheim to deliberately build princely authority; he was the first to identify himself as prince and judge (iudex et princeps eiusdem terre), and towards the end of the century there is also mention of Carinthian territorial law (ius terrae), to which documents from the first decades of the fourteenth century make frequent reference. However, the powerful position of Salzburg, Bamberg and the counts of Gorizia, as well as the counts of Ortenburg and Haimburg, meant that the Spanheims were unable to exercise territorial supremacy as princes within the entire duchy. Like the Eppensteiners – in 1121 after defeat at Krapfeld, the seventy-year-old Duke Henry II of Carinthia was made to appear barefoot in a linen shirt before the archbishop and his forces obliged to beg for his excommunication to be lifted (the example of Canossa clearly still held weight) – they were unable to enforce their interests at the expense of rivals, and unable to acquire Salzburg’s Carinthian holdings. In 1227, even the most important and most powerful
Spanheim, Duke Bernhard, tasted defeat in an attempt to acquire Bamberg Villach. Success would have created a geographical link to his Friulian and Carniolan possessions, while also weakening the dominant position of the Andechs-Meraner, the house holding the positions of bishop of Bamberg, patriarch of Aquileia, and margrave of Istria and Carniola at that time. Because of the weakness of their position in Carinthia, the Spanheims developed the centre of their territorial lordship outside the duchy. They moved southward, to the Slovene Drava basin (which the Otakars would inherit from them in 1147), into Istria, (where they were margraves from 1107 to 1173), partially into Friuli (where they ‘founded’ a monastery at Rosazzo), and primarily into Carniola, where they held two large complexes of estates centred on Ljubljana and Kostanjevica na Krki. Here, Bernhard’s son, Ulrich III of Carinthia, succeeded in acquiring the Andechs-Weichselburg (Višnja Gora) inheritance in 1248 and becoming “lord of Carniola” (dominus Carniolae). However, on his death in 1269, the Spanheims lost the title of duke of Carinthia, which they had held for so long. The last Spanheim, Ulrich’s brother Philip, was first elected archbishop of Salzburg, and then also patriarch of Aquileia; he did not allow himself to be consecrated as such in the hope he would acquire the duchy of Carinthia, yet he was outplayed in manoeuvring for that title by his maternal cousin Ottokar II Přemysl, the Bohemian king and duke of Austria and Styria, who also acquired Carinthia and Carniola on Ulrich’s death.

After the fall of Ottokar Přemysl in 1278, the title of duke of Carinthia passed to the counts of Gorizia-Tyrol, who held it until 1335. Like the first dukes in the latter part of the tenth century, the Duchy of Carinthia elevated them to the status of imperial princes, yet this was merely a side issue for this important house. Meinhard, who was enthroned as duke of Carinthia according to the ancient rite on 1 September 1286, was from the line of counts who took their name from Gorizia (Grafen von Görz in German, Goriški grofje in Slovene), on the middle course of the Soča (Isonzo). When the Gorizian dynasty had divided its lands in 1271, he received Tyrol, where he established princely authority, while his brother Albert took control of all the remaining Gorizian estates. These included all the house’s possessions in Carinthia, on the basis of which the Albertiner – but not the Meinhardiner – counts of Gorizia had territorial supremacy over upper Carinthia as princes. In the three hundred years from the removal of Adalbero of Eppenstein until the Gorizia-Tyrol house died out, no real progress was achieved in the development of the duchy of Carinthia into a Land. Little changed during the first century of Habsburg dominion over Carinthia. On the contrary, when in 1436 the principality and Land of Cilli began its rise, including acquisition of the Ortenburg lands in upper Carinthia, it seemed that Carinthia might even collapse completely. The primacy of the
Land’s prince over the church and nobility, which had held such a decisive influence over the fate of Carinthia, would only be achieved in the second half of the fifteenth century. Only then did a significant increase in Habsburg power take place, related to the reacquisition, almost permanent, of the German imperial crown, and the fall of the Counts of Cilli. The Peace of Pusarnitz, agreed at a small village north of Spittal an der Drau in January 1460, ended the struggle for the Cilli inheritance that followed the murder of Ulrich II of Cilli in Belgrade, as the counts of Gorizia conceded to Emperor Frederick III. This not only handed the Habsburgs the Cilli lands in Carinthia and elsewhere, but also – with the exception of the Puster valley – the entire Outer County of Gorizia, including Lienz, which was then returned to the counts of Gorizia in pledge. This was the decisive event in the establishment of the Land of Carinthia, doubling the princely territory and princely jurisdiction of the Land in one move. In 1535, the Bamberg estates were incorporated into the Land of Carinthia, which finally achieved the territorial unity of the duchy; credit for this final step lay largely with the Estates and a very strong ‘national’ or Land consciousness, rather than with the Habsburgs. In a dispute that culminated in the issue of whether the Bamberg holdings were in any way subordinate to Carinthian princely jurisdiction, the administrator of the Land, Veit Welzer, justified the Carinthian position in 1523 by stating that the “Carinthian archduchy ... derived from antiquity from a foreign and not a German nation, and compared to other duchies of the German nation (the German state) it was endowed with special freedoms and customs.” Here he was, of course, referring to the famous enthronement ceremony of the dukes of Carinthia.

Although over 100 years had passed – when Welzer was writing – since Ernst the Iron had been the last duke of Carinthia to undergo the ancient custom (in 1414), the ceremony’s two material symbols, the Prince’s Stone and ducal throne, preserved to the present day, still bore living witness to a “ceremony that one does not hear the like of anywhere else,” as the humanist Enea Silvio Piccolomini – later Pope Pius II – wrote in the middle of the fifteenth century. At least since the installation of Meinhard, the Gorizia-Tyrol count in 1286, the ceremony had involved the duke appearing before a Slovene peasant, a kosez, sat upon the Prince’s Stone. When the peasant received an affirmative response from his retinue to the question of whether the duke was a fair judge, whether he cared for the well-being of the duchy, whether he was a freeman, and a respecter and defender of the Christian faith, the peasant ceded the stone to his ‘equal’ (the duke was dressed in peasant attire), symbolically conferring jurisdiction over the duchy. The new duke would have already received the duchy of Carinthia from the crown as a fief, but only after the ceremony, which took place at Karnburg where the stone was located, and which was sealed by the duke’s oath, did the
bishop of Gurk give the duke his blessing during a mass at the church of Maria Saal. After noon, the duke was then able to distribute fiefs from the ducal throne at Zollfeld.

The fact that an ordinary peasant symbolically handed over power to the duke was so remarkable because it was so different from the customs, understanding and mentality of the late medieval world. For this reason, the whole ceremony seemed “fun and games” to the retinue of Otto of Habsburg, enthroned in 1335. It also led Frederick III, who found the peasant ritual too humiliating for his royal dignity, to avoid the enthronement in 1443 following lengthy negotiations with the Carinthian Estates, effectively bringing an end to the longstanding tradition. Yet the ceremony would continue to attract the attention of many writers, including famed French jurist, Jean Bodin, who introduced the enthronement ceremony to discourse on the theory of sovereignty. Later, it became a case study for the social contract theory stating that a monarchy derived its authority from the people. Thomas Jefferson, principle author of the Declaration of Independence and later president of the United States, became familiar with the enthronement ceremony via Bodin’s work. The fact that the ceremony already seemed archaic by the late Middle Ages clearly indicates that the roots of the enthronement, which underwent many changes over its lengthy existence, lie in pre-feudal times, and that it was a remnant of the old tribal constitution of the Carantanians. This is also confirmed by the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum which reports that the Carantanians first “made” Gorazd, and then Hotimir, their prince.

Carniola

As with Carinthia, the development of Carniola into a Land was very late. And just as Carinthia’s history was rooted in that of Carantania, the tradition of the Ottonian March of Carniola, first mentioned in 973, went back via the Frankish county to the tribal principality of the Carniolans. Yet, while the early medieval Carniola probably stretched as far as the Savinja river basin, as well as the Sava basin, Ottonian Carniola included only present-day upper Carniola (Gorenjska), Ljubljana and surroundings, and eastern inner Carniola (Notranjska). Most of present-day lower Carniola (Dolenjska), from the Sava to the lower Krka valley, belonged to the March of Savinja. Until around 1000, the Carniolan margrave was subject to the jurisdiction of a Bavarian or Carinthian duke, later, directly to the crown. Being raised to an imperial march introduced rapid changes to Carniola. At that time, strategic positions in Carniola were held by the Ebersbergs, a house named after their castle to the east of Munich. They were one of the most important higher noble dynasties in the south of the
empire, and their power becomes more evident in the sources in the second half of the tenth century. The Ebersbergs’ connections with Carniola probably reached back to the Carolingian period. The majority opinion among historians is that the protection of the “Carantanian border”, which Emperor Arnulf entrusted to Ratold of Ebersberg, meant the upper Sava river basin. This assumption is confirmed by the powerful subsequent position of the Ebersbergs in the region, and their familial ties provide further supporting evidence. In 1011, when Henry II gave the Brixen church a second royal grant relating to Bled, the Carniolan margrave was Ratold’s nephew Ulrich (d. 1029). When Freising received the two major grants constituting the Loka seigneury in 973, the Carniolan margrave was Ulrich’s brother-in-law, Pabo, while Ulrich’s other sister was married to Markquard of Eppenstein. Ulrich was, therefore, the uncle of Adalbero, the duke of Carinthia and margrave of the Carantanian March. It was as a direct result of Adalbero’s murder (in 1036) of Hemma’s husband, the margrave of Savinja, Wilhelm II, that the March of Savinja came under the sway and the jurisdiction of the Carniolan margrave – probably already under Ulrich’s son and successor, Eberhard. The imperial policy that had given royal grants of land to the margravial dynasty, rather than to the office of margrave, to the extent that the allodial lands of the line of Hemma almost overlapped with the border of the march, was thus proved to have been short-sighted. The immense family heritage, the lion’s share of which belonged to the monastery and then to the diocese of Gurk, was fragmented, and there were no longer sufficient royal lands available in the March of Savinja for a grant to a new margrave, meaning that the material basis for the authority of a margrave in this march had been undermined. By 1058, under Eberhard’s successor, Ulrich I of Weimar-Orlamünde – the grandson of Eberhard’s sister, Williburg, who was married to Weriand (Wecelin), count of Friuli and Istria – places in old Savinja territory were described as lying “in the March of Carniola, and in the county of Margrave Ulrich.”

From that time, the size of Carniola, which now stretched from the Karst passes of Hrušica and Javorniki in the west to the Savinja-Dravinja watershed in the east, had doubled. The incorporation of the March of Savinja explains the later-attested double name for Carniola: Carniola and the Slovene or Wendish March (Carniola et Marchia Sclavonica que vulgo Windismarch dicitur). The term Slovene March could refer to the old March of Savinja within the expanded Carniola, but was more frequently used to refer just to the territories of the former March of Savinja south of the Sava, that is modern-day lower Carniola (Dolenjska) between the Krka and Sava east of Ljubljana. Since Ulrich Weimar-Orlamünde was also margrave of Istria from 1061 at the latest, the three marches to the southeast of the empire were combined in a powerful dynastic polity that controlled the routes from Italy into the
central Danube area and the Balkans, and, it seems, that was also capable of taking the offensive against Croatia. It was probably during the war between the German and Hungarian kings, Henry IV and Bela I, in 1063, that eastern Kvarner (Quanero), and later Merania, were added to the Roman-German empire. This moved the empire’s border in Istria eastward, from the Raša river to the Rječina river east of Rijeka, where it was to remain for centuries. Ulrich’s uniting of the two margravial offices prefigured links that would be made and remade in the region on numerous occasions in the coming centuries. The first occasion was in 1077, when Henry IV granted the margravates Friuli, Istria, and Carniola into the “ownership and jurisdiction” of the church of Aquileia and its patriarch Sigeard, his former chancellor. This triple union was somewhat reminiscent of the Carolingian March of Friuli from the start of the ninth century, which extended as far as Pannonia to the east. Yet this was just a brief interlude. Aquileia soon lost Istria and Carniola again; in 1093, it was once more entrusted with the latter, but only regained Istria in 1208/10. By the start of the twelfth century, the Aquileian church had become the major landowner in Istria. In 1102, the son of the Istria-Carniolan margrave Ulrich (d. 1070), Ulrich II Weimar-Orlamünde, who had not succeeded his father as margrave, retreated from Istria to his family’s hereditary lands in Thüringen-Saxony, and left the Aquileian church almost all the family estates in Istria; all north and northeastern Istria, with more than ten castles.

The patriarchate had few estates in Carniola, and they were scattered from the upper Savinja valley in the east to the wider Cerknica region in inner Carniola (equating to Slovenia’s present-day region of Notranjska) to the west. And worse, the main Aquileian possession in Carniola, which lay near Lož and Cerknica, was extremely peripheral, and much better connected to Aquileian estates on the Karst and in Friuli than to the Carniolan hinterland. In stark contrast to the Styrian margraves, the Traungauer-Otakars, who, having acquired an extensive territorial seigneury, and brought numerous free noble families into subordination, managed to achieve territorial supremacy over a Land by the second half of the twelfth century, the Aquileian patriarchate allowed even the power it had held as margrave of Carniola to slip from its hands. In reality, it was representatives or deputies who ruled in Carniola, and the patriarch had to cede margravial jurisdiction and provide the Kranj fief to these deputies as a benefit of office.

We are very poorly informed about this form of governorship in Carniola. The history of the institution, initially linked, it seems, to the old March of Savinja territory within the expanded Carniola, probably stretches back to the end of the eleventh century or the start of the twelfth. On one side, it was based on the traditional independence of the March of Savinja
from the first half of the eleventh century, and on the other on the power, status and reputation 
that relatives of the old Savinjan margravial dynasty retained in the area down through three 
generations. It seems appropriate that Starchand II, a descendant of Hemma’s close relative 
Asquinus, who together with his brothers held most of the remaining estates that Hemma had 
not granted to the Gurk monastery, was the Carniolan margrave’s deputy in about 1100. He 
held the title of “margrave of Savinja” (*marchio de Soune*), but in a documented list of 
witnesses, which gives a clear picture of an individual’s relative social standing, he is not 
ranked as highly as would be expected for a true margrave. Similarly, the deputy of the Istrian 
margrave (again the Aquileian patriarch) from the final third of the thirteenth century 
continued to use the title *marchio*, though his status was only that of the patriarch’s official. In 
1311, the Savinja basin was still being described as a special landgraviate (*lantgrafschaft in 
dem Sewental*) within Carniola, and the margrave’s deputy could therefore also be called a 
landgrave. This dualism, whereby Carniola had two rulers – one, the patriarch, margrave only 
in name, and the other, the so-called ‘landgrave’, to whom the patriarch granted the 
margravate as a fief, is also attested by the fate of the Istrian margrave Henry IV of Andechs. 
Suspicious that he had collaborated in the murder of king Philip of Swabia led to the imperial 
princes reaching a judgment in the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt to deprive him of his two 
marches – Istria and Carniola. When the Aquileian patriarch showed on the basis of “authentic 
charters of privilege” that Istria belonged “to the church of Aquileia from an ancient grant 
from King Henry,” Emperor Otto IV granted it to Aquileia, while there was no mention of 
Carniola at all. Henry of Andechs lost more than Otto later redistributed as grants, since 
Carniola did not revert to the crown but to the figure who had granted it to the Andechs in 
fief: the patriarch of Aquileia.

Similarly, in 1261 the patriarch of Aquileia granted “full jurisdiction of the March of 
Carniola” (*tota iurisdictio marchie Carniole*) to Ulrich of Spanheim as a fief – that is full 
margravial authority – together with Kranj, as the margravial seat. This position meant that 
the Andechs’ style never included the title of margrave of Carniola, while they probably 
received landgrave status within Carniola after the middle of the twelfth century. By then, 
their possessions already included all of today’s eastern upper Carniola (Gorenjska) from 
Kokra river to Motnik and Trojane, centred on the castle of Kamnik, after which Berthold I of 
Andechs was already referred to as the “count of Kamnik” (*comes de Stain*) in 1145. At the 
same time the count Poppo II of Haimburg was probably a landgrave in Carniola, as he 
possessed Kranj and by 1141 he also held the title of “count of Kranj” (*comes de Creine*). At 
the same time, Poppo’s nephew, Günter of Hohenwart, held the title of margrave of Savinja
region and of Celje (marchio de Soune, marchio de Cylié), which not only indicates how the
counts of Haimburg came to possess Celje, but also suggests that the margrave probably had
two deputies in the first half of the twelfth century – one representing him in the old March of
Carniola, and one in the old March of Savinja – which were probably united under the
powerful Andechs.

Yet the power of the Andechs, who were accompanied from Bavaria by some of their
ministerials (e.g. the important Gal family, who made Carniola their new homeland), was still
too weak in Carniola in the final decades of the twelfth century – regardless of the fact that
they held the margravate of Istria – for them to start exercising and developing any form of
princely authority over the Land. Carniola, in which the church and nobility both held key
positions because of their extensive land complexes and various rights (from advocacy to
immunity), was territorially fragmented and divided between five large ecclesiastical
landowners (Salzburg, Freising, Brixen and Gurk, in addition to Aquileia) and a large number
of higher noble families. The most prominent among these, aside from the Andechs, were the
ducal Spanheims, the Styrian margraves Otakars or Traungauers, the counts of Ortenburg,
Haimburg, Bogen and Weichselburg (Višnja gora), and the free lords of Puchs, Auersperg
(Turjak) and Sanegg (Žovnec). Only three of these (the Ortenburgs, Auerspergs, and Saneggs)
survived the thirteenth century, but as long as there was such intense competition, any attempt
to attain princely authority over the land met major problems and opposition. No major
advance towards establishing Carniola as a Land had been made by the end of the twelfth
century, and it even seemed that the march had disintegrated and imperial power faded. The
initiative was taken by private forces, when a powerful offensive was launched in the south of
Carniola at the expense of Croatia or Hungary, which moved the Carniolan – and hence the
imperial – border southwards from the Gorjanci hills and the Krka river to the Kolpa, and
occupied Žumberk. This was achieved by the Puchs or the Weichselburgs and the Spanheims.
The former probably took control of White Carniola (the present-day Slovene region of Bela
Krajina, known as Weiβkrain or Weiße Mark in German) in the middle of the twelfth century.
The Weichselburg offensive must have started from Mehovo castle to the north of the
Gorjanci hills, since White Carniola – together with its market town of Črnomelj – had been
part of the Mehovo lordship for over a century. The Spanheims extended the border to
Bregana from their military stronghold of Kostanjec in lower Carniola. Since the public,
margravial authority was not at stake in this undertaking, in 1261 the tota iurisdictio marchie
Carniole granted to Ulrich of Spanheim by the patriarch of Aquileia still ended at the old
border i.e. the Krka river near Kostanjec.
At the turn of the thirteenth century, with the various rivals for princely authority in Carniola caught in a singular form of stalemate, the Istrian margrave and Carniolan ‘landgrave’ Henry IV of Andechs gradually gained the upper hand. The European reputation and power of the dynasty to which he belonged (most powerfully expressed by his sisters’ marriages: Agnes Maria was the wife of the French King Philip II Augustus, Gertrude, wife of King Andrew II of Hungary, while Hedwig married Henry I, the duke of Silesia; negotiations were also held in Niš in 1189 to marry an unnamed oldest sister to the nephew of Stefan Nemanja, the Serbian grand prince), placed his local policy in Carniola within a wider framework. A suitable marriage with Sophia of Weichselburg (Višnja gora) brought Henry IV of Andechs the large Weichselburg heritage, after the death of her father (after 1209). The core of this territory were the former possessions of Hemma, which stretched from the Weichselburg lands (excluding the estates left by the Weichselburgs to the new monastery at Stična in 1136), along the upper and middle course of the Krka river, down to White Carniola. Henry also added ecclesiastical fiefs to the territorial aggregations of his own and those acquired through marriage. The most notable of these were the Salzburg Krško on the Sava, the Freising market town of Otok near Krka river and the large Gurk seigneurly of Ljubek over Litija, which linked Henry’s possessions in upper and lower Carniola.

In the midst of these grandiose plans, Henry IV of Andechs was outlawed in 1208 due to his alleged participation in the murder of king Philip of Swabia. After the imperial princes judged him guilty of lèse majesté (*crimen laesae maiestatis*), he lost his fiefs, including jurisdiction as margrave of Istria and Carniola (which had been enfeoffed to him by the patriarch of Aquileia), as well as his own allodial possessions and his honour (*honor*). Yet nothing speaks more clearly of the medieval state’s lack of means to enforce its declared will than the fact that this ban failed. Despite these serious threats, Henry’s position remained secure. The patriarch of Aquileia was granted Istria, where he also began to exercise public authority, but in a document of 1209 issued from his capital of Kamnik, and with which he also granted his own allodial property, Henry styled himself as “margrave of Istria, by God’s grace.” Any dispute that could have arisen from Henry’s failure to renounce this title was prevented by the election in 1218 of his brother, Berthold, as patriarch of Aquileia. This balanced out the contentions between the Andechs and Aquileian interests. Henry retained the title in Istria, while Berthold energetically wielded his margravial authority. The patriarch therefore left authority over Carniola – in which he did not set foot until Henry’s death – in his brother’s hands and only retained the title.

Bolstered by castles, estates and numerous ministerials, Henry was able in some points
to start to establish princely authority. One such measure was the enforced use of the Tuhinj-valley road. This imposition probably goes back to the first quarter of the thirteenth century, when the Andechs founded a hospital on the road at Kozji Hrbet, later known as Špitalič. Traders travelling from Savinja towards Carniola and vice versa were forced to use the road via Kamnik and Tuhinj valley, rather than the Trojane road which had linked Pannonia with Italy since antiquity. The Andechs used their possessions and castles to control both routes, and closing the Trojane route was of economic benefit to Kamnik, while harming the fortunes of Spanheim Ljubljana. This may well have been the dispute that allegedly arose due to “Carniolan issues” between Henry of Andechs and the duke of Carinthia, Bernhard of Spanheim, in which the duke of Austria and Styria, Leopold VI, mediated at a famous joust held in 1224 in Friesach, Austria. Regardless of whether the Friesach tournament actually took place or was a fiction created by the Styrian knight and minnesinger (singer of courtly love) Ulrich of Liechtenstein, who recorded it in his poetic work *Frauendienst*, completed in 1255, the text offers a lively account of the spirit of chivalry and the world between the Danube and the Adriatic, a world that Ulrich lived in and knew well.

Henry of Andechs died without issue in 1228, which led immediately to a struggle for the Andechs-Weichselburg inheritance and seigneurship in Carniola. This was to bring Frederick II the Quarrelsome of Babenberg, duke of Austria and Styria, into the region. In spring 1229, Frederick’s father, Leopold, acquired the diocese of Freising’s fiefs in the Slovene March from Henry’s bequeathed properties, which marked the Babenberg’s first entry into territory south of the Sava. They had, however, already built a stone bridge (Zidani Most) across the Sava at its confluence with the Savinja, which marked one boundary of their large Laško seigneur. The same year, Leopold arranged for his son Frederick to marry Agnes, daughter of Duke Otto of Merania, the eldest of the Andechs brothers. The bride’s dowry brought the Babenbergs almost all of the Andechs-Weichselburg inheritance, including Kamnik, Kranj, Višnja Gora (Weichselburg), Otočec, Mehovo and Metlika. By 1232, Frederick had already added the title “lord of Carniola” (*dominus Carniolae*) to his style of duke of Austria and Styria. This clearly expressed his claims to princely authority over Carniola. This is made even clearer in the draft of a document from 1245, which gives evidence of plans by the Emperor Frederick II to elevate the duchies of Austria and Styria into a kingdom within the empire, and to make Duke Frederick a king, which would also have permitted him to make “a duchy of the province of Carniola.” However, this carefully prepared plan have never been realised, and a reality was quite different: Frederick’s princely authority within the march was limited at least by the counts of Haimburg and the dukes of
Spanheims, who personally held territorial supremacy (princely rights) over their own seigneuries. The former referred to themselves as “lords of the land” (*domini terrae*), and in 1237 acknowledged certain freedoms to their ministerials, including the right to inherit fiefs and allods, and patrimonial jurisdiction over their bondsmen, while territorial jurisdiction belonged to the Haimburgs. The bishop of Gurk referred, in 1229, to Bernhard of Spanheim as “prince of the Land” (*princeps terre*), when granting him the seigneury of Ljubek over Litija, which had previously belonged to Henry of Andechs. The Spanheims had already expanded their Carniolan seigneury, within which they administered blood justice, to make some of the major Carniolan nobile families, such as the Auerspergs (Turjak), Nassenfuss (Mokronog) and Scharffenbergs (Svibno), their ministerials.

The death of Duke Frederick in 1246 ushered in the fall of the house of Babenberg, which had ruled Austria for 270 years, and unleashed a succession conflict with the duchies of Austria and Styria at its centre and Carniola on the periphery. Although in 1230 Emperor Frederick II himself had again confirmed that Patriarch Berthold of Aquileia held Istria and Carniola in fief from the empire, changing political circumstances meant that Carniola returned to the crown along with Austria and Styria. The emperor placed authority in the hands of an imperial governor with the title of captain (*Hauptmann*): Count Meinhard III of Gorizia (until 1250). This brought the two main competitors for princely authority over Carniola – Patriarch Berthold and Ulrich of Spanheim – closer together. In 1248, Ulrich married Agnes, the patriarch’s niece and widow of Frederick II of Babenberg. The marriage brought Ulrich the Andechs-Weichselburg possessions, which significantly increased his dominions in Carniola, made up of personal allods such as Ljubljana and Kostanjevica, and ecclesiastical fiefs. Ulrich began to style himself “lord of Carniola”, *dominus Carniolae*. When Ulrich’s father Bernhard died in 1256, making him also duke of Carinthia, the outlines of an immense Spanheim dynastic territory, stretching from the Gurk river in Carinthia to the Krka river in lower Carniola, could already be seen.

Meanwhile, a new power was rising in the north. Ottokar II Přemysl, king of Bohemia from 1253, acquired a seigneury in the duchy of Austria in 1251/52 and another in Styria in 1261, meaning that his authority now reached as far south as the watershed between the Dravinja and Savinja, and, with the Laško seigneury, even as far as the Sava. In December 1268, Ottokar reached a pact of succession with Ulrich of Spanheim that promised the Bohemian king all of Ulrich’s “Länder and allods, and fiefs and other goods.” On Ulrich’s death in the winter of 1269/70, this enabled Ottokar to enter Carniola from Styria, take Ljubljana, and move via Kranj into Carinthia, which he occupied. He took the Freising,
Brixen and Salzburg ecclesiastical fiefs once held by Ulrich, and also occupied some Aquileian estates in Carniola, including Slovenj Gradec, Mirna in lower carniola and Postojna. In 1272, he was also elected captain-general of Friuli, effectively giving him full control of Friuli as well. It seemed that Ottokar, whose lordship stretched from the Sudety Mountains to the Adriatic, had solved the question of princely authority over Carniola that had exercised the Carniolan dynasties for three quarters of a century. Yet Ottokar’s primacy within the empire set off a reaction that led in 1273 to the election of Rudolf of Habsburg as king. The conflict between the two rivals came to an end in 1278 near Dürnkrut on the Marchfeld between Vienna and Bratislava with the last great chivalric battle in the Danube basin. Numerous knights from Slovene territory took part on Rudolf’s side. Ottokar lost his life in the battle, but not on the battlefield: he was killed after having been captured – a dishonourable act in chivalrous terms – by relatives of the Styrian noble, Siegfried of Mahrenberg, above Radlje ob Dravi. Ottokar had accused this renowned noble of lèse majesté in 1272 in Prague and had him executed without trial. Siegfried’s unusually cruel death turned the sympathies of Styrian and other nobles against the Bohemian king, who was gradually making numerous irreconcilable enemies within his own lands, which only hastened his own demise. In the mid-seventeenth century, Siegfried was still venerated as a local saint in the Dominican convent that had been established in Radlje ob Dravi in 1251.

In 1282, Rudolf of Habsburg enfeoffed the imperial fiefs that were now available – the duchies of Austria and Styria, and Carniola – to his sons Albrecht and Rudolf, despite the fact that Aquileia had clearly not renounced its formal claim on Carniola, as patriarchs still made use of the title *marchio Carnioliae* on occasion in the fourteenth century. In this way, the foundations of Habsburg territorial supremacy over the Danube basin and eastern Alps were laid. Yet before this, in autumn 1279, Rudolf had already pledged Carniola to his ally Count Meinhard of Gorizia-Tyrol, and in 1286 he also granted him the Duchy of Carinthia as a fief. For some time in the eastern Alps, until the Meinhardiner line of Gorizia counts died out in 1335, a Gorizian-Habsburg equilibrium was established in which the Meinhardiner lordship over Carniola was always provisory, and could always be bought by provision of an adequate sum. In 1311, Meinhard’s son, Henry, was forced to cede the Savinja basin, “with all that appertains to it on both sides of the Sava,” to the Habsburg Frederick the Fair, having lost out in the struggle for the Bohemian crown that the former allies had engaged in after the Přemyslid line died out in 1306. The Styrian border advanced at Carniola’s expense to the Sava, and perhaps even beyond it at Radeče and Svbno, finally marking the end of the former Great Carniola established in the mid-eleventh century, which had stretched from the Karst
passes in the west to the Dravinja-Savinja watershed in the east.

In 1335, the Habsburgs assumed direct lordship over Carniola, and in 1338 Albrecht II granted “our lords, knights and squires in our Land of Carniola” a charter of privileges affirming older rights and awarding new ones. The 1338 charter is the basic document for the old Carniolan constitution. As princes of Carniola, the Habsburgs upheld the charter in the form of a Handfeste (a collection of the Land’s privileges) until the middle of the eighteenth century. Yet the Habsburg Land of that time, with its prince, territorial law, and territorial court, did not cover Carniola in its entirety. Most of lower Carniola was excluded, a belt of territory stretching north to the Sava (east of Ljubljana) along the upper Krka river, and into White Carniola to the Kolpa. It was here in the first half of the fourteenth century that a special Land developed from the possessions and judicial districts of the Albertiner Gorizia counts, the “County in the March and White Carniola” (Grafschaft an der March und in der Möttling), which had its own prince (the count of Gorizia), and all the instruments typical of a Land such as its own territorial law, a territorial court in Metlika, and a captain as representative of the prince of the Land. In 1365, the count of Gorizia, Albert III, granted a special privilege to the nobility in the county as its prince, which affirmed existing rights and granted new ones, similarly to the Carniolan charter of 1338. The nobility in Albert’s other small territory, the County of Pazin in Istria, received the same privileges at the same time.

When the Habsburgs acquired the County in the March and White Carniola 1374, succeeding Count Albert III of Gorizia, their princely jurisdiction expanded to the Kolpa, but they did not incorporate the county into the Carniolan lordship, instead upholding the charter of privileges of 1365. They expressly stated that the territorial court in Metlika (in White Carniola), and not the Ljubljana court, had jurisdiction for the nobles in the county. The legal independence of the Land of the County in the March and White Carniola was therefore recognised and would remain throughout the Middle Ages. In the sixteenth century, the area was still not part of Carniola, but was considered as “adjoined” to it. The nobles did appear at diets of the Carniolan Estates, but even then, their special status was emphasised, and the same applied to the County of Pazin. Archduke Charles again affirmed a charter of privileges for each of the three Länder – Carniola, Istria and the County in the March – separately in 1567. Only in 1593 did Emperor Rudolf II affirm the privileges of Carniola, the County in the March, and Istria together in a single Handfeste.

In 1382, exactly one hundred years after the Habsburgs had taken their first step into the Danube and eastern Alpine region, they acquired Trieste, making it the only northern Adriatic city not under Venetian sway. The final stage of the Habsburg expansion to the sea
related to the acquisition of seigneuries on the Karst and their incorporation into Carniola. Yet the rivalry between the houses of Habsburg and Luxemburg for primacy within the empire set off a crisis that threatened to shake the Habsburg powerhouse from the inside. German kings and emperors of the Luxemburg dynasty began to acknowledge immediate status (making them directly subject to the emperor rather than to the prince of the Land) for some of the Habsburg’s most important vassals, whose large estates lay in Carniola and Slovene territory in general. This Luxemburg policy led to a weakening – and in the worst case even the end of – the Habsburgs’ princely authority over individual noble families and their territories. The possibility of new Länder developing was increased. First, in 1395, King Wenceslaus (the Lazy) granted the Ortenburgs the right to exercise blood justice over all their seigneuries; then in 1417, king Sigismund also recognised the immediate status of the Ortenburg seigneuries. Two years before, Sigismund also proclaimed the county of Gorizia and other fiefs held by the counts of Gorizia as imperial fiefs. One that was specifically mentioned was the Carinthian palatinate, which the Gorizian counts had actually received in fief from the Habsburgs as dukes of Carinthia, and not from the empire. In 1434, Emperor Sigismund bestowed the privilege of exercising blood justice to the Wallsees, as he had to the Ortenburgs in 1395. The Wallsees had become lords of Duino through inheritance at the end of the fourteenth century and held extensive seigneuries in Kvarner and on the Karst.

The counts of Cilli were the most illustrative case of this Luxemburg policy. In November 1436, Emperor Sigismund raised their status to that of imperial princes, and made their counties and seigneuries into the principality of Cilli. This threatened the collapse of Carniola as the Cillis, who succeeded the Ortenburgs in 1420, now ruled most of lower Carniola between the Kolpa and the Ljubljana marshlands and, through four smaller unitary territories, a significant part of upper Carniola. A new Cilli Land was starting to develop in the territory of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, and the results of the Habsburgs’ farsighted and successful policy of building princely authority over 150 years were seriously threatened; all the more because, with the empire’s support, the Wallsees were also starting to manoeuvre themselves out of subjection to the Habsburgs and Carniola. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Wallsees were already claiming the title “lords of Duino and the Karst” and granting it to a captain, while they even called Duino a “county”. It may well be due to this major crisis in Habsburg power that Carniola (or more accurately its nobility) only received its Golden Bull – affirmation of its Land privileges from Frederick III, prince of the Inner Austrian Länder – in 1460, 16 years after Carinthia and Styria. While in 1443 or 1444 the circle of the Habsburgs’ Carniolan nobility was rather small, the position in 1460 was
significantly different: the succession conflict for the Cilli possessions had concluded with total victory for Frederick III. Carniola had never been so firmly in Habsburg hands. The unity of the Carniolan Land was finally ensured, and the following year Ljubljana also gained a diocese. By the end of the fifteenth century, with the acquisition of the Wallsee seigneuries in Kvarner and on the Karst in 1466/70 (which connected the County of Pazin in Istria with the other Habsburg possessions), and the inheritance of Gorizia in 1500 (when the line of Gorizian counts died out), the Habsburgs’ major political successes in Slovene territory had all been achieved.

Gorizia

The Land of Gorizia developed from the possessions and territorial court districts of the counts of Gorizia located on the Karst and in the middle of the Soča (Isonzo) basin. The latter was originally part of Friuli, and Gorizia, which at least formally in the fourteenth century remained an Aquileian fief, was explicitly described at the end of the eleventh century as “lying in the kingdom of Italy, in the county of Friuli.” The counts of Gorizia were originally from Bavaria and arrived at the estates along the mid-course of the Soča via Lienz, where they held their older possessions, acquiring Gorizia in the third decade of the twelfth century from their Spanheim relations. From 1125, the counts of Gorizia were also hereditary advocates of the church of Aquileia. Advocacy and the related exercise of blood justice represented an important source of income, and above all an opportunity to begin securing judicial rights they had not acquired as territorial lords. Advocacy in effect became one of the most important bases for the counts of Gorizia to develop princely authority on their seigneurial territory. The ties connecting the Gorizian seigneuries along the Soča to Friuli were continually weakened during the many confrontations between the Gorizian counts and the Aquileian patriarchs. A whole range of circumstances and events came into play, such as the considerable power of the extensive Gorizian dominion, which stretched from east Tyrol to Istria. Linked to this was the very large group of Gorizian ministerials, who acted both as intermediaries and as a means of exercising Gorizian rule, as well as their regalian rights, such as the right to mint coins, the right to escort and convey (conductus), and customs rights, their status as hereditary advocates for Aquileia and the (Aquileian) captain-general of Friuli (which the Gorizian counts acquired for a considerable time at the end of the thirteenth century), and the elevation of the Albertiner line of counts of Gorizia to the rank of imperial princes in 1365, during the reign of Emperor Charles IV of Luxemburg. The Tyrol-based
Meinhardiner line had reached this rank in 1286, when it acquired the ducal title of Carinthia. As the Gorizians began to assert princely authority over their territories, the *Land* of Gorizia “broke away” from Friuli, which under its princes, the patriarchs of Aquileia, had also developed into a *Land* (*patria*) with a diet referred to as a (Friulian) parliament, and formal territorial law, which was codified in 1366. The Friulian territorial law, *Constitutiones Patriae Forojulii*, was also used in the county of Gorizia, and it is suggested that a German translation of these *Constitutiones* existed in Gorizia in the fourteenth century in which the patriarch’s name was replaced by that of the count. In this way, Friulian territorial law was applied as Gorizian territorial law. Gorizian and Friulian territorial law was therefore essentially identical, a fact supported by a document from 1340 that promises legal protection “according to the territorial law in Gorizia and in Friuli.” As the thirteenth century ended and the fourteenth began, the development of Gorizian seigneuries into a *Land* was accompanied by the rise of what were originally typical manorial offices to territorial level; above all, the office of captain developed into that of a governor and representative of the prince (the count of Gorizia) who “had full jurisdiction in all matters,” according to the formulation of a document from 1325. The Gorizian estates along the Soča and Karst had therefore already been formed into a *Land* in the fourteenth century; this is also indicated by the existence of Gorizian territorial nobility at the end of the century. This *Land* of the Gorizian counts would, together with territory acquired by Maximilian I at the beginning of the sixteenth century at the expense of the Venetian Republic (the upper and lower Soča basin), develop into the *Land* of Gorizia and Gradisca that remained in existence until 1918.

Yet the extensive dominion of the counts of Gorizia, which stretched from present-day East Tyrol and upper Carinthia to inner Istria, never developed into a single, unitary *Land*. The reason for this lies in the scattered nature of their possessions, which also meant that no single name ever arose to describe all the Gorizian lands. The sum of all the Gorizian allods, fiefs, rights and judicial districts therefore remained a *dominium* within which individual Gorizian *Länder* grew up. From the fourteenth century onward, the Gorizian estates in upper Carinthia and East Tyrol around Lienz, where the counts’ other residential castle of Bruck was located, formed a *Land* known as the ‘Outer County of Gorizia,’ and had its own court, nobles and diet. The Gorizian *Land* that developed along the mid-Soča was also known as the ‘Inner County of Gorizia.’ In 1456, Count John of Gorizia issued a territorial law in Lienz that was to apply “here without and there within the county of Gorizia” – an attempt to tie the inner and outer counties into one *Land*. Yet this attempt was not to come to fruition, particularly after the defeat, in 1460, of the counts of Gorizia in the Cilli succession conflict, leading to
the loss of all their Carinthian possessions up to the entrance to the Puster valley. In the
sixteenth century, the western part of the former Gorizian Land (including Lienz) was added
to Tyrol, while the remainder went to Carinthia. The Gorizian land complexes in Istria, and in
the Slovene March and White Carniola developed into two separate Länder. Both Länder, the
County in the March and White Carniola, and the county of Pazin, which are described in
greater detail above, were inherited by the Habsburgs in 1374, but successfully retained their
territorial identity throughout the Middle Ages. This unique case, in which one dominium
separated into four Länder was also reflected in the structure of the Gorizian territorial
administration, which had not one, but four captains in the fourteenth century: in Lienz,
Gorizia, Metlika and Pazin.

Celje

At a time when it seemed that the development into Länder had definitively concluded
on the territory of present-day Slovenia, a separate Celje Land began to form from the
counties, lordships and territorial courts held by the counts of Cilli (Celje) in Styria, Carinthia
and Carniola. In the middle of the fifteenth century, this new formation threatened to blow
apart the group of three Inner Austrian Länder that was stabilising under Habsburg power.

The counts of Cilli were the most important noble house with origins in the territory of
present-day Slovenia. Their high social standing from first appearances in the records, their
original estates and the time of their appearance in documents indicate their descent from
Asquinus (Asquinus was the advocate of the Gurk monastery and a relative of its founder,
Hemma). Around 1130, they named themselves after the Savinja (von Soune), and from 1173
they named themselves after Žovnek (von Sannegg), a castle in the northwest of the Celje
basin, which they probably built in the first half of the twelfth century on their allodial estates.
Their rise began late, when most of the old noble houses had already died out. In 1308, the
lords of Žovnek gave all their allodial lands to the Habsburgs, who immediately returned them
as a fief, thus beginning a lengthy association with this ruling dynasty. This at first served
them well, but later, in the fifteenth century – at least within the German empire – would
become the most significant obstacle to their ambitions. The inheritance of most of the
posessions of the counts of Haimburg was even more significant, bringing them, in 1333, their
new centre: Celje. In 1341, Louis of Bavaria elevated them to the status of counts of Cilli, an
act repeated in 1372 by Emperor Charles IV. The foundation for the rise of the Cilli to high
politics was being laid at the same time, as they made their first dynastic links to the Bosnian
house of Kotromanić and the Polish Piast dynasty. Although the unheralded increase in lands and Cilli expansion over the borders of hereditary Habsburg lands only occurred in the time of Herman II, they had already established their integration into the European noble elite through widespread dynastic alliances by the end of the fourteenth century. The other major factor in the rise of the Cillis during the first half of the fifteenth century, in addition to these marriage ties, was the alliance of Herman II, who ruled the house of Cilli for almost half a century, with Sigismund of Luxemburg, the Holy Roman emperor and king of Hungary, Bohemia and Germany. Fighting the Turks in 1396, at the unsuccessful Battle of Nicopolis, Herman saved the life of Sigismund; later Sigismund would take Herman’s youngest daughter, Barbara, as his wife. This opened a path to Hungarian crown lands for Herman and the Cilli line; through this connection they acquired numerous estates as fiefs or in pledge, primarily in Croatia, making them among the most powerful landowners in Slavonia. In 1406, Sigismund made Herman ban of Slavonia and Croatia-Dalmatia. This gave the count of Celje the status and power of regent and royal representative for the entire Kingdom of Croatia. The centre of Cilli power was therefore moved outside of the Habsburg lands. Sigismund’s creation of the Order of the Dragon in 1408 clearly reflected the status of the Cillis in Hungary: in the founding charter, Herman II, Count of Cilli and Zagorje (Sagor) and his son Frederick, are at the head of the Hungarian royal barons, before the counts palatine and other Hungarian magnates. The ambitions of Frederick’s son, Ulrich, were also largely directed towards Hungary, where he wanted to establish himself as guardian of his young relative, King Ladislas the Posthumous, grandson of Barbara of Cilli. It was none other than Ulrich who held the crown of Saint Stephen above the head of the three-month old Ladislas at his coronation as king of Hungary in 1440. The crown had been stolen from Visegrád north of Budapest by a lady-in-waiting of Ladislas’ mother. It was being kept there by a party of powerful Hungarian nobles and bishops who intended to place Vladislaus, the young Polish king, on the Hungarian throne. It was a clear sign from Ulrich of the role he wanted to play in Hungary. The outcome of the policy of the Cillis Hungarian policy was the murder of Ulrich in the Kalemegdan fortress in Belgrade in 1456, which brought an end to the house of Cilli.

The rise of the house of Cilli at the beginning of the fifteenth century reached a level that demanded a redefinition of Cilli-Habsburg relations. The end of the Ortenburg line in 1418 signified an enormous increase in power for the Cillis as their heirs, all the more because the county of Ortenburg was a fief with immediate status. In 1415, King Sigismund had granted his father-in-law, Herman II, the right to administer high justice in the county of Celli, meaning both Cilli counties had immediate status within the empire, which limited the
jurisdiction and influence of the territorial prince. Habsburg resistance to the immediate status of the counts of Cilli was reduced in 1423, when, under pressure from Sigismund, Ernst the Iron formally renounced feudal overlordship of the Cilli, who from that time no longer appeared in documents of homage by Styrian nobles to the prince. However, Habsburg opposition to the counts of Cilli being elevated to the rank of imperial princes was far greater. This elevation, testified in a draft document of proclamation, was already in preparation in 1430. One can only speculate that it originally failed due to Habsburg pressure, particularly from the prince of the Inner Austrian Länder, Frederick III. Yet in 1436, when Frederick was on pilgrimage in Palestine, Emperor Sigismund elevated the counts of Cilli to imperial princes without Frederick’s consent, and made the counties of Cilli and Ortenburg-Sternberg into princely banner-fiefs of the empire. The counties and other lands and lordships were made a principality held by the Cilli as an imperial fief. They also received the regalian rights of minting and mining, and a territorial court in Celje, so that – as the charter states – “all nobles living and residing in their Länder, countries, and lordships, and others may defend themselves in this territorial court and obtain justice … according to the law, customs and traditions of the Land.”

If the granting of regalian rights impinged on the rights of the duke of Austria, it did not however affect his princely authority, as regalian rights were also held by other magnates in his Länder. But the elevation of the two counties to banner-fiefs and the founding of a noble territorial court did signal a major change compared to the prior allegiance to the old Länder. The new territorial court meant that judicial jurisdiction over the nobles in the Cilli counties and lordships would no longer be in the hands of the duke of Austria, as prince of the Inner Austrian Länder, but would be held by the count of Cilli as the new prince. This effectively meant the appropriation of these territories from the old Länder, whose nobles were beginning to recognise the Cilli territorial court – where a separate Cilli territorial law was starting to form – as their own court. It also represented the formation of a new Cilli Land. The counts of Gorizia had achieved something similar with their outer and inner counties: the former separated from Carinthia, the latter from Friuli. Frederick III could not afford to recognise the 1436 charter, first appealing unsuccessfully to Sigismund for protection of his princely rights and interests, then launching a feud against the Cillis, which is described in detail by the Chronicle of Cilli, a very rare example of medieval historiographic work created in Slovene territory. Only in 1443 did Frederick – now as king – recognise the Cillis’ title of prince, but in return they had to renounce their principality, concluding a successorial settlement that made the Habsburgs heirs to their Land, which
passed to them only 13 years later following Ulrich’s murder in Belgrade in 1456. The barely twenty-year development of a separate Cilli Land therefore came to an end, though the former county of Cilli within Styria enjoyed special status for considerable time.

Istria

In contrast to Styria, which succeeded in maintaining its unity, Istria’s integrity was completely broken at about the same time. From 1420, when Venice brought the temporal power of the Aquileian patriarchs to an end, until the fall of the Republic of St. Mark in 1797, Istria was politically divided into a Venetian-held coast, and a Habsburg interior. The former Istrian Karst became part of Carniola proper, the County of Pazin was a lordship “adjoined” to Carniola, and Trieste was a free imperial city under the Habsburgs, while all other Istrian coastal towns were individually subordinate to central Venetian control. The only unified Venetian organisation of Istria was for military and policing purposes, under the command of the head of the Istrian paisenatico (paysinaticum from paese – land or region), who in the fifteenth century was stationed at Rašpor castle in the Čićarija hills, which close off the path into the interior of the peninsula from the northeast. Rašpor’s strategic position led to its description as clavis totius Istriae (“the key to all Istria”). From that time, the term Istria described the peninsula only in a geographical sense.

Istria began to fragment soon after the middle of the thirteenth century, when Venice took control of most of the coastal towns, while the counts of Gorizia developed a separate Land in the interior. These were both largely gains at the expense of the Aquileian patriarchate, previously the largest landowner and holder of public jurisdiction in the march of Istria. The underlying causes of the division are probably extremely old, and reach back to the time of the Diet of Rižana and the beginning of Frankish dominion over Istria. At the beginning of the ninth century, two different feudal orders met in the region: on one side the main organiser and authority in public life was the town (commune), on the other it was the seigneury. The political division between Venetian and Habsburg Istria roughly followed the division between these two forms of organising authority.

In 1209, after over a century of jurisdiction as margraves by the Spanheims and Andechs over Istria, Patriarch Wolfgar reacquired “the march of Istria with all honours, all adjuncts and full jurisdiction” on the basis of the privilege granted to Aquileia in 1077 by Emperor Henry IV. In reality, this did not mean a great deal as a large amount of Istria was exempt from this margravial jurisdiction, because of the immunity of the Istrian bishops. For
example, in 948, King Lothar of Italy granted comital jurisdiction to the bishops of Trieste, handing over all royal possessions, and fisc lands, and judicial authority over what would later become the medieval urban territory of Trieste. The diocese of Poreč enjoyed immunity from the middle of the tenth century. The related exemption from the Istrian margrave’s jurisdiction contributed to the foundation of the County of Pazin: Pazin castle and its seigneury was a fief of the Poreč diocese that came into the possession of the counts of Gorizia, who became its advocates from the end of the twelfth century. Pula, first among Istria’s towns in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, held a similar status; there is even mention of a “county of Pula” in the middle of the twelfth century. Patriarch Wolfger, and, to an even greater extent, his successor Berthold (1218–1251), brother of the deposed Istrian margrave Henry IV of Andechs, attempted to gain princely authority over Istria for the patriarchate. Berthold’s efforts were based more on the large Aquileian seigneury than on margravial power, which could only subsequently be exercised, and were not without some success. Legal instructions, judgments, confirmations and charters that he received from the crown between 1220 and 1238 were aimed at removing the obstacles that lay between the patriarch and princely status. These documents were directed against all three main opponents: against the autonomous communes, against the influence of Venice, with which Istrian towns had been concluding loyalty and protection pacts since the first half of the tenth century, and against the counts of Gorizia, who were using their advocacy as a pretext for becoming involved in matters of high justice against the patriarch’s will. A powerful patriarchal principality at the meeting point of the Alpine and Adriatic worlds, as well as on the border between Italy and Germany, was also in the interest of the crown, particularly when opposition to the emperor in the Lombard lowlands closed the Alpine passes to him. As his own documents indicate, Emperor Frederick II knew how to manage Berthold’s problems to his own benefit. This support gave the patriarchate serious possibilities of success, but also made it completely independent of the crown.

When the notion of an empire ruling Italy and Germany was abandoned, following the fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty in the middle of the thirteenth century, the main foundation of the patriarchate’s existence was removed, and it entered a slow but terminal decline. Berthold’s death in 1251 brought an end to centuries of Aquileian patriarchs being drawn from the ranks of the German aristocracy; Gregorio of Montelongo, the nephew of Pope Gregory IX, was the first Italian to occupy the patriarch’s throne after the long German dominance. He was also the head of the Guelf party in northern Italy. He was opposed by the counts of Gorizia, Ghibellines and loyal supporters of the imperial crown. Count Meinhard IV
of Gorizia, duke of Carinthia from 1286, was even married to Elizabeth of Bavaria from the ducal dynasty of Wittelsbach, the mother of Conradin, the last of the Hohenstaufens, who was beheaded in Naples in 1268. In 1267, Meinhard’s brother, Albert, even captured the poor patriarch at Rosazzo in Friuli “at dawn, when still in his bed, and carried him barefoot to Gorizia on the back of an old nag.” By then, the counts of Gorizia in Istria were openly acting against the patriarch and, in alliance with Koper and Piran, destroyed several of his castles in a violent feud. They also acquired many of the patriarch’s major Istrian seigneuries north of the Mirna and beyond Mt. Učka along the upper Raša river. This significantly expanded the territorial base of their emergent Land in the peninsula’s interior. It was in the third quarter of the thirteenth century that Gorizian ministerials began to appear on what were originally Aquileian estates in the area. Two generations later, in 1342, most of these lordships were counted among the property that the counts of Gorizia (three brothers) divided between themselves.

The Venetians also exploited the decline of Aquileian power, which was further reflected in the fact that from the last quarter of the thirteenth century the title of margrave of Istria, marchio Istrie, was no longer held by the patriarch himself, but by his governor in Istria. The Republic of St. Mark began to press on the Istrian coastal towns. These towns had perceived the patriarchate’s margravial jurisdiction, which Berthold had attempted to impose in the first half of the thirteenth century, backed by the imperial crown, as far more of a threat than the protectorate the Venetians had long before forced on them. Between 1145 and 1152, Venice made loyalty and protection pacts with individual towns from Pula in the south to Koper in the north, making them its fideles. The crisis of the patriarchate, heightened by the sede vacante between 1269 and 1273 (after Montelongo’s death), was the awaited opportunity for the Venetians to usher in a new regime and fully subjugate the Istrian towns. Between 1267, when Poreč fell, and 1284, when Rovinj acquiesced, every western Istrian town, except Pula, Muggia and Trieste, acknowledged Venetian overlordship; Pula succumbed in 1331 and Muggia in 1421, leaving only Trieste to recognise the Habsburgs as its lords (in 1382). The old allies (fideles) were made subjects (subjecti), and Venice acquired the right to appoint town authorities. In less than half a century, the Aquileian patriarchate’s power in Istria had vanished, and it was only a matter of time before the peninsula was completely divided into two.
The organisation of ecclesiastical administration is just one aspect covered by the concept of the Church in the Middle Ages. Bishops were not only shepherds of their flocks, but also politicians, high-ranking ‘officials’ of state, influential counsellors, princes, generals, seigneurs, colonisers, town lords, patrons of the arts and intellectuals. In short, they were the embodiment of a defining feature of medieval society: the complete interweaving of the spiritual and the temporal. Take proprietary churches as an example. They were founded and built on their own land by lay lords, who then had a decisive influence over them. Yet this private and lay initiative formed part of the foundation from which the parish network had developed by the end of the Central Middle Ages i.e. the basic form of ecclesiastical organisation, in which the Church and believer met directly on a daily basis. The institute of the lay noble advocate (advocatus, Vogt), who represented the ecclesiastical authority in secular matters, primarily before courts, was an even more important meeting point of the clerical and lay spheres. Further testament to this interweaving can be seen in the Crusades of the Central Middle Ages, a pan-European chivalric movement which grew from what was originally the purely religious idea and aim of liberating the Holy Sepulchre from 'infidels'. Numerous knights and their squires from the territory of present-day Slovenia set off on the long, exhausting and above all dangerous road for Jerusalem and the Holy Land, accompanying their higher noble lords and monarch. The noted knights and nobles who never returned home include Bernhard of Spanheim, lord of Maribor. In 1147, he was killed in a Seljuk ambush near Laodicea in southwest Asia Minor, after he had travelled across the entire Balkan peninsula, passing through Hungary, Belgrade, Niš, Sofia, Adrianople and Constantinople. In fact, people in the Middle Ages travelled more and further than we often imagine.

The Church

The migration of the Slavs into the eastern Alps at the beginning of the Early Middle Ages led to the almost complete collapse of the ancient ecclesiastical organisation in what subsequently became Slovene territory. The Church only persisted as an institution in the Romanic coastal towns in Byzantine Istria, to which, in Late Antiquity, the refugees from the interior probably introduced some of their Christian traditions from the continental hinterland – if that can be deduced from a mention of Andrew, bishop of Celeia, among the Istrian bishops in 680, as well as use of the name Emona/Emonia for Novigrad, where the cult of the
‘Emonian’ martyr Pelagius was attested in the Late Middle Ages, while Maximilian of Celeia was venerated in Piran. The medieval dioceses in the region — of main interest to us are Trieste, Koper, Novigrad, and Pićan in the Istrian interior — at least maintained the tradition of the urban dioceses of Antiquity and the old boundaries between them, even if there was not always a direct continuity with those predecessors, as there was in Trieste. Elsewhere, the re-Christianisation of modern-day Slovene territory required the ecclesiastical administration to be rebuilt from scratch.

The defining action of the entire medieval history of the ecclesiastical structure in Slovene territory came in 811, following the dispute between Patriarch Ursus of Aquileia and Archbishop Arno of Salzburg regarding ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Carantania. Ursus referred to synodal records that proved that the Carantanian region had been under Aquileian control even before the Lombard settlement of Italy in 568, while Arno referred to charters of privilege and affirmations from three Roman popes in the mid-eighth century that annexed Carantania to Salzburg. Charlemagne intervened with a Solomonic judgment, dividing Carantania between the two ecclesiastical provinces along the Drava river, “which flows through the middle of that province.” This made the Drava the border between Aquileia and Salzburg along its entire length, since Charlemagne’s son Pippin had already defined the Drava as the border in Pannonia in 796 during his military campaign into Avaria, on which he was accompanied by Arno (then bishop of Salzburg) and Ursus’ predecessor, Paulinus. Charlemagne himself confirmed this decision in 803. The Drava remained a border for ecclesiastical purposes for almost 1,000 years, although it soon lost that role in Pannonia where it had first been imposed. The immigration of the Magyars and their subsequent Christianisation led to Pannonia being reorganised ecclesiastically in the archdioceses of Ežtergon (Ostrogon, Gran) and Kalocsa. The former was founded in 1001, the second in 1006. The northern part of modern-day Slovene Prekmurje came under Ežtergon as part of the diocese of Győr, while the southern part came under the Kalocsa archdiocese as part of the diocese of Zagreb (founded c. 1094; territory both north and south of the Drava fell under its jurisdiction). The far north of the Zagreb diocese is often referred to as the districtus Transmuranus i.e. Prekmurje, or over the Mura river, in canonical visitation records.

The 811 judgment defined a border at the highest administrative level between two metropolitan sees. The structure of ecclesiastical organisation within these two provinces developed from the very lowest level i.e. parishes. The intermediate dioceses and archdeaconries were organised later. The organisation of the first parishes is unclear, but probably began in the second half of the ninth century in Carantania north of the Drava, and
in Aquileian territory some time after the Magyar raids of the mid-tenth century had ended. Large proto-parishes centred on parish churches began to develop on territory that generally had no previous ecclesiastical organisation. With a few privileged exceptions, these held exclusive rights to baptisms and funerals, and to collect tithes. The first network of parishes was still very sparse. According to some estimates, the original Carniolan March, which covered just upper Carniola, the Ljubljana basin and eastern inner Carniola, was covered by only six proto-parishes: Rodine (north of Radovljica), Kranj, Mengeš, Šentpeter pri Ljubljani, Stara Loka pri Škofji Loki and Cerknica, which are thought to have formed around the mid-eleventh century. The old episcopal missionary centres of the ninth century formed part of the basis for the development of the parish network; a number of typical and very old patron saint dedications support this for modern-day Slovenia. The missionary centres organised by the Aquileian patriarch south of the Drava were characterised by the cult of the Aquileian martyrs, Hermagoras and Fortunatus. Churches in Hermagor (Slov. Šmohor) in the Gail valley and at Gornji Grad were dedicated to them, and this may well go back to the Carolingian period. The cult of Cantius and companions is also typically Aquileian, with very old churches, such as those in St. Kanzian (Slov. Škocijan) in Jaunstain in Carinthia and in Kranj, dedicated to them. Dedications to St. Rupert, on the other hand, typically suggest a connection with Salzburg. Some churches dedicated to St. Peter or St. Martin, typical Carolingian dedications, were also founded in the tenth or even ninth century. These include the presumed Aquileian missionary centres at Šentpeter pri Ljubljani and Šempeter in the Savinja valley. St. Peter’s church at Rajhenburg (Brestanica) may be the proprietary church of the very Waltuni who perhaps in 895 received an alod in that territory from the emperor, although it is more probably that it could be the Salzburg institution that was the centre of the cult of St. Peter in the eastern Alpine area and also the owner of Rajhenburg from 1043. The church of St. Martin’s in Villach (south of the Drava), founded before 979, was also proprietary. Along with the episcopal missionary churches, proprietary churches represented the main foundation for the subsequent development of the parish network. The first three proprietary churches in Carantania had already been consecrated by Modestus in the mid-eighth century, while the two oldest documented churches in modern-day Slovenia, built in Ptuj between 840 and 874 by Pribina and Kocel, were also proprietary. One of these, mentioned in 977 with regard to tithes, became a parish church. In 1043, many of Hemma’s proprietary churches in Carinthia became parish churches, after the archbishop of Salzburg renounced “all his ecclesiastical rights, the right of baptism and burial, and the tithe” relating to them. In exchange, Hemma made gifts to the archbishop, including Rajhenburg
(Brestanica) at Sava river. In a similar vein, five Andechs-Weichselburg churches in White Carniola formed the basis for the patriarch’s establishment of a proto-parish centred on Črnomelj, in 1228.

Despite this very late exception, the basic network of parishes, which underwent numerous changes in the Late Middle Ages, had largely formed in the twelfth century, and probably before that in Carinthia. The regulation of tithes collected within parishes – which represented their main source of regular income – provides evidence of the consolidation of a territorial ecclesiastical organisation. In Carinthia and Styria north of the Drava, in other words the Salzburg area of the former Carantania, this was carried out at the time of Archbishop Gebhard (1060–1088), who introduced the canonical tithe, replacing the lower missionary or Slavic tithe that had existed since c. 800. The tithing issue was also being resolved at the same time by a series of bilateral pacts with lay lords or ‘external’ bishops and landowners. The tithe agreements between the Aquileian patriarchs, Ravengerius (1063–1068) and Sigeard (1068–1077), and the bishop of Brixen and Freising reveal that the same regulation process was also underway in the Aquileian province.

A few isolated reports also indicate that remnants of former pagan customs were preserved well into the Late Middle Ages. According to Patriarch Berthold of Aquileia, writing at the beginning of the thirteenth century, many adults died without sacraments in remote parts of the Slovene part of his metropolis. A document dated 1228 from the same patriarch states that the inhabitants of White Carniola lived “captive to blind error and tribal customs.” In 1300, a knight, Veitl of Bresternica near Maribor was accused of “shaming his Creator” by worshipping a tree that grew by his house and calling on the devil. And, in 1331 in Kobarid, over 30 kilometres east of Udine (see of the Aquileian patriarch from 1238), we find “countless Slavs worshipping a tree and spring in the roots of the tree as a god, giving the veneration to created things that by faith is due to the Creator.”

One cause of this pagan persistence probably related to the general use of Latin, which most of the populace could not understand, as the liturgical language; people of course prayed and sang in their own language, as testified by the Slovene text of the Stična Manuscript from the first half of the fifteenth century. The language barrier was also bridged by parish priests who did not know the language of the parish making use of representatives, vicars, who did. Only in Istria, in the hinterland of Koper, did Glagolites operate – Catholic priests using a Slavic liturgy and Glagolitic script. The Slavic ancestors of the Slovenes had already come into contact with the Glagolitic script, Slavic books, and Slavic liturgy in Kocel’s Pannonia, where Methodius also operated briefly around 870, but that contact did not leave lasting
traces. The Glagolitic script found in the Slovene coast areas did not arise locally, but was introduced by priests from Dalmatia and Istria, as indicated by the language of the inscriptions. The same applies to the relatively numerous Glagolitic fragments discovered in the interior of Slovenia, in upper, lower and inner Carniola. The Glagolitic priests at the Franciscan monastery founded in Koper in 1467 also originated in Zadar. Three years later, a Glagolitic seminary was founded there for Slavic priests who were not proficient in Latin, and who exercised their office (cura animarum) among the Slavic population in the town and the hinterland, and the many sailors and soldiers from Istria and Dalmatia.

The spread of the parish network, and the difficulty of directly controlling such parishes from the remote centres of Salzburg and Aquileia, led to the organisation, in the eleventh century, of interim levels of ecclesiastical administration – archdeaconries and dioceses. Archdeaconries linked a number of parishes into one administrative district. Originally, they could extend as wide as an entire march. The Carniolan archdeaconry was particularly large, with 40 (later testified) parishes covering upper and inner Carniola (the original Carniolan March) and lower Carniola (the part of the Savinja March lying south of the Sava that was adjoined to Carniola); it was broken up in the mid-twelfth century. Only later were these large archdeaconries sub-divided. They were administered by archdeacons, who came from the ranks of parish priests, and had direct authority over individual parishes. In the thirteenth century, the network of archdeaconries covered the entire Slovene ethnic territory, regardless of their division between the various ecclesiastical provinces. There were two archdeaconries in Carinthia and Styria north of the Drava in the Salzburg province. There were also two archdeaconries in Prekmurje, one under the Győr, the other under the Zagreb diocese. The highest number of archdeaconries, eight, was found in the Aquileian province south of the Drava, to the Soča (Isonzo) and Kolpa rivers, where the archdeacons represented the only interim level between parish priests and the bishop (patriarch) at least until the mid-fifteenth century. Archdeacons in that area in the Late Middle Ages often carried out canonical visitations on behalf of the Aquileian patriarch. Later, the bishops of Pićan in Istria established themselves as the patriarch’s representatives in ecclesiastical matters (vicars-general) in the region; some of them even resided in Carniola, particularly during the fifteenth century. By that time, even the patriarch himself had fled from the Venetians to the court of Cilli, after losing temporal power in Friuli (1420).

In 1237, the Aquileian patriarch, Bertold of Andechs, attempted to found a new diocese between the Soča and the Drava, citing the impossibility of performing his pastoral duties due to the vast size of his diocese, which spread ten days walk and more towards
Hungary. He therefore proposed to Pope Gregory IX that the church of the Benedictine monastery at Gornji Grad be made a cathedral with a diocese under the patriarch’s direct jurisdiction, or that the diocese of Pićan, “which is so neglected that it has but few canons or none, and there is also no hope of it reviving,” be transferred to Gornji Grad. Berthold’s proposal was not well received and a separate diocese only appeared in the area in question – between the Soča and Drava – over two hundred years later, in 1461/1462, with the founding of the Ljubljana diocese.

To the north, Archbishop Eberhard II of Salzburg, Berthold’s contemporary, had greater success establishing dioceses. He also used the impairment of pastoral service due to the large size of his metropolis as justification for founding new suffragan dioceses in his letters to the pope. Three dioceses were founded in a relatively short period during his time as archbishop: Chiemsee in 1216 in present-day southeast Bavaria (its see was on the island of Herreninsel in Chiemsee lake, where the eminent Carantanian hostages were Christianised around the mid-eighth century), followed by the Seckau diocese in Styria in 1218, and the diocese of St. Andrä in the Lavant valley in 1228, from where Bishop Slomšek transferred his see to Maribor many years later (in 1859). All three institutions were completely subordinate to the archbishop, and were proprietary dioceses of Salzburg. The pattern for these churches was set by Salzburg’s suffragan diocese established in Gurk, Carinthia, in 1072. The material basis for the diocesan church was the Benedictine convent, founded in 1043, but abandoned at the time of the diocese’s establishment. The Salzburg archbishop had the exclusive right to elect, ordain and consecrate the bishop of Gurk, with an example of this exceptional right being found in the institution of regional bishop to Carantania, completely dependent on the Salzburg metropolitan, introduced by Virgilius in the latter half of the eighth century. This was such a singular privilege within the Roman Catholic church that still Pope Pius IX greeted the archbishop of Salzburg, Cardinal Tarnóczy (1851–1876) with the words: “Ecco il mezzo papa, che puo far dei vescovi” (“See the demi-pope, who can make bishops”). The incredible wealthy territorial possessions of the Gurk diocese, its age and the Gurk bishop’s status as archiepiscopal vicar made it the most important of Salzburg’s four proprietary dioceses, which were otherwise quite small and comparable to the Istrian urban dioceses. Gurk’s wealth and power was well reflected by its monumental Romanesque basilica, which was constructed in the second half of the twelfth century, a time in which the Gurk diocese was attempting to emancipate itself from Salzburg’s total dominance. It was this long-running struggle for the right to control Gurk, rather than the formal concern for believers expressed in the documents sent to the pope, that led Eberhard II to establish the other three proprietary
dioceses.

As long as Gurk’s complete dependence on the archbishop was unique in the western Church, the metropolitan’s special rights over it must have fostered incredulity and opposition. After the three more recent proprietary dioceses – whose full subordination to the archbishop was indisputably documented – there were no longer any doubts about Gurk’s status, since it was now just one of four subordinate dioceses. This led to a settlement being reached between Archbishop Eberhard and the Gurk cathedral chapter in 1232, soon after the establishment of the fourth (Lavantine) diocese, which did not encroach on the metropolitan’s rights.

Monasteries

Two years before the Gurk settlement, in 1230, Archbishop Eberhard ordered Dominican monks from Friesach in Carinthia to settle in Salzburg-controlled Ptuj. The joint founders of the new monastery were the local lords of Ptuj, ministerials of the archbishop who had a greater reputation and more power than many of the higher or free nobility. Around 1200, they themselves dispossessed the Hungarians of land previously “waste and unpopulated” around Ormož along the present-day Slovene-Croatian border, thus moving the then German-Hungarian border further to the east. They brought members of the Teutonic Knights, the German crusading military order, in to settle Velika Nedelja and gave them responsibility for colonisation and *cura animarum* in the land between the Drava and Mura.

The Dominicans and Teutonic Knights were referred to as the newer monastical orders. These include the Minorites (Franciscans), Augustinians, the Order of St. John (later the Knights of Malta), the Poor Clares, and Dominican sisters, to mention just a few of the most important that had a presence in Slovene territory. Their rise is connected in part to the flourishing of towns, where these monastical foundations were built. They were generally involved in exercising the duties of *cura animarum*, and expressed a commitment to poverty, hence they are also known as the mendicant orders and orders of preachers. In this way they consciously differentiated themselves from older orders, such as the Benedictines, Cistercians and Carthusians. The very existence of a monastery of one of the mendicant orders in a settlement is sometimes decisive proof that it already had a burgher culture and was of sufficient size to support such an institution. For example, the mention of a Minorite monastery in Celje in 1310 bears witness to the fact that by the start of the fourteenth century at the earliest the settlement already had the character of a notable urban settlement, although
it actually only formally became a town in law (with walls, town law and autonomous
governing bodies) very late – the second quarter of the fifteenth century.

Although the first monasteries in the territory of modern-day Slovenia were only
established in the twelfth century (with the exception of a convent in Koper, mentioned just
once in 908), the Slavic ancestors of the Slovenes had already come into contact with
Benedictine monks in the eighth and ninth centuries. The fact that most of the Slovene
religious and prayer formulas preserved in writing, and partially in popular song, up until the
end of the Middle Ages – such as those formulated in the vernacular in Bavaria in monasteries
– probably date as far back as the eighth, and certainly the ninth centuries, indicates the
importance of the series of monasteries which, despite being outside Slavic territory, were
vital to the mission to the Carantanians and their neighbours. Worthy of particular attention
are the monastery on the island of Auua (Herreninsel) in Chiemsee lake – where the hostages
from the line of Carantanian princes lived – and the monastery of St. Peter in Salzburg, which
was both home to a monastic community, and the see of the bishop of Salzburg. Two thirds of
the 17 Carantanian missionaries listed by name in the Conversio were linked to this
monastery, as their names are also listed in the monastery’s confraternity book (Liber
confraternitatum), the list of all those who felt a special link to the monastery, and whose
names were mentioned individually or summarily at mass. The Innichen monastery, founded
in 769 by Duke Tassilo of Bavaria with the express task of mission to the Carantanians, was
no less important. Probably soon after 772 in Carantania, the same duke founded a monastery
at Molzbichl near Spittal, a recent archaeological discovery, which is the oldest known
monastery in Carinthia and on Old Slovene soil. The monastery at St John in Duino, on the
Roman-Slavic and Friulian-Istrian borders, was probably founded at the beginning of the
seventh century. Carolingian Friuli, which included a significant amount of present-day
Slovene territory at the beginning of the ninth century, had a dense pattern of monasteries,
which, with the exception of Sesto, were all located east of the Udine-Aquileia line, and were
of differing origin: three dated back to early Christianity in the region, four were of Byzantine
and Lombard origin, while the monastic cell at Antro (Landar) in Venetian Slovenia (Beneška
Slovenija) was either a Lombard or Carolingian institution. At the end of the eleventh century,
two Benedictine monasteries were founded on the western edge of the Slovene ethnic territory,
in Rosazzo and Moggio Udinese, while to the north in the Carantania-Carinthia region, eight
Benedictine communities were founded during the eleventh century: two female (St. Georgen
am See, Gurk) and six male (Ossiach, Admont, Millstatt, St. Paul, St. Lambrecht, and
Arnoldstein; the latter at the start of the twelfth century).
With the exception of the female community in Koper mentioned in 908, by far the oldest monastic institution in modern-day Slovenia, the first monasteries on the territory of modern-day Slovenia date back to the twelfth century. The oldest was the Cistercian monastery at Stična in Carniola. Its founding charter was issued by Patriarch Peregrine of Aquileia in 1136. The Cistercian monks who settled in Stična during the lifetime of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, principle founder of the Cistercian order, came from the monastery of Rein in Styria, founded by Margrave Leopold I in 1129. Stična is the most important monastery in Slovenia. It became the economic, culture and religious centre of the wider area.

Construction of the Romanesque basilica, preserved to this day beneath a Baroque exterior, was completed by the middle of the twelfth century. It was probably the largest building in Carniola at the time, and had a visible impact on the agrarian and cultivated landscape – as it does to this day. The largest collection of medieval codices in Slovenia was produced in the Stična scriptorium, and its quality was equal to that of contemporary European production. Gradually, as many as 37 parishes in Carniola and Styria were incorporated into the monastery with the abbot of Stična presiding over them as parish priest. Part of their revenues came to Stična. It was in relation to the assumption of the cura animarum duty that several religious texts were written in Slovene at Stična in the first half of the fifteenth century: prayers preceding the sermon, the Salve Regina, the start of an Easter hymn, Naš Gospod je od smrti vстал (Our Lord from death arisen), and a formula of common confession (twice, since one was written incorrectly).

The patriarch of Aquileia, Peregrine, also founded the only Slovene Benedictine monastery, in Gornji Grad in Styria in 1140. It is not known where its first monks came from, but the fact that they received books from the monastery in Melk in Lower Austria indicates a link with the north. A hundred years later, the abbey’s central location within the territory between the Drava and Soča (practically on the border between Carniola and Styria) led to it being proposed as the see of a new diocese. Finally, in 1461, Gornji Grad – against the will of the monks, who seemingly may have robbed their monastery and carried off the archive and library – was incorporated into the new diocese of Ljubljana, which was also entitled to the monastery’s income. In 1473, the monastery was finally abandoned.

The third monastery established in present-day Slovenia during the twelfth century was founded by monks from the third great order of the day – the Carthusians. Given the contemplative nature of their way of life, they tended to settle in remote, isolated locations. In 1164, Otakar III, the Styrian margrave, founded the Žiče monastery right on the border of his seigneury at Konjice, the first outside the Carthusian's original Franco-Italian sphere, and the
first such monastery on the soil of the medieval German state. Otakar III was also buried there, together with his wife and his son Otakar IV. The bodies of the last Otokars were moved from Žiče in 1827 to the Cistercian monastery of Rein, near Graz, the origin – as stated above – of the first monks in Stična, lower Carniola, c. 1136. The gravestone at the church of St. Areh in Pohorje which shows a recumbent medieval prince probably originated from a Žiče grave. The figure depicted is probably Otakar IV (who ruled 1164 to 1192), the last of the Otakar line and the first duke of Styria. The gravestone was probably transferred to Pohorje in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Following the intervention of Pope Alexander III, monks came to Žiče from the mother monastery of Grande Chartreuse, founded by St. Bruno near Grenoble in France in 1084, from which the Carthusians take their name. Žiče reached its peak at the end of fourteenth and at the start of the fifteenth century, during the time of the Great Schism, which not even the Carthusian order was able to avoid. The Carthusians from French and Spanish provinces acknowledged the pope in Avignon, while those from the Italian and German provinces acknowledged the pope in Rome. Grande Chartreuse was the centre of Avignon obedience for some time, while the Prior General of Roman obedience amongst the Carthusians selected Žiče as its see in 1391. From 1398 until the reunification of 1410, this office was held by the renowned prior Stefano Maconi, former secretary to Catherine of Siena (d. 1380), whose own handwritten glosses are found in a large manuscript from the community of Jurklošter on the legend of that saint.

It is a striking double that the first Carthusians outside the original Franco-Italian sphere settled in southern Styria, and that four Carthusian monasteries were established in the small area of modern-day Slovenia between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. Henry, bishop of Gurk, established the Carthusian monastery of Jurklošter near Laško just under a decade after the founding of Žiče. This institution failed before the end of the twelfth century, but was re-established in 1209 by the duke of Austria and Styria, Leopold VI of Babenberg. The third Carthusian monastery on Slovene territory was at Bistra in Carniola around the middle of the thirteenth century on the large Ljubljana seigneury of the duke of Carinthia and lord of Carniola, Ulrich of Spanheim, who founded it together with his father, Bernhard. The fourth Carthusian monastery was founded, at the start of the fifteenth century, in Pleterje in lower Carniola by Herman II of Cilli, and the great count was also buried there.

Not far from Pleterje in Kostanjevica ob Krki is the Cistercian monastery founded by Bernhard of Spanheim in 1234. The monks came to Kostanjevica from Viktring in Carinthia, a monastery that had been founded in 1142 by the Spanheim Bernhard of Maribor. The establishment of the Viktring abbey can largely be attributed to the efforts of Bernhard’s
nephew, Henry, son of the second duke of Carinthia from the Spanheim dynasty, Engelbert. Henry entered the Morimond Abbey in France, one of the four primary abbeys of the Cistercian order, as did another aristocratic son from the same region and time, the renowned chronicler Otto of Freising (d. 1158), whose father was the margrave of Austria, Leopold III of Babenberg. In 1132, Henry founded a monastery in Villars in Lotharingia, where he served as abbot, and from where the first Cistercians came to Carinthia. The route the monks followed to Kostanjevica is good evidence of the fact that during the Middle Ages the monastic orders, who continually travelled between their foundations, were – like the nobility – expressly supranational and international. The Spanheims’ links with France, and the West in general, may well have influenced the arrival of the Knights Templar in Ljubljana in 1167. At the start of the thirteenth century, they appear to have come to the Križanke monastery complex, where Duke Bernhard later settled the Teutonic Knights. These reports date from very much later, but need not be discounted for that reason.

In the twelfth century, there were therefore five monasteries in the territory of present-day Slovenia, representing four different orders. The picture had changed significantly by the following century, when there were 21 monasteries from eight different orders. The increase was mainly linked to the expansion of the new orders. In addition to the Dominicans of Ptuj mentioned above, three convents of Dominican sisters were founded during that time (Velesovo in 1238, Studenice before 1245 and Marenberg (Radlje) in 1251), along with three foundations by Teutonic Knights (Velika Nedelja, Metlika and Ljubljana, all three after 1200) and, most significantly, six Minorite monasteries in urban settlements (Gorizia in 1225, Koper c. 1260, Ljubljana 1242, Celje probably before 1250, Ptuj after 1250 and Maribor c. 1250), to mention only the most important. Over the next 150 years, the number of monasteries increased further, growing until the crisis and decline of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when several monasteries collapsed or changed their purpose (Gornji Grad, Pleterje, Jurklošter, and almost all the Franciscan monasteries at some time).

The ideas that the monasteries were the major bearers and centres of cultural life during the Middle Ages on the territory of modern-day Slovenia, and that their relatively late establishment in the region – three centuries after Christianity had started to spread – caused a significant delay in the diffusion of a literary culture are both very well established. The wealthy episcopal residences and princely courts, and of course universities, also functioned as cultural centres during the Middle Ages, in addition to the monasteries. Excluding the coastal diocesan towns (among which Koper already had a cathedral Latin school by the end of the twelfth century), the first diocese in modern-day Slovenia was founded as late as the
middle of the fifteenth century, in Ljubljana, while there were only two princely courts: the

court of the Gorizian counts, from which there is no evidence of any significant cultural
production, and the court of the counts (princes) of Cilli, in Celje. In the first half of the
fifteenth century, under the last three counts of Cilli, who in many ways acted as Renaissance
princes, this court became a cultural centre with attested humanistic links, but the end of the
dynasty also brought an end to the court. Of the other noble castles, only Turjak in Carniola is
known to have started a library in the Middle Ages. The library of the Auersperg (Turjak)
lords became very important, and part of this is today kept in the Library of Congress in
Washington, DC.

Monasteries were therefore institutions that introduced, often for the first time since
the end of Antiquity, the cultural life typical of the rest of Europe into Slovene territory. This
was reflected in many different ways: in Romanesque ecclesiastical architecture, in music, in
miniature illustration in codices, and above all in books, i.e. the manuscript codices collected
in monastery libraries. Books were very much the monks’ tool, an idea held throughout
Europe, as was expressed in 1170 by Godefroy of St. Barbe-en-Auge, Normandy, in the well-
known phrase: “Clastrum sine armario quasi castrum sine armamentario” (“a monastery
without a library is like a fortress without an arsenal”). By the twelfth century, a network of
monasterial libraries had been established throughout Europe, and routes for lending,
ordering, copying or buying books criss-crossed the continent. The literary language of the
time was naturally Latin, given its international and scientific use in the Middle Ages, the
nature of monasteries as institutions, and the international nature of the monastic community.
Indeed, there was no real alternative as a written language. Each monastery required a range
of religious books for daily monastic life – the Bible, evangelaries, missals, commentaries,
breviaries, and the works of some of the most respected of the Church Fathers, such as
Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory the Great. These and similar writings comprised the basic
collection sought after by every monastic or ecclesiastical library. One of the most notable of
the latter was the extremely impressive collection of the Freising church of Sts. Primus and
Felician at Maria Wörth at Wörthersee in Carinthia, which, in the second half of the tenth
century, contained 42 manuscripts, including parts of the Bible, missals, psalters, lectionaries,
two antiphonaries and two graduals, and a book on the lives of Saints Primus and Felician.
Also very much worthy of passing mention is the will of Duke Eberhard of Friuli (from 863
or 864), which has preserved one of the very few lists known today of the contents of a lay
library before the turn of the millennium. In Eberhard’s time, many renowned pilgrims
travelled to Friuli, including figures from the Slavic East, such as the Carantanian count
Witigowo, the Pannonian count and prince Pribina, and the Croat prince Trpimir. The list of Eberhard’s library includes over 25 volumes, including a codification of Germanic tribal law (*Leges*), works of geography, natural science and medicine, and complex theological literature. This all bears witness to a broad collection of knowledge and very wide-ranging interests. According to the best information available, the largest collection of writings in a medieval monastery in Slovenia was to be found in the Carthusian foundation in Žiče, about which Paolo Santonino left a precious report in his travelogue. As secretary to the patriarch of Aquileia, between 1485 and 1487 he accompanied Bishop Peter of Caorle on a canonical visitation around Carniola, Carinthia and Styria south of the Drava. Santonino wrote: “After Vespers the same day, the subprior led us into the monastery sacristy, built with arches and thick walls. There were many and varied precious paraments there. He then led us up concealed stairs to the library and another sacristy, built above the church arch and the lower sacristy. In the library you can see over two thousand books of every subject, mainly on parchment, but also very old, written with reed pens, not printed as is the custom today.”

Monastery libraries were started as soon as individual monasteries were founded, as the first monks would bring a certain selection of essential books from the mother monastery. Soon after the mid-twelfth century, and two decades after its founding, the Stična monastery already had its own librarian (*armarius*), which indicates that the library already possessed a significant collection before the major additions made during the time of Abbot Folkland (d. 1180), when the monastery scriptorium produced more codices in the relatively short period of ten years than the 36, some only fragmentary, that have been preserved to this day. Folkland was undoubtedly a great lover of books, as seen from his crypto-portrait in an initial within a Stična codex with the text of Augustine’s *City of God*, where he is depicted with a book opened on his knees in which it is written that he “ordered this book written for common use.” The wonderful initials of the Stična codices, which are not completely in line with the somewhat ascetic rules of the order that they must use “letters of a single colour and not illustrated”, bear witness to his efforts to create a library that was rich in content and pleasing to the eye. Folkland created the monastery’s scriptorium, in which many masters worked. They did not only come from the ranks of monks, but included lay scribes, who came to Stična from French and German territories. A detailed analysis of Stična codices found that there were probably eleven scribes copying books, nine illuminators, seven parchment-makers turning sheepskins into parchment, and a bookbinder. The Stična scriptorium, so successful despite working for less than a decade, in all likelihood came to an end with the abbot’s death. Nevertheless, it created the most important corpus of medieval manuscripts on the territory of
modern-day Slovenia.

The codices written in Slovene monasteries were largely copies of older texts; there were very few originally authored works. Most were produced in the Carthusian monasteries, but the scribes were all of foreign origin, coming into Slovene territory for all their life, or for a specific period, and thereby creating a link between the region and the rest of Europe. Writing in the middle of the thirteenth century, Siegfried of Swabia (a monk and author of rhyming verse of historical importance) tells us of Leopold VI Babenberg, the second founder of the Jurklošter Carthusian monastery: “He, a Swabian, in Jurklošter lives off the Slovene land.” Michael of Prague (at the end of the fourteenth century) and Nicholas Kempf of Strasbourg (in the fifteenth century) both lived for some time and produced literary work at Jurklošter. At the start of the fourteenth century, in Žiče, Philip, who had come from the northern German lands, copied over 10,000 verses of a Latin epic on the life of Mary into German. His work went on to dominate two centuries of German spiritual epic poetry and over one hundred copies have been preserved – a major success in its time. Stefano Maconi of Siena, the Prior General of Roman obedience within the Carthusian order, also left literary work. Another arrival, perhaps from France, was Johann the abbot of the Viktring monastery in Carinthia, author of the Liber Certarum Historiarum, which is considered one of the fourteenth century’s most important works of European historiography. A German-language chronicle of the counts of Cilli, preserved from the fifteenth century, is probably the work of a Minorite from Celje.

SOCIETY IN MOTION

The Nobility and Castles

The Middle Ages is symbolised, more than anything else, by castles and the noble houses associated with them. Their physical location, often on isolated, inaccessible heights that visually dominate and command the landscape also manifests their military, administrative and political dominion over the local environment. A castle separated the ruler from the ruled and was an instrument for enforcing lordship. Therefore, a castle and a lordship or seigneury were often synonymous. The lord of a castle ruled the surrounding land and its inhabitants. The possession of a castle represented power, and it was for this reason that military success in a war was measured by the number of castles captured, occupied or destroyed.

The role of castles was essential to the exercise of lordship; without a castle, one could
not rule. When Herman of Cilli gave his son Frederick six castles, he did so “that he himself could rule and that he would have his own court.” The importance of castles in forming the Länder and establishing princely authority over them is signalled by the fact that a number of castles that were the seats of princely houses gave their names to actual Länder: for example, the castles of Tyrol near Merano and Steyr on the Enns, which gave their names to Tyrol and Styria (Steiermark, Štajerska) respectively. The castles protected the nascent Land outwardly, while internally supporting the exercise of princely authority. They therefore played a major role in the formation of this authority. Achieving the sole right to built castles within one’s own area of lordship – the regalian right to castle-building – was one of the main objectives for an aspiring prince, and also one of the main signs of their authority. Once this exclusive right existed, the nobility within individual Länder could build castles only with the express permission of the prince of the Land. One of the earliest codifications of territorial law in the wider region, from the Land of Austria in the thirteenth century, clearly states “that no one may build a house or castle without the will and permission of the prince; people may construct what they want on their own inherited land up to a height of two storeys, which may not have a perimeter wall or merlons [raised parts of a projecting parapet with battlements], and the moat around it may be no wider than nine and no deeper than seven feet.” Noble residences of this kind were no more than lightly fortified village manors, in which many knights from the lowest ranks of nobles lived. The building of a new castle (which began to symbolise the social status of its resident or owner), and even the rebuilding or extension of a castle, was associated with immense costs that only the richest and most important lay lords and bishops could afford. It is no coincidence, then, that it is the Older or Upper Castle of the counts and princes of Cilli that is Slovene most representative castle complex, a synthesis, and also the summit, of medieval castle architecture in Slovene territory.

Before the rise of the castle in the Central Middle Ages, the archetypal noble residence was a manor (curtis, dvor) in a village, and manors were one of the oldest and most central components of the developing seigneuries. The use of the term curtis for Karnburg in the ninth century indicates that manors already served as noble residences in the Old Slovene era. They were also (at least partly) the residences of kosezi, who formed a privileged Old Slovene social group. A detailed study and reconstruction of a group of five kosezi residences in a place on the eastern edge of Ljubljana with the illustrative name of Zadvor has shown that it was a (subsequently divided) kosez manor covering around 100 hectares, the origins of which can be dated to before 1000, when the Slovene name of dvor for curtis is already documented. In 970, Emperor Otto I granted Archbishop Frederick of Salzburg a “curtis known in the
Slavic language as Dolenji Dvor, and in German Niedrnhof" (curtem ad Vduleniduar...Nidrinhof), and the appertaining 50 royal mansi in the south of present-day Austrian Styria.

The castles (or rather fortified and protected strongholds), which the Slavs generally referred to as a gradišče, did not have a residential function in the Frankish period – unlike the relatively small noble castles – but, as a large complex with buildings of earth and wood, they served to shelter the wider population in the event of danger. A document of King Arnulf (in 888) is very revealing in this regard, clearly defining, both functionally and legally, the status of Carolingian strongholds in the Bavarian Eastern March, which included most of present-day Slovene territory. The king granted immunity to his ministerial Heimo for alodial possessions on the Danube, making his hereditary possessions exempt from the public-law jurisdiction of the local margrave, Aribo. To ensure the security of these border marches facing the Moravians, Heimo’s dependents were required to work together with the margrave to build a stronghold (urbs, gradišče) in a place he selected and to assume responsibility for its protection and defence; in case of danger they could retreat into it with their belongings. This urbs was not a noble castle or the centre of a seigneur, as was typical of the Central Middle Ages, but a fortified refuge (Fliehburg, bežigrad) for the entire population of the border area, where memories of the bloody war between Svatopulk and Arnulf from 882 to 884 were still fresh, and where there was a constant threat of renewed conflict. The immunity granted did not affect the obligation to build, guard and defend this refuge, which was a form of enclave of margravial rights and jurisdiction within the immune possessions of Heimo, whose life was very closely tied to Carantanian history. He belonged to Arnulf’s inner circle and was a member of one of the leading noble families in Bavaria and the Eastern March; his household were of German, Slav and Roman origin. Heimo's father, Witigowo, was a count in Carantania in around 860, while his sister, Tunza, who was married to a Carantanian Slav noble, Georgius, received an estate as dowry from her brother, which lay south of Wörthersee and had probably belonged at one time to the prince of Carantania.

The end of the Carolingian period was also a decisive period in the beginnings of noble castles, although one of the oldest castles in present-day Slovenia is that at Bled, which was mentioned in 1011 as the centre of a seigneur held in the area by the bishops of Brixen. A “castle, known locally as Bosisen,” was mentioned even earlier, in 973, on the border of the Škofja Loka seigneur of the Freising bishops, but it cannot be more clearly placed or identified. It may have had the same defensive function as the castle of Solkan (near Gorizia) mentioned in 1001, which closed off the Soča valley at the point it spreads out into flatlands,
and which was probably established during the Lombard period, before the end of the eighth century. The Ptuj castle or fortress is older and probably had antecedents in Antiquity. The biographer of archbishop Conrad of Salzburg (1106–1147) reported that an old castle stood in Ptuj, long since in ruins, which the archbishop rebuilt “to the state it is seen in today.” The local Salzburg ministerials, the subsequently very powerful lords of Ptuj, took their name from this castle as early as 1137. The same archbishop rebuilt Rajhenburg, which was the most southerly Salzburg castle, and began to build a castle “from its foundations” in Leibnitz, in the south of present-day Austrian Styria. The biographer states that all three castles were built by the archbishop as a first line of defence against the Hungarians, with whom there was peace, but not necessarily mutual trust. And Conrad’s zeal for construction did not end there. The castle at Friesach, which he had completed, fortified and decorated “so that it seemed more like an imperial than an episcopal residence,” is a good example of the symbolic role of some castles in the Central Middle Ages.

Castles were also the centre of the border marches that were formed in the Alpine-Adriatic region in the middle of the tenth century. This is well illustrated by the correspondence between the names of the marches and their most important castles. The link between the March of Carniola (Krain, Kranjska) and the castle in the march or krajina (Chrainburg, Kranj), seat of the margrave, is particularly clear. Similarly, the March of Drava was centred on a “castle in the march” (i.e. Marchburg/Maribor) and the castle of Ptuj gave its name to the March of Ptuj (marchia Pitouiensi), while in the first half of the twelfth century the annals of the Styrian monastery at Admont referred to Günter Haimburg-Hohenwart as the margrave of Cilli (marchio de Cyli), though his actual title was margrave of Savinja (marchio de Soune). At another level, Ljubljana castle held a similar role as the economic, administrative and judicial centre of the Spanheims’ large Ljubljana seigneury. This largely encompassed the parts of the Ljubljana basin south of the Sava within view of the castle. In the middle of the twelfth century, Ljubljana castle was the residence of the duke’s brother, but a century later it was expressly stated as one of the Spanheim’s main castles (castrum capitale). This designation also indicates that it was locally predominant over the smaller ministerial castles, which were usually in the form of a tower, a universal element in castle buildings, on the borders of the Ljubljana seigneury: at Jeterbenk, Polhov Gradec, Falkenberg, Ig, Osterberg-Sostro, perhaps also Goričane, and occasionally that at Turjak, originally a free noble castle.

The importance of castles to the identity of noble dynasties can be seen from the fact that nobles began to take their names from their castles. Many have heard of the former ruling
dynasty of the Habsburgs, which, of course, exists to this day, yet few are aware that their surname derives from the castle of Hab(icht)sburg (fortress of the hawk), which was originally built by one of their ancestors in the first half of the eleventh century, near Brugg in modern-day Switzerland. This naming after castles was only the most evident expression of a profound and long-lasting change in the structure of the nobility, surmised by the German saying ‘von Sippe zu Geschlecht’ (‘from clans to lineage’). Before the turn of the millennium, the nobility was based more on family or clan than on lineage. These clans were largely known by the name most commonly taken by their leaders, such as the Aribones named after Aribo, the Sighardings named after Sig(e)hard, the Otakars after Otakar, without particular mention of the Frankish Merovingians or Carolingians. Cognate ties predominated at the time, in contrast to the agnate (i.e. male-line) successions that are still found today, and relations within a single generation were more important than the tracing of lineage. By marrying into a powerful noble family, an individual could rapidly acquire power and reputation, despite the fact that this meant in part the loss of their personal identity. The appearance of ‘strongholds’ or castles as noble residences and centres of their own seigneuries, which passed down the male line (usually through the eldest son), finally led to the application of the agnate principle.

The eleventh and above all the twelfth centuries were the prime period for the establishment of castles as noble residences and centres of seigneuries, although on the territory of today’s Slovenia, the construction of castles really flourished between the middle of the twelfth and the middle of the thirteenth centuries. A castle’s location was determined by geography, communications and strategy, and symbolism. The symbolic and strategic criteria led to the classic castle of the Central Middle Ages located on a high point, though undoubtedly they also existed in other forms. A castle was therefore physically separated from the village, although the higher noble residents still partially lived according to the rhythms of peasant life. For example, pepper, which was worth a fortune at that time, was only available to the very richest, yet it was not enough to feed them; to eat they still needed crops from local peasants’ fields. The nobility that lived in medieval castles was very heterogeneous, which was also reflected in the diversity of castle residences. Until the end of the twelfth century, there were still relatively few castles and only a select few – the richest and most notable princely and comital families from the ranks of the high nobility – could afford to build them. The lower nobles, ministerials and the even lower ranking Einschildritter knights (a term meaning literally ‘one-shield knight’ and referring to the lowest rank of noble who could receive a fief but not grant one) lived in towers that in many places remained part of the
Lower noble families only started to build castles in larger numbers in the thirteenth century. At the same time, a significant section of the lower nobility – the ministerials – were starting to liberate themselves of personal dependence and restrictions. In Styria, the freedom of ministerials to marry was recognised, in 1237, by a charter from Emperor Frederick II, and legally they became equal with the higher, free nobility. In Carinthia and Carniola, this occurred somewhat later, though not much later, as the general (territorial) peace issued in December 1276 by King Rudolf I for the former Otakar II Přemysl lands deemed “counts, barons, and ministerials” as equals. By the fourteenth century, the nobility in Slovene territory was already legally equal, and in the following century began to decide equally on matters of the Land. This was the start of the institutionalised Estates of the Land, divided within into “lords” and “knights and squires”. Although legally equal, there remained differences in wealth, title and repute between different members of the nobility – who remained small in number at every level throughout the Middle Ages. Mobility between these noble ranks was not unknown, however.

As in the Early Middle Ages, the nobility remained extremely international throughout the Central and Late Middle Ages. This applies particularly to the high, dynastic nobility, whose family ties spread throughout Europe. As indicated by specific examples before the turn of the millennium, Slavic higher nobles from today’s Slovene territory were able to enter the ranks of the mainly Germanic speaking higher nobility. One typical characteristic of the nobility was the high level of intermarriage between houses. The claim, long accepted, that all the major noble dynasties of the Central and Middle Ages ruling Slovene territory were not Slovene therefore only means that the founders of these houses came from elsewhere to make it their homeland. Even the greatest of the noble houses, the Habsburgs, came to ‘their Austria’ as foreigners from ‘Switzerland’. Defining medieval aristocrats in terms of modern concepts, such as national consciousness, can only lead to major and completely unnecessary misapprehensions and confusion, which create prejudices and lead to a misunderstanding of the spirit of medieval times. The counts and princes of Cilli are often understood and proclaimed – even as a counterweight to a ‘German’ nobility – as a Slovene dynasty and even as bearers of a Yugoslav ideal, which is as anachronistic as proclaiming them Germans by national consciousness. There existed at most a consciousness of belonging to a ‘German’ state that was expressly multinational. The eminent position of the Cilli dynasty in Slovene history is not therefore based on these criteria, but on the fact that they had their residence, their castle and their court in Celje – in the modern-day Slovenia – where they lived for generations, and from where their formed their lordship and governed it. The same applies to
the remaining ‘Slovene’ higher noble dynasties: their place in Slovene history derives from their role in the history of the Slovene territory.

By language, the higher nobility on Slovene land were predominantly Germanic, although some examples indicate that Slovene was understood and spoken in these circles. For example, in 1227, the duke of Carinthia, Bernhard of Spanheim, allegedly welcomed the renowned Styrian knight-poet, Ulrich of Lichtenstein to Carinthia with the words “Bog vas sprejmi, kraljica Venus” (“God welcome you, Queen Venus” – Ulrich is said to have been dressed for a chivalric tournament with a helmet with a depiction of Venus). Similar testimony is provided by a preserved letter of 1480 written in Serbian to Leonhard, the last count of Gorizia, by Katarina Branković, widow of Ulrich, the last of the Cillis; the letter indicates that the Gorizian knew a Slavic language; he may have learnt it at the Cilli court, where Katarina had known him in her childhood. The lower nobles must have been even more familiar with the language of their Slovene surroundings, particularly those exercising patrimonial jurisdiction, as it is not otherwise possible to imagine how they would exercise their jurisdiction over the subject peasants of their seigneur. This assumption is supported by an appeal by the Estates of Carniola from 1527 against the prince’s appointment of a captain’s deputy who was not of the Land and “who did not know Slovene, which has always applied.” The captain’s deputy was the second highest office in the Land and generally presided over the court of nobles. The tenor of the appeal implies that at least the majority of the Carniolan nobility knew Slovene, as this requirement would otherwise close the door to prestigious offices of the Land. Most of the nobility was at least bilingual, and in some areas – especially in Istria and on the border with Friuli – even trilingual, although German predominated in speech, and even more in writing.

Peasants and Villages

The process of legal standardisation did not only affect the nobility. In the Late Middle Ages, the legal status of the peasant population became gradually equated with the status of bondage. Previously, from the tenth to thirteenth century, there had been major differences among this population, covering a wide range of different ranks from “freeman” (homo liber) to “bondsman” (homo proprius). The social structure of the rural population in the Late Middle Ages was characterised by the fact that membership of one level or group or another was transferred from generation to generation, irrespective of whether or not an individual’s role had changed significantly. The emphasis was on one’s status at birth; subsequently a
peasant’s status would never again be so strictly categorised, so closely tied to birth, and so influenced by rigid legal concepts. Economically, the classification was largely justified – and not just in Slovene territory – by one’s status in production, especially in the division of the agrarian units within a seigneury (into manors and mansi). The bondsmen were originally the workforce at the manor that worked the seigneury (i.e. the demesne) land. This made them more dependent than freemen, who worked on a more independent basis, and were therefore freer. During the colonisation period in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the manors were already losing their previous importance in terms of production, as the mansus system (hufe, hube; cf. English: hide) began to dominate. The relatively standard production method on the mansi, usually single-family agricultural units, became the basis for a more standardised personal status among the peasant population. Instead of the previous differentiation based on status at birth, peasants’ personal status was becoming defined in relation to the land they worked. A bondsman was now anyone who accepted work on bonded land. The special social stratum of kosezi went through the same social change in the Late Middle Ages: the status of kosez was no longer determined by birth, and a kosez was simply someone who possessed a parcel of land traditionally associated with kosezi (koseščina). Around the middle of the thirteenth century, land-related dependency in the sense of bondage began to predominate over other criteria, although memories and traces of old distinctions lasted until the second half of the fifteenth century. By then, the vast majority of peasants had been brought under the standard status of bondage, which only came to an end in 1848 with the emancipation of the peasants.

Peasants and their families represented the majority of the population in the feudal period, over 80% by the fifteenth century. In those terms, Slovenes truly formed a peasant nation, though that was by no means peculiarly Slovene or an attribute that would differentiate them from other European people or environments. The stereotypes of a nation of serfs and servants that arose during the nineteenth century, and that were even promulgated as political mottos by Slovene politicians of the time (as though the moment had arrived to rise up after a thousand years under the yoke), apply even less. The term serf is completely inapplicable as a general designation for a peasant, as it only refers to peasants for whom the bonded labour was a particularly onerous burden. Yet even at the height of the seigneuries’ power, bonded labour was not the main burden for most peasants, but just the most resented, which they performed as poorly as they could. One specific characteristic of peasant life in Slovene territory was that they combined their work with non-agricultural activities, first as transporters and carters, and also as traders and craftsmen. How many peasants performed
such work is difficult to determine, but it is clear that they were numerous. Many of these people therefore did not fit the typical image of a peasant as much as those elsewhere in Europe.

Peasants or the agrarian population in general, lived mainly, though not exclusively, in villages, with some more isolated at outlying farms or clusters of dwellings. A village is defined as permanent settlement that lives primarily from agricultural production. The core of a typical village in this period would comprise a group of neighbouring houses (farms), alongside which individual craft workshops might be found. Each village was surrounded by a set amount of village land with fields, meadows, waters and pastures and woods, part of which was for individual use, and part for common use. Yet a group of farms standing together does not automatically become a village, as there must be functional connections between them. Common buildings and public spaces, such as gathering places (often beneath a linden tree in the middle of the village), paths, wells or a church, are therefore as much constituent elements of a village as the common regulation of economic and legal matters that stood above individual farms. A community of village neighbours of this kind – regardless of the dispersed nature of the seigneury land system in the Late Middle Ages, when a number of different seigneurs would have mansi in the same village – linked by common economic interests and the need for common management of village land are referred to as a soseska (from Slov. sosed – neighbour). A similar term that came from common usage is srenja, which derives from sredina or centre (in the sense of the centre of the village where villagers would gather). Sometimes, terms such as commune, deriving from Latin, the German word Gemeinde and the Slovene word gmajna derived from it, are also used to refer to a soseska. The soseska enjoyed a certain level of self-governance or autonomy, which was relatively small in scope yet of exceptional importance to villagers as it included matters such as making binding resolutions on the time and place for certain agrarian duties, on letting otherwise cultivated land be used as pasture (in relation to triennial fallow rotation), and managing shared village equipment and land.

Most villages in modern-day Slovenia grew up during the period of intense colonisation from the tenth century onwards. It was from this time on that the cultural landscape formed by economic use and the building of human settlements began to take shape. This form, which remained well into the modern era, was essentially complete by the Late Middle Ages. Austro-Hungarian urbarial records – and other sources – indicate that the number of villages in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries multiplied rapidly and in favourable locations reached the same number as found today, even exceeding today’s figures.
in some places. Records from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries frequently name villages that no longer exist, having been abandoned for a number of reasons. The form of a village and layout of land parcels can be used to deduce when a village developed, or when an older village and related land was converted to the new _mansus_ system. This type of study of villages is generally based on maps from the Franciscan cadastral survey (named after Emperor Francis I) carried out from 1817 to 1827, which fixes in time a conservative agrarian environment whose main features had remained unchanged over the centuries, before the arrival of the major changes that would later affect rural areas. If parcels are irregular shapes with a cluster distribution, they are usually related to older ‘clustered villages’, where houses are generally located without any particularly order. These villages preserve traces of prefeudal times in their field layout. If the parcels are formed into long, narrow geometrical strips, with houses generally in a row along the road (known as a ‘linear village’), it usually indicates a later form of colonisation, although some clustered villages also formed later. Linear villages with fields distributed in rectangular strips indicate planned colonisation overseen by a seigneur, at a time when the plough was already used intensively.

In many but not all parts of Slovene territory, the elder of a village community was known as a _župan_ at the end of the Middle Ages, and well into the modern era, although the term could also be used for the head of a group of villages, and sometimes even for the head of a group of disparate peasants. The late medieval _župan_ is linked by title to the Old Slavic _župan_, first documented in 777 in the founding charter of a monastery in Kremsmünster, on Old Bavarian land west of the Enns. Duke Tassilo III of Bavaria granted the monastery a group of Slavs (_decania Sclauorum_), headed by two _actores_, Taliup and Sparuna, while the _župan_ (_jopan_) Physso reported the boundary of the deaconry under oath. It is quite possible that Physso’s Slavic group had fled onto Bavarian territory from the Avars around 750 and been brought under the duke’s territorial lordship. The word _župan_ is known to most Slavic languages, and so must have been familiar to most Slavic groups before the first major population movements. This does not exclude the borrowing of the word (and/or its function) from neighbours with whom Slavs came into contact, but the etymology has yet to be clearly and satisfactorily resolved. The sparse, and above all late, written sources, primarily urbarial records from a time in which _župani_ had already become an institution of feudal society, means that an understanding of the role of the _župan_ in Old Slovene society can only be hypothetical, although the later sources do permit a certain amount of retrospective deduction.

The introduction of seigneuries to the Slovene settlement area in the tenth and eleventh centuries led to a major change in the Old Slovene socioeconomic structure. Land
organised as a župa was subordinate to the seigneury and placed under a župan; if someone wanted to continue tilling the land they would sooner or later have to accept some from the lord under the new mansi system, with all the consequences in terms of obligations and personal dependence. Put simply, Old Slavic župani gradually became the lower officials of the seigneuries, similar to the village elders known in German areas, though they retained a few special characteristics. At least in some places in Slovene territory, particularly in the Styrian-Savinja region, the prototype of the seigneury župan was an untaxed župan who held two mansi i.e. a župan who had twice as much land to cultivate as other peasants, but who was not subject to the seigneur’s taxes. This can be explained as a reward from the seigneur for fulfilling the župan role in the reorganisation from co-operative village into the mansus system, and for supervising the new economy. The župan gradually lost these privileges and towards the end of the Middle Ages one finds taxed župani with one mansus, their only distinction from other peasants being in the amount of taxes due.

Some examples indicate that the župan could have several roles: as an agent of the seigneury, an agent of village self-governance, as well as an agent of the local territorial court (i.e. the court of lower justice, for the unprivileged classes) in which they would sit. The involvement of župan as an agent of village self-governance in a local territorial court was the highest level that this form of self-governance could reach during the Middle Ages. A particular and remarkable exception were the župani in the County of Pazin, in the Habsburg interior of Istria. The nobles of the county acquired their own noble court of higher justice in the charter of privileges issued by Count Albert III of Gorizia in 1365. Yet, since there were too few Istrian nobles to sit in their own court, they preferred to give testimony before a local court presided over by a župan than to be subordinate to the territorial court of Ljubljana. The fact they had to appear before a župan in civil cases against Istrian nobles was a particular annoyance to Carniolan nobles, who therefore appealed to the emperor at the start of the sixteenth century to make the Istrian nobles subordinate to the Ljubljana territorial court.

Burghers and Towns

The towns, and the related burgher culture, that developed in Slovene territory in the thirteenth century in particular were a phenomenon that completely changed the traditional face of feudal society in the Central Middle Ages. The reawakening of a monetary economy, and the related development of trade and crafts, which became separate from agrarian production, led to the development of concentrated settlements whose inhabitants were
primarily involved in mercantile and craft activities. These settlements and their inhabitants also represented a special community, legally distinct from the agrarian world.

Only in coastal areas, in Istria, are there concentrated settlements – some of which, such as Trieste, were also referred to as civilitates – that have a continuity of settlement with Antiquity. Despite this, as late as the eleventh century, the northern Istrian settlements, which were also sometimes episcopal sees, were still primarily centres for the control of trade in agrarian products and salt, and much less centres of burgher crafts. Nevertheless, their favourable location on the coast and ties with Venice represented a major advantage in the development of their mercantile function, evidence of which is found in a pact between Venice and Koper from 932. The coastal towns were characterised by a symbiosis of agrarian and non-agrarian functions. A town in the ancient world was the administrative centre for a wider agrarian hinterland, and the coastal towns, which had a continuity of settlement, unlike those in the interior, retained this function into the Middle Ages. The situation was completely different for inland towns, whose establishment in the Central Middle Ages was an act of separation from the agrarian surroundings. These ties, or lack thereof, between a town and its agricultural hinterland also affected the social structure of the town population. The differences between the two types of town in Slovene territory (coastal and continental) were large and significant. By the end of the thirteenth century, the coastal towns had developed a town nobility or patrician class that combined elements of burgher and noble culture: the members of this class were responsible for town governance and membership of the main body of town autonomy, the town council, was reserved for them alone. This closed town council, with the right to sit belonging exclusively to patrician families, was a typical institution of nobility, as this privileged status was ensured at birth. The continental towns did not have a patrician class. The first decades of the fourteenth century saw some attempts to introduce such a class, but these were never well developed and there were never any councils with membership limited exclusively, or even primarily, to town nobles. The arrival of Habsburg rule of Carniola and Carinthia in 1335 brought an end to this tentative development and reintroduced a strict distinction betweenburghers and nobles. Only a feudal lord living primarily from landed possessions could be considered a noble, and the nobles were completely separate fromburghers; in the coastal areas, in contrast, ties with the agrarian surroundings formed the basis for the development of burgher-nobles. The general contrast between continuity with Antiquity and newer development, characteristic of Slovene territory, was very clearly expressed in the differences between the coastal and continental towns.

During the Central Middle Ages, the coastal settlements were transformed from
administrative and ecclesiastical centres, which were not economically very distinct from their rural surroundings, into mercantile and craft centres i.e. towns in the classic sense of the word. This led to the majority of the activities of town populations being reoriented from agriculture to crafts. This process was also related to the advance of the Romano-Slavic ethnic boundary to the direct hinterland of the coastal towns. The appearance of Slavic (Slovene) personal names in the villages surrounding Trieste in the twelfth century indicates that the Slavic farmers were already growing crops in the direct vicinity of Trieste, right up to the city walls. The Slavic-populated rural surroundings of Koper developed their own structure, headed by the captain of the Slavs (capitaneus Sclavorum), first mentioned in 1349, who was usually appointed from the ranks of the Koper or Venetian patricians, and who commanded a peasant army of soldiers known as černida (black army) by the end of the Middle Ages.

In the interior, a town or market town was a place with the right to hold at least a weekly market, and whose inhabitants had the right to perform craft and mercantile activities as free men. Towns were generally larger and more compact settlements than market towns, and held the additional right to have town walls and the ‘town’ designation. This distinction only gradually developed: until the thirteenth century, the same place may equally be referred to as a town (civitas, urbs) or market town (forum, mercatum). Most towns were founded during the thirteenth century, although the origins of a number of continental towns do go back to the Early Middle Ages. At the end of the ninth century, Ptuj is already referred to as a civitas – in an otherwise forged tenth century document of Arnulf, based on an authentic original – with a toll and stone bridge, which is known to have been in continuous use from late Antiquity to the end of the thirteenth century, when the course of the Drava changed and a new bridge had to be built. Ptuj, which already had two churches in the ninth century, experienced a reawakening at that time as a trading post at the Drava crossing, on the route linking Italy and the northern Adriatic with Pannonia. The settlement of Magyars on the nearby plains had blocked Ptuj’s development for a long time, turning it into an isolated border post. However, in the Late Middle Ages, it re-established itself as one of the most important stations for transit trade along the lengthy route between Hungary and northern Italy, when up to 20,000 head of cattle per year were led through Slovene territory to Venice. Ptuj also has a special status in the history of medieval Slovene towns, since it is probably the only continental town that had been continually settled since Late Antiquity. In contrast with other towns in the interior, which generally had their municipal law in the form of a charter of privileges, Ptuj’s municipal law was written in the form of a lengthy statute (1376), similar to those of Mediterranean towns. Its provisions also applied as customary law (even before
Otherwise the Carantanian-Carinthian region had a special role in the earliest phases of development of centres of trades and crafts. In 975, Ima, an ancestor (possibly grandmother) of Hemma of Gurk – it is the same name with a different spelling – acquired the right to hold a market, and to have a mint and a toll, at Lieding in the Gurk valley of Carinthia, from Emperor Otto II, although a settlement did not arise there. In 1016, Hemma’s husband, Wilhelm, received the same rights for what became the renowned Salzburg-owned town of Friesach and, in 1060, King Henry IV granted similar rights to Bamberg Villach, Carinthia’s most important traffic junction. In all three cases, a charter of privileges from the crown lay behind the initial rise of the town. At the time, only the crown could grant market rights; this regalian right was formally renounced by Emperor Frederick II in 1232 (with the Statutum in favorem principum), which relinquished the right to the princes of the Länder.

The higher nobles that owned (or held) large seigneuries therefore began to found urban settlements. They granted the relevant rights – such as the right to hold a fair and build town walls – to settlements to qualify them as a town or market (town). A seigneur on whose territory a town was founded became a town lord, with the pertaining rights in town administration and legal jurisdiction. Lordship over towns in the interior is therefore rooted in territorial lordship, while the town extricated itself territorially, economically, socially and legally from the primarily agrarian structure of the seigneury through the formation of a special legal sphere under town jurisdiction. The law of most Slovene towns in the interior was defined by a charter of privileges issued by the town lords. The charter-based law of the continental towns differed from the statute-based law of the coastal towns in that it was not established autonomously, and did not generally codify existing customary law, but regulated actual, individual cases. In that manner, individual towns gradually developed a book of privileges, in which individual town privileges were recorded, and which the town lord then confirmed as a whole. For example, in 1566, Archduke Charles, the prince of Carniola, affirmed the manuscript charter of privileges of the town of Ljubljana, in which were written around 100 privileges acquired by the town since 1320. On the other hand, the Kostanjevica town law, written around 1300 as a privilege, which provides a good overview of the most important cases of a small medieval town in Slovene territory, formed the basis for the later privileges of Metlika, Črnomelj and Novo Mesto. The formula later passed from Novo Mesto to Kočevje and Lož. This created a special family or genealogy of town law, which did not, in contrast to the situation in Germany, adhere to a significant ‘mother-daughter’ relationship between individual towns.
Even without attributing excessive value to first mentions that are sometimes made only in passing, there is no doubt that almost all important towns on the territory of modern-day Slovenia were founded in the thirteenth century. They usually grew up at well-frequented locations, often on the ruins of their ancient predecessors and below the major castles of the higher noble lords. In this manner, the Andechs towns of Kamnik and Kranj, to mention just two examples, became urban settlements around the first quarter of the thirteenth century; Spanheim Ljubljana also developed around the same time. Freising Škofja Loka grew into a town around the end of the thirteenth century while, in 1365, the prince of the Land, Rudolf IV, founded Novo Mesto ‘from scratch’. Later, in the 1470s, the market towns of Krško, Kočevje, Višnja Gora and Lož were elevated to town status for strategic reasons, in response to the threat of Turkish incursions, and hence acquired town walls as a defence. In Carinthia, Salzburg Friesach acquired walls in the first third of the twelfth century, while other Carinthian towns – Sankt Veit, Villach, Völkermarkt and Klagenfurt – were founded in the thirteenth century. In the south of Styria, Salzburg-controlled Ptuj became a town at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and Babenberg Maribor somewhat later; Andechs Slovenj Gradec joined them a little after the thirteenth century, and Celje of the Cillis in the first half of the fifteenth century. In the west of Slovene territory, only Gorizia of the counts of Gorizia was elevated to town status, at the beginning of the fourteenth century.

During the formation of the Länder in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries – one consequence of which was the creation of the principal towns of the Länder, where bodies responsible for territorial administration would generally have their seat, particularly after the Habsburgs had inherited the Cilli possessions – the towns generally became part of the prince’s fisc. The main exceptions were the Freising Škofja Loka (in Carniola), and (in Carinthia) Bamberg Villach and, from 1518, Klagenfurt, which the prince granted to the Estates of the Land as their see. In Styria, Ptuj belonged to Salzburg until 1479.

Burghers represented a new social group in the feudal social structure, with a role and status that made them legally distinct from the agrarian surroundings. Their most definitive characteristic was the fact that they had personal freedom, and that they performed an economic activity (as merchants or craftsmen) that was reserved for them by law. They also had the right to participate in town governance, which was expressed in town autonomy. The main duty for burghers was to protect and defend the town, which included maintaining the walls. However, not every inhabitant of a town was yet a burgher, so not every person within the walls was entitled to the same rights, but nor were they subject to the same obligations. Generally, a burgher was a person with property in the town in the form of a house, who lived
from some form of burgher activity i.e. trading or crafts. The nobility did not have burgher status, even if they lived in a town. The same applied to the clergy, various officials, servants, Jews, beggars and also subject peasants (bondsmen) who had bonded lands within the town’s area of jurisdiction. The saying “city air makes you free” generally applied only to the extent that a bondsman who lived for a year and a day in a certain town without a lord demanding his return became free, though without gaining the full rights of a burgher. Entry to membership of the leading town bodies was open only to the patrician class in the coastal towns. In the continental towns, which did not have a patrician class, differentiation between burghers was based on wealth. This effectively restricted access to a town’s main bodies of governance to the wealthier burghers, who generally came from the ranks of merchants rather than craftsmen.

The foundations of autonomy for towns were largely laid down in the fourteenth century, and remained more or less unchanged until the eighteenth. The autonomous bodies in the continental towns developed from two sources: from the town magistrate, as representative of the town lord, and from the commune or community (assembly) of all burghers. In Slovene towns, certain rights were acquired very early (well before 1370 in Ljubljana), particularly in comparison to towns in modern-day Austria. These included the right of the burghers to elect the town magistrate, though the town lord of course reserved the right to approve or reject the choice; these rights enhanced both the town lord’s authority and town autonomy (which also led to the late appearance of a town mayor). Another source of autonomy was the community of all burghers, known as the commune (komun) under influence from the coastal settlements, where the communitas civitatis was first mentioned in Trieste in 1139. The commune, presided over by the town magistrate, decided on administrative matters and legal cases. This decision-making process was quickly passed to a more select group – in larger towns to twelve cvelbarji (a direct borrowing from the German Zwölfer), from whose ranks an elected town council developed, though this generally only comprised wealthier burghers. This led to social discord and even clashes between the town council and the wider burgher classes. In 1472 in Ljubljana, a 24-member council was appointed to redress this issue, conceived as a form of supervisory body of the town commune over the town council. However, the latter remained the only real decision-making body in the town and represented it together with the town magistrate. In 1504 Ljubljana became the only Carniolan town to follow the example of Styrian towns and appoint a mayor (again the Slovenes used the term župan for this office), though it was primarily for reasons of prestige rather than need.
The linguistic and ethnic identity of the inhabitants of medieval towns in Slovene territory was heterogeneous; bilingualism and trilingualism was quite normal at this meeting point of the Slavic, Romance and Germanic worlds. Town inhabitants were largely the product of a twofold migration – from village to town and from town to town. The former brought new, generally lower, classes of the town population from the agrarian surroundings, the latter saw craftsmen and merchants moving from town to town. The medieval town was indeed a melting pot of different ethnic elements. This applied particularly to towns in the interior, where the town populations were formed *ex novo*, while the core population of older coastal towns was formed by descendants of the pre-Slavic ‘Roman’ population. This renders rather surprising the mid-fifteenth century report of Enea Silvio Piccolomini asserting that Istrians were by then Slavs, although the inhabitants of the coastal towns used Italian speech, but knew both languages. According to Valvasor, the everyday languages of seventeenth-century Ljubljana were the Carniolan tongue (i.e. Slovene) and German, while nobles and merchants also spoke Italian, though everything was written in German. Even in Slovenj Gradec, Valvasor noted that most of the population knew Slovene and German.

The old assertions that the burghers of the coastal towns of modern-day Slovenia were ‘Romans’ or Italians, while the towns of the interior were inhabited by Germans, are certainly exaggerated and over-simplified. They undoubtedly arose because Italian (Latin) and German were the almost exclusive languages of official written business, which creates an erroneous impression that all of life took place in the two languages at this time. A good example of this is demonstrated by two fifteenth-century Škofja Loka merchants, known in German documents as *Herteisen* and *Leerensack* (literally ‘Hard Iron’ and ‘Empty Sack’). The fact their surnames were recorded by a ‘Roman’ town clerk in Rijeka as *Trdo Železo* and *Prazna Vreča* – clearly how they had introduced themselves to him – indicates that scribes, who were accustomed to listening in one language and writing in another, would write Slovene names in a German form, which gives the impression that the named parties were Germans. It is undoubtedly the case that the Slovene population predominated in smaller towns in Carniola. The fact, for example, that the town magistrate in Škofja Loka in 1579 did not know how “to read, nor write, and much less German” and that the town clerk had to read and translate letters for him, clearly indicates that the inhabitants of the town generally used Slovene. As many as 15 town magistrates gave their oaths in Slovene in eight Carniolan towns between 1750 and 1771. Even in the principal and largest Carniolan town – Ljubljana – Slovenes represented at least 70% of the population according to calculations made during the Reformation, when the total population was around 6,000 people.
Town inhabitants of foreign origin were of less importance to the national composition of Slovene territory, yet their role was greater in the economic sphere, particularly in trade. In early sixteenth-century Ljubljana, the most important merchants were of south German origin, while later many Italians became important. The same held for Ptuj, which was an important town for international trade. Jews began to appear in towns in relation with monetary matters at a relatively early date. They arrived in the towns of Styria and Carinthia – in Maribor, Ptuj, Villach, Friesach, Klagenfurt, Sankt Veit and Völkermarkt – in the second half of the thirteenth century, while in Carniola they operated only in Ljubljana. The first Jews to arrive in Ljubljana came from Cividale and Gorizia in around 1325. By the end of the fourteenth century there were also Jews in Piran and Koper. Florentine bankers, found in Slovenj Gradec, Ljubljana and Kamnik by the end of the thirteenth century, and in Piran around 1330–1340, also dealt with monetary transactions. Before Jews established themselves, the leading position in mercantile and monetary transactions in Ljubljana and across Carniola had been held by the Porger family, who had probably moved there from Friuli.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TERRITORIAL NOBILITY

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the transitional period from the Middle Ages to the modern period, major political, ecclesiastical, social, economic and cultural changes took place that affected both the population in Slovene territory and the population in western Europe. One factor that typically determined the creation of the modern state was the formation of a territorial nobility. These territorial or provincial nobles, as a legally organised, though internally stratified, social group, began to function as a special body. From the early fifteenth century, the territorial nobility would submit a transcript of the charter of privileges they held to each new ruler for confirmation in writing. The ruler or prince (of the Land) who respected the territorial customs and upheld the submitted charters of privileges, known as Landhandfesten, at the same time promised “protection” to the individual Land, while the nobles (the people of the Land) vowed to offer their prince “counsel and aid” to the best of their ability. The first Landhandfesten emerged in 1414 when Archduke Ernest the Iron became the prince of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. The position of the nobility was strengthened since the affirmed privileges restricted the prince’s power, primarily in military, financial and judicial matters.

The military and political events that diminished the Habsburgs’ power as princes and landowners in their hereditary lands forced the prince to begin convening territorial diets from
around 1400. In addition to the nobility (lords, knights and squires), these diets also included prelates and representatives of the princely towns. At the prince’s proposal, these representative groups, the Estates (stanovi in Slovene, Stände in German, a term the groups themselves used from the late fifteenth century), mainly addressed military issues and the closely linked financial issues. The Estates, whose privileges exempt them from all direct taxation, held the right to accept or reject any demand for extraordinary taxes. This gave them powerful influence over all public matters in the Land. The relationship between the prince and the Estates developed into a joint rule, with the prince attempting to obtain approval for taxes by making concessions to the Estates, though was never formally recognised. This dualism, which had become well established by the end of the fifteenth century, was a relationship of mutual benefit and antagonism, a partnership of many contradictions.

The mutual pledge enshrined in the Handfesten committed the prince and the Estates to guaranteeing the peace in the Land and protecting it from external enemies. The territorial diets were therefore initially concerned with creating a new military organisation to protect the individual Länder. There were many reasons to do so. Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, which were collectively known as Inner Austria (forming a special group of Habsburg lands) from the early fifteenth century, were affected by numerous conflicts and military attacks. In addition to dynastic disputes among the Habsburgs, which even escalated into armed conflict in the first decades of the fifteenth century, their acquisitions in the western Slovene territory also began to be threatened by the Republic of Venice, then at the peak of its economic powers and territorial expansion. After the collapse of the Aquileian patriarchate as a state in 1420, it had acquired extensive territory in Friuli, Venetian Slovenia (Beneška Slovenija) and the Tolmin area, as well as taking Muggia (Milje) in the Gulf of Trieste. Furthermore, some major feudal lords – the bishop of Bamberg, the house of Ortenburg, the count of Gorizia in Carinthia, the count of Wallsee in Styria – tried at this time to free themselves from princely authority. The main rivalry, played out in battles and even sieges, was that between the counts or princes of Cilli (Celje) and the Habsburgs, which lasted until a successorial pact reached between these two powerful families in 1443.

The political tensions in the Inner Austria lands gained a completely new dimension with the appearance of a previously unknown enemy, who not only countered the prince’s power and indirectly increased that of the Estates, but also threatened all of Inner Austria. In 1408, the Turks broke into Slovene territory for the first time, plundering widely, burning down the surroundings of Metlika, and killing or enslaving its inhabitants. The attack was
repeated three years later, when the Turks again crossed the territory of defenceless Bosnia and broke into southern part of Carniola, named as White Carniola (Bela Krajina), where they looted the surroundings of Metlika and the area of Črnomelj. The pressure applied on Bosnia by the Hungarian king led some years later to individual Bosnian nobles making terms with the Turks. In 1415, they together encroached on Hungarian territory as far as Lake Balaton. Smaller divisions separated from the main body, one of which reached Ljubljana. In the same year, after the Hungarian army’s retaliatory attack on Bosnia had failed, Turkish troops pursuing the retreating Christian army invaded once again, this time into Cilli lands in Styria and Carniola. Turkish incursions into Slovene territory, which represented the furthest extent of the major raids in Croatia and Hungary, nevertheless strongly marked the consciousness of the Christian population of the Inner Austrian lands, who were now aware that a serious force, foreign and completely unknown, threatened to destroy them. Expressions for the Turks, such as arch-enemies of Christ’s name, evil tyrants, attack dogs, birds of death, beggars, firefighters and similar, became common among every social stratum. News of possible further attacks by Turkish troops became a constant feature after 1415. Many attacks were completely imaginary, however, and another fifty years passed before pillagers came rushing from the south-east once more.

The military situation (primarily the Turkish invasions) revealed that the Länder were completely unprotected. The military system, which was typically medieval, was based on the local feudal (chivalrous) cavalry and reserves (universal conscription). Feudal lords, who primarily defended their own possessions, began to reinforce the castles, and princes who controlled market towns and cities issued orders to renovate or reconstruct town walls and city fortresses (e.g. Ljubljana in 1416 and 1448, Maribor in 1437, Slovenj Gradec in 1448). From this time on, the Estates strived at every territorial diet to put in place a defensive system that would enable the protection of the entire Land. At the Reichstag in Nuremberg in 1431, at the general diet of the Inner Austrian Estates (Styria, Carinthia and Carniola) in Graz in 1445, and at the Styrian diet in Leibnitz in 1462, defensive systems were put in place that gave the territorial army a more permanent form. For the nobility, participation in the army was not determined individually, but was measured in relation to the noble’s material power. Every landowner in a Land was part of the defence system, even if they did not reside there, as was the case for many of the ecclesiastical seigneuries; the Salzburg, Freising, Bamberg, Lavantine and other dioceses owned considerable properties in individual Länder, but their sees were elsewhere. For each 100 or 200 pfunden of income from landed possessions, the lay or ecclesiastical lords had to appoint one cavalryman and a set number of infantrymen. The
participation of bondsmen in the army was determined by a system of proportional conscription. Depending on the perceived threat, every 30th, 20th, 10th, 5th or even every 3rd man fit to bear arms was called up. The Länder were divided into operative areas or quarters, with quarter-captains (Viertelhauptsmann) appointed, while at the Land level, overall military command was usually assumed by the Landshauptmann and his deputy. Towns were required to provide their own defence, and organise an infantry corps proportionate to their size. The prince was also required to send a set number of cavalry for the defence of the Land. This military system, which was not entirely equipped to endure the testing military hardships of the second half of the fifteenth century, nonetheless at least provided an organisational and financial basis that raised defence to the level of the Land. The Styrian, Carinthian and Carniolan Estates had given the Länder an institutional form that made it possible to create closer defence links between them.

THE WARS OF FREDERICK III, TURKISH INVASIONS AND PEASANT DISSATISFACTION

The wars in which Frederick III (prince of Inner Austria from 1439, emperor 1452–1493) became involved stretched far beyond the boundaries of individual Länder, and the funds he accrued from his own lands and through exercising his rights relating to minting, mining, and forests were insufficient to meet his needs. He began to demand further revenue from the Estates, which were only liable to provide for the defence of the individual Länder. The prince became more and more dependent on the Estates in relation to internal territorial issues, but was still able to raise the funds required to pursue dynastic policy. The ruler was forced in part to seek additional money by the numerous developments and innovations in the military sphere, such as the introduction of gunpowder, new military techniques and tactics, and the mercenary forces which began to dominate on the battlefield.

The death of Ulrich, last of the house of Cilli, in 1456, allowed Frederick III to enforce the successorial pact and add the considerable Cilli lands to the Habsburg possessions, lands which had largely freed themselves from the dominance of Habsburg princes due to the power of the Cilli dynasty. An existing dispute with Ladislas, the king of Hungary and Bohemia, and the last member of the Albertiner Habsburg line, brought Hungarian troops into Slovene-inhabited territory. After a year-long war spread across Carinthia, Styria and Carniola for the Cilli possessions, Frederick finally achieved almost total victory. With the elimination of the count of Gorizia – who was aiming to gain control of the
Cilli lands in upper Carinthia – from the fight in 1460, all the former Cilli lands were in Habsburg hands. However, the death of King Ladislas (1457, known as ‘the Posthumous’) dragged Frederick III into another war with Hungary. According to the dynastic principle, the Hungarian and Bohemian crown fell to the Habsburgs, but the nobles of the two kingdoms elected two native rulers: George of Poděbrady in Bohemia (1458–1471), and Matthias Corvinus in Hungary (1458–1490) of the house of Hunyadi. Frederick was prevented from making a military intervention in Hungary by a war over the division of the Habsburg’s Austrian lands started by his brother Albert (Albreht). In 1461, Albert combined forces against Frederick with Matthias Corvinus and, over the following two years, another fierce war was fought, mainly in Lower Austria, though Styria was not spared from battle. Frederick received considerable help from mercenaries led by Andreas Baumkircher, Inner Austrian troops, and the Bohemian king, but he was finally saved by Albert’s death without an heir, in 1463.

As soon as the war in Lower Austria was over, another broke out, this time against Venice. On the Gulf of Trieste, the Venetian towns of Piran, Koper and Muggia, in competition with Habsburg Trieste, were attempting to gain as much as possible of the trade flowing to the coast from the hinterlands. Every year, large numbers of cattle passed through Slovene territory to the sea, as well as over 40,000 freight horses carrying primarily ox hides and wheat down to the coast, and salt, oil and wine in the opposite direction. Trieste used force in its attempts to gain a share of the Venetian towns’ trading revenues, which eventually led to war. The Venetians blockaded Trieste without taking the city, but according to the terms of the 1463 truce the city had to allow merchants freedom to choose their route, surrender its own saltpans and two strategic outposts – the castles of Socerb and Moccó. Frederick III, as prince and emperor, issued an order that all trade from Inner Austria directed towards the Gulf of Trieste had to pass via the city itself. However, a considerable proportion of the goods were clearly avoiding the route, as the ruler reaffirmed the order on numerous occasions. Peasant smuggling became common in the Koper area. Meanwhile, the emperor was opening another gateway to the seas for the Habsburg lands: in 1466, he acquired authority over Rijeka (Fiume) and the Kastav seigneury, subordinating them to his representative in Carniola.

The uncertainty caused by the continual attacks was heightened by unemployed mercenaries, who roamed the region robbing, at a time at which there was peace between Venice and the Habsburg lands. Violence broke out on a larger scale when the mercenaries did not receive their expected pay. This led to the nobility in Styria joining their mercenary troops in open opposition to Frederick. In 1469, Andreas Baumkircher assumed command of the
noble revolt, and declared ‘war’ on the ruler. The ferocious pillaging of large estates, mainly in Slovene areas of Styria, forced Frederick to settle his debts. The Inner Austrian Estates agreed to the introduction of a poll tax on everyone from beggars to lords, from babes to the elderly. It was announced as a tax that would be used for the defence of the Länder, but in reality served as “compensation for the rebel knight.” The threat from the rebellious mercenaries only passed after Baumkircher’s capture and beheading in Graz in 1471.

While internal military conditions were increasing the defensive fragility of individual Länder and the population was no longer guaranteed protection, Slovene territory again succumbed to Turkish incursions. The Ottoman Empire was spreading across the Balkan peninsula at astonishing speed. In just ten years Mehmed II the Conqueror (1451–1481) had turned Constantinople into Istanbul (1453), converted the Athenian Church of the Mother of God into a mosque (1456), ended the Serbian Despotate (1459) and had the last king of Bosnia killed (1463). The border of the Turkish state was now just 100 kilometres from Carniola, and for the next 130 years, Croatian and Slovene regions would experience a continual threat. The Ottoman push gradually slowed, but Turkish designs on Croatian and Slovene territory were at their height in the second half of the fifteenth century. In 1469, fourteen years of incursions – the logical extension of the Ottoman conquests – began; it was the period of the largest and most destructive Turkish attacks. The raids were intended to exhaust the Slovene-populated Länder to such an extent that their occupation would be a simple affair once the occasion presented itself. Over the period, Turkish attackers, coming from Bosnia as they would again later, entered the territory of present-day Slovenia around thirty times. Many incursions were relatively brief, and affected only a very localised area, but just as many lasted weeks or even an entire month. In 1471, a commander in Celje sent a report to the imperial diet in Regensburg, writing: “The vicious enemy destroyed and burned 40 churches in Carniola, 24 in Styria, leading 10,000 souls from the former and 5,000 from the latter, and robbed and destroyed 5 market towns and up to 200 villages.” Five years later, after an attack on Carinthia, Paolo Santonino wrote that of the many villages in the Gail valley, “all were in flames.” The Turks rode through Styria, Carniola and Carinthia on five occasions – 1473, 1476, 1478, 1480 and 1483, and also went on raids into Istria, and via the Triestine Karst to the Soča (Isonzo) and into Friuli. In Carniola, which suffered most over this period, every valley, however remote and hidden, received the ominous visit of the Turks. After 1483, once a new sultan had taken the throne and the first lengthier truces had been signed with ‘infidels’, only lower and inner Carniola (Dolenjska and Notranjska) and the surroundings of Ptuj and Celje were subject to minor raids by Ottoman troops until the end of
the fifteenth century (1491–1498). Istria and Friuli would finally have been free of war, if not for the Venetian-Turkish War that occurred from 1499 to 1503. The Turks’ last ever incursion into Friuli took place in 1499, during this war, causing terrible damage and fear; contemporary reports state that 132 villages were razed to the ground.

As the Ottoman empire expanded across the Balkans and its soldiers encroached on the territory of the German empire, most of the western European religious world displayed ignorance and a complete failure to understand a different political and religious world. In the second half of the fifteenth century and into the sixteenth there were still regular calls for crusades against the Turks, as well as serious, yet completely naive and unrealistic ideas that the Ottoman rulers and their subjects could be converted to Christianity through peaceful means. One proponent of such ideas was Pope Pius II (1458–1464), who proclaimed crusades and stated that the Turkish sultan could convert. One hundred years later, the champion of Slovene Protestantism, Primož Trubar, expressed the similar idea that the spread of the “true faith” would bring those led astray to Christianity. The conviction of the power of Christ’s teaching over Mohammedan “religious errancy” was also expressed by a figure from the ranks of popular piety, the štiftarica Maruša Pogerlic, who believed that “the Turkish sultan would be baptised and all the Turks turn to our faith.” That three different forms of Christianity were fighting for power or survival in western civilisation convinced adherents of the strength of their religion in their own environment, but could not effect a united policy against the conquerors from the south-east. As early as the second half of the fifteenth century, even before the supremacy of the Catholic Church was challenged, the formation of early modern states was started or anticipated by the creation of independent foreign policies by European monarchs, which decisively revealed that it was no longer possible to speak of the ‘solidarity’ of Western Christianity. This was confirmed by the disputes between Matthias Corvinus and Frederick III; not only did they fail to put together a great army against the Turks, they even prevented effective defence through the war they started against each other at the peak of the Turkish incursions, which lasted over ten years (1479–1490).

The controversy caused by the desire of Emperor Frederick III to make the archbishop of Esztergom, who had fled from the Hungarian king, archbishop of Salzburg, brought Hungarian troops into Lower and Inner Austria. The archbishop of Salzburg, who disagreed with the emperor’s decision, turned for protection to Matthias Corvinus, who ‘magnanimously’ sent an army into Salzburg possessions in lower Styria and Carinthia in 1479. After the Hungarian king had occupied some strategic towns there, he went on in the following years to occupy part of Carniola, and reached as far as Ljubljana. The Carinthian
Estates were forced by their military weakness to sue for peace and recognise the authority of the Hungarian king over the Salzburg possessions, while pressure on the Carinthian nobles from the emperor’s mercenaries saw them paid off with money and linen. Hopes of spoils or old grievances also led some Styrian, Carinthian, and Carniolan nobles to join the ranks of the Hungarians’ mercenaries. One such figure was the Carniolan noble, Erasmus Lueger (known as Erazem Predjamski in Slovene after his famous castle in a cave), whose impetuosity and personal arguments with the nobility at home and at court led him to the rebel side. He was an archetypal medieval knight, and met his end in 1484, killed when his let down his defences at his Predjama castle near Postojna.

Matthias Corvinus held the military initiative throughout, and in 1485 marched ceremonially into Vienna in triumph. He added Lower Austria to his kingdom (he already held the Czech crown), as well as much of Styria and Carniola with Rijeka. The Habsburg resurgence had to wait for his death in 1490. Maximilian, son of the ageing Frederick III, could not prevent a Jagiellon ascending to the Czech-Hungarian throne (Matthias Corvinus died without an heir), but he did manage to quickly regain all of the recently lost Habsburg possessions.

The fate of the Slovene-populated Länder, subject to constant warring throughout the second half of the fifteenth century, depended far more on internal relations within the states offering a military threat from the south and east than on their own defence capacity. Joint meetings of the Carinthia, Carniolan and Styrian Estates became more common, but they still could not organise an effective defence. The taxes that had been approved were spent on mercenary units, and fortifying towns and market settlements, and the few open battles against the Turks without exception saw the inflexible noble cavalry defeated (such as at Bizeljsko ob Sotli in 1475). While the Turkish incursions into these Länder were repelled to a slight extent by extensive valley defence works, embankments, and forest belts, towns were protected by sound walls. Most towns had their defences renewed, while the award of a town charter gave some exposed settlements near the Slovene-Croatian border the right to completely new defences (Kočevje 1471, Lož and Krško 1477, Višnja Gora 1478).

Of all the fixed and extraordinary duties to the feudal lords that burdened the peasant population, bonded labour (tlaka) grew most due to the fortification of towns and castles, yet they had the least protection. In order to protect themselves and their possessions, the bonded peasants began to build rural strongholds – tabori. After 1460, when a tabor was first mentioned as a fortified shelter in rural areas, around 350 such fortifications were built on Slovene ethnic territory in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the form of fortified
churches or separate buildings with one or more towers within a village (or suitable nearby location), the *tabor* offered peasants a relative secure shelter from the Turkish raiders, who were not equipped for lengthier forays or sieges. The peasants also used underground caves with secured entrances as shelters, as well as fortified *tabori*. Some *tabori*, such as Diex (Djekše) in Carinthia, Dolnja Košana in inner Carniola and Mozelj near Kočevje grew into larger defensive complexes intended for inhabitants from several villages, and could protect up to 2,000 people.

The endless and varied forms of soldiering imposed on the peasants gave them more than enough reasons for dissatisfaction. The continual increase in the burden upon them and the simultaneous deterioration in their economic position led to reductions in their rights. Material poverty was not only caused by peasants being forced into more and more demanding military undertakings, but was also the fault of their immediate feudal lords, who were starting to become involved in bonded labourers’ economic activities and to change previous forms of dues. Carinthia was further affected by the revived trade between southern Germany and Italy. The lack of protection for rural areas against Turkish incursions led Carinthian peasants to unite, following patterns of rebellion elsewhere in the eastern Alps (in Salzburg and Styria). In 1473 and 1476, united in a peasant league, they warned the Estates that they would no longer pay urbarial dues, unless they received protection from the Turkish attackers. The sense of injustice felt at the nominal conversion in monetary dues from Aquileian monetary value into Viennese on the Ortenburg seigneury near Spittal finally provoked peasants into open rebellion. The rebellion spread from the Drava valley, particularly east and northeast of Villach, in spring 1478 throughout the Slovene-populated areas of Carinthia, as well as the German part of the Tanzenberg and Ostrovica seigneuries. The peasants, joined by some miners and rural artisans, and even enjoying support from some burghers in Villach and blacksmiths in Huttenberg, began to refuse to pay duties to their feudal lords. They started to collect the duties themselves for the purposes of the peasant league, appointing their own judges and priests, and demanding the right to decide on territorial taxes. However, such self-confidence exceeding the possibilities offered by the social structure of the time. The emperor forbade the “unprecedented collection” by peasants and ordered the rebellion put down, but in summer the Turks attacked again, before the noble army could make its move. At Coccau (Kokovo) on the Gailitz, the Turks smashed a 600-strong rebel army, and three weeks later they plundered areas where the peasant movement was strongest. Once the Turks left, the feudal lords were left with a simple task of hunting down and punishing the rebel leaders.
Peasant rebellions did not die down in Inner Austria, or in the German empire in general. In the following centuries of the early modern era, 70 to 80% of peasants in Slovene territory – as elsewhere in the empire – were continuously living close to bare subsistence level, since, despite an increase in non-agrarian activities, the simultaneous increase in service obligations meant they remained in poverty. When peasants also had to face poor harvests, contagious diseases and military action, their tolerance was soon exhausted. At that point, the bonded peasants appealed to the “old law” (stara pravda, alte Recht), not only calling for the application of the “fixed levies” written in the urbarial record, but also to retain their established rights of participation in rural trade. Over the next three centuries, around 170 localised disputes and uprisings took place in Slovene-populated areas, and approximately every two or three generations a major peasant uprising broke out, enflaming a whole region or even several Länder, or provinces, at once.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AT THE END OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

A great deal of arable land was laid waste and abandoned throughout Slovene territory at this time. The worst affected areas were those exposed to Turkish attacks. In the Posavje region, around Brežice and Sevnica, around 34% of farms were abandoned, around 30% in the Ptuj seigneury, around 45% in the Ormož seigneury, and around 30% in the seigneuries of Duino (Devin), Senožeče, Prem and Vipava. In 1498 in the Postojna seigneury, 136 of the total of 359 farms were uncultivated, while in the Gradac seigneury in White Carniola (Bela Krajina), the number of peasant landowners fell from 170 to 106 in just four years during the 1520s. The Kostel seigneury presents an even more extreme example: in 1527, it had 300 occupied farms, but in 1528 that was down to just 7. The typical proportion of abandoned land in the interior of the Slovene-populated Länder was 22%, but along the periphery of Styria and Carniola (on their eastern and southern boundaries) and in Istria (along its northern boundaries), there was a wide belt of largely abandoned lands, covering 40 to 60% of the total. The huge demographic losses in these areas were passionately, and sometimes exaggeratingly, ascribed by contemporaries to the Turks leading people off into captivity or carrying out heartless massacres. Yet the abandonment of the peripheral lands, which in some places were able to recover from the armed pillaging relatively quickly and without outside help, was also due to a concentration of the population in the interior, away from those places under greater threat. This was aided by imperial orders in the 1570s, giving bonded peasants permission to settle in the newly created towns in Carniola, and in other economically
important urban settlements. Inhabitants of threatened areas also found shelter and a means of living in areas with mining and foundries, while people from the exposed villages of the Karst moved into the coastal towns. Seigneurs attempted to maintain the population by bringing others in, as they would otherwise face a loss of revenues. In 1413, groups of refugees from Bosnia and Croatia were already being settled in the villages of Contovel and Prosecco, above Trieste, and between 1432 and 1463 refugees settled between Piran and Lucija, while immigrants occupied the abandoned farms on the Karst towards the end of the fifteenth century.

Depopulation caused by war, the waves of contagious disease, poor harvests, and the related migration led to population stagnation. Population growth was minimal for the final two centuries of the Middle Ages. While the number of peasants in the Poljanska and Selška valleys, in the Škofja Loka seigneury of the Friesing bishops, grew by almost 480% from the twelfth to the fourteenth century and the number of inhabitants by 450%, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century the number of peasants and the overall population grew by just 8%. The growth in the population and the number of peasants was related mainly to the cottars, members of an emerging class in village life which strengthened significantly throughout rural areas from the fifteenth century onwards. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, from 400,000 and 500,000 people lived in Slovene ‘ethnic territory’, which covered approximately 24,000 km² (21,000 km² of which was in the Habsburg hereditary lands). Over 90% of the population lived in rural areas, and was almost exclusively Slovene. Small ‘German islands’ in upper Carniola gradually mixed with their Slovene surroundings, and only around Kočevje (Gottschee) did a larger group of German settlers retain their identity, in a community that persisted well into the twentieth century. From the sixteenth century onward, the population slowly began to grow, and there were no more major demographic events that affected all of the Slovene-populated Länder at the same time. Nevertheless, the population still took 300 years to double.

MAXIMILIAN I – ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORMS, WAR WITH VENICE, START OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND THE PEASANT UPRISING

The imagination of Maximilian I (1493–1519), whose character was quite the opposite of his vacuous, parsimonious, and politically vacillating father, Frederick III, was captivated by fantastic ideas and ambition throughout his reign. By defeating the unbelievers, he would restore the Byzantine empire, and through familial alliance he would gather Christian states
into a global monarchy stretching from Moscow to the New World now being discovered by maritime adventurers and explorers. Yet reality turned the visions of this ‘Last Knight’ into the considered strategy of the ‘first Landsknecht’ or man-at-arms. The continual struggle for supremacy in Europe, in which he was an indefatigable negotiator, military leader and coalition maker, meant that above all Maximilian had need of enormous financial resources. Acquiring these funds involved relying on the Estates, while maintaining and increasing his authority over them, which led him to centralise administrative power. His administrative and political reforms, which aimed to separate financial affairs from the political and judicial, and to concentrate decision-making power at a supra-provincial level, could generally only succeed in lands where the emperor was also the hereditary prince. As a result, the core of the state-building activity of Maximilian I was formed by the Habsburgs’ Austrian Länder, or provinces, which he divided into two groups: ‘upper Austria’, comprising wealthy Tyrol and Vorderösterreich (‘outer Austria’, the complex of westerly Habsburg possessions, including its non-contiguous southern and western German possessions), and ‘lower Austria’, which included modern-day Upper and Lower Austria (then referred to respectively as Austria above and below the Enns), and the Inner Austrian lands of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. Central offices of government – a royal chamber and the Reichsregiment, an early form of executive council or government – were established in each of these units before the end of the fifteenth century. The emperor’s bureaucratic apparatus, with central offices in Vienna and the introduction of offices in individual provinces increased his administrative and financial strength, while the individual provinces saw an opportunity to use Habsburg dynastic policy to acquire greater military and defensive security for themselves.

The financial needs of the ruler and the rights of the Estates to decide on extraordinary taxes necessitated the regular convening of provincial diets. The Estates used negotiations on money for the emperor’s wars and defence against the Turks as a lever to gain concessions. In 1496, the Styrian and Carinthian Estates persuaded Maximilian – in return, of course, for a

1 Translator's note: While the Slovene and German terms (dežela and Land) can equally refer to the medieval and twentieth century versions of the polities that formed the Habsburg lands and subsequently the Austrian empire, the literature in English uses the term ‘province’ in reference to the early modern and modern era, indicating that these territories had become subordinate to a central entity. In deciding on the most appropriate terminology, an English translator therefore has to select a cut-off point, and, since Maximilian's efforts arguably represent the point at which these territories began to be considered part of a greater state or empire, Land and Länder are used in this history when referring to developments prior to this point and 'province' is used after. This is by no means a disavowal of the individual territorial consciousness of Carniola and other Habsburg possessions, which continued for centuries.
large sum of money – to banish Jews from both provinces, in response to the success they had achieved, largely from money lending and trading in property. Members of the small Jewish communities, who were accused of desecrating the sacrament, the ritual murder of Christian children, and usury and fraud, found shelter in Trieste and in Venetian territory. The Jewish community in Carniola, particularly in Ljubljana, was also strengthened for a time, before they were expelled in 1515. The real reason for expelling the Jews was the economic decline, which was worsened by Maximilian’s coveting of the Venetian Republic’s wealthy Italian towns.

The continual disputes over the division of trade in the Gulf of Trieste between Venice and the Habsburgs, which had been dragging on since the mid-fifteenth century, intensified following the death of the last count of Gorizia in 1500. Maximilian immediately sent troops to occupy Lienz and Gorizia, adding the territories of the counts of Gorizia to his hereditary lands. The Venetian Republic had claims of its own on the Gorizian-Friulian estates of the defunct line of counts, but was unable to take up arms against Maximilian because of the war with Turkey (1499–1502). A few years later, however, both sides were ready to solve the accumulated disputes through force. The humiliation Maximilian had experienced when the Venetians refused him passage through their territory to be crowned emperor in Rome was sufficient cause to declare war in 1508. Here, an unsound financial base and the comparatively small number of imperial troops led to a rapid reverse for Maximilian and his designs. By summer 1508, Venetian forces were ranging deep into Slovene-populated territory, plundering as they went, and capturing all the major settlements as far as Postojna: Krmin, Gorizia, Branik, Štanjel, and Vipava, as well as Idrija, which had become far more significant with the discovery of mercury deposits there in 1490. In the south of the military theatre, the Venetians took Duino and Trieste, and most of Habsburg Istria, including Rijeka and Trsat. Maximilian had no choice but to agree an unfavourable truce with his Christian foes, in which he was forced to concede all the occupied territory to the Venetians. By the end of 1508, the emperor had succeeded in creating an anti-Venetian alliance, the League of Cambrai, with Spain, France and Pope Julius II. The aim of the League was to partition the Republic of Saint Mark, with Maximilian taking all territory as far as Verona and Rovereto. Despite the victories achieved by French and imperial troops in 1509, the war dragged on. It fragmented into minor clashes, atrocities and pillaging involving mercenaries and conscripted peasants from both sides. The Habsburgs won back the territory they had previously conceded and also gained some Venetian possessions. In 1516, the two sides reached a truce, but a more lasting peace and recognition of existing borders was not achieved until 1521. Some areas
along the land border (known as *differenze*) remained the subject of ongoing disputes and minor clashes. The territory incorporated into the hereditary Habsburg lands included the area from Predel via Bovec to Tolmin along the northerly border with the Venetians, and Gradisca and Aquileia to the south. By occupying Aquileia, Maximilian aimed to extend Austria’s influence over an ecclesiastical centre with spiritual responsibility for much of Carniola, and some parts of Carinthia and Styria. Nevertheless, the patriarchs of Aquileia were still Venetians, though later they resided in Cividale and Udine in voluntary exile.

This war with Venice effectively marked out the final border between Venetians and Habsburgs on Slovene territory. Only minor Slovene-inhabited areas remained under Venetian authority. In addition to the direct surroundings of the northern Istrian towns (Koper, Izola, Piran), which had been Venetian for centuries, the Republic of Saint Mark also ruled over the area known as Venetian Slovenia (Beneška Slovenija). The area remained separated for many years from most of Slovene ethnic territory by the state border, but its inhabitants enjoyed varying degrees of village self-governance until the final collapse of the Venetian Republic in 1797. In Val di Resia (Rezija), this village self-governance was preserved to some degree given its remoteness and the fact that livestock remained its main economic activity, while the openness and strategic importance of the Natisone (Nadiža) valley even led to an expansion in these rights of self-governance. After 1553, Venetian Slovenia, including Cividale, was detached from Friuli as a separate administrative unit, divided into two parts: ‘Italia’ and ‘Schiavonia’ (Slovenia). The town of Cividale belonged to the former, with the latter comprising the territory outside its town walls. Villages in the three valleys of the Natisone river basin were linked within the *veliko županstvo* of Antro and Mersino. The communities were administered by elected representatives of *soseske* or local communes, headed by two *velika župana*, who even held the right to exercise high, or blood justice. In return for this significant level of independence from the Venetian authorities, the inhabitants of eastern Venetian Slovenia had to provide a permanent border guard to prevent the influx of ‘barbarian tribes’, as the Venetians pejoratively called the inhabitants of the Habsburg hereditary lands, into Friuli.

After 1516, these same ‘tribes’, were no longer capable of forced incursions into the fertile plains of the Venetian Republic. Having contributed around three million florins (also known as gulden) to Maximilian, the Austrian provinces were broke, and much of Carniola had been devastated. The imperial treasury had a debt of two million fl., and the emperor was forced to give the Fugger banking family mines worth two million fl. as surety. Individual provinces were also affected and impoverished by a series of other catastrophes that occurred...
during the war. In 1510, the plague struck Carniola and the following year Carniola and Friuli suffered two major earthquakes that destroyed or damaged numerous castles and stone dwellings in towns and market settlements. At the same time in Carinthia, Klagenfurt suffered a major fire in 1514, and there was a large peasant uprising in 1515. The emperor and the Estates reached a new agreement in an attempt to solve the crisis. Maximilian saw an opportunity to strengthen his position by gaining the approval of the Estates to organise a large army to finally break Ottoman dominance over the Balkans, while the Estates saw the solution in restricting the ruler’s visionary appetites, providing better protection for their provinces, and making them more integrated. In 1518, a general diet of all the Habsburg hereditary lands convened in Innsbruck. After lengthy negotiations, the emperor published the Innsbrucker Libell documents, which, most importantly for the provinces, set out the general defence order or system (Verteidigungsordnung). This gathered together all the elements that had appeared and developed over the preceding centuries. The provincial army was for defence only; it was based on noble cavalry, which was raised on the basis of land revenues, and the conscription of bonded labourers, who were mobilised using a proportional conscription system. The upper and lower Austrian groups of provinces agreed a mutual assistance pact, according to which they would form a joint military command structure, if either were attacked. The Innsbruck agreement revealed the real balance of power between the Estates and the ruler (Maximilian was forced to cede half the membership of the Reichsregiment to the Estates), and also reflected the real interests of both parties in terms of defence. The specified defence system was intended to preserve the territorial integrity of the Habsburg hereditary lands, while preserving the privileges and freedoms of the individual provinces relating to provincial armies and the right to approve taxes. This defence system – entered in the Carniolan Landhandfesten – formed the basis for all subsequent arrangements of these major provincial issues.

The reforms achieved by Maximilian I, and in part the defence system, were threatened for some time following the emperor’s death (1519). The Lower Austrian Estates now refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the Reichsregiment in Vienna, which was supposed to temporarily take over all administrative affairs after the emperor’s death, and this independent path was followed by the Estates of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, although they did not formally renounce their obedience. Until a new prince assumed control of the Austrian hereditary lands, the Estates claimed all of the emperor’s rights. Only when Maximilian’s Spanish grandsons – Charles, who became Holy Roman Emperor (1519–1556), and Ferdinand – agreed to share the succession (1521, 1522), with the younger brother, Ferdinand,
becoming Archduke of Austria (1521–1564), was the previous balance of power restored. Ferdinand moved to stem the Estates’ independence and re-established the central offices, while he also began to develop the existing defence system. Styria, Carinthia and Carniola were forced into closer co-operation by a new wave of Turkish attacks during the 1520s.

From the end of the fifteenth century onwards, political developments were accompanied by economic changes, and a crisis that was felt most of all in rural areas. The rural population, on the seigneuries referred to by the general term ‘subject or bonded peasants’ (podložniki) from around 1500, was facing increasing difficulties in trade in crop surpluses and domestic craft products. The towns and to some extent the feudal lords represented obstacles to rural trade. The towns attempted to muscle in on some of the foreign merchants’ profits, restricting them to certain routes and only giving them leave to remain in towns for a set number of days to offer their wares. At the same time, the towns attempted to protect those involved in crafts and trades, whose main competition came from the rural population: cottars and smallholders. Most burghers, particularly those in smaller towns and market settlements, lived within the rules of a closed town economy, and did not tolerate any competition, preferring to maintain their medieval privileges. This led them to oppose anyone who might force them to change. Since most of the burghers were largely tied to local centres, they saw the growing rural trade as the main threat. To protect their interests against artisans from other towns and craftsmen from rural areas, the burghers began to unite in guilds, which expanded at the end of the fifteenth century, and particularly during the sixteenth century, to cover practically every trade.

Only a few of the 10 towns and almost 70 market settlements in Slovene territory traded on a large scale and over longer distances – Völkermarkt (Velikovec), Villach, Klagenfurt, Maribor, Ptuj, Novo Mesto, and Ljubljana in the interior, and Trieste, Koper, Piran and Rijeka along the coast. Under Italian influence, burghers, particularly in the continental towns, adopted forms and institutions of trading that had been practised in the West since the Middle Ages: commenda, colleganza and compagnia, alongside newer techniques, such as dual-entry bookkeeping, trading ledgers, and special companies formed to handle trading capital. The gradual spread of early capitalism in the fifteenth century led to numerous significant innovations. Trading profits generated conditions for trading in money itself, while individuals or companies began dealing in organised production. Since it was in the interest of the prince to raise sufficient funds for the army and reduce his reliance on the Estates, he was also involved in the process of economic development. He offered foreign – mainly Italian – merchants privileges and benefits, which gradually allowed them to gain the
ascendancy over those involved in commerce in the towns. The prince was a frequent borrower, and would put up his possessions and various toll stations and trading privileges as surety for his loans. After the Habsburg-Venetian War, in particular, the influx of Italian merchants increased apace until the 1570s, when major changes took place in the transit trade and trade in general. The volume of trade and capital investment was now relatively high. The commercial aggression of the foreign merchants was resented by locals, but towns could not resist the influx of much-needed capital for long. The foreign merchants acquired burgher status in towns on Slovene territory and permanent residence in them; they settled particularly in Ptuj and Ljubljana, which had special trading rights with Hungary and Italy. The individual merchants and their families (Khisl, Weilhamer, Glanhofer, Praumperger, Lustaller, Lantheri, Valvasor, Moscon, Bucellini and others), who managed the main trade and capital flows, soon amassed trading capital, acquired land and seigneuries, and later even joined the nobility. They invested in foundries (there were 22 foundries in Carniola in the mid-sixteenth century producing around 4,000 tonnes of forged and cast iron and steel), glassmaking (Ljubljana, Radgona), paper mills (Ljubljana, Villach, St. Veit an der Glan, and St. Ruprecht near Klagenfurt), and leather production, and increased the returns on these activities and trade, while also developing a coterie of dependent professionals (carters, drivers, lumberjacks, charcoal-makers, and woodcutters also recorded an upturn) and production plants (brickmaking, lime-kilns, sawmills) which went beyond the previous, medieval forms of production. At the same time, new specialised trades began to develop – rifle-making, tinsmithing, watchmaking, brewing and others. These activities were largely aimed at foreign markets, particularly Italian markets, to which trade in skins and livestock were also largely directed. In the first half of the sixteenth century, around 200,000 skins were imported from Hungary each year. Around 1.4 million skins were exported to Le Marche in Italy alone between 1477 and 1548, with a value of over one million gold ducats. The extent to which the foundry and timber trade related to the Italian market is illustrated by the use of only Italian words for the different kinds of nails in Slovene territory, as well as for all timber measures and cuts.

In Carinthia, lead mines were an important source of profit, as was iron ore extraction. The most important lead mine was at Bleiberg (Plajberk) near Villach, while in Carniola the only lead mine operating for any length of time was near Littija. The mercury mine in Idrija was particularly important, and it gradually it came under the control of just one mining company. Its rise was due to increased demand for mercury and cinnabar in the mid-sixteenth century following a disaster at the Spanish mine in Almadén, but it was not until the
eighteenth century that the Idrija mine became one of the most profitable companies in Europe. In the sixteenth century, it had around 150 workers, who excavated around 50 tonnes of mercury and 8 tonnes of cinnabar per year, but by the eighteenth it employed 1,350 people, and its annual output was up to 500 to 600 tonnes of mercury and 50 to 60 tonnes of cinnabar. Idrija developed and gradually the living conditions of the miners – whose life expectancy was low due to poor working conditions and mercury poisoning – were slightly improved, but the Inner Austrian provinces had no share in the high profits generated by the mine. The ruler purchased the entire mine in 1575, and the profits were directed out of the region, first into the hands of the ruler, and increasingly to the foreign mercantile houses and banks who leased the mine or took it in surety.

The nobility also had to keep pace with political and economic developments and challenges. They only really had one resource with which to fulfill their desire to increase revenues and overcome the seigneurial crisis – their land. They tried a wide range of measures, such as incorporating abandoned farms into their dominical lands, increasing additional bonded labour obligations, which included the sale and transport of the lords’ agricultural surpluses and restoring neglected levies in kind (by increasing the rates at which peasants paid their duties, raising the tithe, imposing both death duties and a charge on new ownership of land). They also introduced an emigration tax and new levies – both on newly acquired fields, and on pasture, forest use, hunting and fishing – and later on, even forced bonded peasants to purchase the right to inherit farms. These measures were still insufficient, and this led seigneurs to seek revenues outside the direct feudal sphere: they leased new lands and toll rights, and to a lesser extent even became involved in lending, mining ventures and in iron foundries. They attempted to increase profits by forcing peasants out of the grain trade. Some of the most notable noble houses in Slovene-populated provinces, such as the Schrottenbachs, Wagensbergs, Trautmannsdorfs, Herbersteins, Auerspergs, Dietrichsteins, Raubers, Lambergs and others became involved in grain trading. The cash crisis of the seigneurs in the sixteenth century was reflected in the sale of land to bonded peasants. A class of ‘free peasants’ developed (around 700 in Carniola, 500 in lower Styria, and a few hundred in Slovene-populated areas of Carinthia), who were exempt from all feudal levies and only had to pay provincial taxes directly to the office of the prince’s governor (Viztum). The nobility of the time no longer exhibited any of the elements such as chivalry, romance or arbitrary malice, with which they would later be associated in the popular imagination. But this completely rational conduct provided the nobility with the means to take on a new outward form. To maintain their difference from the burgher class, they began to issue formal dress codes,
which defined in detail how different individual social classes should dress.

The commercialisation of the seigneuries had the largest impact on the towns, where burghers wished to restrict rural trade and crafts. The restrictions on bonded peasants’ enterprise also harmed the seigneurs. In 1492, measures were passed in Carniola which were intended to overcome the stand off between towns and villages by means of trade. Areas of varying size defined around towns and market settlements in which craftsmen could not operate. Peasants were only permitted to sell their surpluses in the towns and other designated markets, or on specific church holidays, but could freely trade over longer distances in salt, wine, grain, livestock, linen and other domestic craft products. The frequent repetition of provisions restricting trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries indicates, of course, that rural trade still flourished. The role of bonded peasants and their share of trade continually grew and the volume of rural trade far outstripped that of the professional town traders in quantity, though not in quality. The large volume of peasant trade is suggested by the fact that between 6,000 and 8,000 horses were continually involved in carting work in Carniola, and the salt trade included up to 90,000 loads per year in the second half of the sixteenth century. It was the desire for profit as well as the fight for survival that pushed peasants into business. Their invention and enterprise allowed a few to join the ranks of the richer peasantry, and even become successful members of the burgher class, but most failed to achieve more than mere subsistence. For many bonded peasants, who in addition to all the levies and obligations, also had to pay what were actually the monetary dues of their feudal lords (the annual provincial tax approval), the only real hope of escaping their circumstances lay in spiritual consolation. One example of such consolation can be seen in the famed Dance Macabre frescoes, painted by Ivan of Kastev in 1490 in the fortified ‘tabor’ church at Hrastovlje, which portray the universality of death, which affects princes, lords and peasant alike.

The various pressures that had already led to an increase in land dues also caused dissatisfaction among peasants, and ideas and hopes of rebellion. During the Austro-Venetian War, the seigneuries and the ‘state’, which were largely dependent on the value of the peasants’ agricultural yield, increased the financial demands on their bonded peasants, while also forcing them into military service. As the war went on, these peasants, men “suitable for working the land, not fighting against first-class soldiers,” as the military commander Christoph Rauber described his Carniolan conscripts in 1508, began to lose their coastward trading opportunities, which a total blockade soon cut off completely. Unrest in Carniola, in parts where local conditions affected the bonded peasantry even more harshly than elsewhere, led to the creation of a peasant league in the first months of 1515, which soon encompassed
much of Carniola. The peasants, who demanded a return to the ‘old law’ and the right to decide on extraordinary taxes, rejected any discussion with special commissioners appointed at the request of the Carniolan Estates, and sent their own representatives to Emperor Maximilian in Augsburg. Yet at court they received nothing more than a few promises and the demand that the peasant league be disbanded. Peasant leagues (Bauernbunden) later formed throughout Inner Austria, with around 80,000 peasants joining in a rebel movement that covered almost the entire Slovene-populated territory. The dissatisfaction grew into open armed rebellion (except in Gorizia), which comprised two main waves. Initially, during May and June, the peasants achieved a number of major successes. The nobility’s forces were forced to withdraw to Ljubljana and Kamnik in Carniola, to Maribor in Styria, and Villach in Carinthia. In the second wave, from mid-June to the end of July, the mercenary army of the Estates, which was supported by imperial army units, gradually overcame and split the peasant forces in a series of smaller engagements, with several major battles, such as those at Konjice and Celje, also taking place. When Georg von Herberstein, appointed by the Inner Austrian Estates as overall commander of the forces sent to pacify the provinces, entered Carniola with units of the joint Estates’ army, the uprising was quickly put down. After five months of the peasant rebellion, which was poorly organised and militarily weak, except in Carinthia, with little co-ordination across the different provinces, the final reckoning came. In Graz alone, 161 rebels were put to death. In Carniola the nobility forced the peasants to pay yet another one-off cash levy, in addition to the cruel clean-up campaign that swept the countryside. The peasants only achieved gains in Carinthia, where it was conceded that future disputes between them and their seigneurs would be resolved in the presence of peasant representatives before the regular territorial courts for feudal landlords. The “crazed company” as Valvasor later described the rebels, was charged with a special annual tax, called the ‘rebel’s penny’, introduced to provide reparation for the damage, and the bonded labour obligation (tlaka) was, of course, increased to restore the castles damaged in the uprising.

The Slovene peasant uprising (Windischer Bauernbund), as it was also referred to in contemporary sources, saw the first appearance of the Slovene language in print. The following words appeared in a German song of the mercenary troops from 1515, which seemed to mock the Slovene rebels: stara prauda (the old law) and leukhup, leukhup, leukhup, leukhup woga gmaina (“rally, rally, rally together, all the company of the poor”), but this became the peasants’ definitive calling cry. Over time, the revolts began to make their mark on society, and along with a range of other factors gradually changed the organisation of the feudal world and challenged its fixed division into three Estates (the clergy, the nobility,
and those who worked).

DEFENCE AGAINST THE TURKS AND SHAPING AN “INDIVISIBLE BODY”

From the 1520s onwards, the German empire – like other western European states – was shaken by disputes over religious and ecclesiastical reforms. The Turkish question, which had already exercised the courts of Europe’s Christian rulers for over a century, now took on a new dimension. As the Ottoman forces spread through the Balkans, the “exquisite fear of the Turks” spreading across western Europe, was heightened by a perception of the Turks as a punishment for sin (“the Scourge of God”). To ‘papists’, the Turks seemed to be a punishment for the Lutheran sedition, while for the Protestants the Ottomans were divine retribution for the Church of Rome’s moral depravity. In Slovene territory, Catholic and Protestant opponents hurled the same accusations, yet although Protestants literally equated Turks and Catholics as associated with the Anti-Christ (“antikrist Turk inu Papesh”), the direct threat posed to both sides by the Turks led them to form a united military front. Thus, a tenacious, but unarmed, struggle raged along the southeastern edge of the German empire to establish a new understanding of Christianity, while all the military efforts were directed towards halting the Turkish march on central Europe. Unlike the rest of western Europe, here there were genuine grounds for the ‘fear of the Turks’.

The strength of the Ottoman state’s westward push varied during the sixteenth century, but never went away, reaching its height during the reign of Sultan Suleiman I, the Magnificent (1520–1566), who managed to expand the borders of the Turkish state in every direction at unheralded speed. Over the twenty years from the capture of Belgrade in 1521 to the establishment of the Pashaluk of Budim (Buda) in 1541, the Turkish border in the western Balkans and central Europe moved 400 kilometres westward. The kingdom of Hungary fell in 1526, and two major marches on Vienna (1529, 1532) brought the Turkish forces to the walls of the city. The last great threat to the Austrian provinces came in 1566, when Suleiman occupied the Hungarian town of Szigetvár. The Christian forces were only able to mount two counter-offensives over the entire period. In 1537, an international Christian army led by the Carniolan governor (Landeshauptmann) Johann Katzianer attempted to stop the Turkish advance in Slavonia. Four years later, a Christian army attempted to retake Buda. Both campaigns failed. The attempt on Buda even forced Ferdinand I to accept humiliating terms when suing for peace in 1547, requiring him to pay the sultan an annual tribute of 30,000 fl.
for the western part of Hungary that he ruled over. The border of the Turkish state was now within two days ride of Slovene territory.

Given the meagre material or financial support from the German empire and the rest of Europe, and the weak defensive capabilities of Hungary and Croatia, the direct fight against the Turks effectively became a private matter for the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs and their hereditary lands. Croatia, which was most exposed to the Turkish onslaught, did not receive sufficient protection within the Hungarian kingdom. Since only an approximate balance of power can provide a basis for negotiations, the Croatian nobles could achieve nothing through diplomacy with the Turks. Their search for help led them to develop closer and closer ties with the neighbouring Inner Austrian provinces and enter military service with the Habsburg ruler. The death, in 1526, of the Jagiellon king of Hungary, Croatia and Bohemia, Louis II, in marshland near the battlefield of Mohács, made possible a higher profile and direct military presence from the Inner Austrian lands in Croatian territory. This drastically altered the political position and the Habsburgs’ ambitious marriage speculations now began to pay real dividends. In 1515, Emperor Maximilian I made a famous double marriage and inheritance pact with the King of Hungary, Ladislas II Jagiellon: matching Maximilian’s grandchildren, the twelve-year old Ferdinand and ten-year old Maria, with Ladislas’ children, twelve-year old Anna and nine-year old Louis. The Habsburgs were without doubt Europe’s most successful dynasty in terms of marriage alliances and pacts of succession, and by 1526 they had acquired the right to the thrones of Bohemia, Hungary and Croatia. In Hungary and Croatia, however, they were met by resistance and a lengthy civil war, since a section of the nobility, who had the right to elect the king themselves, selected the Transylvanian noble János Zápolya (János Szapolyai). However, by 1527 Ferdinand had acquired all three thrones. Of course, this was not just decided by the succession pacts secured by the Habsburgs, but largely dictated by the fact that the Austrian ruler and his hereditary lands were the only political and military power able to prevent the Turkish advance into Central Europe. This was a decisive point at which an outlying frame was added to the core Habsburg hereditary lands to create an entity that would later develop into the Danubian monarchy. Styria, Carinthia and Carniola could now ensure their own protection with a successfully functioning domestic military system and a line of castles in the increasingly hard-pressed territory of the ‘kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia’.

The Turkish sultan’s appetite for conquest – directed primarily towards the Pannonian basin towards Vienna – ushered in a new period of Turkish incursions into Slovene territory. From 1522 to 1532, Turkish attack units were an ever-present threat. The attacks were not
quite on the same scale as in the fifteenth century (with just 3 major attacks, in 1552, 1527 and 1528, compared to the 60 in that period), but they still laid waste to the borderlands and to seigneuries in lower and inner Carniola and on the Karst. The aim of most of the raids was to hunt down people and their property, but the overriding Turkish strategy was to keep part of the Christian military forces pinned down in Croatian and Slovene territory. This was particularly the case in 1529 and 1532, when the main Turkish forces attempted to take Vienna. These two campaigns on Vienna also caused massive destruction in lower Styria, through which the Turkish army also retreated in 1532. Later, the incursions became less frequent, only occurring every few years up until 1559, when Turkish horsemen broke into Carniola for the final time.

As the Turkish incursions became rarer, the provinces became defensively stronger, and the military lines across Croatia denser. After 1522, the defence system entered a more advanced stage of development. The provincial army, noble cavalry, and conscripted peasants were still based on the Innsbruck defence agreement, the most frequently applied provision of which was the conscription of every thirtieth, tenth or fifth bonded peasant, which meant that the Slovene-populated territories could put around 18,000 men on the battle field. In the first decades of the sixteenth century, foreign mercenaries also participated in the defence, though their impact on the environment which they were supposed to protect was often negative. The Carniolan Estates wrote in 1525 that “they would rather suffer a Turkish invasion” than continue to maintain foreign mercenaries in their own province, and proposed that in future the prince should quarter his mercenary army in Croatia. The gradual build-up of defensive capability in Croatia in the second half of the sixteenth century led to the call-up of peasants being reduced to every thirtieth man and to engaging domestic mercenaries. A few hundred well-trained men excluded in this way from the conscripted ranks now served as troops for individual provinces for a few months or more.

In addition to these provincial armies, the inhabitants now densely settling parts of White Carniola (Bela Krajina, literally the White March) and Žumberak were also called on to protect the Slovene-Croatian border. During the 1520s and 1530s, migratory pressure into Slovene territory from the southeast increased as the result of changing conditions within the Turkish state. The Orthodox Vlach population of livestock-rearers lost a number of privileges they had previously enjoyed under the Turks, which the Habsburgs offered to restore. This led to the organised arrival of large groups of Uskoks to which Ferdinand I granted freedom and land in exchange for military service in 1535. While those Uskoks who settled the abandoned areas of southern Styria, inner Carniola, the Karst, and as far as Friuli were rapidly
assimilated into the local population, those who settled in Žumberak retained their original identity because of the privileges granted and the compact nature of their settlement there. From the mid-1530s, the Uskoks were increasingly involved in the defensive organisation and became a separate military body. Žumberak was later separated from Carniola and became part of the Military Border (Militärgrenze, Vojna Krajina).

The ruler and the Styrian, Carinthian and Carniolan Estates were aware that defensive capacity also depended on organised intelligence and signalling. There was an extensive espionage system in Bosnia and Dalmatia, and a courier service carrying reports from spies and from frontier posts to the provincial capitals. A criss-cross of signal points raised the alarm in the event of an incursion by enemy units, and from 1522 this was systematically planned and linked the different provinces. Reminders of this network can still be seen today, in the numerous hills in Slovenia called Grmada (bonfire). According to Valvasor, it could alert all of Carniola to a danger in just two to three hours.

Croatia and Slavonia were increasingly included in the Inner Austrian defence system. Croatian feudal lords – and especially those right on the Turkish border – were left to their own devices, with numerous noble estates falling empty after being pillaged, with defence impossible without any form of revenue. These nobles began to place their border castles in the care of King Ferdinand I and to enter his army as mercenaries. The Inner Austrian Estates realised that the defence of the core lands would be more effective beyond the territory, and began to support the royal army and fortresses in Croatia. In 1522, they took control of the first 3 fortresses, and the number continued to rise: to 7 in 1530, 12 in 1537, 22 in 1542, 55 in 1563 and 88 by 1578. As the number of fortresses taken on grew, so did the number of garrison troops, and mobile infantry and cavalry units, increasing from around 1,200 men in the 1520s and 1530s to 4,795 by 1577. The defensive band along the Croatian-Turkish border gradually developed into the Military Border, which was organised under royal military authority, and from 1556 was administered by the Imperial War Council (Hofkriegsrat) in Vienna.

In 1564, a change took place in how the Military Border was administered. King Ferdinand I, who had also been emperor (1556–1564) for the last eight years of his life, died and divided his lands between three sons. Maximilian II (1564–1576) became emperor, prince of Upper and Lower Austria, and king of Bohemia, Hungary and Croatia. The second son, Ferdinand, acquired the Maximilian’s ‘upper Austrian’ complex of lands (Tyrol and Further Austria), while the youngest, Charles, (1564–1590), acquired Inner Austria. Like his brothers, Charles II of Inner Austria, acted as a largely independent ruler. In his strongly fortified
capital of Graz, he created the same set of central offices that existed in Vienna – the privy council, court council, court chancellery and Regiment (Geheimrat, Hofrat, Hofkanzlei, and Regiment). The territorial bequest now placed Croatia and Inner Austria under different rulers, but the proximity of the Military Border meant that it remained under de facto control from Inner Austria. The creation of a Court War Council (Hofkreigsrat) in Graz in 1578 saw control of the line of Croatian border fortresses also pass de jure into the hands of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Gorizia.

The more integrated defence system, which included the main armouries in Ljubljana, Ptuj and Graz, and numerous granaries throughout Slovene and Croatian territory, had an unending appetite for funds. After the fall of Hungary in 1526, “monasteries, dioceses and churches, guilds and fraternities, promised money, valuables, silver and gold on condition that it was gathered only to relieve Christians [from the Turks] and for no other purpose.” Churches in Slovene-populated territory (and elsewhere in the hereditary lands) became significantly impoverished at this time. The collected valuables were sorted according to the metal, and minted as coins, but a one-off action was never going to be enough to meet the enormous costs of a standing army, in addition to the fortification of towns and construction of castles. A permanent source of funding was needed to construct the first military line from the sea to the Drava (Styria was responsible for the Slavonian section, Carinthia and Carniola for the Croatian section). At that time, an individual’s tax base was defined using a property tax (Gült), which also served to determine conscription. The total value of the Gült for an entire province constituted the provincial tax base. This was established in 1542 at 72,000 pfunden for Styria, 36,000 pfunden for Carinthia, 22,000 pfunden for Carniola, and 5,600 pfunden for Gorizia. The annual provincial tax, which naturally had to be approved by the Estates, was now defined as a fraction or multiple of these amounts. The table below indicates the rise in the financial contributions of the different provinces (in Rhenish florin) over time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Carniola</th>
<th>Carinthia</th>
<th>Styria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1537</td>
<td>16,266</td>
<td>39,533</td>
<td>48,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1556</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>94,222</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taxes increased in real terms compared to the actual increase in the scale of the military effort, although their rise was also due to the falling value of money, particularly at the end of
the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth, when the provincially approved tax remained at four times the tax base. The total cost of the Croatian and Slavonian Military Border up until 1613 stood at 27,211,412 florins. Styria, Carinthia and Carniola had together contributed some 24,952,865 florins of this enormous sum, while the imperial coffers provided less than one tenth. The extensive defence system, which involved every strata of society, reached its final form in the last decades of the sixteenth century. The Inner Austrian Estates acquired the right for their members to hold all the major military and administrative positions within the Military Border. Croatia was awarded the honorary title of “antemurale christianitatis” (Bulwark of Christendom) as a consolation, but it increasingly lost its influence over the Military Border.

The military-political community of Inner Austria ensured its security by shaping Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Gorizia into an “indivisible body,” as was written in the common defence documents of 1578. The collaboration between the provinces, dictated by an outside threat, also influenced the internal religious divisions. The idea expressed by the court chaplain of Archduke Charles, that the Turk represented “good fortune for the Lutherans, who would otherwise have been dealt with quite differently,” realistically reflects internal conditions in the 1570s, revealing the impotence of the prince’s secular authorities, the Catholic Church’s declining influence, and the rapid spread of Protestantism among the social elite. The division of the Habsburg lands in 1564 left a Catholic ruler with increased costs of defence against the Turks, but with revenue sources limited to just one group of the hereditary lands, and facing the opposition of mainly Protestant Estates. Dependence on the Estates’ financial approval for the defence against the Turks forced the Archduke to concede to their religious demands. The highpoint of the Estates’ political power came in the second half of the sixteenth century, as Protestantism became established for several decades. As the religion of a minority, limited mainly to the nobility and burghers, it largely involved the non-Slovene population of the Inner Austrian lands, but it did provide Slovenses with a gift of great worth – it created Slovene literature and laid the foundations for a Slovene literary language.

ECCLESIASTICAL AND SPIRITUAL CONDITIONS FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE LJUBLJANA DIOCESE UNTIL THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

As new state formations evolved, and the emperor’s power as a unifying force within the Holy Roman Empire began to fade, Emperor Frederick III (Frederick V of Austria) aimed to increase his influence as prince over the ecclesiastical organisation within his own lands. In
1446, he negotiated with the Pope and gained Rome’s approval to wield special powers over the appointment of bishops and numerous lower-ranking clergy. Two years later, these were upheld in the Concordat of Vienna, which was also adopted by the remaining German princes. Frederick attempted to enforce the wide-ranging and long-lasting rights set out in the Concordat (which remained effective until 1803) as soon as the opportunity presented itself. The acquisition of the Cilli inheritance allowed him to reorganise the ecclesiastical organisation in Slovene-populated regions, while also reducing the influence of the patriarch of Aquileia, whose ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the Habsburg hereditary lands included territory from the Drava in the north to the Kolpa in the south, and eastwards to the Sotla. After lengthy negotiations on the creation of a new ecclesiastical centre, the emperor issued a document in 1461 founding a new diocese with its see in Ljubljana. The emperor’s former secretary, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, who had by then been Pope Pius II for three years, approved the new diocese in a bull the following year. This saw the first independent ecclesiastical centre in Slovene-populated lands that was directly subordinate to the Pope. The diocese of Ljubljana was not territorially contiguous since the emperor could only add parishes over which he held patronage, but it had jurisdiction over areas of Carniola, Styria and Carinthia. The administrative power of the patriarchs of Aquileia, who remained under Venetian influence, was now vastly reduced, although much of Slovene-populated territory would on paper remain under their jurisdiction until the mid-eighteenth century. They now had almost no parishes in their gift, and their archdeacons and priests were prevented from attending church councils. They could also only carry out canonical visitations (with a few exceptions) via proxies.

The first bishop of Ljubljana was Sigismund Lamberg (1461–1488), a humanist scholar from an old noble family who had studied in Padua. During his time, the educational level of the higher-ranking clergy improved, with almost all the leading positions in the new diocese going to priests who had studied in Renaissance Italy – Padua, Bologna and Ferrara. Lamberg’s successor was the polymath, Christoph Raubar, by then barely in his twenties. He was appointed bishop in 1494, but only actually assumed control seven years later, once he had completed his studies in Padua. He remained bishop until 1536, but only actually resided in Ljubljana for a short time. He held a whole range of benefices and positions in commendam (such as abbot of Admont and administrator of the diocese of Seckau in Styria), while as the ruler’s confidant he also performed a number of services on diplomatic missions to Rome, Naples, to the Polish court, as a commissioner for the Venetian-Austrian War, as governor of Carniola, and as the emperor’s representative in Lower Austria. He was awarded for his work
in imperial and royal service with the title of prince, which bishops of Ljubljana could use until 1918. Christoph Raubar was the most ‘complete’ personality of the first third of the sixteenth century in Slovene territory, and had a decisive impact on the cultural and spiritual reality of the day. As a typical Renaissance prelate, he gathered a group of humanists around him in Carniola and corresponded with people of similar mind at the imperial court and the university of Vienna.

When the diocese of Ljubljana was founded, and during its first few decades, there were clear signs of the major crisis enveloping the Catholic Church as a whole over the fifteen century. Since the rise of secular authority over ecclesiastical had led to the creation of the Ljubljana diocese, the church patrons (both the emperor or prince, and the nobles and burghers) treated parish churches as their own possessions, and they had no qualms about selling off the various ecclesiastical offices. Incompatible positions fell into the hands of powerful individuals, which is not only attested by the integration of ecclesiastical and secular authority, but also by the fact that this personal accumulation prevented the direct performance of all the services in question. The Aquileian patriarchs’ loss of influence in Slovene areas (as well as the fading power of the archbishop of Salzburg north of the Drava) opened the door to wide-ranging disorder in ecclesiastical and religious organisation. Paolo Santonino, secretary to the patriarch of Aquileia, who accompanied a visitation commission between 1485 and 1487 on its route through Carinthia, Carniola and lower Styria, reported on many cases of misconduct that demonstrated the moral decay of the Church. He reported that when positions had become vacant in parish and succursal churches in the Drava and Gail valleys, “priests had been replaced by lay people for thirty years or more,” that elsewhere, in return for payments, priests exempted their parishioners from “all kinds of major and minor exclusions, regardless of the reason for which they were imposed,” that most priests had “housekeepers, usually young and beautiful and they often had maids themselves,” and that nuns in the Velesovo nunnery admitted that “they would leave cloisters and the monastery surroundings to travel around, and would sometimes visit relatives, and that almost all of them had personal property, and did not take lunch or their evening meal together in the refectory,” while they were “exhorted not to persist in such infringements in future, and not to allow men into the nunnery.” Priests living openly with concubines, keeping inns and trading, and the neglect of monastic discipline and vows of poverty were common phenomena, and harmed the dignity of the Church. The clear gap between Christian teaching and practice within the Church began to diminish the Church’s authority over spiritual life. In many places, lay people took the initiative themselves, organising processions and pilgrimages without the
clergy, and even building new churches.

The reforming church councils of Constance (1414–1418) and Basel (1431–1439) had already attempted to overcome the weakening of church unity, and the internal moral and doctrinal breakdown. These councils eliminated the challenge posed by the Hussite movement and re-established outward unity, but with a call for the reformation of the Catholic Church “in head and members” continued the demands for change, especially as indiscipline within the Church continued to flourish. Reform became the watchword, and was linked with increasingly open criticism of the Church as an institution and of Christian teachings which based their claims to truth on scholastic theology. Supporters of a new spiritual movement – humanism, which had spread from Italy and become well-established in educated circles throughout western and central Europe by the early sixteenth century – also spoke out against the existing state of the Church and faith. The humanists wanted to save from obscurity and promulgate the wealth of classical Greek and Roman learning, and focused their teaching on the development of the human personality, and on individualism, both of people and of periods of history. This refocusing from the divine to the human led to a new understanding of faith, which was re-imagined as the human search for direct communion with God. The humanists worked on researching, investigating, translating and commentating on Biblical texts in their original language and numerous other writings. The arrival of printing and the humanists’ use of Latin as a supranational means of communication allowed their ideas to spread quickly, signalling an end to medieval scholasticism, shaking the reputation of ecclesiastical circles, and laying the basis for artistic and scientific freedom. The lengthy cultural struggle between these new ‘pagans’ – the humanists – and their opponents, which addressed the reorganisation of the Church’s internal and external make-up and the issue of what should be taught in the universities, was mainly restricted to a relatively narrow circle of scholars. A breakthrough by humanist thought into a wider sphere came with the publication of the satirical essay Laus stultitiae (The Praise of Folly, 1509) by probably the most celebrated humanist of the age, Erasmus of Rotterdam, and a work entitled Epistolae obscurorum virorum (Letters of Obscure Men, first edition 1515), produced by supporters of a famed German humanist, Johannes Reuchlin. Both texts used satire and irony to attack the authoritarian church hierarchy, blind piety and submission, superstition, narrow-mindedness, ignorance and the clergy’s lack of education. Humanists who opened up the spiritual horizons in the fields of literature, art and architecture, developed a number of principles, relating particularly to a personal, internal faith, in their approach to the Catholic Church (which largely supported these new views on ecclesiastical and religious life, but was unable to
overcome its internal crisis) that would later find a place within the Protestant Reformation, albeit adapted to a new reality.

Humanism also had an impact in Slovene territory. As a movement spreading from Italy, it initially gathered adherents in the coastal towns under Venetian rule. The humanists in Koper and Piran engaged with the Italian cultural sphere, and belonged to the Italian humanist movement, but their work also influenced Slovene culture. One member of this circle was Pier Paolo Vergerio the Younger, a jurist, who wrote humanist works as an envoy for the Roman curia and bishop of Koper (1536–1548), and who initially opposed Protestantism. After contact with Protestants, however, he accepted their ideas and became a committed anti-papist. He emigrated to Württemberg, where he had an influence over the literary work of Primož Trubar and of Croatian Protestants. The Habsburg city of Trieste hosted an important Protestant centre at the court of Bishop Pietro Bonomo (bishop from 1502 until 1546). Though already elderly when he returned to Trieste in 1523 from service at court in Vienna, he continued his humanist approach within the wide circle of fellow thinkers he had gathered around him. He supported some Reformation ideas and, as teacher and protector of Primož Trubar, his views also influenced the subsequent leader of Slovene Protestantism. The liberal convictions of the Trieste humanist circle did not, however, lead to a definitive break with the Church of Rome.

The response to the elite literary and scholarly movement of humanism was far less notable at the centre of Slovene-populated territory. Books by Italian humanists found in individual personal libraries, though few in number, indicate that there was an awareness of the new ways of thinking, but the court of Christoph Rauber, bishop of Ljubljana, humanist, and patron of the arts, was probably the only humanist centre, and an intermittent centre at that. The hub of this circle was Rauber’s fellow scholar and regular escort on his diplomatic missions, the versatile Avguštin Prygl, known as Tyfernus, after his birth place, Laško (Tüffer in German). He was the first collector of ancient writings in the Slovene and wider central European territory, and he corresponded with epigraphers throughout Italy. As an architect, he took the chance presented by the fateful earthquake in Carniola in 1511 to rebuild the episcopal palace in Ljubljana, and oversaw work to alter and strengthen the bishop’s residence in Gornji Grad. He also worked in Vienna, where he built an episcopal palace for Georg Chrysippus (Jurij Slatkonja, bishop of Vienna, 1513–1522), who was also an important court musician and originally from Ljubljana. Before Prygl, other humanist scholars from Slovene towns and settlements had already headed to the capital Vienna – the centre of attraction to which currents of reason and spirit flowed from all over the Austrian hereditary lands and
further afield; the most notable included: Tomaž Prelokar from Celje (Thomas de Cilia), who worked at the university and was the first humanist teacher of Emperor Maximilian I, and who concluded his career by holding the prestigious episcopal see of Constance at the end of the fifteenth century; Bernard Perger from Zgornja Ščavnica, who was also a dean, rector and superintendent of the university, and who produced the first humanist Latin grammar, which went through 30 editions between 1480 and 1500; Briccij (Briccius) Preprost from Celje, a professor in the faculty of arts, who was appointed as dean there eight times, and rector twice; and the philosopher Matija Hvale (Qualle) from Vače, who supported the humanist reform of philosophical studies at the university, and was the first Slovene to write works of nominalist philosophy. Another leading figure was Žiga (Sigismund) von Herberstein (1486–1562), originally from Vipava, who spent most of his life either in Vienna or travelling through the countries of Europe as a diplomat for Habsburg rulers. After his missions to Moscow, where he could overcome linguistic difficulties with his knowledge of the “Slovene language, which was of great help in his work,” he wrote the influential *Rerum Moscoviticarum commentarii* (Notes on Muscovite Affairs, 1549), which provided a detailed ethnographic account of Russia that was translated and reprinted throughout Europe and remained a key text on Russia for centuries. Also noteworthy is Jakob Gallus (Jacobus Gallus Carniolus, 1550–1591), whose rich musical heritage lives on to this day, and who established himself in various central European cities. Most of the intellectual energy of these humanist scholars was therefore dissipated or expended outside their home territory, because those lands could not offer the creative and spiritual opportunities available in the great cities of the day.

During the sixteenth century, religious affiliation led some students from Slovene-populated provinces to choose universities in Italy (generally Padua or Bologna), or Germany (mainly Wittenberg and Tübingen). However, until the foundation of Graz university in 1585, most students from these provinces went up to faculties in Vienna. From 1365 to 1609, around 3,000 students from Slovene-populated territory enrolled at the Vienna university, approximately half of them from Carniola. The social structure of students indicates that by far the majority came from the middle, rather than the highest, stratum of society. Many students (up to one quarter in certain periods) came from the lower ranks of society, even from among the most impoverished. Education became increasingly important and positions in the growing imperial administration were open to educated members of the burgher class. The less wealthy were often permitted to study due to the charitable initiatives that were typical of medieval thought, and later on, special scholarship funds were created for their compatriots by Slovene patrons, such as Briccij Preprost at the start of the sixteenth century.
the medical doctor and astronomer, Andrej Perlach of Svecina, in the mid-sixteenth century, and by the mayor of Ljubljana and imperial official, Andrej Hren and his brother Tomaž (bishop of Ljubljana) at the end of the sixteenth century. One such institution, founded in the second half of the seventeenth century, and based on a bequest of Luka Knafelj, a priest in Gross-Rusbach, still exists today.

The ‘brain drain’ of humanists from the Slovene world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was significant, and scholars in Slovene territory in the sixteenth century were almost all Protestants, who were more indirectly influenced by humanism. Their motives for remaining in, or even returning to, their homeland were quite different from those that led the humanists out into the wider world.

FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF PROTESTANTISM TO THE FIRST SLOVENE BOOK AND THE TRANSLATION OF THE BIBLE

In the loose confederation that was the Holy Roman Empire at the end of the fifteenth and start of the sixteenth century, the tensions in political, economic and ecclesiastical and religious life that had appeared in late medieval society had grown more complex. The Empire’s continual wars bore little fruit and massive debts; princes who had carved out their own territories were restrained by the Estates, but together they opposed the emperor’s policy: the towns, although imperially controlled, sought opportunities to exercise as much autonomy as possible applying their economic power, fortified walls and ties with individual princes; the lower nobility, which was in the midst of complete eradication as a separate Estate, put their hopes in a broad union of knights. The economic growth encouraged by new geographic discoveries led to considerable social stratification in towns, while the crisis in the agricultural economy marginalised a great deal of the farming population. The first guild unrest occurred in the towns, while in rural areas, Bundschuh (named after a peasant shoe used to symbolise the movement) groups formed and the armed peasant uprisings reached their apogee in the ‘Poor Conrad’ rebellion in 1514. Society no longer shared a clear political consensus, and unconvincing church practices no longer provided a sense of spiritual certainty – the Borgia and Medici popes were more interested in consolidating the Papal States than in urgently needed internal reform. The reforms put forward at the Fifth Council of the Lateran in 1512 garnered little response, and resistance to clericalism and the moral degradation of the Church spread. The mass of various social currents, changes, large social differences, and the decline of the spiritual assurance, that ‘ordinary souls’ sought within the traditional church, required
only a small nudge to produce open rebellion against members of the Church hierarchy and
their lifestyle. This effect was heightened by the ‘holy trade’ in indulgences, which was the
name given in ecclesiastical circles to the trading in human yearning for salvation.

It was in this environment that Martin Luther (1483–1546), an Augustinian monk,
university professor and preacher in Wittenberg, Saxony, took a fateful stand against the
indulgences that people were purchasing for themselves and for relatives, alive and dead. He
was not so much interested in the actual sale of indulgences, the profits of which were shared
by the Church, princes and bankers, as above all disturbed by the theological issues it raised.
In 1517, he published his 95 theses against indulgences and took the position that salvation
could not be attained by good works, indulgences or pilgrimage. Salvation could therefore not
be earned, but could only be attained through faith. He denied that any person had the right to
forgive sin, and through this effectively rejected the authority of the pope. Luther’s challenge
to the Church in Rome soon moved from the realm of scholarly dispute into the political and
wider public sphere. The dispute continued and, in the following years, Luther’s statements
became more critical as he set out principles for the renewal of the Church. He rejected
ecclesiastical tradition, the divine character of the pope, the infallibility of church councils,
most of the sacraments, monasticism, the doctrine of purgatory, fasting and the mass. His
thesis on the “church invisible” (the church present wherever “there is faith in people’s
hearts”) rejected the institution of the church hierarchy, and recognised only a church of
believers, in which each Christian was a priest before God. The direct relationship between
people and God made the believer subject only to divine authority, free of any other shackles,
and threat of force. This authority could only be discovered via the Bible – God’s revealed
word, which should be understandable to all as the book of the church, the family hearth and
the individual.

This new religious teaching, which aimed according to Luther towards the “true and
ancient faith,” was so radical that it was simply unacceptable to the Church. After he had
refused demands to retract the statements in his writings, Luther was formally
excommunicated by Pope Leo X at the start of 1521. An imperial ban followed some months
later, when he reaffirmed his views before the Diet of Worms, with tradition ascribing the
following brief formula to him: “Here I stand. I can do no other. God help me!” Lutheranism,
which later developed into open opposition to the Catholic Church, began to spread rapidly
among every class and every area of the empire. When, in 1529, some princes and town
representatives ‘protested’ a decision on church reform taken by the Catholic majority at the
Diet of Speyer, the adherents of the Christian faith who had broken away from Catholicism
began to use the term Protestants.

The rapid growth of the new Protestant church was due largely to a clash between the Emperor and representatives of the Estates, who saw conversion to Protestantism as an opportunity to gain complete autonomy. At the Diet of Augsburg, convened by Emperor Charles V in 1530 to deliberate on the “dissension concerning our holy faith” and arrive at “one Christian truth,” the Protestant Estates signed the Augsburg Confession and submitted it to the Emperor. Since the Edict of Worms, the Protestant Reformation in Germany had transformed into Protestantism; the Augsburg Confession, prepared by the humanist Philipp Melanchthon and approved by Martin Luther, signalled the formation of the Lutheran Church. Other reformers followed Luther’s example and founded their own Protestant religious communities. In Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, where people had followed the Lutheran Reformation, Zwinglian – named after the founder Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531), who worked in Zurich – and Calvinist – named after John Calvin (1509–1564), who worked in Geneva – teachings were also known.

In tandem with Lutheranism, which became a religious movement, there were also social movements that took Protestant principles as a guide for what were otherwise completely political objectives. In 1522, an uprising of lower nobility broke out with the aim of reducing the influence of the Church and achieving a united empire in the name of the new faith, in which the power of the state would be based on the Knights’ Estate. After Ulrich von Hutten’s illusions of ‘German freedom’ were shattered in 1523, the larger and more fanatical Peasants’ War began (1524–1526). The peasant rebellions, which also had similar causes, now started to be linked with religious motives. Peasants began to interpret Luther’s teaching on “evangelical liberty” and the “freedom of each Christian” as a freedom that released them from any dependence on secular or ecclesiastical lords, and which also relieved them of all tax duties. Under the spiritual leadership of Thomas Münzer and his ‘prophets’, who proclaimed the teachings of the radical Protestant sect of the rebaptisers or Anabaptists – on the baptism of adults, the evangelical equality of all people and the rejection of any authority – the uprising grew into a veritable peasant war, which engulfed central and southern Germany, and also spread to northern Carinthia and Upper Styria. Luther condemned the “gangs of highwaymen and peasant robbers” and indirectly contributed to the bloody suppression of the radical plebeian strand of the Reformation, which also alienated the peasant population from his teachings. The smashing of the peasant uprising, a pale reflection of which was even seen in Slovene territory (not in an open uprising, but in an increase in mistrust between bonded peasants and the nobility, who would later introduce the Protestant
Reformation to the region) did not stop the work of the Anabaptists, spread in religious communities across German and Austrian provinces (Länder), as well as Switzerland, Bohemia and Moravia, who were prosecuted by Catholics and Protestants alike. They suffered a major defeat in 1535, when, after a lengthy siege, the city of Münster in Westphalia returned to Catholic hands; the city had been proclaimed as the centre of God’s earthly kingdom by its Anabaptist defenders. The Anabaptist movement was not completely suppressed, but by the middle of the century had been confined to the margins of the religious world. Anabaptists in Slovene territory experienced a similar fate to their brothers elsewhere. In 1530, all the prisons in Styria and the county of Cilli (Celje) were apparently full of these ‘heretics’. Anabaptists, who were historically linked to the urban environment, appeared in only a few places within the territory: first in Slovenj Gradec, in several settlements in Carniola in the 1530s and 1540s (including Ljubljana, while they are mentioned again in 1566 in the vicinity of Kamnik), and in Carinthia, in Villach, Klagenfurt, Wolfsberg, and Spittal. They also appeared on several occasions in Trieste, but only as convicts brought from inland regions to serve on galleys. As Trieste was, by the norms of the day, religiously tolerant, the city’s inhabitants often even enabled convicted Anabaptists to escape.

All attempts to form Protestant communities that went against the interests of those holding political power failed, or resulted in people being harshly marginalised from society. Emperor Charles V rejected the fundamental document of Luther – the Augsburg Confession – but Martin Luther’s authority was based on that of princes who effectively placed ecclesiastical organisation in his hands, which led to the founding of local state Lutheran churches (Landeskirchen), under the patronage of the prince. In response to imperial demands to return plundered ecclesiastical possessions and to respect the authority of the Catholic Church, in 1531 the Protestant princes and cities formed a military alliance, the Schmalkalden League, and enforced a religious peace. They claimed the religious divide could only be finally resolved by a general church council. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church was gradually reorganising. In 1540, the pope gave approval to the Society of Jesus, the order of Jesuits, which offered the pope solid support in defence of the Catholic faith, and, in 1545, finally invoked a church council, the Council of Trent. The main purpose of the lengthy, frequently interrupted church council (sessions took place in 1545–47, 1551–52, and 1562–62) was to overcome the religious schism and to create conditions for the renewal of the Catholic Church, as called for by the Council of Basel in the first half of the fifteenth century. Protestants did not participate in the council, since it had been invoked by the pope. The Holy Roman Emperor began to prepare for war, and conflict started in 1546. The following year,
the army of the Smalkalden League was decisively defeated in the homeland of Protestantism, Saxony, and in 1548 the Emperor imposed the agreement known as the Augsburg Interim.

Anticipating that a new church council would be convened, the Protestant princes and free cities prepared for war, despite the splits which were already emerging between Protestant theologians. Philipp Melanchthon, seen as the successor to Luther following his death, moderated some doctrinal formulations, and in this was opposed by Matthias Flacius Illyricus (Matija Vlačić, from Labin in Istria), whose doctrine involved taking even stricter interpretations of Lutheran principles. Vlačić was forced out of Wittenberg and fled to Magdeburg, the centre of opposition to the Interim. In 1552, a new war broke out, which reversed the result of four years before. The Emperor was defeated and the free confession of faith was recognised, though this time it applied until the next imperial diet, rather than until the next council. Jurists who were not great adherents of the idea of empire took up the cause of the victorious Protestants. They laid down the basis for concluding a permanent peace between Catholics and Protestants, which was achieved at the Diet of Augsburg in 1555. This Peace of Augsburg stated that the territorial princes had the right to introduce the Reformed, i.e. Lutheran faith in their own territory (ius reformandi). This right was later expressed in the renowned phrase: *Cuius regio, eius religio* (whose the region, his the religion). Bonded peasants had to accept the faith of their lords or seigneurs or if they did not wish to do so, could emigrate (ius emigrandi). Thus, 25 years after the Augsburg Confession, the schism was gained legal recognition in the religious Peace of Augsburg.

The issue of the ‘permanent’ peace and tolerance was really a question of the current military and political strength of the confessional opponents. Protestantism was spreading rapidly – in the second half of the sixteenth century, two thirds of the Empire was Protestant – while Catholicism had lost its spiritual primacy. However, the Council of Trent, though it failed to achieve its elevated goal of restoring religious unity, was able to assess the state of the Catholic Church and set out its future path. It passed a range of measures condemning errors and abuses within the Church and introducing disciplinary control over the priesthood. With the definition of the official Catholic doctrine and the affirmation of the monarchical principle, the Council of Trent laid the grounds internally for a gradual but lasting Catholic renewal, and externally – assisted by the secular authorities – for the Catholic Counter-Reformation.

In this religious and political climate, Protestant Reformation ideas developed first in Slovene territory, followed in the second half of the sixteenth century by the provincial Estates version of Protestantism embodied in the Augsburg Confession. The new religious
ideas initially appeared among critical priests who had been exposed to humanist ideas in their education. Italian translations of Protestant books came from Venice via Trieste, where Bishop Pietro Bonomo, a supporter of Erasmus and promoter of liberal and tolerant principles, worked, and where there was already a Protestant centre in 1523. The original German Reformation writings arrived in Slovene territory from the seditious German principalities and provinces in part due to people from mobile social classes, such as trades apprentices, semi-itinerant monks and students. Considerable credit for spreading the Protestant Reformation also goes to the German universities, but not from its very start. In the sixteenth century, around 300 young Carniolans, Styrians, Carinthians and Gorizians were studying in Tübingen alone, and when they settled in castles and towns on their return they spread the new religious views. Some of these later became Protestant clergy – preachers. The continual orders from Archduke Ferdinand against religious innovation and calls to burn Protestant books were ignored throughout the Austrian hereditary lands from the very beginning. A canonical visitation in Styria in 1528 found that burghers were generally lukewarm on religious matters, but in Slovenj Gradec and Radgona the adherence to new religious views was far more noticeable. Burghers in Carinthia had already appointed a preacher in Villach in 1526. Five years later, Lutheranism was already described as an “unhealable wound” in the surroundings of the same town. In Carniola, Ljubljana had acquired a powerful Protestant circle by 1529, which was led by an ambitious scribe of the provincial Estates, Matija Klombner, and which included a number of clergy. In the following decade, the Protestant Reformation spread through every Slovene-populated province; this process did not have the same intensity everywhere, but was particularly strong among the burgher classes and the clergy. At this time, the nobility were wary of the changes. Although to some extent they acted as protectors of the proponents of the new religious ideas, they still baulked personally at rejecting Catholicism.

In the 1530s, a new figure joined the increasingly divided religious discourse, Primož Trubar (1508–1586), who became the central personality of Slovene Protestantism. He was born in Raščica (Rašica) in lower Carniola (Dolenjska), in the house of a miller and carpenter, whose seigneurs were the Auerspergs of Turjak. Studying in Rijeka, Salzburg, Vienna and Trieste, he acquired a relatively broad humanist and theological education, which already diverged from official Catholic teaching. In Trieste in particular, where he studied in Pietro Bonomo’s court, he became familiar with ancient writers such as Virgil, as well as the works of Erasmus, and the teachings of Luther, Zwingli, Bullinger, Pellican and Calvin as well as the leading ideas of the Italian Reformation (Sozinianism). Trubar later also served at Bonomo’s
court, and found refuge there on several occasions (1524–27, 1529–30, 1540–42). Trubar was consecrated as a priest in 1530, and received a vicariate in Laško from Bonomo; around five years later, he arrived in Ljubljana as a preacher, continually speaking out against popular superstition, alleged apparitions of saints, the building of new churches, and religious sects. Neither did he stint in criticising his own Catholic Church in his efforts to proclaim gospel truths. The number of priests following Trubar’s example increased, and the impassioned preacher met opposition from the secular authorities in Carniola. Trubar sought refuge with his protector, Pietro Bonomo, in Trieste, and could only return to Ljubljana and take up a post as canon two years later. By the start of the 1540s, the nobility had begun to take the lead in the Protestant Reformation in Slovene provinces.

The circle of those committed to a pure gospel ‘without human addition’, justification by faith, and both forms of Holy Eucharist (bread and wine) expanded significantly in the 1540s, along with increasing demands for freedom of confession for the new religious convictions. In 1548, the bishop of Koper, Pier Paolo Vergerio the Younger (Peter Pavel Vergerij ml.), renounced Catholicism, following Ivan Ungnad (1493–1564), the Landeshauptmann of Styria and a senior military commander in the Croatian-Slavonian Military Border, in 1543. Both had links with Trubar’s later work in Württemberg. At the behest of Pier Paolo Vergerio – who became a diplomat and advisor to Christoph, Duke of Württemberg – Trubar abandoned Gothic, after his first publications in Slovene, and began to use Roman script. In Vergerio’s naïve and zealous understanding of the religious and political reality in the Turkish-ruled Balkans, he saw Trubar’s mission purely within a wider south Slavic context. The publication and dissemination of Slavic Protestant books was conceived as part of a strategy to extend the “true faith” all the way to Constantinople. The strict Lutheran, Ivan Ungnad, provided the means for the printing. With Trubar’s help, he created a Bible Institute (Biblični zavod) in Urach; over the four years in which the institute existed (1561–1564), it published four Slovene, five Italian and thirteen Croatian books in glagolitic, Cyrillic and Roman scripts. These volumes represented a major advance in Croatian Protestant literature, though had little actual impact on the development of Reformation thought itself in Croatia, much less the lands beyond the Turkish border. The books were printed, but remained largely undistributed.

Primož Trubar renounced the Catholic faith in 1548, after being forced out of Carniola by persecution. The Council of Trent and the Emperor’s victory in the Schmalkaldic War briefly placed the Catholic powers back in the ascendancy. The bishop of Ljubljana, Urban Textor (1543–1558), now began a carefully planned long-term campaign against the
increasingly powerful Protestant Reformation movement in Carniola. He attempted to base this movement on the Jesuit order and to stem the falling numbers of Catholic priests. To this end, he began to send students from the Slovene provinces to Vienna, where Jesuits arrived in 1551 encouraged by Textor and founded a college, as well as to the newly founded Collegium Germanicum in Rome. At home, Textor ensured that Trubar was stripped of all duties and benefices. A warrant for his arrest was issued by Archduke Ferdinand in 1547, which forced Trubar to leave his homeland the following year. It was now clear to Trubar that he was no longer involved in reforming the Church, but was part of a religious schism. He accepted Lutheran Protestantism, with Swiss reform influences very much secondary. Almost all of the second half of his life (except the period 1561–1565) was spent abroad in service as a Protestant pastor and preacher in Nuremberg, Rothenburg, Kempten, Urach, Tübingen, Lauffen and Derendingen. Nevertheless, he still saw his basic mission as establishing Protestantism at home, among Slovenes. He was later only able to put this mission into practice – in line with the basic Protestant ideas of a believers’ individual study and understanding of God’s word – by writing and printing books. Trubar wrote half and prepared two-thirds of the approximately 50 books produced by Slovene Protestant writers in the sixteenth century. His central task was translating the New Testament and Luther’s *Manual of Piety* (Die Hauspostille). The New Testament translation was published in several volumes between 1555 and 1577 (with a complete edition printed in 1582), while the second was issued only after his death in 1595, when Protestantism in Inner Austria was being rapidly suppressed due to measures introduced by princely decree. However, his most important literary activity was linked to his earlier period, when the works published not only confirmed Trubar’s genius, but also represented – as they do to this day – an invaluable contribution to Slovene history in general.

If Trubar wanted to spread the new faith with books, then he had first to resolve the issue of a literary language. The fragments of written Slovene in medieval manuscripts did not constitute a literary tradition and there was a conviction that this “raw and barbarian” language could not be written or read. Trubar laid the foundations for Slovene literary language in 1550; his *Catechismus* and *Abecedarium* (Language Primer) were not only the first printed Slovene books, but also the first ever books in Slovene. He overcame the dialectal differences of Slovene by basing his work on the speech of the central Slovene area, and hence offered a literary standard, which as he himself wrote: “any good, simple Slovene could understand” (“vsaki dobri preprosti Slovenec lehku more zastopiti”). The publication of the first books and well-planned standard literary expression represented the start of an
unbroken development of learned culture for Slovenes in their national language. Slovene, which previously had only appeared in brief fragments, was now a true written language.

In the mid-1550s, the Estates of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola moved from a tacit Protestant position to open confession of Protestantism, a decision aided by the Empire’s internal politics. Charles V, who had taken the Religious Peace of Augsburg as a personal defeat, also assessed his fight against the ‘hereditary enemy’ as a failure, and made an extremely unusual move for the time, abdicating as Holy Roman Emperor. He ceded the Spanish crown, the Two Sicilies and colonies in North and South America to his son Philip II, and left the crown of the Holy Roman Empire to his brother Ferdinand I (1556–1564), the prince of the Habsburg hereditary Austrian lands. The imperial crown would be held, with one exception, by the Austrian branch of Habsburgs until the Holy Roman Empire’s dissolution. The Inner Austrian Estates made full use of the political and financial weakness of the new emperor, and, according to some, his lenient and conciliatory attitude to Protestantism. They relied on support from the German Protestant princes, referred to old privileges (particularly in the case of the Styrian nobility), which they claimed freed them from direct subordination to the prince, and demanded religious freedom. Though this was not formally granted, they did achieve de facto religious freedom, and pushed Catholics and their spiritual leaders out of provincial committees, town councils, churches and parishes. ‘German’ Protestant churches were organised in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, while Protestantism in the county of Gorizia remained weak and made little headway. After his triumphant return to Ljubljana (1561/62–1565), Primož Trubar attempted to strengthen Protestant influence in the county of Gorizia. However, his visit to Gorizia, where he states in a letter to Ivan Ungnad, that he “preached for fourteen days in a row in German, Slovene and Italian in the house of the lords of Eck and at the castle in Rubije,” did not produce lasting fruit. Protestantism in the area remained limited to a smaller proportion of the nobility, which was due in part to Gorizia’s extreme isolation in terms of trade at that time. It was only linked by road to Carinthia in 1576, and the low level of trade with Carniola only began to grow with the improvement of the road link with Ljubljana at the same time.

On his return to Carniola, where he was made superintendent of the Protestant church, Trubar decided to produce a book of church orders that realised a long-held dream of a “Slovene-speaking language church.” He first published a relatively free adaptation of three confessions (Augsburg, Württemberg and Saxon) as the confession of the “Slovene church” entitled Articuli oli deili te prave stare vere kerszhanske (Articles or Fragments of the True Old Christian Faith, 1562), and two years later printed a statute, which was a loose
The codification of the church organisation, which made Slovene the language of all church ceremonies, religious services and instruction, established an independent ‘Slovene church’ in Carniola alone, although the use of provisions from the Church Ordinance reached beyond the provincial borders of Carniola into the wider Slovene space.

The Church Ordinance also laid down the basis for primary education in the Slovene language. ‘Domestic’ and ‘public’ German schools in towns provided an education, while the move up to university was largely offered by Protestant ‘Latin’ Estates schools, a form of grammar or gymnasium school that operated in the main provincial towns – from 1563 in Ljubljana and Klagenfurt, and from 1570 in Graz. The wide network of primary schools, which was intended to make people in every parish literate in Slovene, in towns, market towns and rural areas, was not set up in practice, but the use of written Slovene did begin to spread to secular areas of public life, concurrently with the rise of Protestantism. The first official legal texts in Slovene were produced in the final decades of the sixteenth century: a compulsory order (Zapovedni list) on a wine tax and a translation of a wine-growing law (Gorske bukve); in the changing religious and political conditions of the seventeenth century a series of bondsmen’s, burghers’ and feudal oaths were also written in Slovene, as well as translations of various orders by lay and ecclesiastical lords.

By publishing the Church Ordinance, Trubar had encroached on an exclusive right of the prince, who alone was permitted to issue orders on religious matters. At the request of Archduke Charles, who on his father’s death became the ruler of Inner Austria, the Church Ordinance was seized and Trubar was expelled from his homeland for the final time. Charles, a devout Catholic, did not have the power to take more decisive action against Protestants. The debts he inherited, as every Habsburg before him, from his predecessor and limited revenues from the Inner Austrian provinces alone mitigated his attitude to Protestant demands. The growing Turkish pressure on neighbouring Croatia also had an impact on Charles, who had to make significant concessions to the Styrian nobles, in 1572. In an oral declaration before the provincial diet in Graz – made, of course, in exchange for the approval of higher taxes – he granted the nobility freedom of conscience and worship, and freedom to appoint preachers, and to found schools and churches. The granted freedom of conscience was extended to burghers, but not the freedom to practice Protestant worship. The ‘Religious Pacification of Graz’ was intended for Styrians, but Carinthians and Carniolans also incorporated it into their own practice, whilst requesting that Archduke Charles formally recognise the same rights for them, and to further extend them to the towns. Six years after
the Religious Pacification of Graz came the ‘Religious Pacification of Bruck’. At the general diet of the Inner Austrian Estates held in Bruck an der Mur, Charles extended the rights granted to the Styrian nobility and burghers to those in other provinces. He also permitted Protestant worship and education in the main provincial towns and in Judenburg. In return for religious concessions, the Estates approved the Archduke’s taxes for several years in advance and took over the costs for the Military Border. The series of deals between the provinces and the archduke included building a powerful and strategically vital fortress in Croatia. The following year – 1579 – work began on Karlovac (Karlstadt), the town named after its founder, Archduke Charles.

The achievements in 1578 in Bruck an der Mur represent the high point of Protestantism in Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. The church and school orders prepared for the Styrians after the Religious Pacification of Graz by David Chyträus, a renowned German Protestant, were adopted by the Estates of all three provinces, who also agreed to share the costs of printing the Bible in Slovene. The practical organisation of Protestantism in Slovene territory was given firm doctrinal standing by subscribing to the Formula of Concord (Formuli concordiae, 1580), the work of German Protestant theologians which unified the doctrine of the Lutheran local state churches within the Empire, due largely to the efforts of Primož Trubar, who translated the document into Slovene and published it in 1581. A pupil of Matija Vlačić (Flacius Illyricus), Sebastijan Krelj (1538–1567) – the writer of Otrozhia biblia (A Children’s Bible), 1566, and Postilla slovenska (A Slovene Manual of Piety), 1567 – attempted to establish a small group of Flacianists in Carniola, but they soon faded away. They made small inroads in Carinthia, but the most prominent supporters of this strand of Reformation thought were forced out of Klagenfurt and Villach. In Inner Austria, the ‘new faith’ garnered little response in the areas along the south and western borders with the Venetian Republic (in the county of Gorizia, it was limited to Gorizia and Rihemberk-Branik, and had practically no support among Trieste’s social elite after Bonomo’s death, while in the county of Pazin, there was only a small core of supporters in Pazin itself). In Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, however, most burghers and nobles were Lutheran at the end of the 1570s.

One of the main principles of each Protestant (‘national’) church community was that God spoke to believers in their own language. The translation of the Bible was therefore the highest goal of Protestant work. This was an aim shared by Slovene Protestants from the very start, and was finally realised by Jurij Dalmatin (1547–1589). According to the original agreement by the Estates, the Bible was to be printed by Janž Mandelc, who from 1575 had become Ljubljana’s first printer. Since his printing operation was forced, after seven years, to...
close and leave Inner Austria due to pressure from Archduke Charles, 1,500 copies of Dalmatin’s Bible were printed in Wittenberg in 1584. The publication of the Bible in full was a significant success for Slovene Protestantism, and this major translation achievement, based on a literary tradition of just three decades, also finalised a literary standard language that remained practically unchanged for almost 200 years. The Catholic literary tradition, which was not impressive in terms of quantity or quality (by 1574, only the Catholic catechism had been published in Slovene), therefore relied on the literary and linguistic tradition of the Protestants for the next few centuries. In the subsequent period of Catholic renewal, two secular literary works from the Protestant printing presses were to prove their worth alongside the Bible. The book *Arcticae horulae* (Winter Hours, 1584) by Adam Bohorič (c. 1520 – after c. 1598) gave Slovene its ‘prescribed’ form, and this grammar was the only sixteenth century work by the Slovene Protestants to undergo reprints and new editions into the eighteenth century. The rector of the Estates school in Klagenfurt, the German Protestant Hieronim Megiser (1555–1619), composed the first German-Latin-Slovene-Italian dictionary (*Dictionarium quatuor linguarum*, 1592) from the four languages in current use in the Slovene world. The works of the Slovene Protestants, published with the financial support of the local, largely German-speaking nobility, developed the linguistic rules and the essential terminological palette and range of stylistic expression required to establish and breathe life into a literary language. Their achievements went well beyond their religious and ecclesiastical aims, and the literary language they forged provided a foundation on which fragmented national communities could later stand together as Slovenes and organise politically.

**THE CROATIAN-SLOVENE PEASANT UPRISING AND POPULAR PIETY**

The Protestant writers, whose translations and direct religious activity prepared the way for the spread and consolidation of the new faith among their “beloved Slovenes,” as Primož Trubar called his fellow countrymen and women in his writings, generally did not succeed in these efforts. Only partially, in the surroundings of smaller towns such as Radovljica, Kamnik, and Krško, and ironworking settlements, and to a larger extent only on larger landed estates with Catholic lords, did the ordinary rural population accept Protestantism, more as an expression of opposition to their feudal lord than as an expression of a new spiritual path to salvation. In Carinthia, Lutheranism took hold particularly among bondsmen on the estates of the bishop of Bamberg in the Gail valley (Ziljska dolina), and it
survived the entire Counter-Reformation period in clandestine form. Peasants there also carefully preserved Slovene Protestant books, copying them by hand and starting the tradition of *bukovniki*, Slovene autodidacts, who in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries copied, translated, adapted and created a range of works, largely practical and religious in nature, in the form of verse, prose and drama. In Styria, bonded peasants in the seignories of the Teutonic Knights around Ormož, Velika Nedelja and Središče became Protestant, as did bonded peasants in Carniola within the bishop of Brixen’s ecclesiastical estates around Bled, within the bishop of Frising’s estates around Škofja Loka, and within the estates of the Teutonic Knights around Metlika in White Carniola (Bela Krajina). Only in Prekmurje, which was part of the Hungarian kingdom, did the Slovene population follow the religion of their territorial seigneurs. In addition to Lutheranism, an even stricter form of Calvinist Protestantism established itself in Prekmurje and endured as religious freedom was not completely suppressed or the Counter-Reformation fully exercised.

Religious divisions among the social elite were not of direct concern to bonded peasants and most remained untouched by Protestantism. Although if peasants became Protestant it would not affect their social status, the religious and financial negotiations between the provincial Estates and Archduke Charles did affect peasants – regardless of whether their seigneur was Catholic or Protestant. The costs of the Military Border grew continually in the second half of the sixteenth century, with bonded peasants ultimately having to foot the bill. At the same time, tolls at the crossings from one province to another were becoming more common and the increased toll tariffs within provinces increased the nobility’s revenues at the peasants’ expense. Customs duties also increased on the Hungarian-German state border that divided Croatian and Slovene territory. This led to a fall in rural trade and increased unrest among peasants, which was more marked in a number of areas such as the county of Gorizia, lower Carniola (Dolenjska), the county of Pazin, and along the Carniola-Styrian border. These outbreaks of unrest did not occur simultaneously, however, and did not spread into a wider peasant movement. Dissatisfaction on the prince’s own lands and estates was furthered strengthened by the requirement that farm holders change their lifetime ‘usufruct’ on the land (right of lease) into a right of inheritance by purchase. The continual opposition of peasants largely prevented the prince from having his way, but it did force almost all the small remaining class of *kosezi* – who were unable to provide documentary proof of their ancient rights to land – into bondage.

Despite peasants’ reduced opportunities for trading and the increase in the burden on them from the many forms of bonded labour (*tlaka, robot*), the status of bonded peasants in
Croatia was further harmed by conditions arising directly from feudal relations within seigneuries. Tensions grew on the estates of the powerful Hungarian noble, Ferenc Tahy, commander of the defensive zone against the Turks between the Drava and Lake Balaton, who also had many family ties with the Croatian nobility. The peasants on his estates, the extensive Štatenberg estate in Lower Styria and the Zagorje seigneuries of Susedgrad and Dolnja Stubica, which largely belonged to him, faced considerable problems due to lengthy property disputes between the feudal lords themselves and the lack of legal security that this caused. According to the confession of Ilija Gregorič, one of the leaders of the uprising that broke out in 1573, Tahy’s arbitrary cruelty had exhausted the peasants’ patience. As well as a series of violent ‘economic’ measures enriching Tahy at their expense, the peasants were utterly humiliated and harmed by their daughters being removed to the castle, where the lord viewed them naked, and selected some who were bathed before Tahy abused them sexually. After endless failed complaints and entreaties to King Maximilian II, in spring 1572, the peasants forced Tahy off his estates and founded a peasant league with the aim of organising a wider uprising that would cover Croatian and Slovene territory all the way to the sea. The intervention of the king, who sent a commission to settle the property disputes and the peasants’ complaints, and the royal order that peasants could not be punished until the commission had finished its work, quelled the rebellion. Yet Tahy’s return to the estate in late summer 1572 led the peasants to make serious preparations for an uprising. Historical memory encouraged the peasants’ resilience, and spurred them on to make careful military preparations, which increased their confidence but also led them to set overly ambitious goals, such as eradicating the role of feudal lords in society, establishing an imperial governorship in Zagreb, assuming control of the border, abolishing toll and customs duties for agricultural products on trade routes and using their own people to collect any taxes due. At the end of January 1573, after the Croatian diet (sabor) had proclaimed the rebel peasants traitors, the uprising was finally triggered, encompassing the Gorjanci hills and spreading to Croatia, south of the Sava, while in Slovene territory it spread into the areas of lower Styria between the Sava and Sotla rivers, and the narrow band of land in Carniola south of the Sava. Outside this area, a number of smaller local uprisings broke out in Carniola, which did not achieve a wider dimension due to the course of the central rebellion, and were not of major importance. In the central rebel territory, which covered around 5,000 km² straddling the state and province border, and initially had around 12,000 rebels, the military units of peasants, who were joined by some inhabitants of market towns and burghers from smaller towns, soon suffered a series of defeats in battles with the noble army and Uskok units. The peasants had
counted on support from the Uskoks, but they sided with the nobles. The final reckoning with the bulk of the peasant army came at Stubiške Toplice, where as many as 3,000 rebels fell in an unusually long battle. After 14 days, the uprising had been put down. According to an eyewitness in the noble ranks, the peasants were “with God’s aid, broken, slaughtered, hung, impaled on stakes, drowned.” The epilogue followed in Zagreb in mid-February, when two of the rebel leaders, Ambrož (Matija) Gubec and Ivan Pasanec, were executed in public. Gubec was crowned as a “peasant king and emperor” with a heated iron muzzle, clamped with heated tongs and finally quartered, while Pasanec was spared the crowning.

The peasant uprising, which occurred at the peak of the religious schism, was naturally condemned by both Catholic and Protestant ecclesiastical authorities and the secular powers. They all cited the maxim contained in Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Ch. 13) that all authority is established by God, and claimed that anyone rebelling against an authority was therefore rebelling against God. For bonded peasants, left to deal with the trials of daily life on their own, the existing religious and ecclesiastical framework no longer offered adequate spiritual consolation, or a convincing assurance of divine favour in this life or the next. Partly out of resistance to the existing social order, but mainly from a yearning to find a trustworthy path to salvation, a sect known as novo štiftarstvo (Neustiftertum in German, the German term Stifter means ‘donator’) developed. This was a form of popular piety, which, in contrast to Catholic and Protestant theological thought and practice, was expressed in cultic forms with some elements of paganism, and involved direct and emphatic expression of emotion. The new štiftarstvo was based on an older štiftarstvo, a religious movement from the Early Middle Ages. The restored religious fanaticism of the štiftarji in the sixteenth century, expressed through frequent processions, pilgrimages, veneration of saints, founding of brotherhoods, stations of the cross, and chapel and church building (e.g. Nova Štifta near Gornji Grad, and Sveta Gora near Gorizia) was initially permitted and even supported by the Catholic Church, though not by the Protestants. However, the appearance of lay priests and efforts to form peasant church communities led the Catholic Church to oppose such forms of spiritual life among the village population. Moves to actually suppress the movement did not occur until the 1580s, when popular piety had acquired unique practice and customs that went beyond the bounds of existing religious ideas and ceremonial (and legal) rules.

The adherents, known variously as jumpers, ecstasies, flagellants, martyrs, throwers and novi štiftarji, believed that God had decided to destroy the world. They claimed that the Virgin Mary had beseeched God not to do this, and that the novi štiftarji would expiate the sin. After the development of a group in 1583 in the county of Gorizia (Sveta Lucija at Most
na Soči), the movement appeared in the following years across large areas of Carniola (the central point was near Planina in inner Carniola) and also spread to Carinthia. The authorities (somewhat over zealously) linked this phenomenon with the possibility of peasant revolts and moved quickly and successfully to proclaim the *nove štiftarji* as heretics, and by spring 1585 the sect had been quashed. While only isolated cases of ‘jumpers’ occurred in Carniola at the start of the seventeenth century, the sect flourished in Slovene Styria between the Drava and Mura, especially in Slovenske Gorice. The new religious movement only died out in its best-known centre of Radehova near Lenart in 1622, probably following implementation of a princely order from four years previously, which condemned every member of the sect to death.

The *novi štiftarji*, described in 1607 in Graz by a provost as “worthless people, who unlike the Lutherans – who believe too little – believe too much,” expressed their religious ardour in an unusual manner. In the higher hills, where they built wooden chapels and churches, they would gather on Saturdays before dusk and sing ‘Slovene songs’ as a form of litany. At night, warmed by fires they would jump, twist, writhe, flagellate themselves, throw themselves around, run through fire, listen to hear if the earth had messages for them from their depths, and fall into ecstasy, and collapse in sobs and tears. The bishop of Seckau, Martin Brenner, compared their conduct to that of epileptics, and condemned the sect as vagrants and idlers blinded by the devil. The accusations that the rituals of the ‘jumpers’ were “clearly sorcery and deception,” and consisted of “enchanted leaping” by idlers and “shameless women” can be linked to an order against vagrants in 1580 and trials for witchcraft. When the *novoštiftarsko* movement was breaking out in the county of Gorizia and Carniola, numerous trials for witchcraft were taking place in lower Styria. Only when the practice of burning at the stake had largely stopped, towards the end of the century, did *novoštiftarstvo* flourish. Fifty years after the suppression of the sect in the Slovene territory between the Mura and Drava, the same area was again the scene of major witch trials.

**THE INNER AUSTRIAN COUNTER-REFORMATION AND CATHOLIC RENEWAL**

The Religious Pacification of Bruck in 1578 was the high tide of Protestantism in Inner Austria. However, the victory of the provincial nobility was by no means as substantial as it seemed. The greater religious freedom won for the almost exclusively Protestant Estates depended on the large amounts of money they gave to their Catholic prince – the Archduke of
Inner Austria, Charles II of Austria – for defence against the Turks, though it is also true that the Estates had to spend money on their own defence anyway, and did not do so just to buy their religious freedom. Despite the prince’s financial weakness, the nobility therefore sought a balance between religiously blackmailing the archduke and their own security, and in some way were captives of their own circumstances. They must have realised that Charles’ oral promise of religious freedom for the Estates was the most he was prepared to concede. And it was the integration and consolidation of the defensive organisation at the end of the 1570s that gave Charles his first chance to move against the spreading Protestant faith.

The ruler’s right to decide on appointments in the ecclesiastical hierarchy within the Austrian hereditary lands had been responsible in no small degree for the poor state of the Roman Church there in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries. Archduke Charles therefore initially could not raise effective spiritual support for his re-Catholicising plans from a weakened Catholic Church and its morally defeated and poorly educated lower clergy. This hopeless state was seen particularly in the monasteries, where the number of monks had fallen drastically, with monastic life completely abandoned for several decades in some places, such as the Augustinian monastery in Ljubljana, and the Carthusian monasteries of Žiče and Jurklošter. Charles therefore had to carefully plan his Counter-Reformation as a political campaign, which laid the foundations for absolutism. In doing so, he could rely only on a few like-minded bishops for support for his renewal, on the nunciature in Graz, which operated from 1580 to 1622, and on the Jesuits, whose colleges not only provided for the higher education, and hence spiritual level, of young clerics, but also turned out loyal and capable officials for their prince. Alongside the Catholic Counter-Reformation led by the Archduke, there was also a lasting, but slow Catholic Reformation – a renewal of the Church, which based its internal revitalisation and re-establishment in public life on the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. The Protestant Church had no future without ‘state’, for which read princely, support, or rather it had no real footing as long as the Religious Peace of Augsburg was valid in the Empire. Yet, the final victory over Protestantism in Slovene territory took fifty years – as long as it had needed to reach its zenith.

Archduke Charles, an ardent Catholic, did not follow – or indeed receive support from – the imperial court in his Counter-Reformation. His brother, Emperor Maximilian II (1564–1576), was well disposed to Protestants, while Emperor Rudolf II (1576–1612), Charles’ nephew, was at least tolerant of them. The Archduke found allies only in his brother, Ferdinand, Archduke of Tyrol, and his brother-in-law, Duke of Bavaria, William Wittelsbach. In 1579, the three princes met in Munich and planned the political re-Catholicisation of their
territories. They agreed that, on the basis of the rights provided in the now twenty-five-year-old Religious Peace of Augsburg, they would gradually restore the exclusive position of the Catholic faith, and in doing so acquire total political authority. Charles began to implement the plan immediately. In the year of the Munich agreement, he took on the poorly developed Protestantism in the county of Gorizia and banished its adherents; three years later, he closed down the printing press in Ljubljana, putting an end to Protestant printing in Carniola. By the end of the 1580s, he had succeeded in re-Catholicising the peasant population in the episcopal seigneuries of Škofja Loka and Bled. In the smaller towns and market towns, Archduke Charles no longer approved any town councillors unless they swore that they were Catholic; he also dismissed Protestant town magistrates (Radgona, Ptuj, Radovljica, Kranj), stopped the practice of Protestant preachers being appointed to Catholic parishes, and halted the appropriation of the Catholic Church’s lands. Charles also dismissed all Protestants from his court and the central offices of government and replaced them with Catholics. He received most support in these actions from the Jesuits. In Graz, where their presence went back to 1573, they founded a college, which even in 1584 had around 360 students, half of whom were from Slovene territory. The college, along with the university, which the Jesuits gained control of in 1586, made Graz a centre of higher education, the source of numerous educated people from every social class in the following decades, a cadre that helped consolidate the princely plans and the Reformation of Catholic Church.

The start of the political Counter-Reformation saw the dioceses that included Slovene areas acquiring more prominent figures as bishops than had previously been the case. After the Protestants had been banished from the county of Gorizia, the town parish priest in Gorizia, Janez Tavčar (1580–1597), became the bishop of Ljubljana. As a provincial vice-regent imposed by the Archduke, he carried out the political re-Catholicisation of Carniola, while dedicating much of his effort to the internal renewal of the Church. In line with Council of Trent requirements, he carried out canonical visitations within his diocese, held annual church synods, increased the discipline of the clergy, and provided education and religious instruction by founding a seminary in the bishop’s residence at Gornji Grad. He also invited Capuchins and Jesuits into Slovene territory. The Capuchins acquired their monastery in Gorizia in 1591, and during the seventeenth century became the largest monastic order in Slovene territory, with monasteries in almost every larger settlement. Their work of preaching and hearing confession among the common people in the towns and rural areas made them among the most important agents of the Catholic renewal. Similarly, the Jesuits founded a college in Ljubljana soon after their arrival in 1597, and would do the same in Klagenfurt in
1604, Gorizia in 1615, Trieste in 1619 and Judenburg in 1620, and though they largely focused their work on instruction and (religious) education, they were the first to introduce higher education to Slovene territory. Bishop Tavčar’s policy, which set out the path for the Catholic Counter-Reformation and Catholic Reformation, became binding on his younger episcopal colleagues, the Laventine bishop, Jurij Stobej (1584–1618), and the bishop of Seckau, Martin Brenner (1585–1615), as well as his direct successor, Tomaž Hren (1597–1630).

The death of Archduke Charles, in 1590, put a temporary hold on the anti-Protestant campaign. Charles’ successor, his son Ferdinand (who would become Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor), was still not of age and the Estates saw their opportunity to improve their religious status. The Estates made the inheritance of the young archduke’s two regents, the Emperor’s brothers, Ernest (1590–1593) and Maximilian (1593–1595), conditional on the demand that they confirm the charter of privileges, which included the Religious Pacification of Bruck. At the same times, the Estates also delayed approval of funds for the Slavonic-Croat Military Border. Only the Turkish pressure in the early 1590s, when troops from the pashaluk of Bosnia captured the line of fortresses, both large and small, in Croatian territory between the Kolpa and Una rivers, leaving the border of the Ottoman Empire just 15 kilometres from Carniola, forced the Estates to relent and provide money for the army.

On 22 June 1593, the burgeoning solidarity between Croatian, Military Border, and German units, and units from Slovene territory bore fruit in a spectacular victory over the Ottoman army at the Battle of Sisak in Croatia. The result of the battle, in which the Carniolan noble commanders, Andrej Auersperg and Adam Raubar, excelled themselves, showed that the Turkish land forces could also be defeated, following the great victory over the Turkish navy in 1571 in the Battle of Lepanto. In Carniola and Prague – then the imperial capital and one of the most important cultural centres in Europe – the celebrations, gifts, masses of thanksgiving, praise and thanks were still going on when the Turkish sultan, Murad III, declared war on Emperor Rudolf II. This started the ‘Long War’ (1593–1606), which spread across territory from the Dalmatian–Croatian–Bosnian border through most of Hungary and the lower course of the Danube. The main commander in the war against the Turks was the emperor’s brother, Matthias, who was also an active promoter of the Counter-Reformation in Upper and Lower Austria. This Counter-Reformation campaign in the Austrian provinces coincided with the reign of Archduke Ferdinand – the product of a strict Jesuit upbringing – as ruler of Inner Austria. In 1595, the 17-year-old archduke assumed full authority as prince. The following year, when he took the military initiative in the fight against the Turks in Croatia, he
put paid to the Estates’ illusions that the Protestant faith would be legalised. He emphatically rejected any deals with the Estates on religious issues, demanding the oath of allegiance traditionally due to him as prince while rejecting the idea that religious freedom would be included in the *Landhandandfesten* in return. He first subjugated the Styrian Estates, followed by the Carinthian and Carniolan Estates. This reopened the path towards the final re-Catholicisation of Inner Austria and broke the political resistance of the nobility.

Ferdinand’s implementation of the Counter-Reformation followed the principle used by his predecessors, to find the weakest link and isolate the nobility. The towns that came under his direct authority were the most vulnerable. Their resistance was reduced by the increased economic weakness, which was seen in the rising poverty and even depopulation of the towns. Wages had increased in the sixteenth century, but in the seventeenth century they generally remained at the same level, although purchasing power dropped significantly. In return for daily wages, expressed in kreutzer (*krajcar*), which indicate the inflation and falling value of silver, an unskilled worker in Ljubljana could obtain the following equivalent of silver, meat or grain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Beef</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>5 kr</td>
<td>1.25g</td>
<td>2kg</td>
<td>6kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>9 kr</td>
<td>3.36g</td>
<td>1.32kg</td>
<td>2.3kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>11 kr</td>
<td>2.27g</td>
<td>2kg</td>
<td>2kg*  (*or from 2.2 to 2.8 kg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The figures express the state at the turn of each century).

The daily wages of a builder, who generally received the highest pay of all professions, were worth approximately 200% more the wages of an unskilled worker between 1550 and 1650. This difference later increased by a further 20%. At the end of the sixteenth century, towns became impoverished, due to a number of external and internal causes. From the 1570s onwards, numerous bank and merchant houses went bankrupt in southern Germany, which also affected trade in Slovene-populated areas given their links with economic activity in the region. The lack of useful mine deposits, the growing cost of production and becoming less competitive on foreign markets led to a decline in ironworking in Carinthia and Carniola, where almost one third of foundries had closed down by the end of the sixteenth century. Transit trade in Hungarian livestock, which was one of the main sources of wealth for domestic traders, came into the hands of better organised and capable Italian trading families, while another indirect blow of the Turkish war was to force the larger livestock fairs north, to
the left bank of the Danube, which led to a significant fall in the earnings of traders who drove livestock along the ‘Ljubljana road’ from Hungary via Ptuj, Celje, Ljubljana and Gorizia into Venetian territory. The declining power of some towns was also due to a number of important merchants dying without true successors, and some of the wealthier burghers being ennobled, purchasing land and starting to live off revenues from land. Finally, the town merchants’ livelihood was also harmed by peasant trade and crafts, which were continually growing in importance on the internal market, and even to a small extent beyond, with peasant traders managing to combine with carters in deals over longer distances. As transit trade declined, local trade became more important. Relations between the burghers and the nobility, otherwise co-religionists, deteriorated because the nobles were profiting from peasant enterprise at the local level, and the Catholic ruler did all he could to further grievances between the two groups. In 1602, Ferdinand issued strict regulations for Carniola, and two years later for Styria, which restricted peasant trade to the benefit of towns. However, these attempts – like those at the end of the fifteenth century – had no significant impact at this time or later. With the already peripheral market of the Slovene territory becoming even weaker, and with the Protestants of Inner Austria in the already re-Catholicised south-German regions now left without any real support, the Lutherans in the towns in Slovene territory could no longer resist the resurgence of the Catholic faith.

Religious tolerance, which had largely reflected the inability of one side to impose its political and religious views on the other, proved extremely fragile. Calculating that he was not risking an internal war, Archduke Ferdinand began to gradually but consistently implement the re-Catholicisation plan carefully prepared by his advisor, the bishop Jurij Stobej. In 1598, he banned Protestant worship in all princely towns and market towns, and demanded the closure of Protestant schools and banishment of preachers. From the following year, the religious affiliation of the prince would determine the religious affiliation for all burghers. Religious commissions – protected by powerful military units – implemented Ferdinand’s orders in lower Styria and Carinthia, led by Bishop Martin Brenner, with Bishop Tomaž Hren taking the lead in Carniola. After three years (1599–1601) in which they burned Protestant books, banished preachers, destroyed Protestant churches, oratories and graveyards, and the end of the burghers’ oath formula was changed from “So help me God and his holy gospel” to the Catholic “So help me God and his beloved saints.” Klagenfurt, as the town of the Carinthian Estates, resisted until 1604. Most Protestant burghers in Slovene territory renounced their religious convictions and readopted the Catholic faith, with just a few, generally rich, educated and capable, remaining loyal to Protestantism and emigrating (a
process that had started with the first anti-Protestant wave in the 1580s) to Germany, Bohemia, and Hungary. Canonical visitations in the first decades of the seventeenth century found that there were still some wavering Catholics and a few Protestants who, as a bishop of Ljubljana wrote, “hid in the shadows like owls.” No clandestine Protestant community persisted among the burghers, but it did among the rural population, in a few villages along the Gail and Gailitz (Zilja and Ziljica) valleys in Carinthia.

Ferdinand’s plan to isolate the Inner Austrian nobility had succeeded by the start of the seventeenth century. The weakness of what remained of Protestantism illustrated the resounding nature of the Catholic victory. The burgher class, and finally even the bonded peasant population, had been re-Catholicised. The timing of the final strike against the nobility was largely defined by outside events. Fraternal disagreements between the devoted Catholic Archduke Matthias and the administratively far less capable Emperor Rudolf II initially (1608/1609) led to the nobility and towns in Upper and Lower Austria and in Bohemia being guaranteed religious freedom, which kindled hopes in Ferdinand’s sovereign lands of a Protestant revival. When Matthias became emperor (1612–1619), the religious situation grew tenser, but Ferdinand’s moves against the Protestant Estates in Inner Austria were halted by the Austro-Venetian or Uskok War (1615–1617/18). The turning point came with the revolt of the Bohemian nobility in 1618, signalled by royal representatives being thrown from a window of the royal and imperial Prague castle (the Defenestration of Prague). The victims survived the fall, despite the great height, because they landed in a pile of manure. Almost one third of Bohemia’s population did not survive the Thirty Years’ War, which the Defenestration triggered. Although Ferdinand of Inner Austria, who became Holy Roman Emperor following Matthias’ death (as Ferdinand II, 1619–1637), already held the Bohemian (1617) and Hungarian (1618) crowns, the nobility of both kingdoms subsequently opposed his inheritance and elected a new ruler. The victory over the Bohemian nobles in the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 and the subsequent reacquisition of the Hungarian throne allowed Ferdinand II to impose his authority over both kingdoms. In Bohemia, he started a radical religious and political standardisation; and in 1627 proclaimed Bohemia as a hereditary Habsburg kingdom.

Ferdinand had previously only ruled Inner Austria of the Habsburg hereditary lands, but on becoming emperor he also inherited Lower and Upper Austria from Matthias, uniting all the Habsburg hereditary lands under his rule. This led him to state, in 1621, that these possessions (and Tyrol from 1655) would subsequently be indivisible and only inherited according to the principle of primogeniture. In this manner, Ferdinand II had managed to
significantly strengthen his power over the various groups of provincial Estates. After establishing his sovereignty over Bohemia, he was able to conclude the Counter-Reformation in the Austrian provinces. In summer 1628, he issued an order requiring nobles in Inner Austria to renounce the Protestant faith or leave Styria, Carinthia and Carniola within a year. By 1630, about 750 nobles (including 250 from Styria, 160 from Carinthia, and 104 from Carniola who are known by name) had left the provinces, taking significant amounts of capital with them. The opportunity to join the ranks of nobles was now much greater than before, particularly for immigrants from Italy, who acquired seigneuries – and usually noble titles – in exchange for cash. People from the local burgher and even rural communities were also ennobled, ushering in a major change in the composition of the nobility. A majority of the Carniolan Estates was now made up of different families from those who had filled its ranks in the sixteenth century, and the Estates would never again enjoy the power they had wielded during the Protestant period. The victorious princely Counter-Reformation successfully re-Catholicised every social stratum in Inner Austria, which also ceased to exist as a separate dynastic polity (1564–1619). The Church increased in wealth and religious influence, while political power was largely accrued by the ruler, ushering in a period of confessional or political absolutism, which lasted until the first half of the eighteenth century.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century, a more consistent, non-violent internal transformation of the Church took place alongside the efforts to establish the sovereignty of the prince and emperor. The long-term success of the Catholic renewal was due to a considerable increase in the educational level of the clergy, as well as the pastoral work of the bishops. While primary schools – which were seen as centres of Protestantism in the sixteenth century – were neglected and even suppressed, the Jesuits took care of secondary and higher education. Until the educational reforms of the eighteenth century, they controlled all gymnasium schools in Slovene territory, with the exception of a parish school which attained that status in Ruše near Maribor, and which operated from 1645 to 1758. In some towns, they also had one or two-year preparatory schools for theological studies in Graz. The main politico-religious purpose of the Latin six-year Jesuit gymnasium schools was the same as the four or five-year Protestant Estates schools, which were abolished in 1598 and 1601: to educate good preachers, who knew how to convincingly spread the ‘true’ faith. The educational level and morality of the clergy improved markedly in the first decades of the seventeenth century. In 1617 in lower Styria, for example, there were just 2 doctors and 3 bachelors of theology, while 11 years later, (all) Styria already had 28 masters and 9 doctors of theology. The number of students at the Jesuit college in Ljubljana, who generally went
into the priesthood, grew continually throughout the seventeenth century: from 200 students in 1603, to 544 in 1636 and 659 by 1700. The bishops used synods to introduce Tridentine principles of renewal, and by personally training domestic priests, attempted to ensure there were sufficient numbers in the areas they themselves were from. Religious life flourished. Numerous brotherhoods, congregations and other lay groups were founded and developed a whole variety of devotional activities: pilgrimages, processions, prayer gatherings, new forms of Marian veneration and the like. Students from Jesuit colleges contributed to the consolidation of the Catholic faith and loyalty to the dynasty though theatrical performances, while Capuchins organised Passion processions for the lower classes. The best known of these tableaux vivants – Biblical allegories with spoken word – was the Škofja Loka passion procession, starting in 1721, which was arranged and translated by the Capuchin father, Romuald Štandreški (Lovrenc Marušič, 1676–1748). It is also the oldest fully preserved dramatic text in Slovene. The Church’s patronage of vocal and instrumental sacral music also allowed two gifted musicians Isaac Poš (Posch) (?–1621/22) and Janez Krstnik Dolar (1620–1673) to work in their home environment. The construction of new churches, ‘gilded altars’, and more and more churches being equipped with organs and similar dazzling Baroque touches changed the visual and spiritual identity of the Catholic Church and heralded a new era.

Public use of the Slovene language was part of everyday life under the Catholic Renewal, as testified by the numerous manuscripts of devotional (e.g. Liber cantionum Carniolicarum, also known as the Kalobški rokopis), administrative (e.g. various oaths), and even private (e.g. personal letters) origin. Although the development of the Slovene written word and literary language continued unbroken, it did slow down significantly. This was partially due to Protestant writers emigrating, and largely due to the fact that the renewed Catholic Church actually required very little literature in Slovene. In the seventeenth century, the Slovene written word, which during the Protestant period had been addressed at the entire literate population (whose numbers primary education was intended to swell), was intended largely for the clergy (who only indirectly introduced Slovene writings into church). Even the few remaining primary schools rarely taught Slovene. For largely practical religious reasons, the Bishop of Ljubljana, Tomaž Hren, promoted “our Slovene language,” seeing the Catholic Church’s restoration as a moral force as his mission as a priest. Hren, who was later described by Janez Vajkard Valvasor as the “Carniolan Apostle,” gave the Slovene spoken word roughly the same status as a language as the written language had achieved in Slovene Protestant printing. Due to his efforts, Rome allowed priests to use Jurij Dalmatin’s translation of the
Bible – minus the Protestant introduction, of course. In 1613, use of the Protestant Bible began to be largely replaced by a series of New Testament texts entitled *Evangelija inu listuvi* (The Gospel and Epistles), which was mainly adapted from Dalmatin by the Jesuit, Janez Čandek. Two years later, Čandek also translated the *Catechismus minimus* of Peter Canisius, but after that 60 years would pass before another book was published in Slovene. While devotional literature re-established some continuity with the publication of a new edition of the lectionary in 1672 and underwent a Baroque flowering in the pulpit prose of the Capuchin Janez Svetokriški (Tobija pl. Lionelli, 1647–1714), who published five collections (reaching 2,896 pages) of his sermons between 1691 to 1707 entitled *Sacrum promptuarium* (Holy Handbook), there was no Catholic edition of the Bible until the turn of the eighteenth century (1784–1802). At that time, the linguist and priest, Jurij Japelj (1744–1807), and colleagues worked on a new translation of the ‘book of books’, overcoming their linguistic differences by basing the work on Jurij Dalmatin’s language, enriched with neologisms.

The state and Church, which worked together closely to achieve ecclesiastical and political standardisation in the seventeenth century, needed written and printed Slovene texts only inasmuch as they helped them achieve their goals. This was not only seen in the lengthy period without Slovene devotional literature being printed – existing stocks clearly met the Church’s requirements – but was also seen in the lack of non-ecclesiastical printing in Slovene. After the publication of the Italian-Slovene dictionary by Gregorio Alasio da Sommaripe (*Vocabolario Italiano e Schiavo*, Udine 1607), clearly a work belonging to the learned culture, the first non-ecclesiastical book directly intended for the wider population was not published until 1725. This was a practical Carniolan farming manual (*Nova krajnska pratika na lejtu MDCCXXVI*), which had a print run of up to 30,000 copies, and despite, or perhaps because of its rather humble content, influenced the education of the ordinary rural population. The elite cultural works in the seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth were still in Latin or, occasionally, German.

**CONDITIONS FOR THE PREKMIURJE SLOVENES**

Although the Habsburgs held the crown of Saint Stephen from 1526 until 1918 (it became hereditary in 1687), the political, ecclesiastical and economic life of Slovenes in Prekmurje was completely separate from their fellow Slovenes on the other side of the Mura river. They were divided between two Hungarian administrative units, with the northwest of Prekmurje falling under the county of Vas (Železna županija in Slovene) and the southeast
coming within the county of Zala, while the Slovene population came under various German, Croatian and largely Hungarian seigneurs. The high aristocracy – such as the families of Széchy, Batthyany, Széchény, Bánffy – held large, unitary estates, which had largely been subject to manorial (dominical or demense) lordship. As the border of the Ottoman Empire reached deep into the Balkans by end of the seventeenth century, the demense lands increased. At the same time, the great feudal lords monopolised some economic activities, particularly the export of beef and wine, which brought them significant profits. In Catholic ecclesiastical organisation, Prekmurje was divided between the dioceses of Zagreb and Győr, but after 1777 Maria Theresa placed the entire territory in which the Prekmurje Slovenes lived under the Szombathely (Sombotel) diocese.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, when Turkish incursions into Carniola and Slovene Styria stopped, Prekmurje still suffered from serious Ottoman attacks. The major incursions began in the 1570s (1578) and in the 1580s (1582, 1587, 1588), and Prekmurje was particularly vulnerable throughout the Long war (1593-1606). The main theatre of the Austro-Turkish War covered most of Hungary, but after Győr (in 1594, and again in 1598) and Nagykanizsa (Kaniža in 1600) fell into Turkish hands, Vienna was threatened, alongside Graz and Maribor. The fall of Nagykanizsa opened a route into eastern Styria for Ottoman military units. The following year, Turkish horsemen broke into Medjimurje, pillaging along the Mura as far as Ljutomer and Radgona. In the years to come, both sides were exhausted by the insidious and debilitating war of plunder, with neither side capable of a decisive military breakthrough. After thirteen years of war, representatives of the Crescent and the Cross came to the negotiating table and, in autumn 1606 at Zsitvatorok, agreed a 20-year truce. Since no major territorial changes occurred during the war (there were a few minor gains in Croatia – Petrinja, Moslavina and Čazma; otherwise, the Slavonian section of the Military Frontier was significantly reinforced by Vlachs who had fled from Turkey), each side retained the territory which they occupied at that time. The truce was in fact a major victory for the Habsburg ruler, largely on the political level. The peace treaty was no longer dictated by the sultan but was an agreement between equals; the sultan recognised Rudolf II’s imperial title and called him ‘brother’ (previously having referred to him as ‘son’); a one-off gift replaced the humiliating annual tribute the Habsburgs had paid the sultan for the previous sixty years for the part of Hungary in which they ruled. An agreement on the treatment of prisoners and a prisoner exchange was reached for the first time. Although this balanced truce with the Turks gave the Habsburgs a foothold that later helped establish their political influence in the Balkans, the border question in Prekmurje remained unresolved until around 1685. In the area demarcated
by a line linking Lake Balaton and the Mura’s confluence with the Drava to the east, and a
line between the Styrian border and the Rába to the west, the issue of peasant bondage was
settled by force alone. In 1606, the poorly defined border led to violent military action on both
sides, with the Turks resorting to major offensives (1640, 1648, 1663/64, 1683) to enforce
their ‘rights’, which affected all of Prekmurje.

In parallel with the Austro-Turkish War in Hungary at the end of the sixteenth century,
the Habsburg’s devotion to the Church of Rome saw them introducing absolutist measures to
re-Catholicise the population. By the end of the sixteenth century, Protestantism, established
in Hungary around 1550, was thriving, due in part to religious refugees from Inner Austria,
who had found protection with Hungarian nobles after being forced from their homeland. The
severe measures taken against the Protestant nobility, which was intended by the central royal
authorities to break the power of the Estates and force the return of expropriated lands to the
Catholic Church, provoked a powerful anti-Habsburg movement, led by the Hungarian noble
and Transylvanian prince, Istvan Bocskay, who even led a revolt against royal authority
(1604–1606). With assistance from the Turks, rebel troops moved into Slovakia, and even
Prekmurje was not spared destruction. Hungarian hajduks and Turkish units plundered the
region as far as the Ormož–Ljutomer–Radgona–Szentgotthárd (Monošter) line. The worst
attack came in 1605 when insurgents crossed the Mura into the Mursko Polje plain, burned
down 1,500 houses, abducted around 3,500 people and drove off livestock, and razed
Ljutomer and Veržej to the ground. In mid-1606, a religious peace was agreed in Vienna,
acknowledging the Hungarian Estates’ right to freely choose their religion, with a seigneur’s
decision also being binding on his bonded peasants. Lutheranism, and to some extent
Calvinism, were now officially established in Hungary. The Slovene population generally
accepted the Protestant faith, but when the Catholic faith was re-established among the
nobility in the mid-seventeenth century, those Slovenes who had not moved to Somogy
(Šormodsko) county to later be Magyarised also returned to Catholicism. Only a smaller
proportion of Prekmurje Slovenes (up to a quarter) retained the Protestant faith, as the
Counter-Reformation was never fully implemented. Like their co-religionists in Carniola, the
Prekmurje Protestants looked to Germany for Slovene religious literary works. A translation
by Ferenc Temlin of Luther’s Small Catechism was published in Halle an der Saale in 1715,
while the greatest literary achievement of the Prekmurje Protestants was a translation of the
entire New Testament (Nuovi zákon, Halle 1771) by Števan Kúzmič.
THE AUSTRO-VENETIAN WAR

Only two wars directly affected Slovene territory during the Early Modern period. As with the Turkish incursions, they affected only peripheral areas of individual provinces. In the early seventeenth century, at the same time as a reckoning with the Protestant nobility was becoming inevitable in Inner Austria, and the different status of the Hungarian Estates was undermining Habsburg re-Catholicisation and absolutist plans in Prekmurje, another war broke out along the southwest and western borders of Inner Austria with _La Serenissima_ – the Venetian Republic. The causes of this conflict were political rather than religious or ideological. The second Austro-Venetian War was closely related to the first, despite occurring hundred years later. The Treaty of Worms in 1521 and Treaty of Bologna eight years later had not provided a satisfactory solution to the border issue. One issue was the disputed territories (differenze), the land along the continental border which the populations on both sides were permitted to use for common needs, and another was that of freedom of navigation on the Adriatic, where the Venetians maintained a monopoly. The differenze became points of dispute and the scene of numerous smaller and larger clashes. The piratical attacks on Venetian shipping and coastal settlements of Istria by the Uskoks of Senj led to sea battles, and a blockade of Senj and the entire Gulf of Kvarner (Quarnero) by Venetian ships. Venetian ships also occasionally attacked the eastern, Habsburg-held Istrian coast. Economic and political conditions also grew tenser on the border between Habsburg Trieste and Venetian Muggia (Milje). Trieste wanted to strengthen its control of the salt trade, at the expense of the Venetian towns of Izola, Piran and Koper (Isola, Pirano and Capodistria). Both sides caused numerous minor irritations, such as the imposition of Venetian customs duties on non-Venetian ships in the northern Adriatic, or tit-for-tat refusals to recognise the status of merchants arriving at fairs. Trade was also impeded by the strict and biased toll collectors in areas where peasants from opposite sides of the border grew arable crops for sales, with authorities even banning people from crossing the border. Crisis points arose in the northern Adriatic and the surrounding land, stretching from Senj and Kvarner islands, the entire Istrian peninsula to Trieste and its hinterland, while unrest also occurred along the Friulian border. In 1615, these disputes and armed clashes developed into a war, which was known as the Uskok War or the War of Gradisca.

The war developed differently in Istria and the Soča (Isonzo) valley. In Istria, controlled by the Habsburgs north of a line from Muggia to Lanišče and in the interior (the County of Pazin which was attached to Carniola, and the Kastav seigneury along the eastern
Istrian coast), the Habsburg forces held the initiative militarily during the first year of the war, while Venetian troops were in the ascendancy in the following two years. The tactics of both sides were the same – burning houses and fields, destroying vineyards, cutting down olive trees, looting, stealing livestock, and killing and abducting people. The first year of all-out war prosecuted by small numbers of professional soldiers and larger numbers of peasants, both male and female, devastated the border area to such an extent that, in coming years, attacks by peasant guerrilla groups spread deep into enemy territory. In the Soča valley, where the Venetian Republic saw the Soča (Isonzo) river as the natural border of its territory, Venetian troops crossed the lower course of the river in an initial push and occupied 60 settlements. Although the war later spread further afield, with Venetian troops making incursions into Goriška Brda, and the areas around Tolmin and Kobarid, and even pushing as far as the Gail valley in Carinthia, Friuli remained the main theatre, home as it was to two strategically important fortresses: Palmanova (a military town built just over 20 years previously) for Venice, and Gradisca, which, as the only remaining Habsburg fortress on the right bank of the Soča, was constantly harried by Venetian forces.

Spain became militarily and diplomatically involved, and backed by the smaller Italian states, forced the Venetian Republic to disengage its troops and make peace. Peace accords prepared in Paris were confirmed in Madrid in 1617, but the war dragged on in the Istrian-Adriatic theatre into 1618. Attacks under Venice’s winged lion and the two-headed eagle of the Habsburgs only stopped when both sides were completely exhausted. Since the war in Istria did not take place in line with the normal rules of engagement for the sixteenth and seventeenth century (with clearly defined battles lines and undisturbed rear lines, as had been the case in Friuli), its consequences were lengthy and fateful for the peninsula. At the end of the war, Venetian authorities reported to their political leaders: “The war and incursions into Venetian Istria were a wasted effort, for there is nothing there to take but stones!” An overall estimate of the consequences of the attacks on the Venetian three-quarters of the peninsula assessed that 30 to 50% of the population had been killed, 60 to 90% of the houses destroyed or burned, 90 to 99.5% of livestock stolen or killed, and 90 to 98% of arable land abandoned. Emissaries of Archduke Ferdinand gave similar findings for the county of Pazin, reporting that only around 1,000 people remained living there and that war damage amounted to 434,967 florins.

In line with the peace accords, the Venetians withdrew from all settlements they had occupied during the war, while the Habsburgs destroyed the Uskoks’ ships. The Uskoks, who were forced to leave Senj for the Croatian interior, also settled in Istria, Italy, the
Žumberak/Gorjanci hills, Venetian Dalmatia and even Sicily and Naples. The border between Venice and Inner Austria remained the same as before, and there was no further change until the final fall of the Venetian Republic. Austria therefore had to wait another 100 years for free navigation of the Adriatic. Istria was economically and demographically devastated, and, in 1630/31, the coastal towns in particular were hit heavily by the plague, which also broke out on numerous other occasions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The population of Koper, for example, which was an important administrative, ecclesiastical and economic centre for the whole of Venetian Istria, fell from between 9,000 and 10,000 in the first half of the sixteenth century to just 2,310 in 1554 after several years of plague, recovering to 4,000 at the start of the seventeenth century, but declining to just 1,800 after the plague of 1631. Istria fell into a poverty unseen before or since. The authorities attempted to overcome this with a policy of intense colonisation, but the newcomers were met with hatred. This attitude to the settlers was due in part to the poor economic state, while the newcomers were offered uncultivated land and given tax relief. While the colonisation did not introduce settlers from Italy into the countryside, Italians did significantly swell the population of the coastal towns. The colonists who settled in rural areas had come from the interior of Croatian and, in part, Slovene areas, and from central Dalmatia, fleeing the Turks, as well as from Montenegrin, Albanian and Greek areas under Venetian rule. Between 1625 and 1741, the population in the 2,586 km$^2$ of Venetian Istria almost doubled. This was a faster population growth than in Slovene territory, but the population had still only returned to the 1580 level:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>People/km$^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>27.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1625</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>14.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741</td>
<td>69,415</td>
<td>26.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Habsburgs carried out similar measures in their part of Istria, bringing people in and offering them certain tax benefits, such as a six-year tax exemption. At the same time, seigneuries retained strong forms of village self-governance.

The influx of new inhabitants in the seventeenth century did not alter the predominantly Croatian character of Istria as a whole, but it did bring in a noticeably more diverse ethnic make-up.
Absolutism represented a political victory for the ruler over the provincial Estates, but it did not impinge on relations between the nobles and their bonded peasants. The opportunity offered to bonded peasants by the right of appeal to a higher court, and the order issued by Emperor Ferdinand III (1637–1657) that patrimonial courts should resolve peasants’ lawsuits more quickly were largely formal in nature. In truth, peasants did not gain any greater legal protection, nor was the arbitrary power wielded by seigneurs restricted. In fact, quite the opposite – the feudal order was gradually being consolidated, relations between feudal lords and bonded peasants were treated as a matter of private law, and the loss of a political role led the seigneurs to seek satisfaction elsewhere. In addition to the wide range of existing taxes due from bonded peasants and the various forms of farm exploitation (the seigneurs increased the former, and attempted to turn the latter to their benefit by developing their own rural commercial activities – by increasing demesne lands), the lords sought to increase their feudal revenues with further levies. In general, the burden of bonded labour increased and changed most in the east of Slovene territory (Prekmurje, lower Styria and lower Carniola), which also increased the personal dependence of peasants on their seigneur. There were fewer changes in northern and western areas (Carinthia, upper Carniola, inner Carniola and the Littoral, where bonded labour – *tlaka* – was far less common). In the seventeenth century, seigneuries in Carniola began to enforce their right to the “bonded labour typical of the province,” an attractive example for seigneuries in other provinces. This entailed bonded peasants on full farms having to be available to the lord six days a week for the entire year, except holidays. The work duties could be replaced by a monetary payment – the robotnina. Of course, the other forms of bonded labour defined in detail in the urbarial records also continued to apply. Smaller farms were supposed to have lower labour duties, in relation to their size. At the same time, the Church also began to collect a new duty in kind, which it termed the *bira* and which was due to parish priests, curates and vergers. On top of all these duties, there was also a provincial tax.

Although the obligations did differ from seigneury to seigneury and even from farm to farm, the following example illustrates the average burden placed on a bonded farm. The regular duties and obligations settled by a peasant called Jurjočič from a *župa* in Žiri to the Škofja Loka seigneury, partly in money, partly in kind and partly through bonded labour for a *grunt* (a farm) that was worth at least 740 florins, came to the following when converted into monetary equivalent, in florins (fl.) and kreutzer (kr.); 1 florin was worth 60 kreutzer:
duties, bonded labour: from 3 fl. 29 kr to 3 fl. 39 kr (and some minor duties in kind)

tithe: 7 fl.

provincial tax: 5 fl. 5 kr.

duties to church: from 1 fl. 1.5 kr. to 1 fl. 24 kr (and some minor duties in kind)

robotnina: 3 fl. 45 kr. (after 1630)

The total that a grunt farmer had to pay in 1630 ranged from 16 fl. and 35.5 kr. to 17 fl. and 8 kr. One year later, duties on the farm rose significantly from the robotnina alone, with total duties (excluding minor duties paid in kind) reaching a total of around 21 florins. This was the equivalent to approximately four times the monthly wages of an unskilled worker in Ljubljana or five times the monthly wages of a private soldier.

The bonded peasants struggled under the burden of state taxes and a major increase in the seigneurs’ demands. Only a few managed to meet these dues through additional non-agricultural work. Although the previous Turkish pressure from the south had died down, and peace was reached with Venice in the west (the military slaughter within the German empire was taking place far from the Slovene provinces), the material standing of bonded peasants deteriorated for most of the seventeenth century. This was partly due to the lack of improvements in tools and cultivation techniques. Although the state required more and more money for its military undertakings, peasants largely perceived themselves as being exploited by their direct masters rather than the state, and came increasingly into conflict with their seigneurs. Peasant unrest arose in various places around the Slovene-populated lands, most noticeably around Kočevje (from the final decades of the sixteenth century), in the county of Gorizia in the ‘first’ Tolmin revolt of 1627, and in Styria in smaller uprisings in the wider area around Ptuj.

Peasant dissatisfaction intensified in 1635 and a local revolt on the Ojstrica seigneury between Vransko and Trbovlje grew into a major ‘Slovene’ rebellion against the feudal lords. After many years of disputes between bonded peasants and their lord, the former soldier Feliks Schrattenbach, over increases in bonded labour, excessive duties, court fines, and rising state and provincial taxes, the peasants refused to fulfil their obligations. They started to join forces with bonded peasants from neighbouring seigneuries and even further afield. Unsuccessful intervention by representatives from Inner Austrian bodies, which remained in
Graz after 1619 (except the ducal chamber which moved to Vienna) as bodies of a special administrative unit, descended into an armed conflict in April 1635 between Feliks Schrattenbach and his bonded peasants. The revolt spread rapidly and violently. Until mid-May, peasants in Lower Styria robbed and burned between 35 and 70 manors, monasteries and rectories, according to contemporary sources. At the same time, peasants in Carniola destroyed tollbooths on the border between Carniola and Styria, and at Postojna. The revolt spread across most of Carniola (in the east of modern-day Gorenjska, northern Dolenjska, the Kočevje region, Bela Krajina and inner Carniola), where around 20 manors fell into the peasants’ hands. The destructive force of the rebellion covered around 15,000 km² and involved 15,000 peasants. The Styrian and Carniolan Estates responded rapidly and by mid-May had gathered a force of around 2,000 soldiers, around 1,800 of whom were grenzers (troops from the Military Border). There was great alarm among the rebels when 1,300 grenzers were sent to Styria and 500 to Carniola. As the Carniolan Estates failed to offer them sufficient pay, the grenzers began to loot villages at will, including villages that had not rebelled. After some minor clashes with peasants (Šoštanj, Leskovec pri Krškem, Pleterje and Šulentabor), the grenzers soon quashed the revolt. Towns did not become involved in the conflict between the nobility and bonded peasants, but did move to protect their interests as local conditions permitted: Slovenska Bistrica resisted an attack by the rebels, Krško, Ljubljana, Maribor and Ptuj prepared defences, Celje freed some captured rebels, while Kostanjevica and Kranj refused to protect noble possessions, while no town was prepared to receive the grenzers. After two months the revolt was completely quashed. While it took several years to repair all the damage caused by the peasants and mercenaries within the provinces, around 100 peasants paid a heavy price for the rebellion within a few months: some leaders were beheaded and quartered, others sent off as galley slaves or for forced labour in Hungary, while most of those convicted of rebellion paid a fine.

The peasant radicalism and its suppression did nothing to reduce the burden of the unbalanced social hierarchy. As the range of burdens and duties on peasants increased, disputes and smaller, local revolts continued. During the seventeenth century, the lower nobility built new, more comfortable halls and manors from the proceeds of bonded labour and levies on their peasants, and these proved far easier prey for peasant attacks in 1635 than castles built on hard-to-access heights. Luxurious sacral buildings were also common (expressing the sentiment of Ecclesia triumphans). The annual provincial tax due to the ruler, known as the Bewilligung or Contribution (around one sixth to one quarter was contributed by towns, the rest by seigneurs or bonded peasants), was fixed at four times the provincial tax.
base. There was also a new Extraordinary Contribution, which grew faster than inflation (which was only felt for a brief period in the mid-1620s). In the eighteenth century, the two direct taxes amounted to ten times the provincial tax base. In addition to these taxes, there was a range of indirect taxes, such as a poll tax, property tax, and house tax. From the second half of the seventeenth century, the imperial coffers were filled particularly by indirect taxes on meat, livestock, alcohol and similar, in addition, of course, to well-established regalian income from mines, forests, minting, customs and tolls.

In the seventeenth century, a number of new arable crops were introduced, which although not significantly improving the material position of bonded peasants, may at least have meant fewer went hungry in difficult years. They also led to greater diversity in the agrarian appearance of individual regions. Buckwheat, already known in the sixteenth century, now became established in Carniola, as did corn. Since corn arrived in Slovene territory from Italy, Hungary and Turkey, it was known as sîrk in the Gorizia area and the Gail valley, as kukurutz in Styria where it was most successful, and as turščica in lower Carniola. Corn became established faster than the potato in the eighteenth century (introduced to Slovene territory between 1730–1740), which was considered “sticky and indigestible.” In Austrian provinces, the potato, which was also known as the ‘ground apple’ or ‘underground chestnut’, did not become a regular part of people’s diet even after the major famine of 1771/1772. In a few places, it only became established in the early nineteenth century. During the seventeenth century, olive trees and vines become more important in Istria and in the county of Gorizia, where silk production also led to an increase in mulberry tree culture after 1700. In many places, particularly in the plains and along traffic routes, peasants also reared horses, since carting was one of the main non-agrarian activities of the rural population. Independently of peasant horse rearing, the breeding of a now world famous warmblood breed began in the village of Lipica in the Karst – the lipicanec or Lipizzaner. The small stud farm established in Lipica in the second half of the sixteenth century grew by the first decades of the eighteenth century into a major stud serving the army and the court.

In villages, which outwardly remained practically unchanged well into the eighteenth century, peasant crop-growing was supplemented by domestic crafts, trade, carting and transporting. The expansion of the economic space into the central Danube basin and along the northern Sava at the end of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth century, and the proclamation of Trieste and Rijeka (Fiume) as free ports in 1719 opened up new trading opportunities, which had a positive impact on the overall economy of the Slovene provinces. Economic development in villages and external economic influences led to property
stratification in the countryside and indirectly accelerated the fragmentation of farm holdings. Major changes started to appear in the social structure. Wealthier large and medium-sized farms (gruntarji and polgruntarji, or farmers with full and half-plots) increasingly had male and female servants (hlapci and dekle), the lowest rural class. In villages in wine-growing areas there were also vineyard labourers, elsewhere sub-tenants, arable farm workers without their own land, lived in their own simple cottages. The largest growth in numbers was in the class of smallholders (also referred to as cottars), a kind of semi-peasant, who largely held small pieces of formerly common land (srenja), and were generally involved in non-arable work. In some areas, the number of cottars far outstripped the number of gruntarji. Along traffic routes, there were even cottar settlements, such as Drenov Grič near Vrhnika. The social structure showed significant growth, in contrast to the generally moderate growth throughout the Early Middle Ages, as indicated by the table, which provides figures for a seigneury in the two Sora valleys:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Gruntarji</th>
<th>Polgruntarji</th>
<th>Cottars</th>
<th>Tenant farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1501</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>10,142</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>15,105</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall the number of cottar holdings probably did not exceed the number of farms during the eighteenth century. This is also reflected in the table of the social structure in the wider area of parishes within the Ljubljana diocese, which extended territorially into Carniola, Styria and partly into Carinthia (excluding parishes with a primarily urban population):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Cottars</th>
<th>Tenant farmers</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>55,054</td>
<td>19,210</td>
<td>13,934</td>
<td>7,218</td>
<td>95,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stratification of the rural population entailed significant differences in wealth. A select number of bonded peasants and freemen generated sufficient wealth to climb the social ladder. For example, Marko Oblak, a peasant’s son from the Škofja Loka seigneury, grew rich as an iron trader. In 1688 he was ennobled and 19 years later he purchased a seigneury in Postojna. Peasant freemen from the Šivic family in Vipava and Rakovec family (Raigersfeld) from Rakovica near Kranj also joined the ranks of noble seigneurs.
The Habsburg dynasty was preoccupied by the continual demands of its ravenous budget, and while planning its foreign policy, which towards the end of the Thirty Years’ War was mainly caught between the military and economic might of France and an increasingly chaotic Ottoman Empire, it had little time to consider the appalling spread of the plague between 1679 and 1683 or poor harvests at home. Like any other state, it did not forego its demands for taxes, nor did it offer even temporary reductions or exemption. These taxes were growing as a proportion of the peasant’s overall obligations, and peasant rebellions were eventually not just directed against their feudal lord, but also against state bodies. The last great peasant rebellion in Slovene territory – called the Tolmin Revolt after the provenance of its leaders – included both aspects: it originally broke out due to new indirect state taxes on wine and meat (or the extortionate methods of tax collectors), before the peasants expanded their demands to the “urbarial records” and reinstatement of *stara pravda* – the old law.

The new indirect taxes caused unrest in Tolmin from the start of the eighteenth century, and the threshold of tolerance was further reduced by disputes with the Tolmin captain, an exceptionally bad harvest, and a plague that spread through livestock. The unrest, which originally covered the surroundings of Most na Soči, had developed into a major rebellion by the end of March 1713. The trigger for the outbreak was the conduct of a tax leasor, Jakob Bandel, who had a number of people from Tolmin incarcerated, and also seized the goods they were transporting. The peasants marched on Gorizia and freed their imprisoned colleagues, destroying several tollbooths between Kanal and Kobarid and spreading the rebellion into Goriška Brda. The revolt died down several days later, before breaking out again at the end of April on a larger scale. This time, 720 peasant *soseske* or communes, covering around 2,500 km² in the Soča valley area joined the rebellion, as well as some seigneuries in Vipava valley and “the whole lower Karst towards the sea.” In this second phase of the rebellion the rebels’ demands were no longer directed only against tax collectors, but also towards existing and new taxes as well as tolls and the tollbooths. In some places (Rihemberk-Branik, Duino, Švarcenek), peasants appealed to the old urbarial records and respect for the obligations within them, but in some places they even rejected their urbarial obligations. In May, the revolt began to acquire greater dimensions, and the peasant league became more robust. In response to repeated requests from the Gorizian and Carniolan Estates for the central authority to send military assistance to quell the revolt, units from the Military Border arrived in the county of Gorizia. This was also due to claims by the Inner Austrian *Hofkammer* (court chamber) that the Idrija mine was threatened. At the beginning of June, 600 *grenzers* marched into county of Gorizia, and quelled the revolt with a sweeping
manoeuvre across the Karst and a major attack on Solkan in the middle of the month. In spring of the following year in Gorizia, eleven rebels from the Tolmin area were sentenced to death, and 150 were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths. Other participants were sentenced with a range of fines and prison sentences by their territorial courts. Some forms of peasant self-governance were later restricted in the Tolmin area, and župane and village judges who had participated in the revolt were removed.

The Tolmin Revolt was the last major peasant revolt in Slovene territory. Conflicts between the bonded peasantry and territorial lordship, which had grown over the past three centuries from resentment into numerous open rebellions, not only in Slovene territory, but throughout the entire German empire and further afield in Europe, still occurred in the eighteenth century. However, in Slovene territory, the disputing parties settled their differences in court more often than before, and only rarely did local disagreements spread into wider revolt.

**MERCHANTS AND TOWNS**

During the seventeenth century, the increasingly centralised state still did not have an effective and planned economic policy capable of filling the state treasury, and there was no real concern as to where money came from or how it was raised. All that mattered was that as much money for the ruler’s political and military plans came into the state treasury as quickly as possible. The emperor attempted to replace the fall in revenues caused by the major collapse of southern German capital, the Thirty Years’ War, restricted trading links with German Protestant provinces and the emigration of rich Protestant burghers and nobility at the end of the 1620s, by improving connections between his hereditary lands and northern Italian regions. Capital was still not lacking, however, in an otherwise economically weakened region. The possibilities offered by Slovene territory were well exploited by Italian merchants and trading companies. The (Catholic) Italian traders gradually dominated and controlled almost the entire market. In return for advance payments, the ruler leased them some of his monopoly rights over major import and export activities and products. The export of mercury, beef, wax, honey, linen, timber from the county of Gorizia and the import of sea salt, tobacco, English and French cloth, and various Dutch goods were all under *appalto* contracts (leased monopolies).

The most important and lucrative *appalto* until the late seventeenth century was the export of mercury from Idrija. After 1670, trade in mercury returned to state control, but, in
practice, similar or even the same forms of leasing trade and the mine continued. These were particularly common when, at the turn of the century, the Habsburg court took out large loans from trading houses and bankers in Amsterdam. Throughout this period, large profits flowed into the pockets of foreign capitalists and the state treasury, while the Habsburg court’s debt prevented even Idrija from being developed. Only in the second half of the eighteenth century did the town begin to significantly advance economically and culturally, when economic reforms led to the modernisation of the mine, and the production and sale of mercury had increased significantly by the end of the century. With 3,600 inhabitants, Idrija began to appear more like a town; it had well-developed professional and general education schools, and also built a theatre, which is now the oldest remaining theatre in Slovenia. Women in the town took on and developed the existing skills of fine lace-making from the area.

Trade in sea salt was also very important. Although restricted due to the Styrian salt mine at Aussee, which was owned by the prince, it did reach as far as the Drava, taking in most Slovene-populated territory. Unlike trade in mercury, which involved financial interests spread throughout Europe, trade in sea salt remained domestic, though it did cover a large proportion of the population. Production costs of the salt, which came mainly from the salt pans of Venetian Istria, and to a lesser extent those of Trieste, were low and enormous amounts were distributed and consumed. Personal salt use even for the lowest classes was around eight kilos a year, and it was used to enliven a rather monotonous diet based on polenta and kasha dishes, and cooked vegetables. A very common use of salt was in preserving meat. The sea salt trade, which often did break through the ‘Drava salt border’, offered significant earnings for peasant-carters given the large amounts involved. For this reason, the many attempts to monopolise the salt trade and offer it as an appalto to individual Italian merchants (1609/10, 1625) were met by serious peasant unrest. In 1634, the trade was given as an appalto to the Estates, which significantly increased its price. Attempts to monopolise the salt market led to large-scale smuggling, which ensured that the salt appalti never lasted long. In 1661, the emperor abolished the salt appalto, but the salt from state warehouses was still more expensive than the salt from Venetian Istria, which ensured smuggling continued for some time.

Significant numbers of people were involved in the production of iron and iron products. Foundries, which were built in many places in Slovene territory, were run by foundry companies, as cottage industries, and by individual entrepreneurs, which were primarily foreign. The most important foundries were in Carniola, in Bohinj, Kropa, Kamna Gorica, Železniki, Tržič, Javornik and Jesenice. Iron production, which was mainly linked to
the Italian market, depended on traders and cottage industry suppliers. The same applied to
many of the rural craft industries, which produced far in excess of domestic demand. Linen-
making was particularly strong in the Škofja Loka seigneury, sieve-making in some villages
around Kranj, and leather-making (known as kordovansko usnje, taking its name from
Cordoba in Spain) in Tržič, while the production of wooden and ceramic products flourished
around Kočevje and Ribnica. Rifle-making developed in Ferlach (Borovlje), one of the
centres supplying the army with weapons. At the end of the seventeenth century, over 200
master craftsmen were producing up to 45,000 firearms per year.

Every stratum of society was involved in trade, though naturally the returns were
shared on a clear hierarchical basis. The more the profit, the loftier and more exclusive the
group of people involved. Only a few major wholesaler-traders had the means to organise
wholesale import and export trade over large distances, and they were mainly foreigners. The
major capitalists of their day, whose business differed significantly from other merchants in
terms of scale and methods, were involved in a wide range of deals and were capable of
investing significant initial capital in new projects. From the second half of the seventeenth
century, they began to settle permanently in Slovene territory. To avoid control by towns and
the constrictive organisation of trade guilds, they did not initially wish to become burghers
(and if they were burghers, tried to acquire special status). Generally they acquired noble
status, purchasing feudal estates and, despite retaining their wholesale trade, managed to
acquire special diplomas that enabled them to avoid the restrictions placed on most town
residents. Some of these figures, such as Caharija Waldreich (1623–1682) of Augsburg, Jakob
Schell from the Tyrol (1652–1715), or Peter Anton Codelli (1660–1727) and Michelangelo
Zois (1694–1777), both from Bergamo, grew extremely rich from wholesale trade (wheat,
linen, cattle, oil, cloth, iron, cotton, and other products and goods), mining, foundry work, and
by supplying cottage industries, and to a lesser extent by supplying the Military Border. They
were the first to gain major fortunes in Slovene territory, and were worth from several
hundred thousand to millions of florin. These large fortunes allowed wholesaler-merchants to
augment their capital by becoming involved in money trading. Banking at that time covered
exchange transactions, lending to individuals and Provincial Estates and performing
transactions on their behalf, and lending to the emperor. In addition to direct returns on their
money from interest, creditors ensured repayment by taking control of, or recovering revenues
from, various provincial and state tolls, taxes and surtaxes. In Gorizia and Trieste, Jewish
moneylenders were also involved in lending and surety transactions, but their activities were
largely restricted to less wealthy members of society. The Jewish communities grew in
number due to economic development (reaching almost 1,000 by the mid-eighteenth century in Trieste), but from the end of the seventeenth century they were forced to live in a ghetto.

The competition for the expensive loans offered by the Jewish moneylenders (interest rates were 15 to 20%) came from loans offered by credit institutions, known as montes pietatis, founded on Italian lines. These appeared in Trieste (1641) and Rijeka (1657), and offered cheaper rates.

The business of town traders generally did not extend beyond the bounds of their local market. Their earnings were therefore threatened by the wholesalers, who used cottage industry systems to promote rural crafts, as well as manor-based and rural trading. The ordinances restricting rural trade and crafts that had been issued for centuries led to a similar patent in the eighteenth century (1737). Yet now, the mercantilist policy of the state meant it was no longer in its interest to restrict the peasant trade and craft enterprise that were developing outside the monopolistic urban associations – the guilds (cehi). Town tradespeople therefore closed ranks even further within the guilds during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. This led to a series of smaller towns and market towns becoming more rural (Radovljica, Metlika, Črnomelj, Kostanjevica, Višnja Gora), and plunged others into serious decline (Villach, Celje, Novo Mesto). Fires and epidemics also contributed to their downfall. Larger towns were not affected by rural trade, and were able to take over some of the trade previously controlled by the smaller towns. An overview of the social structure of a larger town – which changed slowly but consistently over time with increasing specialisation of work – is provided by a census of heads of families or heads of household, who paid a tax (mesni krajcar) on the slaughter of livestock in 1706 in Ljubljana:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nobility</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clergy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doctors</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public officials</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merchants</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tradespeople</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catering</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fishing</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farming</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day labourers</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>servants to nobility</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paupers</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men without a vocation</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women without a vocation</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,509</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Towns in which burghers represented around one tenth of the population, and half or more of the population with their family members included, tended to grow slowly, retaining a similar population for several decades, unless other factors caused a population decline. They were relatively small compared with towns around Europe at the time. Around 1700, Ljubljana had a population of about 7,500 while eighty years later it was a little under 10,000. Over the same period, Trieste initially had up to 6,500 inhabitants, but as a faster-developing town and an important transit and trading centre it had reached almost 11,000 (or 20,000 including its surroundings) by the 1780s. Gorizia and Klagenfurt had between 4,000 and 5,000 inhabitants around 1700, and between 9,000 and 10,000 by 1780. Other towns were significantly smaller, generally counting between 600 and 1,700 inhabitants, but some had even fewer. In 1780, around 900,000 people lived in the territory of present-day Slovenia, but only up to 6% of them lived in non-village settlements with over 1,000 inhabitants.

The Habsburg monarchy’s military successes and territorial gains at Turkey’s expense were a major factor in the more dynamic trade from the end of the seventeenth century. At the
same time, there was a growing conviction of the need to introduce mercantilist principles to the economy. Yet the introduction of an economic policy intended to ensure higher state revenues by generating a surplus of exports over imports (achieved mainly from the products of cottage industries), demanded peace and genuine power for the sovereign. Emperor Leopold I (1657–1705) had been victorious against the Ottoman Empire in the ‘war of Vienna’ (1683–1699), but his standing army continually placed the state on the brink of financial collapse. He subsequently became involved in war on two fronts: against the French in the west, and against Hungarians in a more internal dispute in the east.

In the west Leopold was in conflict with France for almost the entire duration of his reign, and war broke out due to French designs on the Spanish throne and territories along the Rhine, and French support for the anti-Austrian policy of the Hungarian prince, Imre Thököly, and for Turkey, with the death of the last Spanish Habsburg, King Charles II launching the lengthy War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714). In Hungary, the absolutist tendencies of the Viennese court led to continual open rebellions and conspiracies among the domestic nobility. One conspiracy, known as the Zrinski-Frankopan conspiracy after the two Croatian nobles who played a leading role among the plotters, also involved the Styrian seigneur, Erazem Tattenbach, and the Gorizian magnate, Karel Thurn Valsassina. At the start of the War of Spanish Succession, a new struggle against the Habsburgs’ absolutist rule broke out. The long-lasting ‘kuruc’ peasant uprising now grew into a fight to restore the Estates constitution (1703–1711). After Austrian troops won a series of battles against the rebel units of Ferenc Rákóczi, a peace agreement was reached and Habsburg authority re-established, but not on absolutist lines. By the time the revolt in Hungary had been put down, there was no longer any possibility of retaining or acquiring the Spanish crown. Concerned that the Habsburgs would be too powerful if they acquired Spain and her overseas colonies, two of Austria’s allies (England and the Netherlands) had moved to maintain the balance of power in Europe and drawn up a preliminary peace with France, allowing the grandson of King Louis XIV to ascend to the Spanish throne as Philip V. Given the fragmented nature of its possessions in Italy, Germany and on the territory of the former Spanish Netherlands (present-day Belgium and Luxembourg), the centre of gravity of the central, contiguous Austrian lands, and with it Austrian policy, moved southeast and north – towards Turkey and Poland.

During the final two decades of Leopold’s reign, and the era of his reform-oriented son, Joseph I (1705–1711), Habsburg policy increasingly sought to unite all the possessions of the dynasty’s Austrian branch into a unitary whole. One expression of this desire was the introduction in 1711 of the name the ‘Austrian Monarchy’ (Monarchia Austriaca) to official
documents. This was followed two years later by the ‘Pragmatic Sanction’. This document affirmed the ruling Austrian dynasty’s right of inheritance to the territories it ruled. It laid down the indivisibility of the lands in line with the system of primogeniture, and now permitted female succession. Emperor Charles VI (1711–1740), who bore the name Charles III as the unsuccessful claimant of the Spanish throne, worked to ensure recognition for the Pragmatic Sanction throughout his reign. During the 1720s, it was adopted by all the hereditary Habsburg kingdoms and provinces (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Gorizia in 1720), while the emperor used diplomatic wheeling and dealing to obtain assurances from major European powers that they would respect the Pragmatic Sanction. However, when Charles VI, the last male of the Habsburg dynasty, died, arms once more decided the value and international recognition of the Sanction. Even before it had seen off the Hungarian revolt and before the War of the Spanish Succession concluded, the struggle for control of the Pannonian Plain had been settled: Austria succeeded in forcing Turkey out of the central Danube basin. Despite the great eighteenth century wars against the Ottoman Empire – in 1716–1718 Austria’s main permanent gains included the Banat and eastern Srem, while in the wars of 1737–1739 and 1788–1791 it was unsuccessful – the military and political balance in the Balkans was maintained. The Austrian Monarchy became one of the great powers of Europe. Together with the growing force of Russia, it was most influential in resolving the ‘Eastern question’. It could maintain this position, and at the same protect the dynasty’s place on the throne, not only through skilful diplomacy and various, even changing, alliances, but also via the economic power that provided the material basis for sufficient numbers of troops.

The reforming plans of the early Enlightenment figure, Emperor Joseph I, to improve administration and the plight of bonded peasants, had stagnated under the rule of Charles VI, but the state did start to become more actively involved in the economy. Major colonisation, and drainage, irrigation and similar projects were started in the population-depleted areas Austria had conquered during its wars with Turkey. In 1717, Charles VI proclaimed freedom of navigation on the Adriatic, and two years later Trieste and Rijeka (Fiume) became free ports. The same year (1719), the Oriental Company was founded in Vienna, and as a joint-stock company under the emperor’s protection had a large monopoly over establishing cottage industry manufacturing and unrestricted trade with Turkey. The state’s mercantilist measures also required better transport and communications via the provinces. Redirecting most Balkan trade towards Central Europe required stronger economic and transport connections for territories stretching from the Banat to Vienna and Trieste. The road network had been completely neglected and was only really suitable for freight transport; construction or
improvement of roads was generally only a response to special circumstances, such as preparing a more comfortable ride for the imperial coach and his entourage on a visit to Ljubljana in 1660. Charles VI ordered the preparation of a new road base, which significantly improved roads in the eighteenth century. Various classes of road were defined, along with their method of construction and quality. The most important were the ‘main commercial roads’ which were primarily aimed at providing access to the free ports, though they also influenced the development of a number of towns. Several such roads passed through Slovene territory. One led via Graz, Maribor, Celje and Ljubljana to Postojna, where it split into branches towards Trieste and Rijeka. The second main commercial road ran from Ljubljana to Villach (via the Korensko Sedlo pass), and the third to Klagenfurt (via Ljubelj). The improvement of roads also influenced the development of a civil postal service, with regular mail first carried by couriers (on foot and on horse) between Ljubljana and Vienna in 1573. The postal service later expanded towards Venice and towards Karlovac, which was a major centre in the Military Border. By the mid-eighteenth century, the postal service was already running passenger carriages, which marked the start of regular passenger transport. Connecting the fertile Pannonian flatlands with Trieste also required work to make water routes navigable. In 1735, obstacles were removed from the Sava river, and embankments built so that boats could be pulled upstream. Mercantilist initiatives had a positive impact on economic development, and during the 1720s the first cottage industry ‘manufactories’ began to appear. The first era truly marked by mercantilist policy (also known as Cameralism due to the strong state influence over the economy) was the period after the death of Emperor Charles VI, when his daughter, Maria Theresa (1740–1780) ruled the Austrian Monarchy.

A GOLDEN ERA OF CULTURE AND THE GROWTH OF SUPERSTITION

In contrast to the slow economic development, it seems that spiritual creativity began to take off in the second half of the seventeenth century in Slovene territory, as the Baroque period – which symbolised the victory of confessional absolutism over the Reformation – started to pervade all areas of cultural life and creativity, connecting them with the wider European space. While Slovene territory began to subscribe to Italian artistic influence, the mindset of those embodying aristocratic culture remained fixed on northern, and primarily German and Central European, forms and ideas. The region’s openness to influences from the west and north, of course, involved accepting new social values and manners. Italian was widely spoken among the upper classes until the end of the seventeenth century, but later only
remained as a common language of discourse among the social elite in the county of Gorizia. The status of German was consolidated and began to spread beyond the bounds of upper class speech through its establishment in literary and ‘scientific’ works, although these areas remained for a time predominantly the domain of Latin. Lifestyles and culinary culture began to develop, French and German fashions influenced the style of dress, and hygiene and health habits also began to change. During this period all social classes were involved in extreme forms of superstition, i.e. beliefs in demonic forces, the devil and vešče (the word, derived from the word for ‘knowing’ denoted an evil water nymph, but was also the Slovene term commonly used for women accused of witchcraft in sources of the time).

Theatrical performances became more common, and in addition to the Passion processions and plays, students of the Jesuit college in Ljubljana began to perform to wide sections of society. The Igra o paradižu (Paradise Play), which the students wrote themselves in Slovene, based on foreign works or even on oral tradition, was frequently performed outside of their collegiate environment between 1657 and 1670. In 1660, Ljubljana’s amateur dramaticists demonstrated their familiarity with modern theatrical trends before the emperor, putting on what the head of the imperial entourage described as a “very entertaining and most pleasant light musical comedy.” Italian theatre groups travelling from Venice to Vienna would stop in Ljubljana, and from 1653 onwards German theatre companies also began to visit. Performances were held in the palazzi of wealthy nobles or the town hall more and more often, and in the eighteenth century one could almost talk of a theatre season, with increasing popularity confirmed by the construction of a theatre in Ljubljana in 1765.

The arrival of foreigners with a wide range of professions and expertise, and an increasing number of domestically educated officials, increased the openness of the social elite to education and science. In a book on the proper upbringing of young nobles printed in 1659, Adam Sebastjan Siezenheimb, a Carniolan Estates official, wrote that science was “the most suitable means of achieving elevated thought and heightening one’s observation, of understanding God’s omnipotence, and of serving the homeland, advising and aiding one’s neighbour, of overcoming life’s difficulties and filling youth with joy and the elderly with honour.” This idea – in line, of course, with the times – matched ideas about noble life developed in the early decades of the sixteenth century by Baldassare Castiglione in his celebrated and widely read Il Cortegiano (The Book of the Courtier). The ideal noble should master military skills, have a humanist and rhetorical education, and conduct himself among people with an ethical approach appropriate to his class. A college founded in Ljubljana at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Collegium Carolinum Nobilium) was intended to endow
sons of the local nobility with this balance of physical and spiritual attributes, which allegedly distinguished nobles from the rising non-noble urban middle classes. The libraries now found in many noble homes reflected the growing erudition of the nobility, and its knowledge of the diversity of the world and current events. In contrast to the almost completely illiteracy among the rural and most of the urban population – at the end of the eighteenth century, no more than 30,000 people (3–4%) in the Slovene territories could read – the nobility generally were literate, and bilingual or even trilingual, and this applied to both men and women. However, most libraries (possessed by over half of the nobles in Carniola in the second half of the seventeenth and at the start of the eighteenth century) were small and somewhat limited in content. Exceptions – and indeed they were exceptional – included the library of the Auerspergs’ (Turjačani) in Ljubljana, with 7,000 volumes, and the library of Baron Janez Vajkard Valvasor in his castle Bogenšperk, which already numbered around 10,000 books by the end of the seventeenth century, with a similar number of graphical works when it came into the ownership of the diocese of Zagreb. By normal standards, a very large library would contain between 100 and 200 books, while most had fewer than fifty. The content of books indicates that the nobility in Slovene territory – as in other Habsburg lands – were not generally interested in the findings of modern natural science, which undermined the established view of the world and drastically reassessed the human position within it. The nobility were far more inclined towards the travel literature of the day, featuring descriptions of foreign climes and their features. The shelves also included prayer books and the Bible, of course, as well as books on medical herbs for people and horses. An important and hence frequently reprinted book was the Landhandfesten (collections of the Estates’ privileges), which affirmed the nobility as the heart of the Land or province and fostered self-confidence in response to the growing absolutist tendencies of the state, making it a standard work for libraries of the day. As a small stratum of society representing just 1% of the entire population in Slovene territory, the nobility also saw the broadly conceived publications that presented the individual provinces as affirmation of their role. As expressions of provincial patriotism, though also including early calls to a wider Austrian patriotism, these works of local interest formed a natural part of noble culture at that time.

In addition to individual chronicles maintained by some monasteries and towns in manuscript form, there were also genealogies of ruling and local noble dynasties. The topographical and cartographic work started between 1601 and 1605 by the Augustinian monk, Ivan Klobučarić (Clobučarić), in response to military initiatives and needs, was of particular interest. Many of his sketches represent the earliest illustration of places in Slovene
territory, with other examples including the views of settlements and fortifications by the military engineer, Giovanni Pieroni, completed in around 1639. Large, illustrated albums with over a hundred depictions of towns, market towns, monasteries and castles were produced for Carniola, Carinthia and Styria in the second half of the seventeenth century, and were later reprinted and expanded. The first two topographical works (*Topographia Ducatus Carnioliae modernae*, 1679, and *Topographia archiducatus Carinthiae modernae*, 1681) were produced by Valvasor’s copper-plate engraving workshop, while a third (*Topographia Ducatus Stiriae*), was published in 1681, by the workshop of George Matthäus Vischer. The cartography of the day reached its peak some time later in the work of Ivan Dizma Florjančič (Florianschitsch), who produced the first map of Carniola in 1744.

Historiographical development, which was influenced by previous advances in humanist and linguistic knowledge, was not only the fruit of its writers’ academically inclinations, but also an expression of the milieu to which the authors belonged. In historiographic terms, this led to the predominance of German humanist approaches, in contrast to the Slavic humanist historical writing found in Poland, Bohemia, Dalmatia and elsewhere. Writers tended to aggrandise the nations they belonged to or identified with, exaggerating the extent of their homelands and making other such claims. In Inner Austria, writers followed the lead of German historians, and conceived the history of their own province as part of the history of the German empire. Slavs, in this case Slovenes, were therefore seen as Germans who spoke two languages. Histories expressed a German orientation and the concept of the *Land* or province, which matched the desire to promote the rights and role of the provincial nobility. One major historical work of the seventeenth century was the *Annales Carinthia* (I–II, Leipzig 1612), published by Hieronim Megiser (1554/55–c.1619) under his own name, but written by Michael Gotthard Christalnick (1530/40–1595), a Carinthian preacher and historian, which was directly linked to the Protestant period. A work by the Gorizian Jesuit, Martin Bauzer (1595–1668), *Historia rerum Noricarum et Foroiuliensium* (A History of Noricum and Friuli), remained unprinted but has proved of enduring value for its descriptions of events in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The theological and historical works of the widely known Mariologist, Janez Ludvik Schönleben (1618–1681), also recorded the era. One noteworthy work among the numerous Latin and German books and manuscripts written by Schönleben in the fields of rhetoric, theology, philosophy, and history is an adaptation of Čandek’s lectionary. Published in 1672, it was the first book printed in Slovene for fifty-seven years. Schönleben’s more notable historical works included one on ancient Emona (*Aemona vindicata*, Salzburg 1674), which was the
first archaeological work ever in Slovene territory, and *Carniola antiqua et nova*, of which only the first volume was published, in Ljubljana in 1681. The latter remained unfinished, and was a history, presented in annal form, reaching up to 1000. Schönleben’s expansive overview of his Carniolan homeland’s past, which was a work of local ‘polymathy’, was ‘inherited’ and fully developed in his own work by Janez Vajkard Valvasor (1641–1693).

Valvasor’s family line was from the surroundings of Bergamo, but his grandfather had already become a Carniolan noble and a member of the Carniolan Estates at the beginning of the seventeenth century. After a Jesuit education in Ljubljana, Valvasor, as befitted a young noble, gained experience and knowledge in military service and on travels that far outdid the typical, fashionable study tours of high-born sons. As an inquisitive man of his day, he was interested in the natural world, in art, mathematics and physics, but also in alchemy and magic, and attained a level of knowledge and wisdom that was far broader than the norm for his surroundings. After over ten years of travelling around Europe and northern Africa, he set up an engraving workshop at his castle, Bogenšperk, in the heart of Carniola, and started published artistic and topographical works. His enormous appetite for investigation and research led him to produce a plan for a tunnel below Ljubelj, to invent a special method of bronze casting, and to describe the natural phenomenon of the intermittent, ‘disappearing’ Lake Cerknica, which gained him the honour of an invitation to join the prestigious Royal Society in London. Provincial patriotism and the recognition that almost no one abroad knew anything of his homeland, “as though this most praiseworthy duchy was only a small and unknown part of European land without beautiful cities and decorous castles, which cannot be compared to other lands,” led him to plan and implement an ambitious plan: to describe, with the help of colleagues, every aspect of Carniola, and present it in images and maps. In 1689, his 3,532-page masterpiece was published in Nuremberg: *The Glory of the Duchy of Carniola* (*Die Ehre Dess Hertzogthums Crain*). In this ‘encyclopaedia’ of much of present-day Slovenia and its surroundings (the book was not limited to Carniola, and included parts of Istria and the Littoral, Carinthia and a general description of Croatia and the Military Border), Valvasor presented a most illustrative depiction of the second half of the seventeenth century, which established his views and outlook in the ideas of later generations. Valvasor, as a man of the ‘pen and sword’ embodied the ideal noble, but unfortunately no one truly emulated him. A unique response to the provincial patriotism that had included Trieste in Carniola was a form of exaggerated local pride or campanilism that led indirectly to the first histories written in of Trieste (1698). Valvasor’s creativity represented the highpoint and the end of such ambitiously broad polymathic literature. There was no real link with the intellectual elite that
appeared at the end of the seventeenth century, though, perhaps one can speak of Valvasor as a herald of the emerging empirical spirit, opposed to scholasticism, and embodied in an educated noble, ecclesiastical and upper-middle class elite – largely educated in Italian universities and under Italian spiritual influences – that represented a form of opposition to the Jesuit monopoly over culture.

Following the example of the Accademia dell’Arcadia in Rome, dei Gelati in Bologna and other learned Italian societies, the chronicler, historian and lawyer Janez Gregor Dolničar (Thalnitscher) (1655–1719) and the cathedral provost, Janez Krstnik Prešeren became leaders of Ljubljana’s intellectual elite, founding a similar society in 1693 called Academia Operosorum Labacensium (The Workers’ Academy of Ljubljana). One of the main aims of the 13 lawyers, 6 theologians and 4 doctors who joined the society at its official convening in 1701 was, as written in the academy’s charter, to publish “the Ljubljana academy’s learned discussions on theology, jurisprudence, medicine, civics ...” The number of Academy members grew, reaching 42 by 1714, including respected foreigners such as the Italian poet and literary historian, Giovanni Mario Crescimbeni, and Valvasor’s colleague, the Croatian writer and scholar, Pavao Ritter Vitezović. The work of Academy members, and others operating outside its circle, was diverse and distinct from their artistic and scientific or academic predecessors. Artistic literary production, inspired by Classical and Renaissance themes, generally hid its lack of artistic merit behind baroque and long-winded rhetoric. The most notable scientific essays included work by Academy members, including Janez Gregor Dolničar on history, Janez Štefan Florijančič (Floriantschitsch von Grienfeld) on economics, and the doctor, Marko Grbec (Gerbezius) on medicine. Mention must also be made of essays by non-members of the society of ‘operosi’, such as Wolfgang Andrej Vidmayer, who wrote on health, and the work of Baron Franc Albert Pelzhoffer on politics. The Academy closed for a variety of reasons in 1725.

The writings of the Academy members, which were printed in Latin, with some also in Slovene and German, primarily at the newly established Ljubljana printing house (after printers’ shops were founded in Trieste and Klagenfurt in the first half of the seventeenth century, Ljubljana had to wait until 1678 until it regained a printing workshop), were of a higher intellectual quality than those produced by the Jesuit schools. However, the society was unable to shake the Jesuits’ ideological grip on knowledge and study. The plan for a university in Ljubljana therefore envisaged a Jesuit university with theology and philosophy faculties; physics, to be taught under philosophy, would comprise only Aristotelian physics adapted to Jesuit views (this was taught as a subject at the Ljubljana Jesuit college after
Nevertheless, Academy members did lay long-lasting foundations for cultural development. In 1701, the Academy founded the first public study library in Carniola with donated books. Twenty years later, this became the property of the diocese of Ljubljana and constituted a part of the seminary library. A philharmonic academy (Academia Philharmonicorum) was founded at the end of 1701, largely due to the efforts of the musician and servant of the Carniolan Estates, Johann Berthold von Hoffer (1667–1718). Its aim was to improve the social life of the elite, and – according to its charter – “with occasional playing, devotionally call to mind the divine music that will play for evermore.” However, a planned fine arts academy (Academia incultorum) did not come to life. The Academia Operosorum itself, however, carefully promoted fine arts to the extent that it was responsible for successfully establishing the Italian Baroque in Slovene territory. In addition to Graz, which followed artistic trends from Central Europe and directed them into its own Styrian surroundings, Ljubljana also became an artistic centre, largely, however, channelling Italian influences. After 1700, the town was remodelled in Baroque splendour by northern Italian master-builders, painters and sculptors, aided by local master craftsmen. Ljubljana then became a conduit for Baroque influence, reaching into its surroundings, and further afield to Carinthia, Styria and Croatia. Baroque was accepted as an artistic style in ecclesiastical circles, and among the nobility and burgher class, as well as taking root in popular art in the countryside. Yet Baroque as a way of life also went hand in hand with an imagination far more obsessed with the fear of witches and magic than in the preceding age.

Alongside gradual economic, cultural, and intellectual growth, social reality was framed largely by processes such as the stratification of rural areas, the imposition of political absolutism, the weakening of the Estates’ authority, efforts by ecclesiastical and secular powers to fully re-Catholicise the Austrian crownlands, and the social elite more actively dictating moral standards. The elite saw the ordinary, peasant population, and particularly their customs relating to human and natural fertility, as openly immoral. After the Thirty Years’ War ended, these social processes were joined by a growth in the number of marginalised people, such as vagrants, beggars and highwaymen disturbing the life of individual provinces. They frequently organised themselves into beggars’ associations and robber gangs. The county of Gorizia was subject to robbery by individuals and gangs, primarily from Venetian territory, while other gangs operated in every part of Carniola: prominent groups moved into inner Carniola from Istria, Uskoks were ‘in charge’ of lower Carniola where they were known as hajduki, while the best known outlaw in upper Carniola in the second half of the seventeenth century was Janez Košir, known as ‘Hudi Ključec’ (the
Cunning Bandit, or Evil Conniver), whose gang also roamed through Carinthia and Styria. The robbers were equally heartless to all classes of the population. There was no ‘social banditry’, intended to harm only feudal lords, rich burghers or officials, nor did any ‘noble criminals’, robbing from the rich and giving to the poor appear anywhere during the Baroque era. According to the understandings of the world from Christian or Church viewpoints – a world of contrasts in which the devil played a visible role – all serious evil was ascribed to women.

Large-scale persecutions of witches (male as well as female) took place in Slovene territory in the second half of the seventeenth century, even more intense than the previous wave in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and a later outbreak after 1700. In Styria, the main focus of the witch trials was in the wine-growing districts of Slovenske Gorice and Haloze. Trials before the courts in Ormož, Ptuj, Ljutomer, Maribor, Radgona and Hrastovec were particularly numerous. In Carniola, where, as Valvasor wrote in 1689 in the *Glory of the Duchy of Carniola*, “little old harridans” were often “burnt and many were seated upon white-hot stools, but they could not entirely wipe out the vermin,” most of the main trials and investigations were held in Škofja Loka, Ljubljana, Ribnica, Cerknica, in the village of Bočkovo pri Ložu – where apparently all the villagers were killed – and in the Kočevoje and Krškosp areas. At the same time as in Styria and Carniola, persecutions of witches were taking place in Carinthia, where the main centres were in Pliberk, Ženek, Humberk and Rožek. The defendants, aged from 5 to 80, and exclusively from the lowest strata of society, were accused of acts that they generally could not have committed: they allegedly ‘summoned’ hail, caused cattle to die, gave people diseases and caused them to die, met and had sexual relations with the devil, and so on. The commoners accused, who were probably extremely frightened, and of course lacking eloquence on spiritual matters, found themselves brought before an educated official, well versed in the law. One man usually served as prosecutor, interrogator and judge. The most consistent and influential proponent of persecuting witchcraft in the Austrian crownlands was Christoph Fröhlich von Fröhlichsburg, a professor of law at Innsbruck university at the end of the seventeenth and start of the eighteenth century. Among the cruelest judges of that time – indeed, each province had judges whose cruelty in the interrogation process stood out – was Janez Jurij Hočevar (Gottscheer), a doctor of law, otherwise an astronomer and composer and member of the Academia Operosorum, with the suggestive academic name, Candidus (Pure).

Existing legislation provided the basis for the witch trials. While a frequently reprinted book entitled *The Hammer of Witches* (*Malleus maleficarum*, 1487) was a manual on how to
deal with people accused of witchcraft, the legal basis for the trials was found in the penal code of Charles V (*Constitutio criminalis Carolina*), issued in 1532 and applicable throughout the German empire. A suspicion, that was usually enough to start an investigation against someone, had to be backed with evidence. The actual existence of witchcraft and witches, their evil deeds and purposes, and the link with the devil, was proven most convincingly by the confessions of suspects. Confession, according to an old medieval principle, was the ‘king of all evidence’, and could be obtained by extremely cruel methods of interrogation. In Styria, the witch-hunters even invented a special form of ‘witch stool’, a torture device on which many went mad from the pain and died. Torture was a constituent part of the judicial process; a calculated, incremental torture led to the victim’s confession, which opened the path to their execution. The public condemnation of ‘witches’ ‘exorcised’ the victims of their crime, and in reality served as one form of social discipline inflicted by the complicit ecclesiastical and lay authorities. From the second decade of the eighteenth century onwards, the witch-hunting zeal, which claimed around 400 executed victims from 1655 to 1715, started to relent. The witch trials became less frequent, methods of torture were no longer used in interrogation, appeals benches would also sit, and only exceptionally was anyone put to death. The last witch trial in Slovene territory, which ended in the accused being released, took place before the territorial court in Gornja Radgona in 1746. Superstition was gradually displaced by rationalism, at least among state officials. Maria Theresa issued an order in 1766 that a witch trial could only start with her personal permission. The penal code issued two years later (*Constitutio criminalis Theresiana*) still allowed for the possibility of prosecuting witches and brutal torture, but the empress repealed that section of the code in 1776.

The state’s views on the aberrant superstitions of the first decades of the eighteenth century already indicate the arrival of a new mindset that could only envisage the exercise and protection of its political interests within a profound political and economic reform of the Austrian Monarchy. The start of Maria Theresa’s rule ushered in a period that, of course, did not abolish the world of paupery, poverty, and social disadvantage, or eradicate fear and superstition from most of the population, but the reforms that flowed from her court, and that of her son, Joseph II, broke the link with the old and ossified Estates-based understanding of the function and administration of the state. Instead the Monarchy entered the era of Theresian-Josephin reform, which in the broadest sense is known as the Enlightenment, and more narrowly defined by the form of rule – enlightened or legal absolutism.
“Will not academy members, since all of them work only in accordance with their own reason, be captured by this powerful and alluring knowledge, directed in part towards an understanding of the future? Will they not be captured by this knowledge of things from their very origins onwards, and be carried along so forcefully that soon, each in line with his own reason and vocation, they will investigate the very rarest of things, taking these from darkness into the light and making them available to all, for their own pleasure and that of others?”

This rhetorical question, posed at the turn of the century (1701) by Janez Štefan Florjančič in a grandiloquent speech at a public presentation of the Academia Operosorum in Ljubljana, seemingly offers some very bold promises. Apparent in these words lauding reason, knowledge and education, understanding and investigation, and the experience it produces, and the accessibility of this knowledge, are many elements of the empiricism and rationalism that became established in western Europe during the seventeenth century. However, well into the eighteenth century, the influence of these two systems of thought, the basis for a new age of ideas in Europe (the Enlightenment, generally agreed to have started in the true sense in England and France around 1700), was, at least in Slovene-populated areas, less than overwhelming, and did not generate any intellectual breakthroughs capable of penetrating the dazzling darkness of Baroque.

For the first time, though, there was a lengthy period with a concentrated intellectual elite on the domestic scene, indeed gathered in one place, as a whole range of works on a vast variety of subjects was brought from the ‘darkness’ into the ‘light’ as lawyers formed a society, physicians and surgeons formed a fraternity, and the openness of Latin discourse in these and elsewhere enabled the establishment of the first public library. Nevertheless, the academic disciplines, including philosophy in particular, failed to go beyond a scholastic understanding of their subject. A science limited to a narrow circle of people or even individuals only served to bolster Baroque culture. The circle of Ljubljana operosi also gained some influence over a society dominated by highly charged emotionalism and confessional absolutism through their artistic endeavours. Ljubljana was growing in importance as a provincial and transit centre at the start of the eighteenth century and became the cultural centre from which Baroque art was promulgated to a wider area. The development to a mature Baroque style required the presence of foreign artists.

Ljubljana was without doubt the focus in Slovene-populated lands of the Baroque golden age that encompassed every province of the monarchy. The town became urbanised
and lost its rural appearance. The sacral and secular Baroque architecture that now began to characterise Ljubljana, as well as spreading elsewhere in Carniola, was led by the Roman architect Andrea Pozzo (responsible for the cathedral, 1701–1706), the Venetian Domenico Rossi, Girolamo Frigimelico (a member of the artistic circle in Padua), as well as Candido Zuliani and the Friulian architect Carlo Martinuzzi. The leading Slovene was Gregor Maček (responsible for reconstructing the town hall, constructed 1717–1718). With the end of the Turkish and other military threats, the larger towns saw noble palazzi begin to replace fortified buildings, with garden architecture developing in tandem with them, particularly in the eighteenth century. In Ljubljana, the palazzi began to increase in size and external grandeur, while the homes of burghers also grew in height, with most acquiring a second and even third floor, while courtyards became smaller, enclosed and, of course, shadier.

The sumptuous appearance of ecclesiastical and secular buildings was not only due to architecture, but also to related artistic crafts that reached a peak in the number of practitioners during the first half of the eighteenth century. Prominent secular and ecclesiastical buildings in rural areas and in smaller urban communities were largely decorated and equipped by artistic workshops, which had been providing manual crafts for several generations. They featured skilled painters and carvers who added their own touches to well established artistic tropes. Gifted and famous artists, who were still considered mere craftsmen, came to larger towns. In Ljubljana alone, there were five sculptors and ten painters at work in 1730. The most important creative figures of the mature and late Baroque in central Slovene areas include the sculptors Angelo Pozzo, from Padua, and the Venetian, Francesco Robba (responsible for the Fountain of the Three Rivers in Ljubljana), painters such as the Venetian illusionist painter Giulio Quaglia (who worked on Ljubljana cathedral), his likely pupil Franc Jelovšek, who became the leading illusionist ceiling painter in the Slovene world, and the popular Valentin Metzinger from Lorraine. Among other prominent artists were Fortunat Bergant, the most notable representative of the realist stream of the Ljubljana Baroque school, who was also celebrated as a portraitist of educated noble society and popular folk figures, and the stylistically unique Anton Cebej, who dedicated himself equally to ecclesiastical oil painting and frescoes. Just as the architecture of local builders reflected elements of their surroundings, the painting of the Ljubljana school, though under significant Italian influence, still reflected local traditions in visual art. In Styria, which had its artistic centre in Graz, the visual lyricism of northern Baroque predominated. The Slovenj Gradec workshop of the Strauss family was well represented in Styria and Carinthia: the father, Franc Mihael, operated mainly in the first half of the eighteenth century, while the work of his son
Janez Andrej, mainly from the latter half of the century, signalled the decline of the Baroque artistic system. Numerous works by the Austrian Late Baroque painter, Martin Johann Schmidt (known as Kremser Schmidt), who also worked in Slovene areas, decorated houses in lower Styria and Carniola. Since these artists all worked on commission, the influence of the clients issuing the commissions could often be seen in the iconographic content of the works. Sacral art was therefore the only link between bourgeois and aristocratic Baroque, which were otherwise clearly differentiated. The nobility intended the works they ordered, which required a very specific education (scenes from Antiquity and classic mythology, and varied exotic scenes), to consciously differentiate them from the burgher class. They also affirmed noble self-confidence, their privileged position in society, thoroughly grounded in the past, forming collections of portraits that not only depicted individuals but also their status in the social hierarchy.

The noble way of life included significant ethnological interest in foreign lands and cultures, which were seen as possessing a mysterious ‘aura’. While Turkish fashion had swept across France, Italy, England, and the western areas of the German empire, a heightened and more relaxed interest in the Ottoman Empire and its culture only arrived in Austrian lands after the defeats of the Turkish army, near Szentgotthárd (Monošter) in the Rába valley in 1664, and in Vienna 19 years later. The Turks remained a ‘hereditary enemy’ and anti-Turkish propaganda was no less inflammatory and diverse during the eighteenth-century wars with Turkey than it had been during the previous two centuries. However, the military victories and territorial conquests altered cultural views of the ‘sick man of the Bosphorus’. The superiority of Christian weaponry was felt on many levels: the defender was now the aggressor, while opportunities to satisfy trade and other economic appetites opened up, and this new-found security and self-confidence allowed an increased and safe interest in the Muslim world, its culture and despotic power structure. The libraries of Carinthian, Carniolan and Styrian nobility acquired printed copies of ‘Turkish chronicles’ from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, oriental writings, travel writing from the Ottoman Empire, and in the eighteenth century English translations of the Arabic collection of stories, *One Thousand and One Nights*. The residences of nobles and, more rarely, burghers included numerous objects of Turkish origin such as blankets, fabrics, rugs, equestrian equipment and individual pieces or even whole collections of arms. From 1666, a major collection was developed in Slovene territory (now the largest in Europe) of *Turquerie* oil paintings, which was originally housed in the castles of Vurberg and Hrastovec in lower Styria. The collection not only portrayed realistic and imagined portraits of Turkish oriental dignitaries, but also featured the peoples of
the world, as imagined by educated Europeans of the day. More than an expression of spiritual openness and cosmopolitanism, it reflected a curiosity and desire to find out about the wider world that was influenced by fashions already established in western Europe, such as decorating living quarters with Chinese motifs (*chiniserie*). ‘Chinese rooms’ were arranged in some castles, such as Dornava, Maribor and Jablje pri Trzinu, that in some cases entirely replaced decoration of Ottoman origin. Ideas of the ‘Near East’ and ‘Far East’ in Slovene-populated areas formed on at least three levels – based on a tradition of direct experience with Turkish incursions, based on trade, diplomatic and other non-military links, and based on ideas that came from western European Christian cultures. The overall approach involved a discovery of the Orient (rather than conquest as the American continent was subject to at the time), and did not differ significantly from that in western Europe. It moved between ideas of a miraculous East filled with wonder, sensuous eroticism and cruelty, and ideas of a barbarous, rough and violent world of fanaticism, aggression and elemental Islam.

While the new interest in far-off peoples mainly expanded the horizons of the educated, the ambitious and varied Baroque of the churches, and the directness of their imagery, intended to deepen faith, was aimed at every level of society. The theatrical aspect of church interiors was occasionally matched outdoors by performances of Passion plays and processions. The common people in towns and market settlements experienced actual theatrical performances through broad folk comedy portrayed with elements of the *Commedia dell’Arte*. An established actor in this theatre of improvised dialogues and situational comedy was the Ljubljana-born Franc Jožef Gogala, who worked most of all in Austrian provinces and in Vienna, where in the first decades of the eighteenth century his comedy on the famous battle between the Ernst the Iron and the Turks at Radgona (*Die Türkenschlacht bei Radkersburg*, 1418) was often performed. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, performances of Italian *opera buffa* and *opera seria* were the most popular for the select urbanised few who could attend the nobles’ philharmonic society. The number of performances by Italian and German theatre groups rose continually (increasing from around 30 per year in the early eighteenth century to over 70 later on), which moved performances from private into public and more accessible premises. In 1736, Ljubljana acquired a permanent stage at the town hall (Comedi Haus am Rathaus), and purpose-built theatres soon appeared, in Klagenfurt in 1737, followed by Gorizia (1740), Trieste (1751), Ljubljana (1765), and Idrija (1769).

Many of the lifestyle features that first emerged among nobles and wealthier burghers during the latter half of the seventeenth century became established during the eighteenth.
Increasing number of carriages passed along the roads, mirrors started to feature on the walls of houses alongside the more familiar pictures, windows were covered by curtains, the use of glasses, of porcelain and of coffee paraphernalia became more important, while in furniture, chairs replaced benches and wardrobes replaced chests, beds acquired canopies, and the first bourgeois drawing rooms appeared. Various wall-mounted, long-case and standing clocks were introduced, the most common of which were tabernacle clocks (Tabernakeluhur), also known as Theresian clocks, after the period in which they gained popularity. For inhabitants who could afford lighting, the day could now extend into night, and the time of theatrical performances moved from the afternoon to the evening hours. Behavioural norms in correspondence, in conversation, at table, and when eating were becoming more formalised. Manners became a sign of social distinction, which was also expressed via the use of French in correspondence and conversation among the social elite. The famed comic playwright, Carlo Goldoni, who lived for a time with Count Lantieri in Vipava in the 1720s (there is a passing reference to Vipava in his play Il cavaliere di buon gusto, The Gentleman of Good Taste), mentioned as a curiosity in his memoirs that cursing was common even among women of high birth in the area. The number of daily meals increased from two to three (the introduction of breakfast moved the mid-morning meal towards midday and the afternoon meal towards evening), the use of cutlery increased, and burping, smacking lips, slurping, and breaking wind were no longer accepted in polite company. Most people ate black bread (made from buckwheat or rye) with wheat bread saved for Sundays and holidays. The consumption of beef increased in towns, pork, lamb and goat less so, while the price of game and fish ensured that they remained more exclusive. Fish was imported from rural and suburban ponds, largely for the many days of fasting. Although Trieste and Rijeka acquired sugar ‘factories’ in the latter half of the century, at this time most of the population did not even know what sugar was, let alone eat it. Sweetened food – from meat to sauces, fruit and, of course, cakes and patisseries – thus became a status symbol, and also led to a more substantial physical frame. The erudite Carniolan patron, Baron Žiga Zois, wrote on the subject in a letter he sent to the adventurer Giacomo Casanova, who was making merry in Trieste in 1773. Zois writes, mockingly, that one of the many reasons his noble fellows are incapable of putting on a comedy in Ljubljana was the fact that the women were too large for the stage. However, the images presented by contemporary portraits preclude any firm conclusion on whether plumpness was genuinely the Baroque ideal.

The consumption of alcohol increased significantly during the eighteenth century. Mead, which in previous centuries had been the drink of every class, was now the choice of
the poor, while consumption of wine was on the up. Wine became the dominant everyday drink, with spirits generally reserved for special occasions. Beer consumption grew at the expense of wine towards the end of the century. In addition to inns, where people could enjoy cards, dominoes, chess and billiards, the number of wine shops increased, offering an additional source of income to the urban and rural populations. Chocolate, tea and coffee were unusual drinks of that time, but gradually became established, initially in more celebrated households. With the opening of coffee-houses, coffee made a successful transition from the private to the public realm. While coffee-houses opened in many towns in western Europe towards the end of the seventh century, Ljubljana had to wait until 1713 for its first. Coffee drinking spread slowly and most Inner Austrian towns did not have coffee-houses until the second half of the century. However, coffee and croissants gradually became so established throughout the Austrian (and later the Austro-Hungarian) Monarchy that they even became one of its symbols. The popularity of this widespread habit in towns led to a more relaxed and partly self-mocking reinterpretation of the widespread abbreviation k.u.k. as Kaffe und Kipferl (coffee and croissant) rather than the official kaiserlich und königlich (imperial and royal). Johann Gottfried Seume, a traveller who crossed Slovene-populated territory on a journey to Italy in 1803, wrote that the coffee-houses of Graz and Ljubljana (seven in number by the end of the eighteenth century) were much better than those of Vienna. The claim is no doubt exaggerated, but it does indicate that coffee-houses were already firmly established in the towns of the territory. Alongside alcohol and coffee, another new ‘treat’ grew in popularity during the Baroque period – tobacco. The consumption of dried tobacco leaves in various forms spread significantly throughout every stratum of society, including the poor. The import and distribution of tobacco was therefore associated with significant profits and a tobacco monopoly was introduced as early as 1701, and this was soon followed by a tax. The mass consumption of addictive tobacco products led to the founding of an imperial tobacco factory in Trieste in the 1720s, and an Estates’ tobacco factory in Ljubljana in the 1750s; it also led to smuggling, and – as with salt previously – to numerous disputes between peasants and officials of the companies leasing monopolies or taxation rights.

Another phenomenon marking the new century was a change in dress. The changes in clothing styles at the start of the eighteenth century largely affected the upper classes, while the middle classes – depending on their material possibilities and despite the existence of a dress code – only changed inasmuch as they were able to copy the upper classes. The vast majority of inhabitants in towns and villages (colourful regional costume predominated in the countryside) naturally changed their dress only more gradually if at all. Three-cornered hats
became the norm for wealthier male inhabitants, both children and adults, along with a knee-length jacket, initially worn long but later as a shorter garment more like a waistcoat, narrow trousers, which reached below the knees, stockings, and low-heeled shoes with a buckle. Before they became genuinely necessary items, pocket watches spread as a fashionable accessory, with various names such as ‘onion watches’, ‘coach clocks’ or ‘riders’ travelling watches’. Women wore close-fitting, thin-waisted garments on their upper body (with a corset), with various widths of crinoline supporting their skirts, and high-heeled shoes. The demands of fashion led to the appearance of a new trade in towns – wig-making. Women wore their hair up and heavily powdered or wore a wig, while men also used a range of hairpieces, and went clean shaven, a marked change from the seventeenth century when a moustache and goatee (in the first half of the century) and a moustache alone (in the second half) had been the norm. This era of powered hair and faces shunned the use of water – seen as a carrier of disease – in personal hygiene. Most people’s bodies were not clean, and public bathing was regarded as scandalous and immoral by members of the upper classes. People generally attempted to cover unpleasant bodily odours by copious use of perfumes.

A new urban feel, giving a sense of cultural breadth and cosmopolitanism, developed with more vigorous commerce, and was characterised by increased building activity, the presence of foreign artists, the work of academics, music from local composers, performances by foreign theatre groups, the scent of tobacco and the first sips from a cup of coffee. It seemed that educated individuals were ready to adopt – and accept – the means of spreading information already established in larger towns in central and western Europe. In 1707, the printer Janez Jurij Mayr began publishing the first newspaper in Carniola – the Wochentliche Laybacherische Ordinari und Extra-Ordinari-Zeitungen (Weekly Ljubljana Ordinary and Extraordinary Newspaper) – though this failed after just two years. The potential audience for cultural activity was insufficient to support a domestic newspaper until the final decades of the century. However, the circulation of foreign newspapers and domestically published pamphlets continued to grow. At the same time, state censorship was increasing its profile and becoming stricter. The authorities did not merely wait for material to be printed, but attempted to use advance admonitions and pressure to prevent the publication of anything that portrayed the state in a negative light. To this end, it was announced in 1751 in Carniola, Gorizia and Gradisca, and Rijeka (Fiume) that writers would receive a birching for “unfounded, mendacious, or apparently deliberately invented” news, while informants were promised rewards of 100 gold pieces. Following the major reforms to the Austrian Monarchy’s administrative and political system in the 1740s, the state authorities also began to cultivate a
unified and positive view of state measures among the wider population. Imposing confessional uniformity was no longer a current issue, and the creation of political uniformity moved to the forefront. The equal status of the confessional and political spheres began to shift decisively in favour of the political.

The small intellectual elite involved in creating or supporting this change in cultural outlook belonged to the upper stratum of society. It is clear from the mid-eighteenth century in Ljubljana, for example, as in other towns, that the higher social groups (priests, nobles, doctors of law and medicine, officials, and a few rich tradesmen) formed around 10% of the population. People who managed to maintain or very gradually increase their small or middling wealth via an economic activity formed around 30% of the population. Around 50% of the population (sub-tenants, servants, etc.) lived in smaller sub-urban settlements, which were largely agricultural in nature, and their material and economic position placed them on the lowest rung of the social hierarchy. They received very low wages for their work and were unable to accumulate any wealth for themselves. The nobility and military were joined among the social groups that ‘preferred to take rather than to give’ – as a saying had it – by the beggars. They were truly the bottom of the social pile, and like the upper class represented around 10% of the urban population. If the very highest stratum of society (the nobility) represented up to 1% of the total population in Slovene territory, the lowest stratum of society (beggars) represented between 1% and 2% in Carniola in 1767, when they numbered 3–4,000.

Begging, asking for alms and vagrancy grew significantly in the second half of the seventeenth century and remained part of everyday life for a considerable time. The moderate population growth did not increase the size of this marginal group to the extent that it would affect the existing social structure or threaten its stability. The numerous harsh corrective measures used, for example, on individuals accused of witchcraft and on criminals condemned to serve as galley slaves or yoked in ship-hauling crews somewhere in Hungary, were not required against beggars in Slovene areas. The town and provincial authorities attempted to control their numbers and later began to force them to work. In 1647, a census of beggars was taken in Graz, and the same task was carried out in Ljubljana four years later. Beggars were given tin badges to distinguish them from any new arrivals, who the town authorities attempted to expel immediately. The ascendance of mercantilist economic ideas, however, led to a change in attitudes to charity and poverty. In individual provincial towns, burghers began to put forward initiatives and make plans for special institutions and even poor funds (cassa pauperum) to eradicate poverty among those capable of work. The authorities wished to extract at least some benefit from idlers, while also maintaining strict
supervision over them. A Carniolan entrepreneur, Franc Rakovec (Raiersfeld), reflected the dominant idea of the day when he wrote in 1730 that mendicants and beggars should be removed from the roads and closed in workhouses and educational institutions. Within their walls, the “ne’er-do-wells” and the “godless vagrant mob” would be forced to do dignified work, while genuine paupers and orphans would be better provided for, receiving Christian instruction and an introduction to the world of work. The economic justification for workhouses was discussed by the cameralist theoretician and University of Vienna professor, Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi. In 1761, he wrote on the living conditions of workhouse inmates: “There is no need for them to work only on bread and water or to suffer daily beatings, unless of course they will not perform their work. Every day they should receive a pound of bread, vegetables at noon, and soup in the evening, with small beer alongside.”

Institutions for the poor were established in Inner Austrian provinces – in all of the major and some smaller towns – but not until the 1760s and 1770s, when attempts were made to organise work within them on a larger scale. Orphanages, on which Justi offered the opinion that the care provided should not be so poor that the majority of the children died, were mainly intended to serve as cotton spinning schools, but after a few years this work stopped because it was not economically viable. The orphanages remained from that time as an expression of the Monarchy’s policy of social care, but most children, several hundred in each province, lived in conditions that were just as poor as they had been before the policy's introduction.

There were many causes for the extreme poverty that forced people into destitution and begging, including physical and mental disability, disease, and starvation after poor harvests. A further explanation for poverty comes from the property situation in rural areas, conditions in towns, and the relationship between town and country. Social stratification in villages had created a broad band of rural dwellers who were no longer dependent on working their own farms (cottars, sub-tenant farmers, vineyard labourers, and male and female servants – *hlapci* and *dekle*), while in at least some of the larger towns there was a significant increase in the division of labour (domestic and other jobs, workers in small factories), though the labour supply outstripped the work on offer. Life in villages was generally extremely humble, which was matched by their appearance, and the dwellings within them. Centuries of development led to three main types of peasant house in Slovene-populated territory: *dimmice* or ‘smokehouses’ (a living space with a fire but no chimney) to the north and east, houses with a *črna kuhinja* or ‘black kitchen’ (a kitchen space, again with no chimney) in central areas, and *ognjišnice* or ‘hearth-houses’ (another chimney-less space) and stone houses in the
west. Houses were usually wooden, and only in parts of modern-day Primorska, particularly on the Karst, did stone houses become established at an early date. All forms of housing offered similar levels of comfort, or the lack thereof. Social stratification resulted in a gradual alteration of the appearance of villages. Stone began to replace wood in house construction, and some dwellings now had at least one other living room in addition to the kitchen, if not two, alongside workshops, barns and other functional spaces. The increased wealth of one section of the rural population fostered demand for works of art: paintings on glass, the first decorative beehive panels, and votive paintings, which were hung in churches as supplications or in thanks for divine intervention. Yet most of the population remained in poverty, and despite demands from the state in the latter half of the eighteenth century that house building in wood should be stopped, and that fire safety regulations should also be respected in rural areas, the manner of life of the rural population did not change at any great speed. A record made in 1788 by a Graz doctor on the situation in the Koralpen (Golina) mountain range in Soboth (Sobota), where a flu epidemic had spread, provides an insight into the life of a significant part of the population that could easily describe an even wider area than Styria, where 40% of the population still lived in dimnice at the end of the eighteenth century. According to the report, people lived “almost like savages” in smoky premises without drinking or cooking water, together with chickens and pigs. Adults and children alike were insufficiently clothed.

The urban and village poor (including those making some kind of living from work) were unable to freely enter into marriage, so most of the population remained unmarried, with many not marrying until well after the age of forty, because of their property situation. In the mid-eighteenth century, around 42% of Styria’s population, male and female, aged between 20 and 40 were unmarried, while in upper Styria the proportion of unmarried people was higher, at 54%. In mining areas, which had large migrant populations, the unmarried proportion was as high as 75%. This led to growth in the number of illegitimate children and orphans, filling the orphanages, while the unmarried status of so many people also contributed to slow population growth. While paupers were unable to create families, it was common for tradesmen’s widows – particularly in trades requiring skilled men – to remarry much younger domestic assistants or apprentices. On the spiritual level, fraternities (of which there were 396 in Carniola alone, and another 476 in Styria) prayed for the salvation of the dead, while, on the everyday level, widows protected the trade or craft through remarriage to give themselves and their children security, as young apprentices became master craftsmen and gained the chance of guild membership, which remained important during the first half of the century. As
sample studies have indicated, the typical marrying age for those able to marry (independent tradesmen, merchants and others in the middle and higher strata of society), and those who were given permission (mainly peasants) was 20–25 for brides and 25–30 for grooms. Families in towns were generally smaller, with an average of 3.59 members; larger households averaged 6.24 members. The population around 1700 was significantly larger than two hundred years previously, although population growth then stagnated after 1700. The average birth rate only slightly exceeded the mortality rate, with both rates fluctuating around the figure of 35 per 1,000. A higher rate of population growth was observed for a few decades in the second half of the century. An indication of the population is given by the 1754 census, according to which Styria’s total population was 696,606, Carinthia’s was 271,924, Carniola’s was 344,544, and that of the county of Gorizia (probably including Trieste) was 102,347. According to estimates based on the 1754 and other censuses, the population in the territory of present-day Slovenia in 1754 was a maximum of 830,000, while in 1780 it was already 893,000.

NEW WORLDS, GOD AND POWER

Within the diverse social structure in the environment of the Slovene-populated territory, a number of different rhythms of life were played out. The increased interest in and knowledge of foreign lands and other civilisations (as reflected in part in libraries, and the turquoise and chinoiserie) brought entirely new dimensions of human understanding into the noble and burgher consciousness. Information about the new worlds of Asia and, in particular, Africa, and North and South America, also arrived from missionaries, primarily the sons of nobles and burghers, who left the Austrian crownlands on missions in great number in the late seventeenth century, and all the more in the eighteenth. Some carried out research and scientific work in addition to their religious mission. A prominent position among missionaries in Asia was earned by Avguštin Hallerstein, a Jesuit born in Mengeš, whose distinction was manifest in his books and debates, as court astronomer and as head of the mathematics department in Peking, with contacts in London, Paris and St Petersburg. Marko Anton Kapus, a Jesuit from Kamna Gorica, worked in Mexico as a professor and rector of the college in Matape. He participated in a research expedition to the Gulf of California, describing the natural wealth of the Sonora lands and the lives of the local ‘Indians’. Volbenk Inocenc Erber, of Ljubljana, and Ignac Cirheimb (Cierheim), a Jesuit born at Hmeljniški (Hopfenbach) castle, also worked in Latin America, most notably in Uruguay and Paraguay. Picturesque imagery of previously unknown peoples from around the world, primarily from
less-developed societies, now entered European thought systems. A new ‘human science’ began to develop, and was first named “andropologia” by the Koper-born Gian Rinaldo Carli in his writings on the inhabitants of the ‘new’ continent.

Thoughts on the comparative nature of man opened a range of questions for disciples of the western European Enlightenment, such as whether virtue, goodness, intellect, truth and justice were exclusively European traits, or whether ethical behaviour applied in characteristic forms in all humanity. And while historians in the second half of the eighteenth century (such as Edward Gibbon) were beginning to enquire into the reasons for the rise and fall of civilisations, philosophers had for some time drawn conclusions about the interconnections between all cultures and their common bases, and also, taking into account differing levels of development, about humanity’s capacity for perpetual progress. The noble savages of Jean-Jacques Rousseau rarely seemed as interesting and as scientifically instructive to those who met them personally as they did to western European scholars in their academies and halls of learning. There was an unbridgeable gap between the theoreticians, or defenders of the idea of universalism as a search for common origins and a common nature, and the ‘practitioners’ or conquerors. In principle, the role of the missionaries was to ‘teach the ignorant and make the blind see’, or, as one Spanish conquistador put it as early as the sixteenth century, conquerors and their spiritual colleagues should “bring light to those living in darkness.” In reality, they were largely realising the human desire to conquer and satisfy their voracious greed, an attitude supported by the mercantilist policy of many European states. While a flourishing transatlantic trade began to carry millions of African slaves to the two Americas in the eighteenth century, the slaughter and death of the domestic populations on these two continents began to take on the character of genocide. As western Europe became more culturally developed and made deeper incursions into foreign worlds, it became increasingly convinced of its status as the centre of the world. External strength fanned an internal ethnocentrism, forming a Eurocentric image of the non-European people, who through conquest were stripped of their individuality and denied their own historical dignity.

During the late seventeenth and into the eighteenth century – a time of new political and economic concepts of the modern state, which included ideas of conquest – a range of figures, particularly Enlightenment thinkers in England (Isaac Newton, John Locke), France (Francois-Marie Arouet Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Denis Diderot, Jean le Rond d’Alembert) and Germany (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Immanuel Kant) defined a new relationship and attitude to God, based on modern natural science and new philosophical arguments. God was no longer the direct master and director of inter-human relations, but was
now conceived as a less personal and more metaphysical entity. Ideas of the divine were split into a duality between ‘God and man’, between an (unconscious) natural harmony and freedom of thought, between the given order and creativity, between timelessness and history. As the prime mover or first cause, God enabled conscious creativity, and enabled people to influence their own time and history. God was the creator of earth and humanity, but, on earth, the creator was humanity. The new approach of the spiritual elite changed their attitude to the Church and its role in human life. However, discussions on the secularisation of specific church activities, debates on liberalism and individualism, and a call for the courageous and consistent application of reason – an idea encapsulated for Enlightenment figures in the motto of Horace “Sapere aude!” – did not usually involve a denial of God and supernatural powers; indeed, attacks on the Church and on people’s blind devotion to their religion and the Church generally came from committed Christians and devout Catholics. It was not just a few individual philosophers who considered themselves part of the Enlightenment, but also a wider circle of intellectuals, who did not delve deeply into ideas of human perfection and natural law, but who (in relation to the political authorities) supported clearly defined individual reforms within the framework of the state. Absolutism went unquestioned as a form of government in this context. On the contrary, it was the predominant form of government across Europe and seen as the ideal. This view was fostered by the triumph of mercantilist principles within the economy, which required a single and protected internal market within a state in order to be successful. Only an absolute monarch could properly apply mercantilist principles. Applied mercantilism therefore helped shape both state sovereignty and the sovereignty of the ruler, which in turn shaped mercantilist thought.

Patriarchal ‘oriental’ despotism offered an attractive example for the formation of an all-encompassing monarchical power. The attraction lay in the systems of power in the Asian states that Europe was unable to subjugate, or even form a working understanding of (although it had experienced military successes against the closest despotic neighbour – the Turkish sultan – from the mid-seventeenth century onwards). Advocates of absolute monarchy affirmed that rulers could only carry out reforms leading to common prosperity by being raised high above their subjects. Through this ‘top-down reform’, the ruler would not create a clash between the interests of the state and the interests of the individual, but would personally embody the general and common interest. The monarch’s role as ‘father of the nation’ changed in the second half of the eighteenth century with the rise of Enlightenment ideas (the philosophy of state law and of natural law) on the equality and equivalence of all people, and the separation of the national or state interest from the monarch’s, or the
subordination of the monarch’s interest to that of the state. From the ‘father of the nation’, the ruler became a ‘first servant of the state’ – as executor of the state’s interest and as legislator – who would see to the welfare of the state, but rule with unlimited powers. Authority understood in this way, and expressed as ‘enlightened despotism’, gave the state’s inhabitants equal status on principle. This did not however create equal citizens, but a sense, which remained rooted in popular thought until very recent times, that people were merely subjects of the state.

Despite the openness of some rulers to Enlightenment thinkers and their ideas, and the fact that some even formed their own philosophical views on the issues of state authority and function, the route they followed to any form of enlightened absolutism certainly followed the path of “effective truth,” as explained by Niccolò Machiavelli (*la verità effettuale delle cose*). Only by understanding the current state of affairs at home and internationally could monarchs ensure that conditions were in place for successful action, which included using all available resources to achieve the main objective of serving the ‘public weal’ or the prosperity of the state. Monarchs justified their entirely egotistic political conduct – which changed continually in response to circumstances – in terms of the national interest (*raison d’état*). This became the guiding principle for the military and diplomatic statecraft that aimed to maintain the balance of power in Europe. It was in the search for a balance of power between states – motivated by the fear that one power might become predominant, rather than a desire to achieve equality between them – that the German nation’s position within the Holy Roman Empire was most complex.

From the end of the Thirty Years’ War until its final dissolution in 1806, the Empire never again functioned as a political whole. After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had formalised the religious division, the loose nature of this community of 355 more or less independent principalities and cities allowed individual principalities to start to accumulate power and extend their influence. The peace treaty also acknowledged the sovereign right (*Landeshocheit*) of German princes to conclude treaties outside the Empire. The prince-elector of Brandenburg was the most successful in consolidating an expanded power base, and by the mid-eighteenth century a territorially unitary Prussia, unified under enlightened absolutist rule, had become one of the most effective military forces in Europe and the main rival of the Austrian Monarchy. The emergence of absolutist rule across the Habsburgs’ dynastic lands was much slower than in other states within the Empire, such as Prussia, or outside it, such as France. The Habsburgs were hemmed in on one side by the idea of continuing, as Holy Roman emperors, to proclaim some form of ‘global rule’ (*Imperium*)
mundi), and on the other by the fact their power could only be drawn from the contiguous territories of the Austrian hereditary lands, the hereditary Bohemian and Hungarian (including Croatian) kingdoms, and other possessions over which they had direct rule: the Austrian Netherlands, and a number of Italian states. The main obstacles to Habsburg efforts to create a modern state came from this duality in the nature of their role as rulers, and from the ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of the lands under their direct rule, as well as the strong provincial consciousness of the ruling elites in those lands, who were not well disposed to subordination to the concept of a higher, all-encompassing state. The Habsburgs could only respond to modern economic and political challenges by finding some way of ‘drawing a veil’ between Austria and the Empire. The dynasty expended considerable energy shoring up a title whose lingering prestige reflected the depleted imperial dignity, but the spiritual meaning and associations of the Empire continued to fade. A new state identity started to form, based on the ‘Austrian Monarchy’ and aided by military successes against the Ottoman Empire in southeast Europe, and territorial settlements in the west, following the War of Spanish Succession. Emperor Charles VI, as ‘pater familias’, and ‘father of the nation’ began to represent a new state, which he moved to preserve with the Pragmatic Sanction. The dynastic machinations of an absolutist prince – who himself was the only unifying force of the monarchy, since it was still a personal union – could only be realised if he could forge a unified state and provide the protective system such a state required: an administration, sufficient financial resources and an army.

The Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, as already noted during the eighteenth century, was neither holy, Roman, nor an empire. Achieving the much-debated ‘prosperity of the state’, the proposed aim of every enlightened monarch, in the first half of the eighteenth century at least, did not mean ensuring prosperity for the people, but above all establishing a powerful state.

THE THERESIAN-JOSEPHIN REFORMS AND THE ABSOLUTIST STATE

Following the sudden death of Emperor Charles VI, the Pragmatic Sanction that he had designed to secure the position of his daughter, Maria Theresa, as heir to all Habsburg hereditary lands, proved inadequate. The promises to respect the sanction that he had garnered from the great European powers were now forgotten. At the end of 1730s, the Austrian Monarchy no longer had the aura of a great power. Its vulnerability was betrayed by its defeat in war with Turkey (1737–1739), and even more so by its depleted treasury, large internal
debts and weak standing army, which numbered just 50,000 men. When Maria Theresa (1740–1780) assumed the throne, the predictions of the most successful Habsburg general, Prince Eugene of Savoy, proved true. In the mid-1730s, just before his death, he said that an Austrian ruler could only succeed in uniting the monarchy’s lands into a whole (*ein Totum*) and protecting it, if the Austrian forces had at least 140,000 soldiers, otherwise France, Bavaria, Saxony and Prussia would move to carve up the territory between them. None of these states recognised the Austrian Monarchy’s statehood, preferring to see it as a collection of provinces and kingdoms on which they also had claims, if, of course, they ignored Maria Theresa’s hereditary rights and only considered their own ties of kinship. This heralded the War of the Austrian Succession (1741–1748), with Spain adding its weight to the coalition of the four rivals to the Austrian Monarchy. King Frederick II of Prussia (who later earned the epithet ‘the Great’) launched the military attack in 1740. In the two Silesian Wars (1740–1742, 1744–1745) the considerably smaller Prussia conquered nearly all of Silesia, the most developed and industrialised region in Central Europe. Charles Albert, the Bavarian duke from the house of Wittelsbach (once great allies of the Habsburgs) occupied Linz and Prague, and proclaimed himself King of Bohemia (1741). One year later, he was elected Holy Roman Emperor as Charles VII (becoming the first non-Habsburg emperor since 1437). France and Spain entered the conflict with the main aim of acquiring lands in Italy.

Outside the Austrian provinces, only Hungary could offer significant help to the 23-year old Maria Theresa. In 1741, with a babe in arms, the fourth of sixteen children that she bore to her husband, Francis Stephen of Lorraine (together they founded the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty that remained in power till 1918), she turned as queen of Hungary to its Estates for aid in keeping all the lands under her rule intact and united. The young queen did not win the favour of the Hungarian magnates merely by playing on their sympathies for a helpless mother and child – the heir to the throne, Joseph, the dynasty’s first male descendant in over 20 years – but was forced to uphold their Estates privileges in order to win their military backing. This protection of noble rights ensured continued independence for Hungary, which though connected to the Austrian Monarchy by the personal union of the ruler, remained free of its absolutist reforms. The support of the Hungarian cavalry (and the monetary support offered by England, which did not want the balance of power in Europe to be disturbed) was decisive in the War of the Austrian Succession. An important achievement at this point – though primarily a matter of moral satisfaction – was having Francis Stephen elected and crowned as Holy Roman Emperor (Francis I, 1745–1765), following the death of Emperor Charles VII. The anti-Austrian coalition’s plan to leave Maria Theresa with just
Inner Austria and Hungary (with Croatia) failed. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 required the Austrian Monarchy to cede only Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla in Italy to Spain, though it also had once more to endorse the painful loss of Silesia to Prussia. Yet by signing the peace treaty, it had successfully defended Habsburg succession and prevented partition. The rivalry between Prussia and the Austrian Monarchy (the Protestant Hohenzollerns and Catholic Habsburgs) was now a permanent fixture of European politics. A permanent policy issue for Maria Theresa and her advisors was the recognition that ensuring the security of the territory (and having any prospect of recovering lost lands) demanded a standing army of at least 108,000 troops, as well as the need to collect approximately 15 million florins per year from direct tax for its upkeep. This could not be realised without sweeping changes to the administration and tax systems, which logically would require numerous related reforms.

‘L’Augustissima’ as Maria Theresa was addressed in Europe and at home, even though she was never officially an empress and never styled herself as such, except as ‘Empress-Consort’ and ‘Dowager-Empress’, took the social planning of the Austrian Monarchy in the broadest possible sense into her own hands, taking the arch-enemy, Prussia, as the model for her many reforms.

The central chancelleries in Vienna were poorly co-ordinated and their allegiances were too subordinate to the interests of individual provinces, which meant they were often mutually contradictory. In the provinces themselves, tax collection, military conscription and justice were controlled by the aristocracy and their Estates. If the Empress wished to guarantee the security of the Monarchy, and – though seemingly a contradiction – the security of the Estates, she had to reduce their capacity to block centralising tendencies by establishing a new state administration. She entrusted this task to Friedrich Wilhelm Graf von Haugwitz, a skilful and experienced politician, who had already proved his worth in the first half of the 1740s, when he had established a centralised administration in the part of Silesia that remained in Habsburg hands. After investigating the administrative and financial situation in the individual provinces, and after initial attempts to institute reforms within them, Haugwitz set out a plan, which entailed the state taking over from the Estates at the intermediate (provincial) and lower (local) levels of administration, and also assuming control of the distribution and collection of taxes. The implicit opposition of the Estates to this radical administrative (and actual constitutional) reform of the Austrian Monarchy was largely due to the preliminary findings of Haugwitz’s commissions, which revealed large provincial debts, overdue tax liabilities, widespread corruption, and arbitrary local forms of administration. Carniola was a typical example, with its debt of 2.8 million florins, while managing to spend
approximately 1.5 million florins on various ‘gifts’ over the previous century and a half, while Carinthia had also spent approximately the same amount on ‘gifts’ over a period of a century, and was burdened with a debt of 4 million florins.

The basic construction of the bureaucratic pyramid took from 1747 till 1749. At the central state level, Haugwitz united the Bohemian and Austrian chancelleries, which lost their former importance with the introduction of new bodies of state authority. The central body, which effectively functioned as a national government, united financial and administrative matters (known as Directorium in publicis et cameralibus, the Directory) from 1749, which, combined with the introduction of a supreme court (Oberste Justizstelle) in the previous year, successfully separated, or compartmentalised, the political and judicial. In 1753, the Commercial Directory was also merged with the Directory, giving it control of internal policy, finances and economy. Among the main central state offices, the Imperial War Council (Hofkriegsrat) and the General War Commissariat (General Kreiskommissariat) for military matters were of particular significance as well as the State Chancellery (Staatskanzlei) which had effectively operated as a foreign ministry since 1742. When Chancellor Wenzel Anton Kaunitz-Rietberg became the most important figure in reform policy at the Viennese court in 1760 (a position which he retained for the next thirty years), he delegated some of its powers to state offices, which appeared to reduce the centralised power of the Directory. At the same time, however, he concentrated decision-making power in a newly established office, the small Council of State (Staatsrat), which dealt with all matters of state (including Hungary), and to which all other central state offices were subordinate.

Provincial levels of government were established which were directly subordinate to the Viennese central state offices, and took control of the judiciary out of the Estates’ hands. In 1747, governments were established in Carniola and Carinthia, and a year later also in Styria. At first, these central provincial governmental bodies in Ljubljana, Klagenfurt and Graz had different titles, but from 1749 they were named ‘Representations and Chambers’ (Representationen und Cammern). Initially, Gorizia, Gradisca d’Isonzo and Trieste with Rijeka (Fiume) also came under the control of the Carniolan government. In 1748, a special ‘mercantilist littoral province’ was established, uniting the ports of Kraljevica, Bakar, Rijeka (Porto Re, Buccari and Fiume), Trieste, and Aquileia; in 1754, the county of Gorizia and Gradisca d’Isonzo was separated from Carniolan authority, receiving its own provincial government. The administrative system at the provincial level was now clearly outlined, although it took another two decades for the system to stabilise. The establishment of provincial governments and provincial courts led, in 1748/49, to the abolition of the Inner
Austrian offices in Graz, which had existed since the second half of the sixteenth century (there was also no longer any need for the office of prince’s governor, *Viztum*). Nevertheless, attempts were made in 1763–1765 to re-establish a common government for the Inner Austrian provinces. This attempt was unsuccessful, since the provincial governments were in direct contact with the central state offices in Vienna, and its only lasting effect was the new names for the provincial governments: in Styria, the government was called a *gubernium,* while in Carniola, Carinthia and Gorizia-Gradisca, it was called *Landeshauptmannschaft* (both terms effectively meaning governorship). In 1776, the mercantilist association of ports with Aquileia was abolished, with the latter being annexed to Gorizia and Gradisca d’Isonzo, while Trieste and its surroundings became an independent gubernium. Rijeka (Fiume), which was linked primarily to Croatia and Slavonia and the lands further eastward (with the Carolina road to Karlovac and onward along the Kolpa and Sava rivers), was included in the Kingdom of Croatia. Three years later, Rijeka was placed under Hungarian vice-regency, but retained a certain level of autonomy as a separate entity (*corpus separatum*) of the Hungarian throne.

The newly established districts (*Kreis*) at the local level were subordinate to provincial governments. As the most important official, the district governor (*Kreishauptmann*), had control over seigneuries and town councils and was also therefore in charge of the distribution and collection of taxes. Districts remained the basic provincial administrative units for the next hundred years. In Styria, there were five (Judenburg, Bruck an der Mur, Graz, Celje – which was entirely Slovene – and Lipnica, replaced in 1750 by Maribor – which was Slovene-German). In Carinthia, there were initially three (Villach for upper Carinthia, Klagenfurt for central Carinthia, and Völkermarkt for lower Carinthia), later reduced to two in 1783, centred on Klagenfurt and Villach. The northern Carinthian districts encompassed a predominantly German population, while the south had a Slovene minority. In Carniola, there were three districts (Ljubljana for upper Carniola, Novo Mesto for lower Carniola, and Postojna for inner Carniola), while in Gorizia and Gradisca the two main towns each formed the centre of a separate district, but after 1754 the county formed a single district with its seat in Gorizia. The Trieste administration functioned as an independent district.

This vertical arrangement of administration and power (Directory, provincial governments, district offices – *Kreisämter*) was assigned numerous administrative tasks at every level, covering matters such as trade and crafts, transport, education and health. As the traditional offices at the provincial and local levels were stripped of any influence, the power of the Estates was much reduced. All matters of public law now came under the auspices of state offices. District officials decided on the division of taxes among the seigneuries, and
could also supervise the division of tax among bonded peasants on the seigneuries. For some time, the Estates were still authorised to collect a selection of cameral and Estates taxes, partly to assuage the nobility’s fading influence, but this too was stopped in 1758. The Estates could now issue opinions on the legal amendments, while their most important task, approving the annual tax, which had once made them partners with the prince in shaping provincial policy, was now merely for the sake of appearances. At the start of the early modern era there had been an Estates administration and a princely administration that in some manner supplemented each other (each with its own agenda) within a territorially integral and legally uniform territory – the Land or province – but by the second half of the eighteenth century an administratively uniform state (the Austrian half of the monarchy) had developed an administration from which the Estates were excluded. The Estates were not challenged and destroyed, but neutralised and put out to pasture. The central administration began to dominate, although absolutist centralism still found room at the intermediate (provincial) level of the administrative structure to preserve the historical provinces in some form. This structure, divided into central and provincial, remained until the final collapse of the Monarchy in 1918. The administrative reforms introduced in 1782/83 by Joseph II, which introduced two ‘new’ gubernia in Graz and Trieste (the former covered Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, as a major administrative region, while the latter included Gorizia and Gradisca along with Trieste), were abandoned in 1791, soon after Joseph’s death.

The building of a state administration included the creation of a stable structure to produce a civil service and supervise its officials appropriately. Public officials’ functions started to be clearly separated from their private lives. Hierarchically defined competences created an administrative system, subject to and dependent on the crown, which began to excel itself in accuracy and impersonal officiousness. The administration’s long-established forms of written intercourse ensured its consistent and confident performance, which now demanded increasing numbers of rationally educated people.

The new and standardised administrative organisation provided Maria Theresa with an effective tool for the state to exercise direct control over tax revenues, and the opportunity to make exclusive use of those revenues. The resentment expressed by the provinces when Maria Theresa imposed direct taxes (the Contribution) worth 15 million florins on them was quelled when the most intransigent province – Carinthia, which refused to provide the agreed amount for years – was punished by having its right to any participation in relation to tax affairs revoked for 20 years (1750–1770). Maria Theresa took this action on the basis of ‘royal prerogative’ and in this way clearly signalled to other provinces just where their
decision-making powers ended. Tax reform was also needed, however, to ensure that more funds continued to flow into state coffers. In a spirit of “equality, pleasant and prized by the Lord,” though actually due to the extreme burden on bonded peasants, the reform plan introduced taxation of the nobility. This was originally covered by agreements called recesses, introduced in 1748, according to which the nobility contributed funds as restitution-in-kind for military service, which had not in fact existed in traditional form for considerable time – except for the quartering of military forces, which remained a valid obligation – due to development in weaponry, soldiering and the existence of a standing (professional) army. The ‘Theresian tax rectification’, which was introduced between 1748 and 1757, involved the preparation of new tax ledgers (the ‘Theresian cadastre’), and a census of fees, and also abolished the previous tax exemption of dominical lands. The assessment of land revenues and commission-led inspections of these estimates (which revealed the “secret Gülten or property tax dues,” i.e. concealed land revenues, which did not feature in any records for a variety of reasons, such as unreported change of ownership, etc.) defined a tax referred to as the ‘dominical contribution’, which was based on the dominical lands, while the ‘rustical contribution’ naturally was based on rustical lands. The term dominical land (usually referred to by the German terms hof or meierhof and the Slovene terms marof or pristava) developed in the eighteenth century, and indicated former manorial land, which was directly administered by a feudal lord, but cultivated by peasants serving their bonded labour duties (tlaka, robot). Most rustical land in the eighteenth century was feudal land divided into farms used by bonded peasants according to a lifetime right of lease or the right to inherit or purchase (Kaufrecht or Erbrecht), and its use was encumbered with numerous obligations. The most onerous of these obligations were various forms of bonded labour, particularly those requiring peasants to cultivate dominical land. Although dominical land was taxed at a lower rate than rustical land, it still represented up to one third of the total Contribution, the remaining two-thirds coming from rustical land taxation. Direct taxation, which was equally distributed across the provinces and their inhabitants, increased significantly and by the 1750s totalled around 1.1 million florins in Styria, 460,000 florins in Carinthia, 260,000 florins in Carniola, and around 75,000 florins in Gorizia-Gradisca. Almost 2 million florins was now provided to the state by this tax (almost the equivalent amount was collected in Inner Austrian provinces from indirect taxes). The Styrian, Carinthian and Carniolan Estates had previously paid significant sums to supply the Military Border instead of the Contribution, but this option was now denied to them. The central offices in Vienna, which had started to openly plan a state budget, now added control of the Military Border to its competences. The reorganisation
of this military territory on a regiment basis and its complete separation from Croatia in the middle of the century made around 50,000 men from the Croatian and Slavonian border forces part of the Austrian Monarchy’s regular army. Most units from this vast military camp could then be deployed on battlefields around Europe, and in the late-1750s, when the administrative and tax reforms had largely been concluded, and were bearing fruit financially, the battlefields indeed opened up again.

The Austrian Monarchy did not want to give up its claims to Silesia, while Prussia sought to increase its influence within the Empire with new territorial acquisitions; France and England also had a stake in the disputes. National interest dictated the formation of unusual coalitions. Austria entered a pact with its enemy of the past few centuries, France, (with Sweden, Russia and Poland joining the pact), while Prussia entered an alliance with England and Portugal. After war broke out in 1756, the coalitions were joined by various greater and lesser kingdoms and principalities, which perceived tangible benefits in backing one side or the other. The Seven Years’ War was the greatest war there had ever been, and not only engulfed Europe but was also fought in areas of European colonial interest, on the high seas, as well as in North America and the East Indies. Over the course of the war, the composition of the coalitions changed slightly, as the major players took great care to maintain the balance of power. Thus, the Austrian Monarchy desired Prussia’s complete defeat, while France only wanted to see it weakened, but both Maria Theresa and Louis XVI wanted to avoid Tsarina Catherine II’s power being strengthened too much, despite being in alliance with her. After seven years, the Austrian Monarchy (in its third Silesian war) remained alone against Prussia. The two militarily and financially exhausted sides finally sat down to negotiate and the peace treaties agreed in Paris and Hubertusburg in 1763 confirmed the same territorial alignment in Europe that had applied before the war, though there were considerable changes in the colonies. England, Russia and Prussia all gained in political influence. France lost its role as the leading power in Europe and the colonies, and Austria was also significantly weakened by the war. The tax and monetary reforms (the monetary reform introduced in 1750 led to the introduction of the Konventionsthaler and the stable Maria Theresa silver thaler, and in 1762 an attempt was made to cover internal debt by introducing paper currency – banknotes) had facilitated the entry into war, but were insufficient to cover the losses of a protracted military campaign that brought no territorial acquisitions. Although outwardly Maria Theresa was reconciling herself to the loss of Silesia, having had enough of war, her son, Joseph II – who on his father’s death in 1765 became emperor and co-regent with his mother, and took an active role in foreign policy and military
matters – pursued a policy that would lead, if not to retaining Silesia, then at least to acquiring adequate territorial compensation. In the so-called ‘compensation wars’ from 1772 onward – from the first partition of Poland – the Austrian Monarchy (in alliance with Russia and Prussia) acquired Galicia, before annexing Bukovina in 1774, which it prised off Turkey in recompense for Russian territorial gains in the Russo-Turkish war. Five years later, Prussia stopped the Habsburgs in their attempt to annex over one third of Bavaria in the War of the Bavarian Succession. Instead they acquired only the Innviertel, a small territory north of Salzburg. Subsequent efforts by Joseph II to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria and thus increase the Monarchy’s contiguous territory, and provide sufficient recompense for the loss of Silesia and neutralise the power of Frederick the Great, soon collapsed because of Prussia’s now dominant position within the German empire. As well as the administrative and tax reforms that turned the Monarchy into a sovereign state, this wartime era, which brought territorial losses (Silesia) to the Monarchy in the 1740s, as well as acquisitions in the 1770s (Galicia, Bukovina, and the Innviertel), also saw the formation of another feature of statehood and perhaps the most convincing: the development from an imperial army to the army of the Austrian Monarchy. Although the wars and foreign armies did not directly affect Slovene-populated territory, the Slovene population participated in the newly organised – again the reform was modelled on Prussia – mobile infantry units, artillery and cavalry, wherever the Monarchy attempted to defend or exercise its interests with force.

The military defeats in the early years of Maria Theresa’s reign naturally led to fundamental changes in the military structure, and adaptation to new combat tactics and techniques, while also demanding a new understanding of the state. The standing army, which was filled with mercenaries (both domestic and foreign), was to be replaced by regular, standing military units formed from military conscripts. To ensure that the measures affected all provinces as equally as possible, after the first census in 1754 – which was intended to then be taken every three years – the number of conscripts was set in relation to the provincial population. On this basis, it was determined that Slovene areas within the Inner Austrian lands would contribute 6,000 men. Over the following decade and a half, significant changes took place in the system to ensure an adequate supply of troops. Military regiments were assigned territorial units, from which to draw sufficient men to ensure they maintained a full complement. In peace time, a regiment counted 2,070 troops, and in wartime 4,476. Between 1770 to 1773, smaller recruitment districts were defined within these territorial units (in Carniola and Styria, a recruitment district was generally a group of parishes, while Carinthia used the former local territorial court districts) and in each a seigneury was placed in charge
of conscription, if required. Houses were numbered, a census taken of the male and female population, and conscripts were defined, but military service was still not universal. The importance of the economy in achieving the ‘prosperity of the state’ forced the state to exempt the entire population of Trieste from military service, and in general it remained both very ‘liberal’ and very biased in relation to drafting men into its armed forces. All the privileged classes were exempt from the call-up (the clergy and nobles, officials, doctors, advocates and their sons), as well as all tradespeople, merchants, wealthier peasants and their first sons and sons-in-law, and all holders of farms that were smaller than a quarter grunt. People performing ‘essential occupations’ were also spared service, such as charcoal-makers and woodcutters, or street-pavers in towns. In effect, it was the underprivileged stratum of the male population that found itself in the army, a stratum largely comprising the poorest and weakest bonded peasants. The draft committees could not afford to strictly exercise the regulations requiring healthy men aged 17 to 40, and at least five feet three inches (167 cm) tall for the infantry and artillery, and five feet one inch (162 cm) for the cavalry, as they would not have found sufficient draftees. Conscripts often hid to avoid the call-up, fled to Croatia, which as part of Hungary did not carry out conscription, or even crippled themselves. Military service was for life until 1802, when it was reduced (depending on the military division) to between 10 and 14 years. The death toll was heavy in some years (in 1778, during the War of the Bavarian Succession, 9,450 men were drafted in Styria, 3,381 in Carinthia, 4,801 in Carniola, and 1,239 in Gorizia-Gradisca), which ensured that the lowest classes of society did not lose their disdain and rejection of the army, despite the benefits they gained as soldiers (leave, the chance to marry, from 1776, care for elderly or disabled war veterans, and care for their children).

THE STATE AND BONDED PEASANTS

Of the many images illustrating the status of peasants, the one that perhaps made the greatest impression on popular consciousness in the early modern era was a woodcut by Hans Weiditz in 1530: resting on the shoulders of a peasant – whose feet are set in the roots of a tree – are representatives of all social classes and dignitaries, the more important ranking higher up the tree. Although a peasant was also placed at the crown of the tree to illustrate a promise of payment in the next life, the peasant’s true position and influence was better reflected by being placed at the foot of the tree stump. A peasant at that time was almost certainly a subject or bonded peasant (podložnik, Untertan). Except for a few ‘freemen’ (for
example, in 1784 there were just 399 in Carniola), all peasants in the continental part of Slovene-populated territory were bonded peasants. Peasants had use (*usufruct*) of a seigneur’s land under varying conditions and assumed a subject status. The essence of the bonded peasant’s position was the obligation to render part of their produce, revenue and work to their seigneur in return for use of the land. The customs and structures defining their many obligations were numerous, intertwined and complex, depending mainly on the peasants’ specific status and the variable economic and political interests of their direct lord and the state. The simple equation that peasants were supposed to solve from year to year was to acquire enough from agricultural (and non-agricultural) activity to cover their own needs and their obligations: a peasant’s livelihood = subsistence + dues. From the start of the great reforms in the mid-eighteenth century, the state sought to simplify and unify the extremely dependent and varied position of peasants, in terms of their relationships with both lord and state. In line with the rise of physiocratic principles, the state saw benefits for the agricultural sector in improving the status of peasants and giving them greater freedom. The aim was to increase their interest in agricultural production, thus increasing the quantity of agricultural products and consolidating the peasantry as a source of tax revenue. In the spirit of the state’s demographic policy, this would serve to increase the birth rate and the population, hence ensuring an adequate number of men capable of military service. Although during Maria Theresa’s rule the intention was certainly not to end the feudal system, for this reform programme to be a success, the state had to protect the populace by restricting the ability of feudal landlords to arbitrarily and excessively exploit their bonded peasants.

The introduction of the tax rectification clearly defined the rights of seigneuries and prohibited certain abuses of peasants. District administrative offices (*Kreisämter*) could supervise the annual obligations demanded from peasants via specific ledgers issued to each bonded peasant, while seigneuries could no longer directly pass their provincial tax burdens onto bonded peasants. The bonded peasants’ carefully defined obligations could not be increased, and gradually upper limits were also set for periodical dues indirectly linked to the usufruct of a farm (wedding tax, death duties, emigration fees, handover fees). Improving the lot of the peasants naturally demanded that the *tlaka* (*robota*, bonded labour) be properly regulated. This was addressed by the Maria Theresa with the *Robotpatenten*, and in greater detail by additional decrees. From 1772, bonded labour service was proscribed in the county of Gorizia and Gradisca on a number of specified days, when most work was needed in the vineyards and fields. Estates opposition to the state restrictions on bonded labour delayed the issue of a *Robotpatent* for Styria and Carinthia until 1778, and until 1782 for Carniola.
Bonded labour in Styria and Carinthia was limited to three days a week, regardless of farm size, or 156 days a year (with a working day considered as 12 hours from April to October and 8 hours the rest of the year). In Carniola, bonded labour was calculated differently according to the size of a peasant’s land: the maximum obligation for a full grunt was four days a week or 208 days a year, for a three-quarter grunt it was 156 days a year, 104 days for a half grunt, 78 for a quarter, 52 for an eighth, and 26 days a year for a sixteenth (with a working day set at 10 hours for spring-summer, and from sunrise to sunset for the autumn-winter period). Seigneurs were not able to carry forward any unused days of bonded manual labour or carting. If the bonded labour obligations had previously been lower than those defined in the new regulation, they had to remain at the lower level. The regulation of bonded labour (and state pressure to distribute dominical land to farms) marked the start of efforts to completely abolish it. The minor early efforts to abolish bonded labour on princely and town seigneuries were halted by a new tax and urbarial regulation that cancelled bonded labour and changed it into a monetary obligation. Following the Josephin cadastral survey (1785–1789), seigneurs effectively became rent-collecting landlords. Peasants were only obliged to render their obligations in cash, and the dues could not exceed 30% of their gross income (12.22% of the gross income was due to the state and 17.77% was due to the seigneur). Peasants were to be left with 70% of their income (from which they would also have to pay contributions for the church, school and municipal administration), which almost exactly reversed the previous state of affairs, when peasants’ total obligations came to roughly three quarters of their income. This action by Joseph II (as well as the measures that, partly in the 1760s and more substantially in the early 1780s, endowed bonded peasants with personal freedom and greater legal protection) was so radical that it effected a major change to the existing social order and the lord-peasant relationship. The universal resistance of the nobility to this patent led to its abolition in Styria, Carinthia and Carniola within a few months of the death of Joseph II in 1790, though his other reforms of the peasantry’s status remained in force.

The judicial reforms also went some way towards alleviating the peasants’ lot. Peasants could now bypass the patrimonial courts, and seek justice in disputes with their lord in the district office, which as a state body would not be under the direct influence of the seigneur. In civil cases against a seigneury, peasants had to be represented by a ‘subject’s advocate’ (advocatus subditorum), originally selected from the ranks of state officials, though after 1761 these ‘imperial appointees’ tended to be professional lawyers. Peasant petitions were not often resolved in their favour, since officials were still linked to the feudal lords through the Estates system and a whole complex of shared interests. Abuses of seigneurial
power and status could not be eradicated, and bonded peasants did not merely respond to injustices with petitions to court but also with violence and minor revolts, though they were limited to individual settlements and seigneuries (as occurred at Brdo pri Kranju in 1783 due to bonded labour being imposed with force). Nevertheless, the new judicial structure did rein in arbitrary feudal injustice, and peasant rebellion in turn.

It was the exercise of direct freedoms, however, far more than the new civil procedures and impartial, or at least less partial, courts, that provided tangible improvements in everyday life. From 1765, noble consent was abolished, meaning peasants and their children no longer required their seigneur’s permission to marry. One year later, a patent was promulgated forbidding marriage for vagrants, beggars, disabled people, the elderly, people incapable of work and people living on alms, but it did not deny the right to marry to people with insufficient means to live. They were sent – according to a 1765 court decree applying to Carniola and Styria – to cotton spinning workshops and manufactories. A reform measure that had a major impact on personal subject status for peasants was the abolition of personal servitude or serfdom (Leibeigenschaft). In 1782, a year after the issue of such a patent for Bohemia, one was issued for each of the Inner Austrian provinces separately, though the content was effectively the same. They laid down bonded peasants’ freedom to marry upon prior application, the free movement of bonded peasants (subject to regulations on military conscription), freedom of occupation, and freedom of departure without permit, the abolition of service in a seigneur’s court (except for the three years to be served by orphans in return for the seigneur’s guardianship), and reaffirmed the prior restrictions on duties, which also could not be derived from the legal state of personal servitude or serfdom (Leibeigenschaft). The most important of these rights in practice were freedom of movement and free choice of occupation. The Estates, still dissatisfied with the Josephin reforms, managed to add a proviso to the freedom of movement, limiting it to those farm-holders who were able to find a suitable replacement to take over their plot. This restriction meant that bonded peasants did not enjoy complete personal freedom, but in practice this was not a major issue in Slovene-populated territory. There were very few opportunities for employment outside farming in Slovene provinces, given their lack of development (with very little manufacturing activity), so there was no wave of farms being abandoned by their tenants. Peasants’ children – despite the opportunity to leave – were even more likely to remain single and at home, waiting for the chance of a marriage that would bring a farm plot with it.

Since the state’s economic and demographic plans were not co-ordinated, court policy was inconsistent on the question of whether it was better for a grunt to be indivisible after its
tenant’s death (as affirmed by economic policy), or if it should be divided (as affirmed by demographic policy). What was undisputed among the central offices of power, however, was the assertion that bonded peasants’ personal rights of property or tenure should be strengthened in every province. Even before the Theresian reforms, all peasants had held a right of tenure based on the right to purchase or inherit (Kaufrecht or Erbrecht) on cameral i.e. the prince’s seigneuries, while on non-cameral seigneuries the predominant rule in the provinces was the (life-time) right of lease, except for Carinthia, where there was the weaker Freistiftrecht, a revocable tenancy. The ‘colonate’ system continued to predominate in the county of Gorizia and Gradisca, and Istria. The route to improved land-use rights differed from province to province, but initial progress was based on a patent on contracts between peasant and landlord, issued by Maria Theresa in 1753. The patent ordered that such contracts required the prior approval of the competent district. The district office gave an opinion, which then required confirmation by the Representation. The state introduced these measures to protect peasants and prevent new agreements with their lords introducing less favourable conditions on the farm than they had previously enjoyed. Maria Theresa’s ordinances from the 1760s, requiring an end to farms being allotted on a temporary basis and making it possible to purchase the right of use and inheritance, had been disregarded in Carinthia, To counter this, in 1772 she issued a direct decree for the province, changing the revocable tenancy (Freistiftrecht) into the right of purchase (Kaufrecht). Peasants had to pay a fee on the handover of a farm, set at one seventh of the land’s value, as the purchase price for the right to inherit. Maria Theresa’s policy in Carniola and Styria was less strict, and in the mid-1770s she issued decrees laying down the transformation from leased farms to purchased rights based on an agreement between landowners and peasants. In part because of peasant mistrust of their lords, but mainly due to peasants’ inability to find the money needed to purchase an improved status on a farm, the transformation of peasants’ property rights initially moved slowly in both provinces, before starting to accelerate, predominantly in Styria. By 1786, there were just 794 leased plots left in the Graz, Maribor and Celje districts, while in the Ljubljana, Postojna and Novo Mesto districts, 14,860 plots were still leased, 57% of all farm plots.

The reforms granting peasants an improved personal standing, more favourable use of land, and greater legal protection in relation to feudal lords, reflected the emergence of the new physiocratic doctrine of economics, which conceived of the agricultural and non-agricultural within a total economic system. The guiding principle for rulers (and their advisers) in managing the new economic policy came from the physiocratic idea that the land provided all that was necessary for the prosperity of the state. Physiocratic thought suggested
that the monarch should allow the economy to function as naturally as possible, which entailed the removal of numerous artificial barriers, such as restrictive guilds, the autonomy or legal immunity of towns, the old provincial privileges, internal customs, and the numerous monopolies. Though state economic policy did not fully shake off the mercantilist grip on economic matters, especially in relation to foreign trade, physiocratic thought was the dominant doctrine in the Austrian Monarchy after 1770. The state’s efforts to improve both the personal status of peasants and the standard of agricultural cultivation were completely in line with the new economic understanding. The idea was that improved agriculture would ensure wider domestic cultivation of industrial crops, which would increase the number of manufactories and production output. The increase in agricultural production was to be supported by agricultural promotion services, known as kmetijske družbe – ‘agricultural societies’. The agricultural society in Klagenfurt was the first to be founded, in 1764, followed by those in Gorizia and Graz (1765), Ljubljana (1767), and in Trieste in 1770 for the city’s hinterland and northern Istria. Taking local conditions and natural resources into account, they promoted the cultivation of crops typical for an individual region, but their programmes were otherwise very similar. The work of the Association for Agriculture and Auxiliary Crafts (Gesellschaft für die Ackerbau und nützliche Künste) in Carniola serves as a general illustration of the work of these societies. Its initiatives were aimed at spreading industrial crops (flax and hemp), and improving their quality by supplying better seed, and promoting the planting of mulberry trees to increase silkworm rearing (above all in the county of Gorizia and Gradisca). It promoted white clover among the forage crops, and by partitioning common pasture lands (a process that continued long into the nineteenth century), it encouraged the stalling of livestock in barns, as well as emphasising the importance of manuring fields. The society imported breeding specimens to raise the quality of cattle and horse rearing, suggested improvements for sheep rearing, established test estates (on the Ljubljana marshlands, and in Styria at Pekre near Maribor). It also promoted fruit growing, the cultivation of potatoes, warned against excessive forest clearance and promoted the idea of forest management.

A typical physiocrat, who put his beliefs into practice, was the entrepreneur and patron, Peter Pavel Glavar (1721–1784), parish priest in Komenda and owner of the Lanšprež castle and estate in lower Carniola (Dolenjska). He was a committed member of the Carniolan Agricultural Society, and on his own estates focused on husbandry and beekeeping, also writing on those subjects. The agricultural society followed his proposal to provide wooden beehives, which they distributed among bonded peasants, replacing older versions made of
straw and twigs. In agreement with the society, he translated (but did not publish) the book *Abhandlung vom Schwärmen der Bienen* (Treatise on the Swarming of Bees) by his fellow Carniolan Anton Janša (1734–1773), from Breznica, who had established himself in Vienna as a beekeeper and the first teacher at a dedicated school of apiculture there. From the late 1760s to the mid-1780s, the agricultural society, which was also responsible for improving commercial trades and crafts (for example, introducing a spinning wheel with two spindles), established a mechanical institute, agricultural school and draughtsmanship school in Ljubljana, as well as cotton spinning schools in Ljubljana, Škofja Loka and Kočevje. The Carniolan society was also the only one in the Austrian provinces in the 1770s to produce anthologies of agricultural instruction (*Sammlung nützlicher Unterrichte*) and a weekly gazette (*Wochentliches Kundschaftsblatt*, 1775–76), which reported government measures, market prices, property affairs, as well as publishing essays on physiocratic theory, and news on events at home and abroad. In the rational approach of Joseph II, however, the agricultural societies were perceived as a source of more costs than measurable direct output, and from the mid-1780s they were gradually closed down. The overall influence of these societies, the membership of which was drawn from a social elite of committed Enlightenment and physiocratic thinkers, may have been indirect, but was by no means inconsequential. By introducing new ideas into agricultural production, the seigneuries established a new rural economy, and also influenced the gradually changing appearance of the villages.

The overall effect of the reform still left peasants at the bottom of the social scale, but they did have greater personal freedom, while improved cultivation made them economically more successful and a little better off materially. The introduction of agricultural innovations (such as fallow rotation, new crops, barn rearing of livestock, and manuring), however, doubled peasants’ work, particularly since the actual tools available remained largely unchanged (the iron plough would only completely replace the wooden at the very end of the nineteenth century). The everyday working rhythm of country life, which was largely dictated by the seasons and the related requirements of work in the fields, began to change in the second half of the eighteenth century. The new understanding of time is reflected in numerous sayings, which although attested from the nineteenth century, have earlier origins. Perhaps the best known Slovene saying of this kind, which remains in use to this day is: *rana ura, zlata ura* (the early bird catches the worm, or literally, the early hour is the golden hour). The number of working days in the year increased; until the major upheavals of the seventeenth century, there had been many free days and the working rhythm was not intense. For example, in the parishes of Radovljica and Ljubljana, in addition to Sundays, there were another 70
days of designated fixed and movable feasts, while in Kranj there were almost 60 such days, and around 63 in Piran. After 1642, the Church reduced the number of holy days, and around a century later, in 1754, only 13 fixed holy or feast days remained in addition to Sundays, while other days were reduced to the status of 'half-holy days’ on which mass was compulsory, but there was no prohibition on work. In 1771, the number of ‘labour-free days’ was fixed, the half-holy days abolished and 16 fixed feast days defined (a calendar that remained in force almost until the end of the Austrian Monarchy). From the 110 to 122 labour-free days a year (including Sundays) in the early decades of the seventeenth century, just 68 remained by the second half of the eighteenth century.

The reforms which affected the traditional environment of the peasant were introduced relatively quickly – within the span of a single generation. Peasants, although desiring change, were also filled with mistrust and suspicious of the reforms. Though they offered peasants greater rights and freedoms, and eradicated existing obligations, the economic measures dictated by physiocratic reform often simply imposed new obligations on them. With the death of Joseph II and the revocation of some of his decisions, peasants lost some of the rights they had acquired, and their hopes faded. The Enlightenment scholar, Anton Tomaž Linhart, summed up the feeling of peasants at the end of the eighteenth century, in the second half of his Versuch einer Geschichte von Krain und den übrigen Ländern der südlichen Slaven Oesterreichs (Essay on the History of Carniola and other Lands of the Southern Austrian Slavs – 1791), in these words: “they have an irreconcilable hatred for their feudal lords, who they see as oppressors.”

**THE STATE AND PROTO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIESTE**

The prevailing economic concept in the Austrian court throughout most of the eighteenth century was mercantilism, which had trickled into the Austrian lands at the end of the seventeenth century, primarily through the work of the ‘first generation’ of theorists, Johann Joachim Becher, Philipp Wilhelm Hörnigk and Wilhelm von Schröder. Theorists of cameralism and mercantilism were also active in Slovene-populated territory and beyond, although the fact that their writings went unpublished meant they remained unknown outside their own direct circles. However, the work of Philipp Rosenberg from Carinthia, Tomasso de Gerardi from Trieste, and Franc Rakovec from Carniola in the first half of the eighteenth century, and of Johann Peter Weber from Styria in the second half, matched the general level
of economic thought of the time. In contrast to the physiocratic ideas that were to arrive later, and which opened up the path towards competition by allowing almost complete economic liberalism, the economic aim of mercantilism was to increase the wealth and power of the state by allowing state intervention in every area of public life. The increasingly powerful state bureaucracy therefore devoted significant focus to establishing a mercantilist economic model that was meant, in principle, to ensure the prosperity of the state, and actually did reduce (or even entirely eradicate) the Austrian Monarchy’s economic and financial lag behind western Europe. The state provided individuals and companies with benefits relating to tolls and, by means of private or exclusive privileges, ceded usually temporary monopoly rights for the production of certain types of goods and products in a specific territory. State companies were also established. It used a policy of economic regionalism and compartmentalisation in an attempt to identify and respond to the industrial advantages of individual provinces, and also to ensure the successful development of individual sectors within them with financial support (subsidies). In 1747, commercial konsesse (offices) were established across the provinces, subordinate to a central commercial office in Vienna; their function was to foster the development of manufacturing and of all activities encompassing trading and retail under the expression ‘commerce’. These commercial offices gradually acquired further functions, which included measuring the annual export-import ratio, drawing up tables of trading figures and planning development for the following year. A statistical office came into existence (and with it the new science of statistics), which was intended to provide the fullest possible expression in figures of the economic situation within the Monarchy.

In accordance with physiocratic theory – that the state must intervene as little as possible in the economy – the state commercial offices in the provinces were closed down in 1776 and state subsidies were reduced, or in some areas even completely withdrawn. It was mainly Joseph II (otherwise much more enthusiastic than Maria Teresa about awarding noble titles to entrepreneurs) who was loath, he said, to award state subsidies “to ‘millionaires’ who hungered and thirsted for projects without a kreuzer to their name.” One major benefit for the economy, particularly for trade and competitive manufacturers, was a physiocratic and mercantilist measure, adopted a year prior to the dissolution of the konsesse, which abolished intra-Monarchy customs between the provinces and individual customs areas. After 1775, the single customs territory encompassed Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia, Upper and Lower Austria and Inner Austria (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca and the small coastal belt called the Littoral). Trieste, which functioned like a modern customs-free zone, and the
Hungarian half of the monarchy, including Croatia, were not included in this customs area. The promotion of manufacturing opened up the path to industrial modernisation (capitalism), primarily in those places which already had a more robust economic base. In the mid-1760s offices at court had already concluded that the economic development of the Inner Austrian provinces was unsatisfactory, with a lack of professional application and entrepreneurial spirit. There was too little domestic capital, and state subsidies were much more modest than those available in the more northerly provinces. In the Inner Austrian provinces (including Trieste and Rijeka) at the end of the 1780s, there were 53 manufactories (including textile plants, leather factories, glassworks, chandlers, and paper mills), each of which directly employed more than 100 people; the total number employed was up to 7,000. The overall work process in these manufactories involved at least three times more people than there were employees. Outside this production circle, several thousand more people were employed in ironworking and mining, as well as in numerous smaller factories (craft undertakings), cottage industries and trades.

While state policy throughout most of the eighteenth century provided support to non-agrarian production by granting special privileges, at the same time it rolled back those based on a medieval concept of freedom. Medieval libertas, effectively a right (privilege) tied to a specific Estate, had become too restrictive, as had the dominance of the trades by the closed ranks of the guilds. A patent issued in 1725 was one of many measures announced at the beginning of the century as part of the ongoing policy to restrict the influence of the guilds. Tradespeople who were not part of a guild and who performed their work travelling from place to place (such work was known as štera or štira, and the tradesperson as a šter) were allowed to perform their work if they paid a certain fee. The imperial handicrafts patent of 1732 for the Inner Austrian provinces was a direct encroachment on the operation of the guilds. Among other things it determined that guild rules could only apply if they had princely approval, permitted complaints against master craftsmen outside the guilds’ own structures, prohibited guilds from fixing prices and wages, and threatened guilds with abolition if they failed to obey the ruler. This stripped guilds of some of their powers, and brought them under the provincial ruler’s control, which constituted de facto abolition of guild autonomy. The debate continued for decades within court offices of the benefits of completely abolishing the guilds, but Maria Theresa never went that far, probably because the different guild traditions that existed from province to province would have meant that it could have no real effect. The prevailing approach, then, was to break the power of the guilds by providing greater protection to those trades that were not organised into guilds. In the mid-1750s, a prohibition
was ordered against the establishment of new guilds and forcing unaligned tradespeople into existing guilds; ten years later, in 1765, trades were divided into ‘police’ and ‘commercial’. The former were oriented towards production for consumers in close vicinity; while the commercial trades produced in greater quantities and for the wider market. This division of trades, for which the term ‘profession’ had already been established by this time (with tradespeople being referred to as Professionisten), had the aim of freeing the more entrepreneurial from the constraints imposed by local authorities. Commercial trades, which gradually increased in number, were subordinate to state authorities in the provinces, while ‘police’ trades, which continued to fall in number (for example, there were only ten such trades in Ljubljana by the end of the century: brewers, coopers, printers, farriers, tailors, cobblers, joiners, cloth-cutters and carpenters) came under the auspices of town magistrates. From this time on, the economic and organisational importance of the guilds was significantly reduced, and the strict guild regulation on a compulsory travel requirement (Wanderzwang) for journeymen was also abandoned. In the 1780s, Joseph II granted city and rural tradespeople the same rights, abolished restrictions on the number of masters and journeymen or assistants within any one trade, and lifted all remaining guild-imposed restrictions on those trades that required specific professional formation (sculptors, painters, teachers, apothecaries, surgeons and midwives), declaring them to be liberal arts or professions. The sole exception to the long-term liberalisation of the guilds was the rifle-makers of Ferlach (Borovljce), who, as special military producers, were considered a separate case. From 1732, the Ferlach Professionisten, of which there were 312 by the middle of the century, came under the control of the Hofkreisrat, which made constant and considerable firearm orders (up to 40,000 pieces a year). The declining economic influence of the guilds led to their final disappearance at the end of the century, when the only remnant of the historical importance of the guilds was the theatre of the medieval ceremonies featuring guild representatives performing elaborate protocols to mark their patron saint’s day or the admission of new members.

Mercantilist and physiocratic measures played their part in the economic liberalisation, while the spread of general commercial activity in turn increased the volume of commercial trades activity, within which a number of new occupations arose. Transit trade in Trieste had a considerable effect on the economic development of the Slovene-populated territory, although the territory itself did not provide any great incentives for development. Compared to many other parts of the Austrian half of the state, the Inner Austrian provinces (and with them, the majority of Slovene-populated lands) were in somewhat of an economic standstill: there were
at least 15,000 Professionisten from both branches of trade in the Inner Austrian provinces around 1770, with Slovene-populated territory (including Trieste and Prekmurje) having around 4,500 Professionisten in 25 sectors of commercial trade at around the same time. In contrast, just a few years later (1776), Bohemia had almost 57,000 Professionisten in the commercial trades alone, and 12 years later this number had risen to 122,000. There were also significant increases in the number of commercial Professionisten in Moravia (from 22,000 to 31,000 during roughly the same period) and Lower Austria (from 25,000 to 34,000 between 1783 and 1790). A similar picture of development in the trades (or the lack of it) can be obtained by comparing Trieste with Ljubljana, which was gaining in economic and cultural importance for the Slovene-populated territory. In relation to the size of their respective populations, and the comparison was similar for the two provinces as well as the two cities, Trieste had a professionally more varied and denser network of trade activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No employed in trades</th>
<th>Ratio of total population to trades workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ljubljana 1706</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieste 1700</td>
<td>6,433</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>10,644</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trieste could not compare to the large ports on the northern Mediterranean coast or the European Atlantic coast, but its continuous economic growth through the eighteenth century did transform it into an important trading centre for the entire Monarchy. At the beginning of the century, the Habsburgs shifted attention to the Adriatic, after the peace treaties following the War of the Spanish Succession had brought them Naples, Sardinia and, later, in exchange for the latter, Sicily. Charles VI was no longer prepared to accept Venetian dominance of the Adriatic, and was also moving to connect the Habsburg possessions in southern Italy to the Italian and Austrian possessions in the north as effectively as possible. He granted Trieste (and other ports then part of Inner Austria) a series of privileges and rights in 1717, 1719, 1725 and 1731, because it was mainly through Trieste that supply routes in two directions were to pass: Milan needed supplies of Neapolitan salt and Naples needed iron from the north, as well as linen, cloth, and wool goods. These economic plans drawn up by court strategists in Vienna did not prove completely effective. In the mid-1730s, Charles VI was obliged to cede Naples and Sicily to the Spanish Bourbons (in exchange, the Habsburgs received Parma and
Piacenza, though they only held them just over a decade), and Vienna’s grand maritime designs, including efforts to establish a navy, fell by the wayside. These events did not affect Trieste too adversely since the commercial links that naturally tied the city to Slovene-populated territory and onward to Vienna and the heart of Austrian territory, as well as eastwards to the newly gained territories in Hungary and Slavonia, were much more important for its development.

The privileges that Trieste enjoyed under Charles VI were perpetuated by Maria Theresa, and it was only in her reign that the city could take the fullest advantage of them. A large new quarter called the ‘Borgo Teresiano’ started to grow up alongside the city’s ancient core. While the coastal towns in Venetian-controlled Slovene Istria declined because they were cut off, trade and transport-wise, from their hinterland, the arrival of foreign merchants, businessmen and tradespeople meant that Trieste was becoming an international commercial and trade centre. The right to berth at the port, to trade, to leave port with goods, or indeed store them there for several months, was granted to every merchant. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the free port privileges were extended to the whole city. There was substantial economic growth, as shown by the constant rise in the quantity and value of goods, the increase in the number of ships and, more significantly, the increase in total shipping capacity, and by the fact that the Venetian shipping gradually began to lose its dominance of maritime transport.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incoming ships</th>
<th>Outgoing ships</th>
<th>Total value of goods</th>
<th>Volume of goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>3,348</td>
<td>3,138</td>
<td>6.7 million fl.</td>
<td>14,504 tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1764</td>
<td>4,131</td>
<td>4,103</td>
<td>7.8 million fl.</td>
<td>26,880 tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>5,191</td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>16.2 million fl.</td>
<td>82,015 tonnes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trieste was very much the import-export port of Inner Austria. Of the total value of the goods that arrived in Trieste from the interior provinces in the 1760s, around 50% was from Styria, Carinthia and Carniola (chiefly iron, mercury and linen), while only 30 to 40% of the total value of goods that Trieste exported to its large hinterland (chiefly olive oil, cotton, spices, citrus fruits, sugar and coffee) went to these provinces. A large portion of Trieste’s trade was linked to Upper and Lower Austria, and Vienna. This trade gradually began to increase, and Slovene-populated territory began to take on an economic role as a transit area for the core of the Monarchy.

Along with the increase in the quantity of goods at the port, and in the city itself,
where an increasing number of trades workshops and manufactories were producing more and more goods, came an increase in transport and carting of goods between Trieste and its hinterland. Improvements to the main commercial roads in particular transformed transport as well. The carriage of goods by road, which had to a large extent provided the inhabitants of the impoverished Karst region with a livelihood, did not decline (or only to a barely noticeable extent), and in fact there was a substantial increase in carting: in 1760, carts carried around 2,000 tonnes of goods, rising in 1794 to around 22,000 tonnes. The civil postal service developed in tandem with a more rapid and extensive flow of goods. By 1730, post riders were travelling along the main road route from Trieste via Ljubljana and Graz to Vienna twice a week; this became daily in 1784 (the same postal service travelled along the other main commercial road routes two or three times a week). In the second half of the century, post riders were joined on the main road routes by scheduled passenger carriages and by the less comfortable but faster postal carriages. The single customs regime introduced in the last quarter of the century removed another obstacle to the development of Trieste itself and to the smooth flow of goods throughout the Austrian half of the Monarchy. Excise duties were only paid on goods moved from Trieste into the interior. From this time on, the only serious nuisance faced by merchants and travellers, in addition to the improved but still poor roads, bridges and river crossings, were bandits; the authorities responded by establishing military posts in Gorizia-Gradisca and Carniola (the modern-day place name of Ravbarkomanda near Postojna is a reminder of the military garrison once stationed there).

It was mainly in the second half of the century that Trieste developed into a flourishing trading city. An international community comprising Italian, German, Jewish, Greek, Serbian, English and Dutch merchants and entrepreneurs used the imperial privileges granted to them to establish the trade organisations – a stock exchange, marine insurance companies, banks and the professional maritime school – that in turn allowed major trade transactions to take place. At the same time, the construction of religious buildings and places of worship for the numerous religious groups in the city (the majority were Catholics, but the city was also home to Jews, and Serbian and Greek Orthodox, Calvinist, Lutheran and Armenian Christians). Trieste was an ethnically and religiously tolerant city, strongly linked economically to its eastern and northeastern Slovene, Austrian and Hungarian-Slavonian hinterland, while retaining expressly Italian spiritual and cultural features, and its economic growth gave rise to increasing demands for autonomy and civic freedoms.
By turning the Austrian Monarchy into an absolutist state, Maria Theresa and Joseph II succeeded in centralising and thereby monopolising decision-making on key matters. This enabled the Monarchy to function as a sovereign state both internally and externally (the army, domestic and foreign affairs, finance, the judiciary with modernised legislation, the economy). Economic development, political interests and modern Enlightenment ideas all served to place a comprehensive general education system and its supervision among the fundamental matters of state. The state considered the increased working capacity of bonded peasants as a means of achieving greater economic and financial power (indicated by the founding of and support for technical schools, such as the school for metallurgy and chemistry in Idrija, the maritime school in Trieste, trade schools in Klagenfurt and Ljubljana, and a series of spinning training schools; also part of this trend were the schools of midwifery that were set up in all the main towns). The aim was to provide the population with access to primary education and remove the Church’s influence from every level of the education system. In the 1750s, Maria Theresa had already nationalised the universities and in 1770 she declared the entire education system as a “politicum” – a matter of state. After a few years, the education system was entirely under state control.

In debates on whether the common people really needed an education, the nobility and the clergy took completely opposing standpoints, with other social groups picking their side: the division was between those who considered education to be the basis for the cultural and economic growth of the individual and the community, and those who saw that if the people were kept in a state of intellectual or educational backwardness, then they would remain faithful to Church and state. Church circles often expressed the fear that if peasants learn to read and write then they would become aware of their miserable circumstances, rise up against their lords and abandon the Catholic faith, although, as the parish priest in Griže wrote, they were also enthusing over the “excellent and holy thought that by founding schools in villages, the dear young people would be more civilised than their animal-like parents.” One proposal that reached the court in connection with the instauration of primary education came from Blaž Kumerdej (1738–1805) in early 1772: he proposed the establishment of state schools in Carniola that would be attended by all children regardless of gender or social standing. He assured Maria Theresa that literate people would find it easier to overcome the problems of ignorance, superstition and poverty, they would find it easier to understand the state’s demands if expressed in the language of the province, would better understand their
faith and the economic system, would be better at dealing with money, would be more flexible in trading and better taxpayers, as well as better soldiers. Schools, he proposed, should teach in Slovene as only then would they reach all children, though this would mean that books for both pupils and teachers would have to be translated into Slovene. The changes suggested by Kumerdej, who was rewarded one year later by being made headmaster of the Ljubljana primary school and later became a school inspector in the Celje district office, were only realised some years later, and even then only in part.

Like most of the important army generals and advisors, the planners and implementers of the large reform projects of Maria Theresa and Joseph II were foreigners (soldiers Leopold Joseph Daun, Gideon Ernst Laudon, and Franz Moritz Lacy, the statesman Friedrich Wilhelm Haugwitz, the lawyers Karl Anton Martini and Joseph Sonnenfels, and the doctor Gerhard van Swieten). School reformer Johann Ignaz Felbiger was also a newcomer, who had already successfully transformed Catholic education in Prussian Silesia. The General School Regulations (Allgemeine Schulordnung, translated into Slovene three years later as the Splošni šolski red), published in 1774, was based on the Prussian example and provided the legal basis for primary schools as a state institution. The regulations stipulated compulsory instruction for children aged 6–12 in three types of ‘German’ state school: the four-year Normalschulen (established in the main provincial towns and in Trieste by the end of the 1770s), the three-year Hauptschulen (in larger towns and market settlements) and the one-year Trivialschulen (mainly in larger villages). The schools were called ‘German’ though the author of the school regulations mainly used this term to distinguish them from ‘Latin schools’. Instruction in German was often impossible because pupils simply did not speak the language. In the pedagogical handbook on teaching (Kern des Methodenbuches, translated into Slovene in its entirety and in abridged form), Felbiger stipulated that in an environment where the mother tongue is not German, lessons should first be taught in that language, then bilingually, so that in the last years of Hauptschule and Normalschule classes could be taught in German only. The implementation of the General School Regulations – which also defined rights and powers regarding the establishment and maintenance of primary schools and teachers, the school curriculum, and its content – went slowly and at different rates depending on province. Around 1790 (a decade and a half after the publication of the regulations), Carniola had 58 schools with 3,154 pupils, Carinthia had 157 schools and 8,567 pupils, and Styria 376 schools with 20,576 pupils. On Slovene-populated territory within the Monarchy, there were probably over 8,000 pupils attending 4 Normalschulen, 8 Hauptschulen, 141 Trivialschulen, and some town schools (Bürgerschulen) in Istria. Lessons in Slovene alone or
in bilingual combination with German, which was the predominant form of teaching in these schools, required school textbooks in Slovene (a spelling book, a reading primer, an arithmetic book, the catechism, and a songbook). The state, which had to introduce the Slovene language into elementary education if it wanted to ultimately establish German as the common official language, unintentionally triggered the process of standardising Slovene language rules. The almost forgotten tradition of literary Slovene from the sixteenth century and the dialectally fragmented Slovene of the eighteenth needed a modern and unified literary standard. The use of Slovene in primary schools and the translations of German textbooks (and in different patents and orders) encouraged the development of rules for the language and its increased use in public life in general; at the same time, the conviction began to grow among the nationally conscious secular and ecclesiastical intelligentsia that literacy and education were broadly beneficial.

The state also took control over higher education. After Portugal, France and Spain had banished the Jesuit order (largely due to its power in the colonies), before Pope Clement XIV abolished it in 1773 following pressure from these countries, the devout Catholic Maria Theresa also reluctantly dissolved the Jesuit order in the Austrian Monarchy (which did not have an overseas empire). This eased the state’s path to complete control over secondary and higher education, which had previously been controlled by the Jesuits. Maria Theresa used the Jesuit assets to create a school fund, and retained many Jesuits as teachers in schools, which were given a broadened and modernised curriculum. In gymnasium schools, which became even more elitist than before and largely accessible only to noble children, German began to assert itself (as did Italian in Gorizia) and challenge the dominance of Latin. In the lyceums, which played the role of high school institutions in the provincial capitals rather like expanded gymnasium schools, it was possible to study a four-year course in theology, a two-year course in philosophy as well as two or three years of medicine and surgery in Klagenfurt and Ljubljana.

Many Slovenes left their homeland and made names for themselves elsewhere, such as the polyglot scientist Janez Sigismund Valentin Popovič (1705–1774), who worked in Germany and Vienna, the philosopher Franc Karpe (1747–1806), who was active in Olomouc, Brno and Vienna, the lawyer Franc Ksaverij Jelenc (1749–1805) in Innsbruck and Freiburg, and – probably the most famous mathematician in the Monarchy at the time – Jurij Vega (1754–1802) in Vienna, but there were also some civil engineers, doctors and scientists who came from elsewhere to teach and achieve success in Carniola. The Viennese Jesuit Gabrijel Gruber (1740–1805), who worked as a professor of technical subjects at the lyceum, can be
credited for the construction of the river canal in Ljubljana. The canal, which prevented the swollen river from breaking its banks, was completed in the beginning of the 1780s by the Carniolan military engineer Vincenc Struppi (1733–1810), who also worked on draining the marshes near Aquileia and constructing a road from Senj to Karlovac. Two doctors who became known for their exceptional research, above all in the field of natural sciences, and who were also driven by the triumph of physiocratic principles were the Tyrolean of Italian origin, Giovanni Antonio Scopoli (1723–1788), and Baltazar Hacquet (1739/40–1815), from France. In the mid 1750s, Scopoli was appointed mine doctor in Idrija, and later professor at the technical school there. He devoted his research to various fields of natural science (botany, zoology, mineralogy, chemistry, and metallurgy) and gained a considerable reputation outside the Monarchy as well. Of his numerous books and treatises, the two most important addressed the plant-life of Carniola (*Flora Carniolica*, 1760, 1772) and its insects (*Enthomologia Carniolica*, 1763). Scopoli was succeeded in the mid-1760s in Idrija by Hacquet, who later also became professor, taking the chair of medicine and surgery at the Ljubljana lyceum. He was very proficient in his field and was an educated Enlightenment man, but in an environment in which Enlightenment ideas only reached a few rare individuals, often not well understood. During the 21 years that he spent in the province, he criss-crossed Carniola numerous times, and also visited other Alpine countries, and Lika and Bosnia, as an inquisitive traveller and researcher. He authored over 60 studies covering various aspects of the natural sciences and his most important work was the *Oryctographia Carniolica* (vol. i–iv, 1778–1789), which offers a comprehensive survey of the geological, mineralogical, botanical, and partly also ethnological characteristics, of Carniola. The cosmopolitan Hacquet had planned to present the ethnography and folklore of the province in a separate fifth volume, which was ultimately published incomplete at the start of the nineteenth century.

The school reforms established an educational hierarchy subject to full state control; they improved the teaching content and consequently stimulated empirical research, introducing the principle of compulsory lessons for children, which was intended to lead to the general literacy of the population. After the death of Joseph II in 1790, primary education reforms stalled. The provincial Estates had been completely excluded from any decision-making during the rule of Joseph II, so when Leopold II (1790–1792) invited them to send their proposals, complaints and wants relating to their circumstances and the abolished tax and urbarial regime, they acted quickly, submitting a declaration by the middle of 1790. It included the demands of the Carniolan and Styrian Estates (as well as some others) for the abolition of the *Trivialschulen* in rural areas. The Carniolan Estates demanded that all three
types of primary school should only be maintained in the towns and that education should not be compulsory. Fearful that the ideas of the French Revolution might prove contagious, some feudal lords went so far as to demand that schools should be for the nobles alone, while the people, as Count Kajetan Auersperg asserted, should remain ignorant and pious. No such restrictions were introduced in primary education, but the number of Trivialschulen began to decrease after 1790, and the Church managed to regain influence over education in the early nineteenth century.

The Church was not immune from the sweeping changes of the second half of the eighteenth century. The state acknowledged the Church’s role as guardian of its citizen’s souls but also considered the Church’s pastoral work to be the realisation of its own intentions and vision, therefore it not only intervened in the Church’s organisational structure but also in expressly religious matters and the Church’s internal domain. The longstanding political efforts of the Habsburg rulers to subordinate the Church reached their pinnacle with the actions of Maria Teresa and Joseph II. The ecclesiastical policy reforms of Joseph II, often referred to as Josephinism, aimed at completely subordinating the Catholic Church to the absolutist state, creating a kind of state church.

In parallel with the distinct external (state) pressures on the Catholic Church aimed at turning priests into “state officials in black cassocks,” there were also aspirations for internal reform of the Church. Catholic Reform – its opponents referred to it as Jansenism and to its adherents as Jansenists (after the originator of this dogmatic, moral and political movement, Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638)) – could be divided into two very distinct groups. The first group was made up of clergy who favoured a moral rigorism that was close to Jansenism. According to their belief, the demands of the Council of Trent were to be closely followed and religious practice should be free of the extravagance of numerous processions, religious fraternities and various forms of popular devotion. The second group, which opposed Baroque forms of Catholicism as much as the first group, thought that co-operation with the state offered an opportunity for religious reform. Adherents of this movement took their ideas from the Italian priest and philosopher Ludovico Antonio Muratori (1672–1750), whose work influenced Maria Theresa and also enthused Joseph II, and who argued that the work of the Church should be limited to matters of spirituality and faith, leaving everything else to the state. There were also other more radical ideas which connected themselves with this interpretation of the Church’s role, such as French Gallicanism, a movement demanding an independent ‘Gallic’ national church, and Febronianism, named after the suffragan bishop in Trier, Johann Nikolaus von Hontheim (1701–1790), who used the pseudonym Justinus
Febronius, which was particularly widespread in the Catholic areas of the German empire. Febronianism called for restrictions on the pope’s authority, reducing it to an honorary role. The authority of the pope as ‘monarch’ would be replaced by a church council, as had already been decided at the Council of Basel. This would greatly increase the power of the bishops in relation to the pope, but, in order to function entirely with more autonomy on religious matters within their dioceses, the bishops who were enthusiastic about enlightened Catholicism needed the help of the secular authorities, and they acknowledged the right of provincial princes or rulers to intervene in the external structure of the Church’s organisation with the aim of reform. This was a similar position to that of Joseph II, who wanted to reorganise the state on rationalist principles. This would mean that the Catholic Church would have a subordinated role within the state borders. Catholic Reform – personified in the Slovene world by Bishop of Ljubljana, Janez Karel Herberstein (auxiliary bishop 1769, full bishop 1772–1787) – and Josephinism, found a common ground as reform movements for a number of years. The ecclesiastical policy reforms achieved by absolutist rulers were therefore only possible with the support of Church circles that were in the mood for reform.

Maria Theresa, who in her deep faith was not favourably disposed to Enlightenment ideas, led a Church policy that was continued (much more decisively) by her son Joseph II, who was extremely attached to Enlightenment ideas. She did not believe that everything done by the Church at the time had been entrusted to it by Jesus and the apostles, so these tasks should also be the responsibility of the crown, perhaps exclusively. Her reforms influenced religious life and the functioning of the Church on three main levels. The first affected popular devotion and ceremonies and the emotional understanding of religion among common people. In the 1750s, she forbade feasting at christenings and wakes, gunfire to mark church and other feast days, and other popular customs. The second level expressed the state’s mistrust for the unsupervised functioning of the Church. From 1746 onwards, numerous prohibitions were introduced proscribing the publication of papal or episcopal decrees and pastoral letters without prior permission from the state. They also prohibited canonical visitations by foreign superiors of religious orders on the Monarchy’s territory and the training of clergy abroad, and took away the Church’s control over the press and education. The third level of measures, however, required the Church to conform administratively to the state system. The existing church jurisdiction of the patriarchate of Aquileia (which covered all of the Slovene territories south of the Drava except for the diocese of Ljubljana) offended proponents of the Monarchy’s absolutist structure. The Habsburgs had already been blocking the influence of the Aquileian patriarchate (which was subordinate to Venice) over clergy in
the Habsburg lands. However, it was only possible to overcome the unofficial church division when the balance of power between the Austrian Monarchy and Venice turned in Austria’s favour. In 1751, the pope abolished the patriarchate of Aquileia and founded two archdioceses: the archdiocese of Udine in Venetian territory and the archdiocese of Gorizia in the Habsburg part of the former patriarchate.

Maria Theresa’s ecclesiastical policy reforms limited the authority of the Church and introduced considerable control of its functioning, but they were not considered to have destroyed the internal structure and moral authority of the Church. In general, the combination of her success in putting the prevailing mood for reform into practice and her dignified, conservative attitude (and intolerance to people of other faiths, especially Jews and Protestants) preserved a popular image of her as the archetype of a good and wise ruler, with a paternalistic attitude towards her subjects. The intentions of her intellectually gifted but despotic son, Joseph II, were similar to those of his mother, but he was often overhasty in implementing reforms.

In the desire to change the status quo, Joseph II overestimated his absolutist power, which rather than constituting limitless authority proved to be power without control. After he came to full and independent power in 1780, Joseph continued his mother’s work with the regulatory reorganisation of the Monarchy in all domains, but the extent of legal absolutism became excessive and too invasive. His constant issuing of decrees, orders, mandates and patents reflected his desire to regulate everything, defining the role of the individual down to the smallest detail and preventing anything that might threaten or in any other way trouble the state. Utterly absurd prohibitions were introduced (e.g. banning gingerbread because it was claimed to upset digestion) alongside some meaningful innovations (such as controlling the number of dogs due to the rapid spread of rabies, and introducing dog badges and taxes to Carniola in 1785). His most radical, systematic and in some cases far-sighted measures, however, concerned the Church. Like Maria Teresa, Joseph II implemented his ecclesiastical and political measures more or less simultaneously, and affected the religious life of the entire population, the functioning of the clergy and the Church’s administrative structure. Joseph added further prohibitions to those of his mother, which concerned visible expressions of faith and attitudes towards life and death. His decrees included prohibitions on various processions and feast days, and in 1783 he abolished religious fraternities and put their assets in a religious fund. He even went so far as to regulate the number of candles that could burn on an altar and the number of masses that could be held. However, his order that the dead must be buried in canvas bags or sheets instead of in coffins in order to save wood led to such popular
resistance that he retracted it.

In 1781, Joseph issued a decree extending religious freedoms to non-Catholics, which was met with bewilderment in Rome and among the Monarchy’s own anti-reform clergy. The Edict or Patent of Toleration gave Protestants (Lutherans and Calvinists), Orthodox Christians and Jews freedom of worship. A group of non-Catholic believers of a certain size was permitted to build their own place of worship if they avoided making visible signs such as bell-towers and entrances on main streets. The Catholic Church retained its privileged position but non-Catholics now had almost the same employment rights. In Slovene-populated territories, this measure was not particularly controversial as virtually everyone was Catholic, but it did have a negative impact on the pope’s authority. Pope Pius VI decided to travel to Vienna in order to convince Emperor Joseph II to abandon such radical interventions in religious life, the first papal visit in 350 years to any state within the German empire. But the political journey in 1782, which took the pope to Vienna via Gorizia, Ljubljana and Maribor, did not bear any fruit. The Patent of Toleration, which represented a turnaround in the Habsburgs’ traditional religious policy, remained in place, while control over the Church was strengthened. Joseph even prescribed what the priests should preach, determined how many novices could be trained as priests and merged theology seminaries in the larger towns. In 1783, theological study was abolished in Ljubljana for eight years (philosophy was also abolished for three years). A general seminary was founded in Graz to serve theology students from Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca, and Trieste.

The most lasting and fateful ecclesiastical reforms were those which changed the administrative and organisational lay structure of the Church and defined the role of the religious orders. After a decision made by Joseph II in early 1782, all monasteries not contributing to, or deemed as not essential to, the growth of state prosperity were to be dissolved in several waves. The monasteries deemed unprofitable were largely from the contemplative and penitent orders, while those deemed useful were mainly those involved in educational activities and caring for the sick. In less than ten years, 738 out of a total of 2,163 male and female monasteries in the Austrian Monarchy (including Hungary) were dissolved; less than half of the approximately 65,000 men and women in the religious orders remained. In Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca and Trieste, 65 male and female monasteries were dissolved (Cistercians, Carthusians, Benedictines – male and female orders, Poor Clares, Carmelites – male and female, and some Franciscans). Only 31 monasteries remained (Capuchins, Franciscans, Minorites, Ursuline sisters, the Brothers of Mercy, Dominicans and a few others). The vast Church assets were brought under state administration. The assessed
The net value of the largest monastic seigneuries seized from individual orders came to several hundred thousand florins in a number of cases (Vetrinj, Žiče, Stična, Mekinje, and Bistra). The state also inherited the cultural wealth of the monastical libraries and archives, which were taken to Graz, Vienna and partly also to Ljubljana. Assets from the dissolved monasteries were invested in religious funds, which were set up in the different provinces, to provide for the upkeep of the now ‘unemployed’ nuns and monks, to support rural schools, and for the ‘retraining’ of monks as lay priests, who were now needed in a whole series of newly created parishes. The dissolution of monasteries was accompanied by the alteration of parish boundaries. Parishes often differed greatly in size and their territories were not always contiguous. In the three years between 1782 and 1785, the dioceses (under the control of the state authorities) drew up a rational plan to redraw parish boundaries, using the criteria that a parish should contain around 700 people and that the church should be no more than one hour on foot from all its parishioners. Slovene-populated territory gained several dozen new parishes and around 350 ‘local curacies’. These were intended to become parishes over time, if sufficient funds were found. Through this even distribution of parishes, the pastoral activity of the ‘state’ church could now reach the entire population, while the registers of births, marriages and death which parish priests were required to keep gave the state a more accurate insight into its overall population, and the data could also be broken down to individual province, district and local levels. The old dioceses were also disproportionately large and did not conform to the administrative boundaries of the provinces or the districts. The bishops of Salzburg and Gorizia opposed a more rational territorial arrangement of diocesan boundaries within the Monarchy and slowed down the reform process, but could not stop it altogether. After the parish boundaries had been set in 1785, it was the turn of the diocesan boundaries to be redrawn. The Lavantine diocese (with its see in St. Andrä) was joined to the district of Völkermarkt in Carinthia and the district of Celje in lower Styria. The diocese of Gurk (with its see in Klagenfurt) was adjusted to conform to Carinthia’s provincial borders (with the exception of the district of Völkermarkt). The diocese of Seckau (with its see in Graz) gained the districts of Graz and Maribor. The diocese of Ljubljana now covered a territory which was mostly in keeping with the borders of Carniola. The changes in the west were, however, most painful as the influence of the archbishop of Gorizia was completely lost. Following pressure from Joseph II, the pope abolished the archdiocese of Gorizia in 1788 and transferred the see of the diocese to Gradisca d’Isonzo and then back to Gorizia in 1791 (for the diocese of Gorizia-Gradisca). The transferral of diocesan powers from Gorizia to Gradisca d’Isonzo also meant the abolition of the dioceses of Trieste and Pičan (Pedena), and their territory was
added to the diocese of Gradisca d’Isonzo. In 1791, the diocese of Trieste was restored its
territory and also incorporated the former diocese of Pićan, which was not revived. The
diocese of Koper at the western end of the Slovene ethnic area and the diocese of
Szombathely, which contained the Slovenes of Prekmurje in the far northeast of the Slovene
ethnic area, remained outside Inner Austria. With the new diocesan boundaries, Ljubljana
acquired its first archbishop (Mihael Brigido, 1787–1806), who was now a metropolitan
bishop (1787–1807). Dioceses with a Slovene population south of the Drava were subordinate
to Ljubljana, but opposition from the archbishop of Salzburg meant that other dioceses (Gurk,
Lavantine and Seckau) which were partially populated by Slovenes were not.

Within the span of half a century, Maria Theresa and Joseph II thoroughly altered the
appearance of the Austrian Monarchy. The numerous reforms succeeded in limiting the power
of the Estates (and preserved aristocratic rule), liberated the economy from the restrictive,
closed guilds, challenged and reduced the pope’s influence over dioceses in the Monarchy,
weakened the Church’s religious orders, and by founding an enormous network of institutions
turned the Monarchy into a centralised state. Society was on the road to modernity. In western
Europe, this was largely related to industrialisation, while in Slovenia the concept of
modernisation was linked to the struggle for national autonomy.

SLOVENE TERRITORY AND SOCIETY AT THE END OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

When the people revolted in Paris in 1789 and the Bastille fell, supporters of the
Josephine reforms in the provinces inhabited by the Slovene-speaking population cast nervous
glances towards France. The news from Paris, sometimes described briefly, sometimes at
length in the newspapers of the provincial capitals, was seen as a final warning. Many who
sympathised with the Josephine reforms in Graz and Trieste, though far fewer in Ljubljana
and Klagenfurt, warned the emperor that he should persist with the reforms. The more
determined of them even loudly proclaimed that the main cause of the French Revolution lay
in the absolutism of Louis XVI, and called on Joseph II to make use of support from the
reform-minded members of the nobility, the burgher classes and the ‘third estate’, if he
wanted to avoid events following the French lead. They were aware that the development
fostered by the Theresian and Josephine policy could no longer be halted, and a new era was
underway that would gradually change the foundations of society and the economy in the
Habsburg lands. Anton T. Linhart (1756–95), the most important figure of the Slovene
Enlightenment, predicted in the first part of Versuch einer Geschichte von Krain und den
übrigen Ländern der südlichen Slaven Oesterreichs (An Essay on the History of Carniola and other Lands of the Southern Austrian Slavs – 1788), the gradual, but profound disappearance of the original characteristics of the “Carniolan people” and said that it would only be possible in the future to know about the life of “old Carniolans” from the descriptions in the Die Ehre deß Hertzogthums Crain (The Glory of the Duchy of Carniola), published in 1689 by Johann Weichard Valvasor (1641–93).

This prediction would eventually prove justified, but the world around Linhart at the end of the eighteenth century was still only starting to change. At that time, fewer than 900,000 people lived in the territory of modern-day Slovenia, with probably over 200,000 more across the entire territory then settled by Slovenes. The social structure of the population had not changed significantly: most people (around 93%) lived in rural areas, nobles accounted for just less than 1%, and towns were small, generally with populations between 600 and 1,700. Only ten towns or so had more inhabitants: in the interior, Gorizia, Idrija, Klagenfurt, Maribor and Ljubljana, which had a population of 9,000 to 10,000 at the end of the eighteenth century; on the coast, Koper, Izola, Piran and Trieste, where the population had increased fourfold from the beginning of the eighteenth century (Trieste’s population in 1800 is estimated at around 28,000). The rapid growth of Trieste was due to immigration from the surrounding area, and from further afield, which was still an unusual phenomenon at that time. The rural population meanwhile was only increasing slowly: the high birth rate was matched by a high mortality rate, famine and epidemics still occurred, while the high infant mortality rate, particularly in early childhood, meant that villages still lacked the large families and overpopulation that could lead to migration to towns.

The reforms accelerated the process of social stratification and by the mid-eighteenth century in some regions (such as Carniola), peasants already represented just half of the rural population, with smallholders and tenant farmers (cottars) making up over 40%. As in the previous century, many of those who could not make a living from the land sought and found one in domestic crafts, iron working and transport. Most non-agrarian production, trade and transport was still linked to the countryside, and in many areas offered a larger source of income than farming. Even Carniola, which lagged behind Carinthia and Styria in terms of economic development, boosted provincial finances through the export of non-agrarian products – linen and iron – while importing the grain and livestock it lacked.

General cultural conditions in the region, both social and economic, were also undergoing gradual change. Most of the rural population still had no education and, before the introduction of universal compulsory education in 1774, were almost entirely illiterate. The
The introduction of compulsory education was only the first step towards improving this situation. The financial side of organising schools was left to the provincial, district and local authorities, and there was little money and few trained teachers, as well as opposition to universal compulsory education from the clergy and nobility. Initially, despite the new regulations, very few children attended school; at the end of the eighteenth century over 90% of the populace was still illiterate in Slovene-speaking areas.

The modernisation of secondary schools, which by the end of the eighteenth century already had lay teachers as well as former Jesuits and other priests, did not progress any faster. By the 1790s, there were state secondary schools in Ljubljana, Klagenfurt, Maribor, Gorizia, Novo Mesto, Trieste and Koper, while in Idrija there were three private secondary school classes maintained by miners. Lyceums, which took over the role played by the former Jesuit schools of higher study following the dissolution of the Jesuit Order, functioned in Ljubljana, Gorizia and Klagenfurt. The episcopal seminaries in Ljubljana and Graz served the educational needs of the clergy. For anyone wanting to continue their studies at a university, Vienna was the only option as from 1782 to 1827 the closest university, in Graz, was still classed as a lyceum, except for theological studies.

The rescinding of some reforms and the uncertain fate of others following the death of Joseph II caused considerable unrest among the peasant populace. The status of peasants had definitely been improved by the Theresian and Josephine reforms, which had raised new hopes, as well as new fears. Rumours spread in rural areas – during Joseph’s lifetime – that the reforms would sooner or later lead to the final abolition of the feudal system, but after his death fears strengthened that the authorities would abolish even those rights which the peasants had already gained. In the spring of 1790, major peasant revolts occurred in Carniola and lower Styria, which were only quashed by the army. The sense of peasant dissatisfaction and news of the revolution in France led even the most intractable and harsh land-owning nobles of some decades before to develop warmer relations with the peasantry. In 1790/91, the Ljubljana lawyer Jožef Lukman gained a reputation in Carniola as an advocate for bonded or subject peasants, who even addressed several petitions to the emperor. Some supporters of the Josephine reforms supported a proposal to include the burgher classes in the Estates and permit representation of the peasants. Yet calls for the authorities to uphold appeals and complaints from peasants did not meet with much success.

The Provincial Estates, which had lost all their powers under Emperor Joseph II, were treated with greater sympathy immediately after his death when Vienna granted the request
for some autonomous rights to be restored to the provinces and Estates. The administrative
powers of the Estates were restored (though with very limited authority), the governorship of
Graz was abolished, Carniola and Carinthia regained their governments, and the Gorizian
provincial government was also restored. The judiciary underwent fewer changes: the joint
provincial court that had functioned for Carniola and Carinthia since 1782 was again divided,
and a higher court was established in Graz to serve as a court of appeal for the inner Austrian
lands. The Josephine church system remained largely in place until 1848, but the seminaries
were returned to the control of the dioceses, and the dissolution of the monasteries was
brought to an end. In 1791, Pope Pius VI moved the see of the Gradiscan diocese founded
under Joseph II back to Gorizia. Pilgrimage routes were revived. Among those that became
most popular were Svete Višarje (Monte Santo di Lussari) near Tarvisio, Sveta Gora near
Gorizia, and Brezje in Carniola.

Sympathisers of the Josephine reforms, Enlightenment philosophers, and admirers of
French revolutionary ideas continued to meet in secret circles and Masonic lodges in the
Slovene-inhabited lands for some years after the death of Leopold II and the ascent of Francis
II, as elsewhere in the Habsburg Monarchy. Such circles existed in Graz, Klagenfurt,
Ljubljana and Trieste, each of which had a Masonic lodge. Nevertheless, only two Carniolan
nobles in Slovene territory were convicted of sympathy for the French Revolution and
Jacobinism after 1792: Count Leopold Stanislav Hohenwart and Baron Siegfried von
Taufferer. Furthermore, we know of only two sympathisers with the French Revolution who
made direct contact with revolutionary France. These were Taufferer, who served France in
Italy in 1794/95, and the Graz law student, Johann Kuprtin Navršnik, originally from
Slovenske Konjice in lower Styria, who lived in Paris from 1793 to 1795. Working for the
revolutionary government in Paris, Taufferer prepared a plan for an armed uprising against the
Habsburgs, which would replace Vienna’s absolutist rule with an authority organised
according to French revolutionary principles. In 1795, he was captured by the Austrians; the
following year, he was executed as a traitor in Vienna.

NEW SPIRITUAL TRENDS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NATIONAL
‘REVIVAL’

The use and hierarchy of languages that had applied for centuries did not change
significantly during the eighteenth century. Until the second half of the century, Latin retained
its primacy as the language of the Church, science and education, but it was starting to be
replaced by German, and in the southwest by Italian, the established languages of the upper
classes, state administration and courts. The vast majority of the population in territories with a Slovene-speaking population continued, of course, to use just one language, Slovene. This did not only apply to the bonded peasantry and other rural inhabitants, but also to the lower classes in towns, and often to most of the inhabitants in the smaller towns. The spoken language of higher society – the nobility, and burgher and educated classes – was German, Italian in the southwest, Hungarian in Prekmurje, and in many places, though only in select company, French. Yet most of higher society was bilingual or multilingual, and to varying degrees also spoke and understood the language of the lower classes.

The use of one language or another was therefore – as for centuries before – determined by the social environment, the level of discourse or correspondence, and the social affiliation of the people involved. In Slovene territory (as in many places in central and even western Europe at the time), the language boundaries largely coincided with social and ethnic boundaries. The German-speaking inhabitants were very much in the minority in rural areas, despite German-language islands (especially in the Kočevje area). They were also in the minority among the lower classes in towns, but were predominant in the higher social classes in towns and among the nobility. The situation was the exact opposite for Slovene speakers; a Slovene who wanted to climb the social ladder had first to learn the language of the elite. In this context the work Kraynska grammatika (A Carniolan Grammar), published in German by the Augustine monk Marko Pohlin in 1768, was both the author’s decisive denouncement of foreigners and his educated fellow Carniolans for denigrating the Carniolan language, and a call to Slovene speakers not to be ashamed of their language. As such it was a turning point in two clear ways: first, it encouraged greater confidence in the use of Slovene, and second, it used the language to unite the Slovene-speaking Carniolans as a separate language unit from their German-speaking neighbours.

The publication of Pohlin’s Kraynska grammatika marked the start of the early period of the modern national movement among Slovenes, which Slavists referred to as the ‘national awakening’ or ‘national revival’ following the Czech model. Pohlin was followed in the 1770s and 1780s by other writers from the clergy and the sparse ranks of educated laity, who dedicated themselves to writing grammars, dictionaries, collections of poetry, schoolbooks and farming manuals, as well as writing dictionary material, popular folk songs and national customs, and translating the Bible, and other ecclesiastical and lay texts. Their work took place in small circles without any special programme, yet simply the idea of raising a vernacular tongue to a level previously reserved for prestige languages was an important break with tradition, moving away from centuries of cultural and linguistic practice, and
opening the way to the public use of Slovene.

The Slovene national ‘awakening’, like the contemporaneous early national movements elsewhere in central and western Europe, had its roots in the major social and spiritual changes of the eighteenth century. The middle classes in Slovene territory were weaker and grew more slowly than in more developed parts of the Monarchy. However, the absolutist reform policy, which promoted the development of crafts and trade, transferred administrative tasks to a professional class of officials, and started to reduce the Church’s influence, despite this slower rate of development in the area between the Alps and the Adriatic, led to a growth in the educated laity, officials, and even urban merchants who actively participated in public life. The relative relaxation of the religious and philosophical environment in the second half of the eighteenth century increased interest in natural sciences and history; rationalist and Enlightenment influences also established a more creative, more critical point of view that was more focused on actual problems. The centres of these learned meetings and talks were the agricultural societies, and – following the expulsion of the Jesuits and abolition of their order – the lyceums, and the academies founded along the Italian model in the Austrian Littoral province (German: Österreichisches Küstenland, Slovene: Primorska). An attempt in 1781 to revive the Academia Operosorum in Ljubljana (on the model of the Baroque Academia Operosorum) failed. The idea was first evoked at the end of the 1770s by scholar and linguist Blaž Kumerdej (1738–1805), who conceived of the institution as an association of researchers into the “Carniolan language”. However, his plan failed, and the revived institution was short-lived.

New ideas and convictions were gradually, but persistently, being established in Slovene territory. The Jesuits had already been teaching secondary school pupils of some of the latest scientific ideas (even Newtonian physics), while among the most notable scientists at work in Carniola in the second half of the eighteenth century were two foreigners: Giovanni Antonio Scopoli (1723–88) and Balthazar Hacquet (1740–1815). Scopoli, who was from Tyrol and served as a doctor and professor in Idrija for over a decade and a half, laid the foundations for the study of plants in Carniola and neighbouring lands. Hacquet, a Frenchman (probably from northern France), was also originally a doctor in Idrija, before becoming a teacher at the lyceum in Ljubljana. His work set the framework for the study of physical geography in Carniola, while also developing a genuine Enlightenment curriculum which addressed a number of key issues in Enlightenment thought and rationalist philosophy. This was all the more important since domestic scholars who were familiar with the work of figures from the German and French Enlightenment had generally not addressed
philosophical themes.

The influence of reformed Catholicism and advocates of the Josephine church policy among the clergy carried the spirit of the new age into ecclesiastical circles. Sympathisers of reformed Catholicism did not accept Jansenist dogma, but did flirt with Jansenist moral rigorism. Their most significant representative was Karel Janez Herberstein (bishop of Ljubljana from 1772 to his death in 1787), whose convictions and library had an effect on a number of Slovene scholars, including Anton T. Linhart and Jurij Japelj (1744–1807). The latter was the main author of the first Catholic translation of the Bible into Slovene (1784–1802), and the second ever following the Protestant, Jurij Dalmatin. The spirit of innovation also affected other areas. One noted scientist of Slovene origin at the end of the eighteenth century was the mathematician Georg (Slovene: Jurij) Vega (1754–1802). Achievements in architecture and the figural arts were more humble, essentially continuing the Baroque period. There was a major flowering flourishing of painting on glass and beehive panels, which became an important form of popular expression.

Of greater interest to the nobility, and the middle, official and scholarly class was the development of the theatre. After the Estate Theatre opened its doors in Ljubljana in 1765, Idrija gained a theatre at the end of the 1760s, and was followed by a number of other towns before the turn of the century. German and Italian theatrical and choral groups appeared on these stages, while, as early as the 1760s and more frequently by the 1780s, local amateurs would also put on performances. These plays were primarily in German: the performance of a Slovene adaptation of Joseph Richter’s Die Feldmühle at the Estate Theatre in Ljubljana, adapted in 1789 by Anton Tomaž Linhart under the title Županova Micka (The Mayor’s Daughter Micka), was therefore an important event for all those favouring a higher status for Slovene. A year later (1790), Linhart created an adaption of Beaumarchais’ ‘Marriage of Figaro’ in Slovene, entitled Ta veseli dan ali Matiček se ženi. Following Mozart’s lead, Matiček was set to music by Janez Krstnik Novak (1756–1833), the most important musical composer of the day in Carniola. However, the authorities would not permit Linhart’s Figaro to be staged given its anti-noble bent and it was only in 1848, in Novo Mesto, that it was finally staged.

Although the Slovene cultural movement in the eighteenth century was still small and fragmented, it quickly acquired supporters in most Slovene-inhabited provinces. The introduction of universal compulsory education entailed providing lessons at the lowest level of schooling in Slovene to a populace that only knew its mother tongue and this required that schoolbooks be written. The school reform and resistance to attempts by the authorities
particularly under Emperor Joseph II) to impose German as the only language of state administration and schools throughout the entire monarchy even encouraged some Slovene scholars to support lessons in Slovene at higher levels of education. The number of Slovene books grew steadily, with the first Slovene secular literary texts now taking their place alongside the schoolbooks, farming handbooks and religious writings. In the last decades of the eighteenth century, writers from various parts of the Slovene world were already putting forward short commemorative verses, while the priest Valentin Vodnik (1758–1819) gained recognition as the first Slovene poet with the collection of poetry *Pesme za pokušino* (Poetic Essays) published in 1806.

However, one of the fundamental issues, the question of the detailed definition of the Slovene language and nation, remained unresolved. Those writing and issuing work in Slovene considered themselves on the one hand to be part of the wider Slavic community of peoples, reaching all the way to Russia, and on the other inhabitants of the province (German: Land) in which they lived. Pohlin wrote and spoke about the Carniolan language and Carniolan grammar, while the Carinthian grammarian Ožbalt Gutsman (1727–90), who was more of a proponent of Slovene linguistic unity than Pohlin, wrote of the “Wendish language”, by which he meant the speech of Carinthian Slovenes. Jurij Japelj was responsible for an important step towards linguistic unity with his translation of the Bible, which was based on the Dalmatin translation and Protestant Slovene literacy from the sixteenth century. Consciousness of Slovene linguistic unity developed just as slowly as consciousness of the unity of the Slovene nation. This was first clearly expressed in the scholarly circle centred on Baron Sigismund (Slovene: Žiga) Zois.

Baron Sigismund Zois (1747–1819), son of an Italian father and Slovene mother, was at that time the richest and, according to some of his contemporaries, the most erudite man in Carniola. He travelled western Europe, knew many foreign languages and, influenced by the Enlightenment, became a Deist and a freemason. He gathered around him a diverse group of educated people who met in his house in Ljubljana. He did not write any particularly significant works himself, but his library, which was prodigious by Slovene standards of the time, included scientific works, as well as Voltaire, Pope, Boileau and a concise version of the great French work *L’Enciclopedie*. The permanent guests at Zois’ table included major figures from the early Slovene cultural movement, such as Anton T. Linhart, whose work *Versuch einer Geschichte von Krain und den übrigen Ländern der südlichen Slaven Oesterreichs* (An Essay on the History of Carniola and other Lands of the Southern Austrian Slavs) first expressed the idea that the inhabitants of the “land between the Drava and Adriatic” were one
people in terms of “language and origin”, and distinct from other South Slavs. Linhart still did not use the later term ‘Slovenes’, but he expressly planned his history as the history of a people united as a distinct whole by language, culture and history, irrespective of administrative and political divisions.

Zois’ circle included the poet Valentin Vodnik and linguist Jernej Kopitar (1780–1844). In the 1790s, Vodnik was not only active in poetry, but was also involved in issuing the first Slovene almanacs, providing entertainment and factual information, and newspapers (Velika pratika 1795–97, LUBLANSKE NOVICE 1797–1800). In 1809, Jernej Kopitar established the unity of the Slovene language internationally with the first academic Slovene grammar, written in German, which was published in Ljubljana with the title Grammatik der slavischen Sprache in Krain, Kärnten und Steiermark (Grammar of the Slavic Language of Carniola, Carinthia and Steiermark).

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, no conflict was yet apparent between German and Slovene cultural efforts. The Austrian authorities did not oppose literary activity in Slovene, since it did not threaten the traditional cultural and linguistic hierarchy. Linhart’s Županova Micka was performed in 1789 without problem in the Ljubljana Estate Theatre, and Italian singers often sang in Slovene at operatic performances with the open support of listeners. In the mid-eighteenth century, according to Vasilij Melik, Slovenes had a similar social and cultural status to the Bretons in France. The linguistic and literary movement that developed in the second half of the eighteenth century was a process that would turn historical trends for the Slovenes in a significantly different direction from developments in Brittany.

WARS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE ILLYRIAN PROVINCES

In 1797, the armies of France defeated the Austrians in northern Italy under Napoleon’s leadership, and pursued the retreating divisions of the Austrian army along the Soča river (Isonzo) in the direction of Carinthia and Vienna. Part of the French forces, commanded by General Bernadotte – who later became King of Sweden – then occupied most of the Slovene-speaking territory, including Ljubljana. The French commanders reassured inhabitants, who had in some places hidden in the forests or fled north under the influence of Austrian anti-French propaganda, with proclamations that were also issued in Slovene. In 1797, their occupation of Slovene territory did not last two months, their withdrawal being made after the Peace of Leoben (18 April). It was the first and last time that Napoleon himself would stop in Ljubljana.

In 1805, the forces of France occupied the Slovene-speaking territories for the second
time. Their forces seized Austrian state property, placed military duties on the population, and burdened the provinces with high taxes. This second occupation, which like the first lasted just two months, therefore left a negative trace in popular memory.

The French army occupied Slovene territories for the third time in 1809. This time, the Austrian authorities specifically prepared the population for resistance by means of anti-French propaganda, promoting Austrian patriotism and the creation of a provincial defence force. The French exacerbated negative attitudes by their actions after arrival: the duties and taxes imposed were significantly higher than in 1805, and their rule more violent. Peasant uprisings (the largest occurred in lower and inner Carniola) and clashes between defence forces and the occupying soldiers only intensified French belligerence. The situation only calmed after the Illyrian Provinces were established in October 1809. At the Schönbrunn peace negotiations, the Habsburgs were forced to concede approximately half of the Slovene-populated territories to Napoleon (the province of Gorizia, Trieste, Austrian Istria, Carniola, western Carinthia) and all of the territories south of the Sava between Carniola and Bosnia (part of Civil Croatia and the Military Border, and the Hungarian Littoral with Rijeka/Fiume). On the same day the Treaty of Schönbrunn was signed, 14 October 1809, Napoleon issued a special decree establishing the Illyrian Provinces, which united the newly acquired territories, as well as the territories of Venetian Istria, Dalmatia and the Bay of Kotor, acquired by France in 1805. The Illyrian Provinces also incorporated the territory of the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), occupied by Napoleon’s forces in 1808. In 1810, the French authorities added East Tyrol (with Lienz). In all, the Provinces covered 55,000 km² and had a population of around one and half million, including Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Germans and Italians, with Ljubljana as the provincial capital.

Napoleon’s motives in establishing the Illyrian Provinces were economic and military: the 750 km-long polity between the Adriatic, Italy, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire provided France with a vital land connection towards the east and Turkey for its economy and trade, while allowing it to establish a customs blockade along a coast it had not previously commanded, breaking the trading links between Austria and Great Britain. In formal international law, the Illyrian Provinces were part of the French Empire, though constitutionally not a properly part of it. The provinces had a special status among the territories conquered by Napoleonic France: their inhabitants held Illyrian citizenship, though the French flag was flown on their territory and the imperial coat of arms was used. In general, French law applied across the provinces, though not in its entirety. Some institutions had an imperial name, whilst others were solely Illyrian. Illyrian state offices were
subordinate to ministries in Paris, and the high court in Paris also held legal jurisdiction. Administratively, however, the Illyrian Provinces did not follow the French administrative organisation, as the basic administrative units were not departments but regions known as ‘intendancies’, ruled by ‘intendants’ with similar powers to those of French departmental prefec\ts. With the exception of Military Croatia, which was the only military region alongside six civil jurisdictions, the Provinces were administratively divided into districts, cantons and municipalities; the head of the civil administration was the chief intendant, who was subordinate to a governor. The political and military rationale behind establishing the Provinces is apparent – all of the governors of the territory, with the exception of the last, Fouché, were soldiers.

The Illyrian Provinces existed for just four years, and the French officials of the territory struggled against considerable problems: they were rapidly replaced, and were very unfamiliar with conditions in the lands that they were administering. They also faced major problems in organising authority at the lower, municipal level, since the local population was generally unqualified to carry out the new administrative tasks, or else refused to co-operate with the French. Yet the new administration and legislation represented considerable progress for the territories that came under Napoleon’s rule in 1809, as a first meeting with a modern ‘bourgeois society’. Between 1809 and 1813, the French introduced equality before the law and a general military service for all citizens, simplified the tax system, and abolished tax privileges. They brought the judiciary under state control, abolished the patrimonial courts and stripped territorial nobles of their public law function, while introducing a modern bureaucratic administration, and modernising education. However, many of the measures introduced during the brief French rule did not produce any short-term benefits, and a considerable number had negative consequences.

The new Franco-Austrian border had a major impact on the economic situation, because it interrupted the north-south route of traditional transport and trading routes, and divided Inner Austria between two states, which affected inhabitants on both sides. The crisis was deepened by the French blockade known as the Continental System, which was crippling Trieste and Istrian ports. The French planned to construct new roads that would allow the transport of goods from Turkey through the Illyrian Provinces into Italy and France, but work on their construction was slow. The burden of constructing the new roads – as well as the entire financial burden of the French administration and army – was supposed to be borne by inhabitants of the Illyrian Provinces. This high tax burden naturally strengthened anti-French feelings, and negative connotations evidently remained in the popular consciousness – *fronki*
(francs) persisted in the vernacular as a term for taxes for over a century after the French departed.

Peasants were particularly disappointed by the French authorities, although some French actions did improve their status. In accordance with the Napoleonic Code, in public law peasants were no longer bonded or unfree, but equal citizens. The landlords (seigneurs) lost their administrative and judicial rights, and any personal duties and services from peasants, such as bonded labour (*tlaka*), which were not linked to possession of land. Taxes to the landowners were also reduced, as more paid taxes directly to the state. However, there was no talk of emancipation, or of being made equal with the peasantry of France. The lords remained owners of the land, and peasants were still required to pay taxes and carry out duties for the land that they cultivated. French pressure on peasants to fulfil their duties further increased dissatisfaction, so it is not surprising that rebellion was common between 1811 and 1813. However, for French rulers, it was more important to gain the trust of the nobility than that of the rest of the populace. By 1813, the French had lost the nobles as well.

The French authorities also failed to gain many supporters among the inhabitants of the Slovene territories. Against them were supporters of the old order, the peasant population, the majority of the clergy, and most of the burghers – still too weak a group to be enthused by the ideas and institutions of a modern bourgeois society. The liberal economic policy and abolition of the guilds gained opponents among tradespeople, and those affected by economic problems, new taxes and financial regulations were equally ill-disposed to the new regime. The narrow circle of French supporters was centred on the educated, reform-oriented Francophile officials, and the more important merchants. Although the French administration did not differ significantly from the Josephine positions in relation to the Church, and did not transfer ecclesiastical policy from France to the Illyrian Provinces, the policy of religious equality and the division of powers between the state and the Church prevented the regime from gaining the trust of the traditionally Catholic Slovene population. On the contrary, the return of the Jews to Carniola and Carinthia (although few in number), the foundation of Masonic lodges in Ljubljana, Koper and Trieste, and above all the regulations introducing civil marriage and civil management of registrars’ records, only increased the mistrust of French rule. The reorganisation of the education system was also ineffective in gaining further support from the population. Despite representing a major advance on the organisation of education under the Habsburgs, financial problems and the brief extent of French rule prevented any great headway.

The French administration removed supervision of education from the Church,
replaced the three forms of Austrian primary school (Trivialschule, Hauptschule and Normalschule) with a single, four-year primary school and made it easier to move to secondary and technical schools. It also expanded the network of lower gymnasium schools, and founded higher secondary schools (lyceums) in Trieste, Koper and Gorizia, as well as a central school in Ljubljana, which was renamed as an ‘academie’ in 1811. Academies were French schools of higher education, founded at the time of the Revolution. The French academy was therefore the first school of higher education on Slovene territory. It had five departments – theology, philosophy, law, medicine and (originally) a technical school. Between 200 and 300 students attended the academy in Ljubljana, and were instructed in French, Italian, and Latin. In 1811, the capital of the Illyrian Provinces became an important centre of education, with over a thousand students being educated.

Yet the new education system did not have a sound financial basis. The French charged municipalities with the financing of primary and lower gymnasium schools, and they generally could not meet this burden. The number of primary schools did not therefore increase, and in many places even decreased. Some of the lower gymnasiums closed soon after being established. These conditions meant that the educational reforms failed to gain any support from teachers and the general population. The most committed welcome came from a number of adherents of the Slovene cultural movement, who saw the French schools as offering greater opportunities to establish the Slovene language. The plan to reorganise education in the Illyrian Provinces did envisage instruction in primary and lower gymnasium schools in the local ‘Illyrian’ language, with French gradually replacing German in the higher gymnasium school classes. Led by the first governor, Marshal Marmont, French officials who had served in Dalmatia before their arrival on Slovene territory were originally convinced that ‘Illyrian’ was a single language, spoken by all Slavic inhabitants of the Illyrian Provinces. They only changed their opinion when persuaded by Žiga Zois, Jernej Kopitar and Valentin Vodnik, who demonstrated that the Slavic-speaking Illyrians had two languages: Serb and Slovene. In the discussion on Illyrian and Slovene, Kopitar and Vodnik finally accepted the idea of Slovene linguistic unity and separateness, as well as the national name – Slovenes (Slovenci).

But the official language of the Illyrian Provinces was French. German and Italian were still in use in the state administration at the lower provincial and municipal level, where officials and their clients did not know French. Official use of Slovene was only made in direct contact with those who did not know German or Italian. The official journal of the Illyrian Provinces, *Telegraphe Officiel*, was published in French, and occasionally in German.
and Italian as well. The issue with official use of Slovene also lay in the fact that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Slovene language had not yet developed forms of legal and administrative expression, and there were too few educated Slovene speakers who could assume control of matters of official business. This was, however, not decisive for the French attitude to Slovene: far more important was the fact that the linguistic and ethnic situation in the Illyrian Provinces was only understood to any useful extent by French officials who had lived and travelled there for some time, with very little local knowledge filtering through to Paris. Furthermore, high-ranking officials in the French capital, and even newspaper reports reporting from the Illyrian Provinces, were generally completely uninterested in the specific linguistic and ethnic characteristics of ‘Illyria’.

Nevertheless, the creation of the Illyrian Provinces raised great expectations among adherents of the Serb and Croat movements in Dalmatia, and the Slovene cultural movement in Carniola. One reason for this lay in the very name of the Illyrian Provinces. For Napoleon, this was primarily a name taken from Antiquity, with no specific ethnic or national meaning. For Slavs in the Balkans and even the Austrian ruling elite the name had been used for centuries to indicate Slavs, the South Slavs, or the Serb or Croat-speaking populations of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The idea that the French Illyrian Provinces were a revival of an ancient Slavic Illyria, enslaved since the Roman occupation and only now called back to life by Napoleon, was expressed by the poet Valentin Vodnik in his 1811 poem, *Ilirija oživljena* (Illyria Reborn). Vodnik’s ode to Illyria and Napoleon was the first Slavic and pro-French attempt, albeit rather vague, to politically define Slovene national ambitions. But Vodnik found very little support for his views of ‘Illyria’ and the French regime, even among adherents of the Slovene literary movement. The duration of French rule over Slovene territory was too short to significantly affect the direction and understanding of the few educated Slovenes committed to cultural work in the Slovene language.

The armies of France began to withdraw from the Illyrian Provinces in the summer of 1813. During September and October, Ljubljana and Slovene territory were reoccupied by Austrian troops. The majority of the population were left with negative impressions of French administration. Yet these perceptions began to change towards the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth century, when the difficult circumstances within the Austrian state before the First World War led liberal Slovene scholars to begin praising the French as liberators from Habsburg rule. Liberal opinion claimed that the three years of Napoleon’s rule in Illyrian Provinces had done more for Slovenes than an entire century of Austrian rule.
RETURN OF THE AUSTRIANS: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRE-MARCH ERA

After the French withdrawal, the Austrian authorities did not abolish all of the measures of the Napoleonic empire on the territory of the Illyrian Provinces. Those measures that promoted economic and administrative modernisation, and centralised state power along the lines of the eighteenth-century reform policy without threatening the absolutist regime, were retained. The guilds and patrimonial justice were therefore not restored, nor was the right to collect taxes restored to landed nobles; instead the division of land applied under the French was left in place. Most of the existing administrative boundaries remained in force, and district-level administration was partially restored to the landowners, who were required to engage educated officials. Due to the costs associated with performing official tasks, these representatives gradually relinquished their rights and were gradually replaced by district commissariats; hence, public administration was incorporated into the state well before 1848 on those Slovene territories that had been part of the Illyrian Provinces during the French interregnum.

The ruling elite in Vienna acted very differently regarding reforms which could threaten the existing political and social order of Austria. On regaining power, Austrian officials immediately warned the peasant population that the feudal system was still in place and that peasants had to continue paying urbarial duties and performing bonded labour, as well as settling other obligations to the landowners. Only a handful of personal duties were not restored; the decision that peasants should pay taxes directly to the state was not revoked, and this reduced duties to landowners by a fifth. The old order was largely restored in education and ecclesiastical matters. The clergy again took charge of registrar duties, civil marriages dating from the time of the Illyrian Provinces had to be confirmed by a church wedding, and primary schools once more came under church supervision. The gymnasiums established by the French were abolished, and the ‘academie’ in Ljubljana met the same fate. The Austrian secondary schools and lyceums were restored, and the curriculum was again ordered according to Austrian law. The Austrians removed French sympathisers from schools and state administration. At the same time, stricter police and censorship regulations applied to territory reoccupied after the French withdrawal for the duration of the war against Napoleon.

The preservation of some of the French reforms, and the only partial abolition of others, led to conditions in the former Illyrian Provinces remaining significantly different
from areas that were always under Austrian rule. For some time the ruling elite even
considered bringing part of the former Illyrian Provinces together in a separate community,
and in 1816 they formed the ‘Kingdom of Illyria’. This included most of the Slovene-
populated areas: Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca, Trieste and its direct surroundings, first the
Villach district, and then after 1825 the Klagenfurt district, Gradisca and Cividale and
surroundings, as well as all Istria and, until 1822, Rijeka and Civil Croatia south of the Sava.
The Kingdom of Illyria had its own coat of arms, and the title ‘King of Illyria’ was added to
the ruler’s style. In 1830, the Archbishop of Gorizia acquired the title ‘Metropolitan of
Illyria’.

Yet the Kingdom of Illyria existed only on paper. Its territory in reality comprised two
‘gubernias’, which were directly subordinate to a central office in Vienna. The Trieste
gubernia united Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria, and, until 1822, part of Croatia, while the
Ljubljana gubernia covered Carniola, the Villach district, and all of Carinthia after 1825.
Styria, which was not part of the Kingdom of Illyria, came under the Graz gubernia. The
provinces (Länder) did not have autonomous jurisdiction, although the Styrian and Carinthian
Estates still sat, and the Carniola Estates were revived in 1818. The Provincial Estates were
not restored in the Trieste gubernia. The borders between the provinces were generally fixed
from that point – with a few exceptions – until 1918. Ecclesiastical borders were adapted to
provincial borders: the diocese of Ljubljana was equated with Carniola, the western boundary
of the diocese of Gorizia-Gradisca (once more the archdiocese of Gorizia from 1830) now
followed the new western provincial border of Gorizia, while the diocese of Koper was
incorporated in the diocese of Trieste (1828).

The first half of the nineteenth century saw the continuation of social and economic
processes encouraged by absolutist reforms. Only at this point were cultivation procedures
and culture associated with the physiocratic movement brought into agriculture on a large
scale: triennial and quadrennial rotation without fallow predominated, production of corn,
potatoes and fodder crops continually increased, and various stubble crops were increasingly
planted. There were no longer major famines – the last was in 1817 – although there was
often a lack of grain for domestic consumption. The growing of white clover and other forage
crops allowed the gradual transition of livestock rearing from mountain pastures to barns.
This development remained relatively slow, and the agricultural societies that sprang up after
the Napoleonic wars had limited success with their calls for the modernisation of fruit
cultivation and the introduction of industrial cultivation methods. Changes in forest
management were more evident, as forests were subject to greater planning and more detailed
care from forest owners and the authorities.

These innovations developed more rapidly nearer to the larger markets and major transport routes than in the more remote villages and settlements. The countryside in the pre-March era (German: Vormärz), and also to some extent later, was therefore quite diverse in character: village settlements near towns, major roads and navigable rivers were often dominated by stone houses and farm buildings, while the peasants sold their produce at market. Yet, at the same time throughout the Slovene-populated regions, sometimes not so far from the busy transport routes and market centres, there were still areas where villages consisted of wooden and straw-covered huts, preserving their traditional form unchanged, while the produce of the inhabitants largely covered their own needs, and were only exceptionally traded with people in the surrounding area. The transport network was still too poor for the rural economy to be connected into a functioning whole, and there was a lack of money in the countryside. The land division introduced by the French and which remained under the Austrians led to further social stratification in villages: the number of smaller farms and smallholdings grew more quickly than before, while the numbers of wealthier peasants fell, or at best remained steady. Earnings from non-agricultural activities remained an important part of the rural population’s income, particularly from ironworking and carting, but also from domestic crafts such as cloth and linen-making.

Despite the innovations of the first half of the nineteenth century, the non-agricultural economy did not undergo major changes. The first steam engine on the territory of modern-day Slovenia was set up in 1835 in the Ljubljana sugar refinery. By 1841, there were 8, and by 1847, 25 steam engines on the territory of modern-day Slovenia. The number of partially mechanised manufacturing processes increased, all of which were still closely linked to cottage industry, and domestic, peasant crafts. Efforts to modernise production were generally limited to the introduction of technical improvements and tools, but did not profoundly affect the traditional organisation of labour and working methods, and so there were no major developments in the non-agricultural sector before 1848. The most important non-agricultural sector was still ironwork, which in Slovene-populated areas remained significantly less developed than the metalworking plants in northern Carinthia and northern Styria, in terms of production and technological advances. In the pre-March era, iron mines were still sought and excavated across a wide area, but the iron was generally poor quality. The most common metalworking undertakings were small iron foundries, workshops and blacksmiths’ shops, which were connected to traditional production processes and wood charcoal. Some major entrepreneurs attempted to modernise production, while others struggled to keep up with
increasing competition. Iron production still continued to grow: in the 1830s and 1840s, some modern ironworking plants were founded, which successfully combined iron extraction and processing. The largest and most modern ironworking company in Slovene territory during the pre-March era was the works of the English Rosthorn brothers, in Prevalje.

A number of other non-agricultural activities brought important income into Slovene-populated provinces in the first half of the nineteenth century. Production at the mercury mine in Idrija was actually significantly lower than in the final decades of the eighteenth century, but 500 miners were still employed. Lead production grew from the start of the century, as did coal extraction. Textile production remained the most important of the trades: the first mechanised cotton spinners were introduced, while cloth, linen and horsehair continued to be primarily woven and produced in the countryside. Conditions were also favourable for glassmaking, paper production, sugar beet production, shoemaking, and various other trades and crafts that produced consumer products. However, all these crafts were secondary to the ironworking and textile sectors. The non-agricultural economy remained pre-modern and pre-industrial, and the main energy source was still water. Coal was only slowly introduced to production processes. In this regard, even before 1848, Slovene-inhabited provinces were already lagging behind the more developed areas of the Monarchy, which industrialised more quickly.

The lag in the development and modernisation of ironworks and other non-agricultural sectors in Inner Austria and Slovene territory were already being observed with concern by the most ardent admirers of technology and industry in the 1830s. The need for faster economic modernisation was discussed in agricultural societies, and in 1838 an Association was founded in Graz to support and promote industry and trades in Inner Austria. It was sponsored by the Enlightenment-influenced Archduke Johann (known as Janez to Slovenses), and had branches in Ljubljana and Klagenfurt. In Graz, the main role of the new association was seen as disseminating information on technology and industrial innovations and promoting them, and supporting entrepreneurial initiative, because, ever-faithful to Enlightenment ideas, they felt that ‘knowledge’ and ‘desire’ were essential to achieving the necessary economic modernisation. Together with the agricultural societies, they introduced an atmosphere of ceaseless curiosity to the Inner Austrian lands, and consolidated an awareness of the need for change. Their influence, however, remained restricted to a narrow circle of members and readers of the societies’ publications. The membership largely comprised entrepreneurial landed nobles, iron-workers, estate managers, major tradespeople and high-ranking provincial officials, who did not generally have the funds for more
ambitious investment. The agricultural societies and Graz Association were also unable to provide the capital needed to effectively support investment.

The monetary institutions founded in Slovene-populated territory in the pre-March era did not generally lend or invest capital in the economy. In 1820, the Carniola Savings Bank was founded in Ljubljana, the second ever savings bank in the Austrian territories, and this was followed by similar institutions in Klagenfurt, Trieste and Gorizia. Large insurance companies were founded in Trieste, and insurance companies from Graz and Vienna began to offer fire insurance. However, there was a lack of capital for larger economic investments. The local entrepreneurs with most capital were in the main landed nobles, and owners of mines and iron foundries. Enterprising merchants and tradespeople of Slovene peasant origin gradually began to establish themselves in the pre-March era, increasing their wealth and becoming true, modern, capitalist businessmen. The economic rise of the Kozler merchant family started with Ivan Kozler, son of a peasant, who grew rich at the end of the wars with France by trading in fruit, and increased his wealth in the early 1820s by buying property. The father of Fidelis Terpinc, one of the most successful Slovene entrepreneurs, was the son of a Bled peasant and small-time trader; his entrepreneurial path began with the leasing of bridge tolling rights and sales taxes, and continued with trade in crops. The business skills of Janez Kalister, an uneducated trader from inner Carniola, acquired a special reputation; he became one of the richest people in the Slovene world through trade, tax farming and speculation.

The Austrian authorities first announced the plan to construct a railway from Vienna to Trieste in 1836. The preparations for construction of the southern railway, the Südbahn, were enough to fuel enthusiastic expectations and optimistic plans, as well as unease and fear of the future. The agricultural societies tried to anticipate what the new transport link would offer to settlements along its route, and there was no lack of concerned voices warning of the economic changes the ‘iron road’ would bring. Most people agreed that the economic future for the Inner Austrian lands lay primary in the modernisation of agriculture and ironworks. The discourse only exceptionally touched on the lack of profitability of the existing organisation of the agricultural economy (burdened with the remnants of feudalism), or the urgent need for emancipation of the peasants, since the authorities, at least until 1848, would clamp down heavily on any such discussion. However, individuals were well aware that the railway would unleash new forces in Slovene territory, which would usher in far-reaching social and economic changes. The first part of the Südbahn on Slovene territory – the line from Graz to Celje – was opened in 1846. A year earlier, construction of the section to Ljubljana had started, and this was opened to traffic in 1849.
The relatively favourable economic conditions of the pre-March era led to rapid population growth. Health and hygiene improved, but as old infectious diseases faded away new ones emerged. Nevertheless, the mortality rate fell by almost a quarter (from 36 to 26 per thousand), which was largely due to reduced infant mortality. Increased child survival increased the number of family members who had to leave home to earn their keep. Many rural areas were already suffering from relative overpopulation, and peasants’ sons and daughters for whom no room could be found on the farm began to migrate to the towns. The populations of Trieste and Ljubljana, in particular, began to increase during the pre-March era, growing by 86.4 percent in Trieste, and around 75 percent in Ljubljana (from 9,900 in 1817 to over 17,000 in 1847). Like Graz and Trieste, by 1848 Ljubljana was the seat of a governor, and the administrative centre of two provinces (Carniola and Carinthia). It lagged more and more behind the capitals of the neighbouring gubernias, though in the first half of the nineteenth century it did start to increase its advantage over Klagenfurt and Gorizia. Its location close to turbulent Italy led to it even becoming the site of a major international diplomatic meeting in 1821 – the Congress of the Holy Alliance. With the exception perhaps of the 1895 earthquake, this was the major event of nineteenth-century Ljubljana.

GENERAL CULTURAL CONDITIONS IN THE PRE-MARCH ERA

Despite the pressures from police and censors that marked the period from 1815 to 1848, it was not a time of cultural stagnation. This is seen from figures for primary school attendance in Slovene territory, which increased from one in seven children of compulsory education age attending school in 1810 to one in three by 1847. School attendance differed by area: the lowest was in lower and inner Carniola, the highest in the Podravje region in Styria. Complaints by those in favour of economic and cultural progress lamenting the backwardness and ignorance of the Slovene peasant did, at least in some areas, have some grounds. However, it is indisputable that the number of schools and literate people was continually on the increase.

Following the French withdrawal, the Austrian authorities reinstated the old system of *Trivialschule, Hauptschule* and *Normalschule*. The most common school was the three-year primary school, the *Trivialschule*: there were only 16 middle schools (*Hauptschule*) and ‘normal’ schools (the *Normalschule* for teacher training) throughout the entire Slovene territory. The seven existing gymnasium schools (Ljubljana, Novo Mesto, Celje, Maribor, Klagenfurt, Gorizia and Koper) were joined by two others: the restored gymnasium in Trieste.
and the private gymnasium in Idrija. Higher education studies took place in lyceums (Ljubljana, Klagenfurt and Gorizia), but were limited to two years of philosophy and a four-year study of theology. In Ljubljana and Klagenfurt (though only until 1833 in Klagenfurt), medical and surgical studies were also organised within the lyceum. Young people wanting to go on to university generally went up to Vienna, where the number of Slovene students grew continually from 1820. In 1827, the restored university in Graz had just two faculties (law and theology), which enhanced the importance of the Johanneum, a museum and education institution founded in the Styrian capital in 1811 by Archduke Johann. The technical department of the Johanneum and the mining school at Leoben were the closest technical schools for Slovenes during the pre-March era.

The status of Slovene in education did not change significantly in comparison with the period before the French arrival. The language of instruction in primary schools in towns and larger settlements was generally German, with Italian used in the Littoral and Gorizian provinces, while in rural areas it was Slovene in most Slovene-populated areas. Most of the education that took place in the Sunday schools introduced in 1816, to extend compulsory schooling for the peasant youth, was also in Slovene. The languages in use in gymnasia everywhere, including the Austrian Littoral, were German and Latin, and these were also the languages of instruction at lyceums. The inauguration of a chair for the Slovene language at the lyceums in Graz (1812 and 1823) and Ljubljana (1817) were important advances for the study of Slovene. Language study in the lyceums, a first for Slovene, was primarily aimed at officials and priests who were not proficient in the language. The gymnasia and lyceum in Gorizia did not organise a course in Slovene until 1848, while Slovene was the language of instruction in Klagenfurt at the school of midwifery and the seminary.

The clergy retained an important position in public life during the pre-March era, and in some areas their influence even increased, though at the same time the proportion of priests in the educated population fell, reflecting the advance of laicisation. Theological studies were still the cheapest way for the sons of Slovene peasants to access higher education, and the priesthood continued to be considered a prestigious vocation, particularly among the peasant population. Nevertheless, there was a noticeable increase in the number of young Slovenes choosing to study for other vocations, or only moving to theology after failing in other studies. The clergy therefore shared far from unified convictions about the world around it. There were significant numbers representing relatively liberal positions, and at the same time they saw spreading different forms of knowledge, such as knowledge of Slovene, as one of their most important tasks. The Josephists and so-called Jansenists retained significant
influence. The Jansenists’ rigorism and opposition to popular religious devotion led not only to disputes with church authorities and believers, but also with adherents of the Redemptorist movement, which stressed a faith of simplicity and wisdom. One supporter of the Redemptorists was Friderik Baraga (1797–1868), later a bishop in the United States, who crossed the Atlantic in the early 1830s after years of disputes with Carniolan Josephists, and became one of the best known Slovene missionaries among the native American population. The period after 1815 represented a major turning point in the leadership of the Catholic Church in Slovene-populated territory. The bishop’s staff and mitre were acquired at that time by clergy who were no longer from the nobility, but from urban and rural, and even extremely poor, backgrounds. The number of Slovenes among them also began to grow.

As well as receiving news from travellers, people were kept informed about events at home and abroad by the German-language provincial newspapers. Newspapers, which started to appear in the 1780s, and became more common after 1815, were joined by informational and entertainment supplements and news-sheets. Although in line with official Austrian positions, but with surprisingly current news, both formats not only reported on the Austrian ruling elite and major state and provincial officials, but also included news on the political situation from various parts of Europe and elsewhere around the world. They also published items of local interest and literary pieces, articles on economic and technological innovations, and cultural reviews, with a general tone of Austrian and local patriotism. The published contributions of literature, travel writing and local interest were predominantly influenced by Romanticism, while descriptions of economic and technological innovation reflected a reserved sense of wonder combined with no little fear regarding the rapid changes underway. Contributors to the provincial newspapers and information sheets included Slovene authors and newspapers occasionally featured articles in the language. However, Slovenes only succeeded in acquiring their own newspaper, after many years of effort, towards the end of the pre-March period. From 1843, the Carniolan Agricultural Society in Ljubljana issued the *Kmetijske in rokodelske novice* (Agricultural and Handicraft News), a weekly intended for the instruction of farmers and tradesmen, which as the only Slovene paper in the pre-March era rapidly developed into a general educational and national journal.

The inhabitants of the Inner Austrian and Slovene lands over the period from 1815 to 1848 were not uninformed about the main trends and events of the day. This is reflected in their artistic, cultural and academic life which, with a few notable exceptions, was not outstanding, but could by no means be described as backwards. The foreign poets copied by local producers of verse, and published in the provincial papers, were primarily second or
third-rate Romanticists who appealed to less demanding tastes. Similarly Bauernfeld, Denhartstein and Kotzebue enjoyed a greater reputation than Raimund and Nestroy among audiences at the estates theatres, which initially hosted Italian productions, before the groups of actors appearing were with increasing frequency German. As elsewhere in Austria and in Germany, the moralist Christoph Schmid was particularly popular among prose writers, and was in part the model for Janez Cigler, author, in 1836, of the first work of modern Slovene fiction, *Sreča v nesreči* (Good Luck from Bad).

Baroque still dominated ecclesiastical architecture, visual art and sculpture in the first half of the nineteenth century. Neoclassicist trends gained ground in architecture in Trieste in particular, which underwent a major urban renovation to match its rapid economic rise. Painting was more in step with the times, with academy-trained artists replacing craft painters. With their work, Baroque gave way to Classical, Romantic and Realist influences; in portraiture, portraits of nobles became less common than those of burghers, while artists focusing on nature and landscapes were already appearing. Valentin Janša (1747–1818) and Franc Kavčič (1762–1828) taught at the academy of art in Vienna, while on home territory Josip Tominc (1790–1866), Matevž Langus (1792–1855), Marko Pernhart (1824–71) and Franc Kurz von Goldenstein (1807–78) all gained recognition and acclaim. Music held the prime position in cultural and social life. The Philharmonic Society (Filharmonična Družba) in Ljubljana was relatively current in terms of musical creativity at home and abroad, and attempted to foster the next generation of musicians by founding its own music school. Concerts and musical recitals outstripped the theatre in terms of popularity, and included works by the major European composers, as well as lighter, less serious fare. The work of local, largely amateur composers also featured, generally following the trends set by examples established abroad. Some of these artists added folk motifs to church choral works.

The conditions for academic work in the pre-March era were worse than those for artistic endeavour. Archduke Johann’s intention in founding the Johanneum Institute in 1811 in Graz was for it to become the educational and scientific centre for all Inner Austria. However, despite its importance, scientific work in the individual provinces only acquired a much-needed institutional structure with the founding of provincial museums and professional associations. The Museum of Ljubljana, opened in 1831, concentrated primarily on natural sciences, though it also gathered historical material. Science was also the focus of the Carniolan Museum Association, founded in Ljubljana in 1839. Alongside these institutions, scientific books, historical documents, and items of scientific interest were held in private noble libraries and collections. In Carniola, Baron Jožef Kalasane Erberg (1771–1843), one-
time tutor to a child of Emperor Francis I and owner of the Dol pri Ljubljani castle, had a true private museum with an impressive library and art collection. Organised support for the study of history had to wait until the establishment of the historical societies of Carniola, Styria and Carinthia, which began in 1843.

Locals and people who had settled in the area demonstrated an interest, sometimes more systematic, sometimes more as dilettantes, in science and history. Scientists catalogued flora and fauna, continuing the tradition of eighteenth-century descriptive science, and natural features of Carniola and the Karst attracted wider interest in Austria and Europe after 1830. At the same time, historiography – profoundly influenced by Romanticism – moved towards studies of the history of the individual provinces or Länder, and to demonstrating their legal and political individuality. The books and other publications connected with these efforts were initially produced only in German and Italian in the Austrian Littoral. The authors of the first academic works (and particularly scientific works) in Slovene faced considerable linguistic difficulties, since they had to create new Slovene terminology themselves. This meant that the various manuals aimed at farmers issued in Slovene by agricultural societies were of greater importance. The priest Franc Pirc’s Kranjski vrtnar (The Carniolan Gardener, 1830), parish priest Matija Vrtovec with Vinoreja (Winegrowing, 1844) and Kmetijska kemija (Agricultural Chemistry, 1847), and gymnasium teacher Karel Robida with his work Zdravo telo narboljši blago (A Healthy Body is Best, 1846) formed the basis of Slovene ‘popular science’ writings. The first history book in Slovene, Dogodivšine štajerske zemle (Notable Events in the Province of Styria), was published in Graz in 1845. It was written by Anton Krempel, a parish priest, and largely described the history of Styria, while also placing particular focus on the development of the Slovene population.

The influence of the Romantic movement and the growth of the Slovene national movement created interest in the Slovene language and Slavic linguistics, and this increased rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century. There were few genuine experts in linguistics among the writers addressing various linguistic and literary issues, collectors of linguistic material and authors of grammars and dictionaries. Priests and Slovene language enthusiasts predominated, but their work remained poorly integrated and unsystematic, despite the growing circle of those involved. One of the few highly educated experts on linguistics and European literacy was Matija Čop (1797–1835), teacher and librarian at the Ljubljana lyceum. Amongst those of Slovene origin, the most important in the pre-March era was Jernej Kopitar, who lived in Vienna and worked as a censor and curator at the Court (National) Library, and only occasionally intervened in Slovene linguistic discourse from afar.
In the 1840s, Franc Miklošič (1813–91) gained a reputation on the basis of his linguistic knowledge, and in 1849 became the first professor of Slavic studies at the University of Vienna; later he was made a full member of the imperial academy.

The cultural and social life in larger towns on Slovene territory did not differ during the first half of the nineteenth century from that in similar towns around Austria. Members of the nobility, state and provisional officials, the clergy, the educated urban middle classes and the military formed the town elite. They continued to speak German, with Italian confined to the coast and a few groups elsewhere, Hungarian in Prekmurje, while French might occasionally be heard at soirées or dinés. The urban elite met at the theatre and at concerts, Sunday and holiday masses, at various entertainments, including dances, in societies, such as shooting and social clubs, on trips, walks and of course in private salons. Despite pressure from the police and censors, people in Slovene towns and were, throughout the pre-March era, able to hear news of events in Austria and Europe which the authorities would rather be kept from such circles. Such contact spread new, more liberal ideas, and information on the rapid economic and social changes in Great Britain and western Europe. The most important intermediary role in this regard was played by Graz and Trieste – the former via the Enlightenment and reform-oriented institutions of Archduke Johann, the latter as a free port, in which Austrian censorship could only ever apply to a limited degree.

SLOVENE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Most people in territories with Slovene-speaking inhabitants did not express a national identification in the first half of the nineteenth century. The predominant emotional ties involved identification with the province (Land), and a sense of belonging to the Monarchy, embodied by the emperor and Habsburg dynasty. Knowledge of Slovene extended – as for centuries before – to the upper echelons of society, but the traditional status of the different languages had not changed. Educated and noble-bourgeois society identified with German, Italian and Hungarian culture, and gradually began to acquire a modern national consciousness, which fostered social stratification and differentiation.

At the same time, the consolidation and spreading of Slovene national consciousness that had started in the final decades of the eighteenth century continued. This process advanced relatively slowly before 1848, generally “from person to person, friend to friend, from curate and priest to church-attender” (Vasilij Melik). At the time, the sense of national
identity was not necessarily linked to an awareness of origin or mother tongue, since many Slovene speakers identified themselves as Germans, given the traditional identification with the German cultural world. The sections of educated and urban society who felt sympathy for both nationalities and cultures, Slovene and German, either identified with both or swapped allegiances from one to the other. In these circumstances, there were no major nationalist clashes; Slovene literary efforts also received approval and support from the educated classes who identified themselves as German. The Austrian authorities were much more suspicious of Slovene culture creativity, opposing as they did any change in the traditional cultural and linguistic hierarchy, and decisively rejecting clear expressions of national identity.

The number of nationally aware Slovenes was undergoing continuous growth. Their rise was matched by an increase in the number of Slovene books and other publications, and at the same time – particularly in the most Slovene province, Carniola – the name ‘Slovene’ (Slovenec and the adjectival form slovenski) was ousting the provincial term ‘Carniolan’ (Kranjec and kranjski). The clergy formed the largest group among the people from various professions and social classes already identifying themselves as Slovene. They adhered to a wide range of different ideas: the liberals were in the minority, with conservatives clearly predominating. This inevitably left its mark on the pre-March Slovene national awakening and literary activity. The conservative wing of the Slovene educated classes and the clergy held the position that the traditional relationship between languages and cultures need not change. They saw the enlightenment of the people as the main task of Slovene writing. This led them to issue devotional works, popular didactic works and manuals for farmers, while also addressing the authorities with appeals for schools and offices to increasingly acknowledge Slovene.

Towards the end of the 1820s, this very undemanding policy of the Slovene cultural movement was opposed by the educated circle that formed around the linguist Matija Čop, and the poet France Prešeren, which set itself far more ambitious objectives. Čop considered that simple, peasant-oriented literature was not enough to establish Slovene; in his opinion, the Slovene language had to be raised to a level at which it could become a useful means of expression at “the highest level of literary art”. Thus he gave his devoted support to the poetry anthology Krajnska čbelica (The Carniolan Bee), issued in four volumes from 1830 to 1834 (the fifth volume only arrived in 1848). Most significant Slovene poets of the time contributed to Krajnska čbelica, but without doubt the most impressive in terms of artistic expression was France Prešeren (1800–49), the great poet of Slovene Romanticism, and one of the most important Slovene literary figures of all time. His poems, collected in Poezije (1847), became
a source of inspiration to generations of Slovene literary artists. Prešeren was also one of the few educated Slovenes in the pre-March era to openly express his national and political ideas. In his poem *Zdravljica* (A Toast, 1844), in which some detect Polish and French influences, he called for a national freedom struggle and, in line with early liberal concepts, brotherhood and harmony between nations.

The hopes that *Krajnska čbelica* would develop into a lasting literary review were not realised due to opposition from the censors. It took until the 1840s for the Austrian authorities to permit the publication of the Slovene newspaper *Kmetijske in rokodelske novice*, issued by the Carniola Agricultural Society. The veterinarian Janez Bleiweis became editor of the ‘Novice’. The *Novice* was published under the motto “Swim with the tide, or sink” and aimed to spread the latest news on commerce, tools and working methods, fighting backwardness and superstition, and promoting education and progress. It generally carefully avoided social and political topics, upholding its loyalty to the emperor and Monarchy, and adhering to traditional cultural and religious values. At the same time, it openly promoted awareness of the Slovene community’s national identity and love for the Slovene language, and addressed a wide range of linguistic, orthographic, historical, ethnographic and literary issues.

The editor of the *Novice*, Janez Bleiweis, was a physiocratic and Enlightenment-oriented conservative, who opposed more radical social and political changes, and perceived the future for Slovenes in a gradual modernisation of the area based on agriculture and peasants, so although the *Novice* subscription included priests and educated lay people of various vocations, Bleiweis largely focused on the peasantry. He was well aware, however, that the *Novice* – as the only Slovene paper in that pre-March era – had a wider mission. To this end, from the very beginning, the *Novice* represented all Slovenes and had correspondents throughout the entire territory. The *Novice* published an ode to Emperor Ferdinand, written by Jovan Vesel Koseski in 1844, that includes the first written mention of “Slovenia” (*Slovenija*) as homeland of the Slovenes. Bleiweis’ taste was more for simple patriotic poets and sentimental national poets, but some of Prešeren’s poems did appear in the *Novice*. The *Novice* had an important role in the efforts to standardise Slovene orthography. Between 1843 and 1846, the *gajica* version of the Latin alphabet (named after the leader of the Illyrian movement in Croatia, Ljudevit Gaj) was adopted as the standard, providing one of the essential foundations for the development of Slovene literacy.

The adoption of Gaj’s script was one of few lasting traces left in Slovene territories by the Illyrian movement. The movement flourished after 1830 in Croatia. Its founder, Ljudevit Gaj (1809–72), was an enthusiastic supporter of the pan-Slavism of Jan Kollar and his
position on the four major Slavic languages: Russian, Polish, Czech and Illyrian. Gaj endorsed an idea that stated that the South Slavs – the ancient Illyrians – were one nation and should attempt to create a single literary language. In Croatia, the movement accelerated the process of national and linguistic unification, but for Slovenes it demanded a new form of linguistic hierarchy: ‘Illyrian’ would assume the role of the literary language for the educated, while Slovene would remain the language of literature for ‘simpler folk’. In this light, Illyrianism strengthened the sense of Slavic identity among Slovenes, but its rejection of Slovene as a literary language failed to gain it a wider circle of supporters.

In the pre-March era, the Slovene movement was still largely a linguistic and cultural endeavour, and had not yet established political objectives. Before 1848, its political ideas were largely indirectly and covertly expressed by a small number of Slovene-speaking individuals, and the circle of people who connected their national identity to specific political ideas and expectations was still extremely small. It is no surprise then that a foreigner who travelled though Slovene territory before 1848, and who did not enquire in detail about the local populace, would have the impression they were entering the German world. The towns looked German and German was the language of administration, as well as the language of the streets and public spaces. The French Slavist, Cyprien Robert, who travelled to Zagreb via the Slovene parts of Styria in the 1840s, predicted a negative future for the Slovenes in his book on the Slavic world (published in Paris in 1851) stating that they would probably soon succumb to German dominance.

Yet in reality developments were heading in the opposite direction, towards strengthening and politicisation of the Slovene national consciousness, as became evident in 1848.

1848: YEAR OF REVOLUTION AND UNITED SLOVENIA

News of the revolution that broke out in Vienna on 13 March 1848 was brought to Ljubljana three days later by a traveller bearing on his coat the white ribbon that the uprising’s supporters had worn in the Habsburg capital. The news spread quickly around the town, causing huge commotion. The authorities and the urban elite welcomed the news with a performance at a theatre illuminated in celebration, while the keepers of law and order founded a ‘national guard’.

Ljubljana’s response to the news of revolution in Vienna was similar to that in other Austrian towns, although less violent than the reaction in Graz and Klagenfurt. The news of
disorder in Vienna was not entirely unexpected, but Metternich’s fall was more of a surprise. Critical articles and pamphlets calling for the end of absolutism and the remnants of feudalism had already been circulating in Slovene-populated areas before 1848. The provincial newspapers had been reporting on revolutionary stirrings in Italy, France and individual regions of the Monarchy from the start of 1848. However, the urban middle class, which did not, except in Trieste, include owners of large manufacturing plants (merchants, tradespeople and a range of different professionals predominated), were unprepared to meet the sudden end of absolutism, and only just in the process of forming their own political positions. The most engaged urban representatives used circulars and essays to praise the emperor for the promised constitution, to salute Austria and Germany, and to express their commitment to freedom of the press, equality before the law, the right of association, free elections, and other liberal demands. Janez Bleiweis came out in favour of a reserved ‘wait and see’ policy in the Novice, which called for patience and the “peaceful expectation of good news”, which the new laws and times would bring. The policy suited most of the Slovene urban middle classes and scholars, although supporters of liberal ideas and policies did appear among them.

The revolutionary upheaval and emperor’s promises were welcomed by peasants, who had high expectations. Convinced that the time had finally come for their emancipation, and that in future they would own the land, in many places they stopped paying land dues, refused to provide bonded labour, and ceased to pay taxes. In places where relations with the local lords had been tense, they rebelled and attacked castles, looting manor buildings. In some places their anger was also directed against the clergy and local parish priests. The wave of uprisings reached its apogee in Carniola, where the authorities declared a state of emergency. The urban populations did not have a great deal of sympathy or understanding for the peasant uprisings. Although the rural population was almost entirely Slovene, the leaders of the Slovene movement largely condemned the peasants’ violence, calling on them to acknowledge and support the position that emancipation could not take place without reparations.

The national question still did not lead to intolerance or major conflict in the first weeks after the March uprising. Some complaints came from the Slovene side about the fact that the national guard’s language of command was exclusively German, while disputes arose in Ljubljana at the start of April over the flag hung from the castle. It was resolved by flying the white-blue-red colours of Carniola, which became the Slovene national flag, alongside the Frankfurt German flag. But generally Slovenes and Germans united in calls of support for freedom and the emperor, and the German-language newspapers were still open to Slovene
positions, with the prevailing conviction being that relations between the nations could be managed in peace and harmony within the Monarchy. The Carniola Estates also approved some Slovene demands, such as the call for official use of Slovene. The idea of a new, greater Germany that included Austria did not yet lead to major divisions. Many Slovenes supported the idea, believing that Slovene territory and Austria in some way naturally belonged together, given their traditional ties, in a constitutionally organised and modern arrangement of the former German empire. The consequences of joining a Greater Germany for the continued existence of the Habsburg Monarchy and the future of the Slovenes were not widely considered.

Slovene-German relations quickly began to sour, when educated Slovenes started to set out national political demands, following the pattern of other nations. The first to address this task was the Klagenfurt curate Matija Majar (1809–92). In the second half of March 1848, he was already calling on his fellow Slovenes not to miss the great moment and “step among the free nations, as a free nation itself.” He affirmed that all the Habsburg nations were brothers, and should respect each other, while each of them – including Slovenes in “Slovenia” – should live as they saw fit. Majar’s original initially limited himself to demanding the introduction of Slovene in schools and administration, but in an essay composed at the start of April he expanded his demands. He said that Slovenes formed a special nation that had to acquire its own sabor or diet, and called for closer links with their “brothers” in Croatia and Dalmatia. Just a few days after Majar, and quite independently, Slovene scholars and students made their voices heard in Vienna. Most of their proclamations and essays called for Slovene linguistic equality and for the Slovene national territory, dispersed across different crownlands, to be united in a single Slovene province. On 20 April 1848 they founded the Slovenija society in Vienna (with the renowned Slavist Franc Miklošič accepting the position of president), and developed their ideas into a programme. They demanded the foundation of a “kingdom of Slovenia” that would have its own provincial diet, and would be a part of the Habsburg, but not the German, empire. At the same time they were in favour of equality with German for the Slovene language, and demanded the free use of Slovene in schools and offices in “Slovenia”. Slovene societies founded in Graz and Ljubljana issued similar programmes. Matija Majar set out the boundaries of a “United Slovenia” (Zedinjena Slovenija) and included Slovenes in Hungary and Austrian Venetia.

The United Slovenia programme – although by no means yet fully defined in 1848 – represented a radical break from the previous linguistic and cultural focus of the Slovene movement. It unequivocally supported the abolition of the old provincial borders and the
reorganisation of the Habsburg Monarchy as a federal state, in which Slovenes – like all other nations – would enjoy administrative, political and economic autonomy. Yet the supporters of the United Slovenia programme in 1848 were still very small in number, and could not count on wider support for their calls for the “holy and natural” right of every national to “freedom of development”. For most Slovene-speaking middle class and educated circles, the idea of a United Slovenia was too violent a break with history, and hence a call for changes that would have unpredictable consequences. Janez Bleiweis did not reject it outright, but found it too radical, saying since Slovenes did not yet have the “spiritual strength” to realise the programme. As a realist, the editor of the *Novice* was not far from the truth in his assessments. The idea of dividing historical regions and drawing new provincial borders in favour of an undefined, as yet non-existent, Slovenia was too strange for many Slovenes, who though considering themselves Slovene, still retained a strong regional sense of identity, and saw their province as their homeland first and foremost.

The revolutionary spring of 1848 called Slovenes into political life, but their voice remained weak and uncertain. The authors and most committed proponents of the United Slovenia programme were largely from the geographic margins of the Slovene nation (Graz, Klagenfurt) and the Austrian capital, where they formed their ideas under the influence of the liberal German groups, as well as taking on ideas from adherents of other Slavic nations in Graz and Vienna. In Slovene territory, and particularly the ‘most Slovene’ province of Carniola and its capital Ljubljana, the local attitudes, which were much more traditional and less open to change, had a more decisive impact on the movement than the atmosphere in the larger, outlying towns. Styrian Slovenes gathered thousands of signatures supporting United Slovenia by mid-June 1848, while petitions supporting the Slovene national programme were also signed elsewhere on Slovene territory. Nevertheless, unlike its Czech, Croat and even Slovak equivalents, in 1848 the Slovene movement was not a mass movement: Slovenes did not convene assemblies of national representatives or select a leader who could take their demands to the authorities. Their national and political life revolved around the societies that grew up in Vienna, Graz, and Ljubljana, and also in Trieste, Klagenfurt, Gorizia, Celje, Novo Mesto and elsewhere. In the second half of 1848, other Slovene papers joined *Novice* on the newspaper scene. The most important was the first political Slovene newspaper, *Slovenija*, which started to appear twice weekly in Ljubljana from the beginning of July 1848. The Celje weekly *Celske slovenske novine* and the Trieste monthly *Slavjanski rodoljub* (The Slavic Patriot) started to cater to the more liberal, while Catholic circles welcomed the arrival in Ljubljana of the *Slovenski cerkveni časopis* (The Slovene Church Newspaper). Although it
had not gathered a mass following, the Slovene national political movement still encompassed almost all Slovene-populated areas.

The first major political test for Slovenes, like other nations in the western areas of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1848, came with the pan-German elections to the Frankfurt parliament. The authors of the United Slovenia programme and their supporters followed the Czech example and rejected the elections to the Frankfurt parliament with the argument that they were Slovenes and not Germans. In line with Czech convictions that only an intact but constitutional Habsburg Monarchy could protect Austrian Slavs against German and Russian expansionism, they saw any idea that threatened the integrity of the Habsburg state as a threat. Yet, explicit opponents of Frankfurt were again only a minority in Slovene territory. Most Slovene voters followed the directions of the Austrian government to participate in the elections of May 1848 without any great enthusiasm. Some liberal Slovenes even pronounced themselves in favour of the elections to the pan-German assembly, since they expected liberal tendencies to prevail – the idea of a “union of German states”, in which Austria and Slovenes could take their own equal place. In these circumstances, opposition in Slovene territory to the pan-German parliament only achieved significant success in Carniola and lower Styria, in contrast to the Czech lands, where anti-Frankfurt agitation ensured participation in the elections was very low.

The elections to the Frankfurt parliament were a completely new historical experience for Slovenes, as for other inhabitants of the German union. Although the preparations did not lead to a genuine political battle, they caused significant upheaval. News of the emperor’s flight from Vienna to Innsbruck and the new uprising in Vienna in May 1848 increased tensions further. The Viennese liberals and democrats did not initially have many supporters among the Slovene population. A pro-Viennese atmosphere only arose at the start of June, when preparations for elections to the national assembly began, and it became clear that the May barricades in Vienna had been successful. At that point, even the Novice opened up its pages to the few Slovene admirers of the Viennese revolutionaries, who called on their fellow Slovenes to look to the “Viennese” and learn “what freedom is”. At the same time, the paper took a critical position on Frankfurt and started supporting demands inspired by “United Slovenia.”

This change in attitude was not followed by decisive action. Ljubljana did not take its place at the forefront of a national movement, as the most ardent Slovene patriots were advocating. Instead, the political initiative remained in the hands of Slovenes from peripheral national areas, and scholars from Graz and Vienna. These were the main proponents of
Slovene co-operation with Croats and Czechs, which certain individuals had been calling from the very beginning of the political unrest. Yet despite enthusiasm about the large numbers of Slavs coming together, it proved impossible to put these ideas into effect. The call of 1 May 1848 to “Slavic brothers” with which the Czechs convened a pan-Slavic congress in Prague – as a response to the pan-German Frankfurt parliament – was signed on behalf of Slovenes by the Slavist Franc Miklošič, but of the 300 participants, only 4 were Slovene. Their presence ensured that the congress conclusions, which supported the reorganisation of the Habsburg Monarchy as a federal state, also included Slovene demands: the unification of the Slovene national territory in a kingdom of Slovenia with Ljubljana as its capital, diplomatic recognition of the validity of the Slovene language, the use of Slovene in state administration, schools and the judiciary, and the founding of a university in Ljubljana. At the same time, the envoy of the ‘Graz Slovenes’, who participated in a session of the Croatian sabor or diet expressed his support for Slovene-Croatian “fraternity”.

The elections to the Reichstag (imperial assembly) in Vienna in June 1848 again took place against a backdrop of unrest and relatively low participation in areas where participation in the Frankfurt elections had been low. But the result was surprising, since the peasants who participated in the elections chose representatives from their own ranks, or more educated people that they trusted. No priest or noble was voted to the national assembly from Slovene-populated territory, and the men elected were mainly from the liberal ranks. Half the deputies elected were Slovene-oriented, while explicit opponents of Slovene aspirations were in the minority. The Slovene deputies travelled to Vienna, where the assembly started its session in July 1848, without a special programme or agreement on a joint approach. Even within the assembly, they did not operate as a cohesive unit, and generally acted independently. Nevertheless, in discussions on the emancipation the majority sided with liberal views. Some were express opponents of an emancipation including reparation and stated that the claims for reparation contravened the principle of “equality of all citizens”. At the same time, liberal views were also represented on other issues. The Ljubljana lawyer, Matija Kavčič rejected the term ustava (German: Verfassung), stating that it was too general and supported the use of the term konstitucija (German: Konstitution), which he considered incorporated the concept of sovereignty of the people. However, this would require the Habsburg Monarchy, as he expressed it, to transform into a federation of national units. “Nations are the foundation stone of the Austrian state,” he said; “it is my privilege to be a Slav.”

But in October 1848, when revolutionary Vienna rose in defence of Hungary, the Slovene deputies and leaders supported court and government policy, in the hope of the
emperor’s support for national equality and a constitutional monarchy. Like the Czechs, they proclaimed the Viennese revolutionaries as supporters of the “Frankfurt-German and Hungarian party”, which opposed the “equality of other Austrian nations, particularly Slavic”. Given this position, most Slovene deputies left Vienna after the outbreak of the uprising and returned home. The few that remained and supported the revolutionaries were subjected to criticism and rebukes. When the Reichstag convened again in the second half of November in the Moravian town of Kroměříž (German: Kremsier), Matija Kavčič was among those putting forward a plan to transform the Monarchy into 14 national and historic units, but in doing so, he did not even receive the support of his fellow Slovenes. After lengthy debates, the central position of the constitutional committee of the assembly prevailed. The traditional crownlands would be maintained but would be divided into districts with limited local autonomy, with the boundaries of the districts matching linguistic and ethnic borders as closely as possible. At the beginning of March 1849, the constitutional committee finally produced a draft constitution, and submitted it to the Reichstag. The assembly, however, could no longer debate anything as it had been dissolved on 7 March 1849.

The newspaper *Slovenija* wrote that Slovene political leaders were “astonished” by the dismissal of the Kroměříž parliament and the constitution ‘imposed’ by the emperor. Conservatives, both educated and urban, impotently hoped that at least the ‘imposed’ constitution would come into force, while liberals openly expressed their disappointment. The ‘imposed’ constitution made reference to the Kingdom of Illyria founded in 1816, which some adherents of the Slovene movement saw as a sign that the government was still considering combining Slovene territory into a separate ‘Illyrian’ whole. But these expectations were soon seen to be unfounded. The new constitutional arrangements of 1849 left Slovene national territory divided between different provinces, while the gubernias were abolished. The new ethnically defined districts anticipated by the ‘imposed’ constitution were only established in Styria.

Other Slovene demands were also left unanswered. In 1849, the government decided to translate the Austrian Civil Code into the national languages, which marked the first official recognition for the Slovene language. It was backed by an order to the provinces to translate provincial laws into the “provincial” languages. One year later, publication of the first Slovene official journal (*Ljubljanski časnik*) began in Ljubljana. Yet the government’s readiness to recognise national languages in state administration, courts and schools ended there, as soon as the first results of the new policy began to appear. When the ‘imposed’ constitution was suspended in 1851, even those places in which attempts had been made to
introduce the official use of Slovene reverted to German, and the use of Slovene was largely restricted to oral contact with people unable to communicate in German. In primary schools, the principle that at least the first few years of instruction would be in the mother tongue made some progress in rural areas, but not in towns and areas with a lower proportion of Slovene speakers. In secondary education, the language of instruction was exclusively German, though the reform of gymnasiums made Slovene a subject in some such schools. The return to absolutism also quashed other revolutionary achievements. The abolition of citizens’ political rights led to the termination of political societies. The measures against press freedom also saw Slovene newspapers close one after another (including the recently founded Slovene official journal). The only survivors of the new censorship regulations were the Novice, which returned to its emphasis on economic and Enlightenment tasks, and the Slovenski cerkveni časopis, which was renamed in 1849 as Zgodnja danica (The Morning Star).

Slovenes failed in 1848/49 to realise any of their national political demands, but the very establishment of a Slovene political programme and the first attempts to create a movement to support such demands represented a major turning point in national development. The demand for the unification of the Slovene territory in an autonomous whole that would enjoy a broad and open form of ‘home rule’ – within a wider, federally organised multinational state framework – became the Slovene national political model. It remained the basic template for Slovene national policy until the break-up of communist Yugoslavia in the 1980s, though its intensity would vary depending on circumstances.

THE 1850s: FAREWELL TO TRADITION

The territory more or less contiguously inhabited by the Slovene-speaking population covered around 24,000 km² in the mid-nineteenth century. The linguistic border with Italian and Friulian neighbours to the west ran from the Gulf of Trieste to the Tagliamento river, where the Friulian plain meets the Karst hills. The Val di Resia (Rezija) was settled by Slovene speakers, then the border rose to Kanin and back down in the Val Canale (Kanalska Dolina). From there it crossed the Carnic Alps towards Gail in Carinthia. The Slovene-German language border in Carinthia traversed the Gail valley east of Hermagor, dividing the Slovene and German speaking inhabitants in the Gailtal Alps, headed past Villach to the Ossiacher Tauern then northeast across the Zollfeld plain, where it turned towards the Drava and ran towards Styria, slightly to the north of the modern-day Slovene-Austrian state border. Prekmurje remained within Hungary, with Slovenes living up to the Rába river near
Szentgotthárd (Monošter). The Slovene-speaking population was separated from Hungarian and Croat-speaking populations by the centuries-old border along the Sotla, Gorjanci hills and the Kolpa. In Istria, Slovenes and Croats lived on both sides of the current Slovene-Croatian state border. It is difficult to define a clear national-linguistic border between them, since the dialects of the two languages only differed slightly, and the population was not separated by any clear administrative border.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, somewhat over 1,300,000 people lived in the area delineated above (an approximate area, of course, since the ethno-linguistic borders were not really clearly defined anywhere), of which over 1,150,000 were Slovenes. The provincial borders were drawn so that Slovene speakers were in a majority in just two provinces: Carniola and Gorizia. Of the old non-Slovene linguistic islands, the only survivors were the Gottshee Germans (Kočevarji) in Kočevje (around 23,000 of them in 1857) and the German settlers in Val Canale and at Bela Peč. Elsewhere, Germans or German-speaking inhabitants lived primarily in towns. The coastal towns of Koper, Izola and Piran remained predominantly Italian-speaking, and Italians and Friulians also represented over half of the population in the town of Gorizia. Alongside the Italians and Slovenes, there was also a notable proportion of German speakers in Trieste and Gorizia.

Despite the high birth rate and falling mortality rate, Slovene-inhabited territory experienced a demographic decline during the second half of the nineteenth century. Slovenes remained significantly behind the average population growth in the Habsburg Monarchy before the First World War. The population only grew very slowly, which was largely due to the economic circumstances and related emigration. Although changes were gradual and the Slovene territory did not undergo an industrial revolution, the 1850s represented a turning point in terms of economic and social development. The emancipation of the peasants, Austria’s free trade and free crafts policy, and the construction of the Südbahn from Vienna to Trieste in 1857 saw the beginning of a modern market economy for the Slovene-speaking populace. Peasants became owners of the land they cultivated, except in parts of Gorizia and Slovene Istria, where a ‘colonate’ existed. Peasants now had to pay reparation for emancipation, and taxes and dues which before 1848 they had partially settled in kind were now to be paid in cash, which meant selling more produce at market. Tradespeople, artisans and small business people also had to fight for their market and customers, which were increasingly threatened by cheaper industrial products, following the removal of customs and craft restrictions. The Südbahn also took significant income away from the populace of the provinces through which it passed, as it destroyed the transporting and carting trade, as well
as facilitating the delivery of cheaper goods from industrially more developed parts of the Monarchy and abroad. The traditional, still largely pre-industrial economy in Slovene territory had little to offer in exchange.

The new taxes and the reparation for emancipation which the authorities introduced to the Slovene countryside, where relatively small farms (up to 10 hectares) predominated after the emancipation, proved to be a major financial burden on the peasant population. These problems were heightened by the still unsettled issues relating to the use of pastures and woods, which took the authorities until the end of the 1870s to resolve (and even later in some cases). Large landowners retained large swathes of land and forest even after the emancipation, but most of the communal pastures were divided among peasant owners. Small farmers and smallholders came off worst since the pasture and woodland they acquired was too small for their livestock or for gathering wood for fuel (or else the reparation for rights to pasture and woods they had previously held was very small). Since the money raised by previously successful farm crafts, such as the manufacture of linen and of sieves, was in continual decline, farmers’ debts started to grow in the second half of the 1850s. Borrowing from town and village moneylenders led to many farm owners being evicted from house and farm.

The agricultural societies attempted to address the growing crisis in agriculture with typical calls for modernisation and the adoption of new agricultural processes and techniques. Janez Bleiweis shared their conviction that agriculture would remain the main source of revenue for the Slovene population for some time, and that the Slovene territory still did not have realistic prospects of achieving modern industrialisation. Indeed, there was still no trace of large new industrial plant that would indicate the arrival of modern industrialisation. Some new companies – as well as the coalmines in the Zasavje region – grew up along the Südbahn, but otherwise it was Trieste, above all, that enjoyed major economic development. Elsewhere the non-agrarian economy retained its traditional image; small plants and manufacturing companies continued to predominate on Slovene territory.

The Novice, which was the main Slovene newspaper after most other Slovene newspapers failed in the 1850s, primarily attributed the causes of the economic backwardness to the population’s low education level. The reasons went deeper: there was a lack of domestic capital, the largely hilly lands did not offer high levels of raw materials, and the mostly pre-modern economic structure was not of great interest to foreign investors. Yet claims regarding the cultural backwardness of the Slovene peasants were not unfounded. Responsibility for the poor educational level of the population could be largely attributed to
the primary school system, which did not undergo any major change after 1848. The Austrian reform plan for primary schools, the fruit of the 1848 revolution, stayed on paper, and the status of primary education was not significantly improved compared with the pre-March era. On the contrary, in some places it actually deteriorated, since in many places rural schools which had been financially supported by landowners before the emancipation lost this source of funding. In contrast, secondary and higher education underwent a major overhaul. The 1849 reform changed the six-year gymnasiums into eight-year general secondary schools. Mathematics and scientific secondary schools – Realschulen – were introduced, while the position of lyceums as a stepping stone between gymnasiums and university was abolished. After the abolition of the lyceums in Ljubljana, Klagenfurt and Gorizia, the only higher education institutions on Slovene territory were the theology colleges in those three towns, and a new theology college in Maribor.

The 1849 administrative reorganisation of Slovene territory remained in place with minor adjustments until the end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Styria was divided into three, in line with the imposed constitution, which envisaged the formation of districts following ‘ethnic boundaries’. This led to the division into Upper, Middle and Lower Styria; only the ‘Maribor district’ (lower Styria) had a Slovene majority. The Austrian Littoral remained a single administrative area, sub-divided into two districts, one based on Istria, the other on Gorizia. The city of Trieste and its surroundings had a separate status and a separate constitution. At the end of the 1850s, the ecclesiastical system in Carinthia and Styria was adapted to the new administrative arrangements. In 1859, the Lavantine diocese, which had been predominantly Slovene since the Josephine reform, left its lands in Carinthia to the Gurk diocese, while acquiring parishes within the Maribor district from the Graz-Seckau bishop. In 1859, the Lavantine bishop Martin Slomšek transferred the bishop’s see to Maribor from the peripheral St. Andrä in Carinthia. By the end of the 1850s, there were five Catholic episcopal sees on territory inhabited by the Slovene-speaking population: Ljubljana, Gorizia, Maribor, Klagenfurt and Trieste. The Slovene-populated territory also extended into the dioceses of Graz-Seckau, Zagreb and Szombathely. The Protestants in Prekmurje and the Rába region had their own ecclesiastical organisation.

After the defeat of the 1848 revolution and the triumph of neo-absolutism, the Slovene cultural and political movement went into relative silence for over a decade. In 1851, Matija Majar said: “At present nothing new can be started – we must just observe what happens – and carefully sustain ourselves through our literary work. That is now our policy.” The circle of Slovenes who openly defined themselves as such again shrank to a small number of lay
scholars and clergy. The longest lasting of the various attempts to establish a Slovene literary journal was the monthly review *Učiteljski tovariš* (Teacher’s Companion), which started publication in Klagenfurt in 1852. The first Slovene literary society, the Society of Hermagoras (Družba sv. Mohorja), had been founded in 1851 – also in Klagenfurt – with the aim of popularising Slovene literacy and books. By the end of the 1850s, it was in crisis, from which it would only recover in the following decade, when its impressive rise began in earnest.

The Slovene movement again assumed a literary and cultural emphasis, and in public the traditional language hierarchy with German at the summit was reinstated. The ideas and views of the men who steered the tone and direction of Slovene cultural activity were initially considerable divergent. The active leaders of Slovene national and cultural life in the 1850s can roughly be divided into three groups. The first was personified by Janez Bleiweis, always ready to compromise, but indisputably Slovene, who sincerely believed that the practical education of the ‘people’ was the primary and most important national task. The second group was led by Anton Martin Slomšek, the Lavantine bishop, and Luka Jeran (1818–96), the editor of *Zgodnja danica*. Slomšek was a great lover of Slovene, and the author of numerous devotional and instructional texts, but at the same time was a confirmed legitimist, opponent of revolution, industrial capitalism and liberalism, and an advocate of leaning firmly on the foundation of “divine law”. Jeran, who largely shared Slomšek’s spiritual outlook, represented ultramontanist and clerical positions in *Zgodnja danica*. The third group comprised liberally minded young people – secondary school and higher school students – whose poems and literary works began to move away from Romanticism towards Realism. In general, they were devotees of the poet France Prešeren, and adherents the Slavic and Slovene slogans of 1848. The poet Simon Jenko (1835–69) and literary all-rounder Fran Levstik (1831–87) were two main figures from this movement.

The first two groups by far predominated in national and cultural life. They had their respective journals in *Novice* and *Zgodnja danica*, which were the only two Slovene newspapers for most of the 1850s. The clergy also had a decisive influence over literary and publishing. As in the pre-March era, publications and books intended for the ‘people’ generally had a devotional, patriotic and very moralistic bent; nevertheless, the range of entertaining literature available was soon displaying more modern tendencies, as indicated by translations of JH Campe’s *Robinson the Younger* (1849, 1851) and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1853). Original poetry and prose displayed a wide range of different qualities, through the younger generation of Realism-oriented poets and writers of much more
expressive literary texts. These were published in Novice, almanacs, poetry anthologies and occasional literary publications. A form of prose fiction with an explicit national policy aim was created by Fran Levstik with Martin Krpan (1858) and Ferdo Kočevar Žavčanin (1833–78) with Mlinarjev Janez (John the Miller, 1859) and gained a wide readership. Lestvik’s work told the story of how a simple Carniolan peasant and smuggler defended the emperor and Austrian capital against the fearsome giant, Brdavs, and in return for his heroism and loyalty earned the ingratitude of the lords and the court. Initially, Kočevar’s tale was more popular. In contrast with Levstik, who ascribed great strength and heroism to a humble Carniola peasant, Kočevar described the social rise of an entire Slovene village, which according to the story was ennobled by the counts of Cilli (Celje); readers soon identified with the story about the rapid social rise of their fellow Slovenes and Kočevar’s book became a genuine bestseller.

During the 1850s, academic work was only really being pursued within historical societies. Individual adherents of the Enlightenment and early-liberal ideas dedicated themselves to writing histories of the provinces. Although their members included Slovenes, their work was only produced in German. Calls for an “illustrious society” of Carniolan historians to publish a history of Carniola in Slovene remained unanswered. Instead, in the second half of the 1850s, the Novice started including quasi-academic articles from the priest and writer Davorin Trstenjak (1817–90), who claimed that Slovenes were an indigenous people with a presence in the Alpine-Adriatic area stretching back over 1,000 years. Trstenjak’s work did not gain a great response, and yet revealed Slovene feelings of powerlessness and insecurity in the face of absolutism and German pressure.

The Germanic external appearance of Slovene towns did not undergo visible changes during the brief revolutionary period of 1848/49. From the beginning of the 1850s, even those areas of public and social life where external Slovene expression had become relatively common regained a predominantly German character. As in the pre-March era, the authorities were extremely suspicious of public expressions of national affinity, and claimed that Slovenes – like other non-German nations in the monarchy – still lacked “sufficient Austrian consciousness”. The map of the Slovenske dežele (Slovene Lands) prepared by the cartography Peter Kozler as part of a presentation of United Slovenia could no longer be published in 1853, even under the title “Map of the Kingdom of Illyria”. The formal celebrations in Ljubljana in 1858 to mark the centenary of the birth of Valentin Vodnik were a sign that the absolutist pressure was starting to diminish. Nevertheless, it was only after the Austrian defeats in Italy (1859) finally signalled an imminent end to absolutism within the
Habsburg Monarchy that the new era for the Slovene national movement could truly begin.

START OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA: THE SEARCH FOR A SLOVENE POLITICAL IDENTITY

Slovenian leaders welcomed the end of absolutism and the start of the constitutional era with guarded optimism. “Carniolans are a practical nation, waiting when something new arrives to see what it really means,” wrote Bleiweis in October 1860 about the October Diploma. His caution was not an expression of doubt about the real intentions of the authorities in Vienna, as much as his conviction that the Slovene movement’s social base was still weak. “What Galicia and Bohemia is, Slovenia is not,” said Bleiweis, clarifying his thought as follows: “There the national gentry, the national urban class, is strong; we, Slovenes, can count the number of such men on our fingers.” That Bleiweis was in many ways right was seen in 1861, in the first elections to the provincial diet. The preparations for the elections were unsystematic and poorly co-ordinated, and the political camps remained ill-defined, with candidates primarily identifying themselves with voters on the basis of personal ties and sympathies, and much less on the basis of any national or political standing. Bleiweis was therefore elected in three places in Carniola at once, which illustrates the lack of political organisation, as well as the difficulty in finding Slovene candidates. Despite the lack of political clarity, in 1861 voters in Slovene territory again favoured liberals in the choice between conservative and liberal candidates. This result was partly due to the fact that – as in 1848 – peasants did not vote for priests. Although considerable numbers of priests stood, only one was elected.

The electoral geometry and formation of constituencies did not favour Slovenes. Socially it favoured the large landowners and middle classes, while nationally it favoured Germans. The rural population, which formed around 80% of the Slovene-populated provinces and was largely Slovene, elected only two-fifths of the deputies to the provincial diet. Until 1918, Slovenes were always more poorly represented in the provinces they inhabited than their numbers merited, if the figures for the Slovene-identified population until 1918 were used as the criterion. Yet the provincial diet elections of 1861 did not yet lead to open Slovene-German or Slovene-Italian tensions. The main demand of the nationally affiliated Slovenes in 1861 was for equality for Slovene in schools, courts and offices. None of the candidates, including those who later opposed the Slovene camp, opposed this demand. On the contrary, it seemed to have wide-ranging sympathy and support. The Slovene
movement suffered a significant failure in the elections: in the Carniolan provincial diet 13 out of 36 deputies identified themselves as Slovene, and 7 out of 21 in the Gorizian diet, while the diets of Styria, Carinthia and Istria did not have a single deputy openly identifying himself as Slovene. A number of deputies in the provincial diet who were elected by Slovene votes also later sided with the Germans. Given the situation in the provincial diets, Slovene representation in the Reichsrat in Vienna was also less than meagre, with only three deputies representing Slovene interests, separately and unconnected: one from Carniola and two from Gorizia.

Janez Bleiweis retained a leading role in the Slovene national movement in the 1860s and 1870s. Zgodjna danica attempted to influence voters during the elections, but its policy of Catholic faith first, and only then the Slovene language and the ‘nation’ did not even have the full support of the clergy. In the debate on the political make-up of the state, Bleiweis’ circle clearly supported a constitutional monarchy, but otherwise favoured moderate conservative positions and avoided the liberal-Catholic dispute. At least until the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, Slovene politics were not clerical in character. During Anton von Schmerling’s period in office as prime minister (1861–65), Slovene leaders opposed centralism and supported the federalist right in the Reichsrat, but did not take a position of principled opposition to the government. Following Schmerling’s departure (in 1865), they supported the conservative government of Count Richard Belcredi. This calm and careful policy did have its open opponents. The more liberal, educated classes were greater in number in Styria, and were the source of most of the Slovene national movement’s new impetus during the 1860s.

The demand for a United Slovenia remained the guiding principle of Slovene national politics, but was almost never referred to by Slovene deputies and leaders once it had been written into their 1861 manifesto. Relations between supporters of the Slovene movement and their opponents rapidly soured after the elections, with two camps forming across most of the Slovene territory: Slovene and German. Bleiweis had already warned that these designations were not completely accurate, since there were also Slovenes in the ranks of opponents of Slovene policies. He divided the opponents of the Slovene movement into three groups. The first group comprised tradespeople and officials who spoke Slovene at home, but who supported greater use of German in public. The second was all those who were “dependent on the first”, but who “in their hearts” were not anti-Slovene. The third group was the “true Germans”, members of the German urban middle classes and officialdom. This group provided the most vocal opposition to Slovene national demands, accusing Slovenes of separatism and treason.
Yet even Bleiweis’ three groups of opponents to Slovene policies failed to fully illustrate the problems that Slovene political leaders faced in their efforts to spread national consciousness and gain supporters. Personal ambitions and benefits did have an important influence on national affiliation, but the Slovenes who gave their support to the German rather than the Slovene side, in the 1860s and later, were not just people seeking a ‘higher status’ or in fear of their superiors. A considerable proportion of the Slovene urban and educated classes remained convinced that Slovene was not yet suitable for fully assuming the role of German in public and cultural life. They remained faithful to the traditional hierarchy of languages and attempted to avoid the Slovene-German dispute. Many people remained attached to both Slovene and German culture and hence found Slovene politics to be overly Slovene. Many also found the Slovene camp to be too conservative, and supported the German side for political and idealistic reasons. The process of national stratification and identification therefore advanced slowly; it led to very personal divisions, splitting friendships and even families. The decisions of famous and influential people to support perceived national opponents led to fierce criticism and accusation. Slovenes suffered their first major blow of this kind in 1861, when the popular, educated and previously highly committed supporter, Dragotin Dežman (1821–89), left their national camp. Dežman’s ‘national defection’ to the German camp was due to his disagreement with Slovene leaders and his opposition to their often patriarchal conservatism. After leaving the Slovene camp, he started to advocate German positions with as much vigour as he had Slovene ones. For nationally affiliated Slovenes, Dežman was the embodiment of a national deserter, a ‘traitor’ and ‘nemškutar’. Nemškutar (meaning ‘Germaniser’) came into use in 1848 and became a favoured pejorative term to describe Slovenes taking the German side in the German-Slovene conflict.

The United Slovene manifesto was subject to intense German criticism and that, coupled with an awareness of the Slovene political class’ lack of wider social support, saw the idea pushed into the political background in the political appearances of Slovene nationalists after 1861. Slovene deputies and leaders restricted themselves to demands for national and linguistic equality, and on many occasions expressed enthusiasm for Slavic and South Slavic linguistic and national affinity. The Klagenfurt priest Andrej Einspieler (1813–88) attempted to provide the demand for a United Slovenia with broader “historical” grounds, and was committed to ideas about modernisation of Inner Austria. He supported the provinces of Inner Austria retaining their historical borders, but with recognition of Slovene autonomy. Yet Einspieler’s Inner Austria did not win much general support. To the Germans, who predominated in Styria and Carinthia, it seemed like an unnecessary complication, while for
Slovenes, who would remain a minority in this form of Inner Austrian union, it resolved nothing.

During the 1860s, Slovene cultural and political life developed in reading rooms. The first was established in Trieste in 1861, with others opening their doors in Maribor, Ljubljana and Celje the same year. The number of reading rooms increased throughout the 1860s. They appeared in the towns, market towns, and smaller administrative centres, and even villages in the Littoral province and inner Carniola. Scholars, town notables of Slovene origin, and members of the middle class or ‘petite bourgeoisie’ (merchants and tradespeople) gathered in them, as well as farmers, particularly in the Littoral. At the end of the 1860s there were 57 reading rooms across the Slovene territories, with around 4,000 members. The reading rooms were a newer version of the pre-March reading societies: they organised events with talks, lectures, recitals, plays, and musical and poetry performances. Some of the reading rooms had libraries, choirs and musical ensembles. Their activities were overwhelmingly and uncritically patriotic. Although the artistic level of the reading-room events was generally low, some individuals did break out of the ranks of unskilled amateurs that packed their stages, and developed into talented creators and curators of Slovene theatrical and musical life. Reading-room meetings became important, sometimes even the premier social events, and affirmed ties and feelings of national affiliation. Women also participated in their organisation and programmes; these ‘national ladies’ had not previously actively participated in public life. Despite the nationalist enthusiasm, German was only gradually replaced by Slovene as the language of conversations between reading-room visitors, which illustrates the deeply rooted nature of the traditional hierarchy of languages.

The Ljubljana reading room became the centre of the entire reading-room network, as Ljubljana developed into the capital of the Slovene cultural and political movement in the 1860s. Externally, the city retained a Germanic appearance, but the number of Slovene societies there was rapidly increasing. Following the Czechs, the Južni Sokol (Falcon) gymnastics society was founded in 1863, and the first Slovene academic association, Slovenska Matica, in 1864, while theatre-lovers came together in 1866 to found the Dramatic Society. Ljubljana was also an important printing and publishing centre. Slovene literature had been flourishing since the beginning of the 1860s, and this was reflected in the growing number of literary publications. The post-Romantic movement dominated the literary scene, while the first proponents of Realism were growing in strength; in poetry Simon Janko stood out alongside Fran Levstik, while Josip Jurčič (1844–81) – an admirer of Walter Scott – was the major writer. He published Deseti brat (The Tenth Brother), the first Slovene novel in
1866, while his contribution to Slovene drama was also very important. Also in 1866, the first Slovene operetta – by Benjamin Ipavec (1829–1908) – was performed on the stage of the Ljubljana reading room. Ipavec is celebrated as the most important representative of Romanticism in Slovene music.

With its weekly edition of just a few pages, *Novice* had been outgrown by the burgeoning Slovene cultural and political movement. This led the wealthy landowner Miroslav Vilhar (1818–71) – popular among reading-room members as a poet, dramatist and composer – to publish a newspaper called *Naprej* (Forward), in 1863. The newspaper supported the United Slovenia programme, and promoted co-operation with other South Slavic nations and systematic work in the field of national politics and culture. Yet it was not even to last for one year; its owner was sentenced to imprisonment and a fine, due to an article in which he supported the abolition of the old provincial borders and national unification in the spirit of United Slovenia, and that also saw the end of the newspaper. In 1865, Andrej Einspieler started a new Slovene newspaper in Klagenfurt called *Slovenec* (The Slovene) edited in a conservative, but united-Slovene spirit, which lasted for two years. There was no enthusiasm in Bleiweis’ circle for a Slovene political journal that would compete with *Novice*. Instead, Bleiweis and his sympathisers favoured the creation of a German-language newspaper that would clarify Slovene positions to readers unskilled in Slovene. The dispute over what kind of newspaper the Slovenes needed divided the national elite into two completely opposed groups. Bleiweis and supporters acquired the name *staroslovenci* (Old Slovenes), while their liberal opponents were called the *mladoslovenci* (Young Slovenes), the terms modelled on the Old Czechs and Young Czechs. In 1865, the Old Slovenes founded a German-language paper called *Triglav*, which lasted until 1870.

In principle, the Austrian ruling elite and government were in favour of linguistic and national equality from the start of the 1860s. They recommended that provincial offices and courts use the provincial languages when dealing with people who could not speak German. In reality, this practice depended on the local and provincial situation, regardless of government proclamations and recommendations, on the goodwill and linguistic capacity of officials, and on people’s willingness and persistence in exercising their rights. Slovene only gradually made inroads into the state bureaucracy and the courts. In Carniola, the use of Slovene in dealing with people who knew only Slovene did not become compulsory until 1867, and its use in the Carniolan provincial diet only became more established after 1867. Elsewhere, the status of Slovene was significantly lower than in Carniola, and even the municipality of Ljubljana had German as its administrative language, despite politically being
in Slovene hands until 1868 and having a Slovene mayor.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE SLOVENE MOVEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT DIVISION

The events that shook the Habsburg Monarchy in 1866/67 also had an impact on the Slovene national movement. The Austrian defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866 opened the path to German unification under Prussian leadership and also allowed the further unification of Italy, which was proof to Slovene leaders that “historical boundaries” could be changed. It seemed to them that the “national idea was taking over the entire world”. Yet at the same time, the course of events disappointed them and strengthened feelings of national insecurity. The new border with Italy, confirmed by a plebiscite in Venetia in 1866, left around 27,000 Slovene speakers on the Italian side, in the bordering areas of Venetia. The newly instituted dualism and division of the Empire along the Austro-Hungarian border of the Leitha river (hence the name Cisleithania for the Austrian part of Monarchy) not only separated 45,000 Slovenes living in Hungary from the majority of Slovenes in the western, Austrian part of the Monarchy, but also separated Croats and Serbs. In the eyes of the Slovene urban and educated classes, these were the most natural allies of the Slovenes, alongside the Czechs.

In the atmosphere generated by these events, part of the Slovene political leadership repeated the call for a United Slovenia in 1866. At the same time, support for the Slovene movement was gaining strength in towns and the countryside. The Slovene camp recorded its first convincing electoral victory in the provincial diet elections of January 1867. The rural population largely supported Slovene candidates, and in Carniola Slovene candidates won in most towns and in the chamber of commerce. Slovenes were therefore in the majority in the Carniola provincial diet, while in Gorizian diet they were almost equal with the Italian representatives. They also made inroads in the rural curia (electoral college) in the Slovene part of Styria. The elections revealed that the Slovene movement had gained significant support among the population at large. “Only now can we breathe freely, only now can we say that the Slovene nation actually exists in the world, that it lives and is a mature political movement, and we are not just an ethnographic expression,” proclaimed with pride the lawyer Valentin Zarnik (1837–1888) in Novice.

In the tense climate that accompanied the discussions on dualism in the Empire, in February 1867 the government dissolved a number of provincial diets that had returned a federalist majority, including that in Carniola. Despite firm government pressure, Slovenes only lost a few places in the urban curia in the repeated elections of March 1867, and retained
their majority in the Carniolan provincial diet. The electoral successes of 1867 also strengthened Slovene representation in the Reichsrat, where the number of Slovene deputies rose to eight. In contrast to the Czechs, who had boycotted the Reichsrat since 1864, Slovenes agreed to go to Vienna and oppose dualism. An attempt at tactical opposition balanced by agreement with the government failed to bear fruit. At the start of the Reichsrat session, the Slovene deputies together considered that the German-Hungarian division of the Monarchy represented ‘death’ for Slovenia and Austria, yet when the time came to vote they raised their hands and supported Austro-Hungarian dualism. They justified the change in their position to extremely surprised voters at home by pointing out government promises of an increase in provincial self-governance and a higher status for Slovene in schools and administration. There soon proved to be substance behind these promises, as, in exchange for the Slovene votes, the government approved the construction of the Ljubljana-Tarvisio railway, for which the Slovenes had campaigned for some time. The concession was won by the deputy Lovro Toman, who sold it on for a tidy profit.

The actions of the Slovene Reichsrat deputies deepened divisions within the movement. The political scene, already divided between the (more conservative) Old Slovenes and (more liberal) Young Slovenes, was further split on the issue of political tactics. On one side were supporters of a ‘realistic’ or compromise policy, on the other were the committed advocates of United Slovenia. Ever more visible signs of clericalisation were now starting to appear on the conservative side – especially in the discussion on the termination of the Concordat with the Vatican. The clergy, the main bulwark of the national movement in rural areas, was particularly opposed to the cancellation of the Concordat. In the sensitive climate generated by the discussion on the Church’s role in public life, Slovene leaders started to give way to pressure from the Church. Demands for the defence of Roman Catholic principles and of the Church’s influence were included in the Slovene national programme. The March 1867 elections were the first to feature the slogan: “Everything for the faith, the Emperor and the homeland”. At the same time, they joined the emerging German conservative and clerical camp in opposition to German liberals, and formed a parliamentary club with the clerical Tyroleans in the Reichsrat.

The clericalisation of the conservatives and their cautious national policy encouraged liberal Styrian Slovenes to found a newspaper in Maribor in 1868, Slovenski narod (The Slovene Nation), which became the paper of the Slovene ‘progressives’. The newspaper was initially issued three times a week, becoming a daily on its move to Ljubljana in 1872. It was committed to a “powerful and free Austria” that would protect Slovenes against the Italian
and Prussian threat, but rejected dualism. It was in favour of federalism, enthusiastic about Slavic and South Slav co-operation and proclaimed United Slovenia as the principle Slovene political goal. Nevertheless, it did not offer a clear view on a range of issues that formed a constituent part of the wider Austrian and European liberal programme, and even supported positions that were quite at variance with liberal thought, such as acknowledging the close link between the Catholic Church and the Slovene nation. In political conflicts regarding the Church it attempted to set out a neutral position, while on economic issues it rejected freedom in trade and crafts, calling for the protection of “domestic jobs”. The continual search for compromise between liberal principles and the domestic reality was the characteristic weakness of the Slovene liberals, which would also later damage their credibility and political reputation.

The liberal demand for more determined national policies soon fell on more fruitful ground. The first mass public national gatherings on Slovene soil took place at the end of the 1860s. The initiative for these large outdoor gatherings, modelled on the large public meetings in Ireland, and known as ‘tabori’, again following the Czech example, came from the Styrian Slovenes. Between 1868 and 1871, there were 18 tabor meetings on Slovene territory, with an average of 5–6,000 people gathering (as many as 30,000 gathered at Vižmarje near Ljubljana). The highlight of the meetings were speeches in which national leaders and deputies supported United Slovenia, demanded the introduction of Slovene in schools and state administration, the founding of new schools, and even a Slovene university. The speeches would also touch on other issues of the day, especially economic. The earliest tabori were organised by the Young Slovenes, with the Old Slovenes joining later as the movement spread.

The major political upheavals of the mid-1860s strengthened the Slovene desire for closer co-operation with other Slavic nations. The most important role models for the Slovenes were the politically and economically more advanced Czechs, while opposition to dualism in 1867 also encouraged active contact with the Croats. Relatively large numbers of educated people learnt Russian and the Cyrillic alphabet, and looked to Russia as an expression of their enthusiasm for membership in the ‘greater Slavic family’ and the idea, ‘better the Russians than the Prussians.’ In 1867, three ardent admirers of Russia even participated in an ethnographic exhibition in Moscow as a protest against the German political class, and news of Czarist reforms led many Slovene scholars to visit Russia. Yet the earnest pan-Slavic feelings and calls for Slavic and South Slavic unity did not lead to a clear objective or political programme. An attempt to form such a programme was only made at the
“Yugoslav congress” (Yugoslav meaning South Slav) held in Ljubljana in December 1870 in response to the German victory over the French. This meeting, featuring Slovene, Croat and Serb representatives from Vojvodina, still did not go further than expressing a desire for the Habsburg Yugoslavs to “live together”, if the existence of the Monarchy were threatened after the Franco-Prussian war. The only tangible results of the Ljubljana Yugoslav meeting was the founding of the newspaper Südslawische Zeitung, first published in Sisak in 1871, but only lasting for half a year.

The Slovene camp presented a relatively united front until at least the first half of the 1870s, despite internal divisions and differences. For the time being, there were still only two camps or ‘parties’ on territories with a Slovene population – the nationalist, i.e. Slovene, and the German. The German camp rejected the title ‘national’ and defined itself as liberal, anti-clerical, and ‘faithful’ to the existing constitution. In 1868, Germans founded a Constitutional Association (Verfassungsverein) in Ljubljana, and started to issue their own newspaper, the Laibacher Tagblatt. Germans in Celje and Maribor also had their own newspapers. Members of the ‘German party’ included officials, merchants, tradespeople, members of the professions, as well as innkeepers and local worthies in smaller settlements and rural areas, and there were many Slovenes among them. Although the German positions were not extreme, the growth and increasingly popular nature of the Slovene movement had already started to put a major strain on Slovene-German relations by the mid-1860s.

The tabor movement died away at the start of the 1870s, after being banned by the government during the Franco-Prussian war. Meanwhile, the differences between the two sides of the Slovene movement were deepening. The organisation of a Catholic camp in Austria at the end of the 1860s influenced the formation of Catholic societies on Slovene territory, which united Catholics regardless of nationality. This strengthened the Slovene conservative-clericals, and this was reflected in the founding of Catholic newspapers. In 1872, the Catholic newspaper Slovenec was founded in Ljubljana, Glas was published in Gorizia, and the Catholic-oriented Slovenski gospodar in Maribor. The Young Slovenes continued to concede to Catholic pressure because of the clergy’s important role in the national movement, while a group of conservatives headed by Bleiweis opposed a complete split. But the split could no longer be prevented.

In 1872, the Old Slovenes decided to unite with the Viennese conservatives, the Rechtspartei (Party of Right), but the Young Slovenes were vehemently opposed, stating that their programme entailed an unacceptable return to historical rights and retrograde conservatism. The two sides of the Slovene movement now openly clashed; with their
disagreements turning the run up to the Reichsrat election of 1873 – the first direct elections, which should have favoured the Slovenes – into a genuine Kulturkampf. The fractious Slovene camps put forward their own candidates in the electoral campaign, who agitated against each other. The political failures and a lack of wider popular support forced liberals to put their differences aside and make common cause with the clerical-conservatives in the middle of the 1870s. In 1876, they joined the Rechtspartei, led by Count Karl Sigismund Hohenwart, and ‘unity’ once more reigned between the opposing Slovene camps, and was to last until the 1890s (even longer in some places).

The conservative-liberal split had caused disaffection and criticism among Slovenes, so renewed unity met with widespread approval. Yet in truth the restored ‘unity’ meant the subordination of the liberals and victory for the conservatives, who from that point on regained the political initiative on the Slovene scene. During these years of unity, the liberals were constantly required to compromise on and abandon their principles. At the same time, Slovenes, united with German conservatives, again had to let the United Slovenia programme slip into the background. Their Czech and Croat allies were not particularly open to the national law argument they used to justify the programme, since the Czech and Croats could refer to their own historical legal tradition. The Poles were even less well disposed to the Slovene argument, since they had acquired major concessions in Galicia during the 1870s. The national fervour that had accompanied the tabor movement and Slovene electoral successes in the latter half of the 1860s was nowhere to be seen by the mid-1870s.

During the German liberal governments of 1872 to 1879, the Slovenes recorded a series of electoral failures. Although the poor electoral results were undoubtedly due in part to internal disputes, they could also be attributed to a government policy which obliged officials to vote for government candidates. Furthermore, many among the Slovene urban middle classes and wealthier people in rural areas voted for the German side, which promised economic progress through liberal government. In these circumstances, the status of Slovene in schools, administration and courts could not be significantly improved. Major changes were only made in primary education. A new law on education was finally passed by the Reichsrat in 1869, removing schools from the supervision of the clergy, introducing eight years of compulsory education, and updating the primary school curriculum. Under the new law, provincial education councils were placed in charge of primary education, which included deciding on the language of instruction after consulting municipalities. Slovene became the language of instruction in primary schools in Carniola, the Slovene parts of the Gorizian province, and the surroundings of Trieste (though not in the cities of Gorizia and
Trieste themselves), and in some municipalities in Styria. In Slovene Istria, the number of Slovene schools only grew slowly due to opposition from the Italian majority in the provincial diet, while conditions were least favourable to Slovenes in Carinthia, where they did not have a single public primary school until the final decades of the nineteenth century.

The lack of a powerful, economically active, urban middle class meant that the most dynamic force in the Slovene movement remained the secular intelligentsia, whose strength and numbers differed across the various provinces in which Slovenes lived. This had an unavoidable impact on the direction and strength of Slovene politics in the different provinces. The Slovene movement in Carinthia, where the secular Slovene educated classes were particularly weak, only gradually overcame its initial difficulties. Conditions were somewhat different in Styria, where the liberal-minded Slovene educated classes were more active and stronger than in Carniola, though not strong enough to acquire sufficient support in towns in the electoral campaign. Slovene status was strongest in Carniola, although there was a fierce electoral fight for the towns there in the 1870s. In 1877, Slovenes lost their majority in the Carniolan diet following a German victory in the urban curia, which was a harsh blow to Slovene politics in general.

In contrast with Slovenes in provinces they co-inhabited with a German population, Slovenes in the Littoral, Gorizia, Trieste and Istria faced two opponents: Austrian officialdom and the Italian movement. The Slovene position was best in Gorizia, where Slovenes represented two thirds of the population, and the Italian majority in the provincial diet was too weak to completely dominate them. The Slovene language had equality with Italian in the Gorizian provincial diet, and the relatively strong Slovene political movement featured notable liberal representation and had its own societies and newspapers. The situation was different in Trieste, where a small number of Slovene representatives on the city council were unable to count on any tangible successes, although the increasingly economically successful Triestine middle classes included Slovenes, who were largely liberal. In 1874 the ‘Edinost’ (‘Unity’) society was founded, which gradually grew into a Slovene political society for the entire Austrian Littoral province, and two years later a newspaper with the same name began publication. In Istria, Slovenes joined with Croats in the struggle against Italians, who saw the province as an Italian region.

During the 1870s, the Slovene movement was not yet a closely connected whole, and had no common political institutions or joint political parties. Newspapers published in Ljubljana made room for articles from all over the Slovene world, but they remained an outlet for the positions and views of the Carniolan and Styrian Slovenes. The undoubtedly patriotic
members of the Slovene national elite nevertheless retained a strong attachment to their province or Land. The life of Slovenes in the Alpine valleys of Venetia (an area known in Slovene as Beneška Slovenija or Benečija; and in Italian as Slavia Veneta) and Hungary took place in almost complete separation from Slovenes in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy. The hopes raised, after Venetia’s inclusion in the Kingdom of Italy in 1866, that the Italian authorities would restore the autonomous rights the population had enjoyed during the Venetian Republic, proved unfounded. The language of administration, courts and schools was Italian, and the authorities openly promoted the Italianisation of non-Italian speaking inhabitants. The preservation of the Slovene language and ethnic consciousness in these circumstances was largely the concern of priests and a few educated lay people, who maintained contacts with Slovenes in the Habsburg Monarchy and involved themselves in Slovene national life there.

Dualism made the national position worse for Slovenes in Hungary. In 1868, the Hungarian parliament passed a special nationality law, which permitted the use of non-Hungarian languages alongside official Hungarian in administration, schools and courts, but in the area between the Mura and Rába, which had a Slovene-speaking minority, the law was effectively left unimplemented. The public use of Slovene among the Hungarian Slovenes was therefore largely limited to church sermons and the publishing activities of a small circle of Slovene scholars. The Mura remained a major barrier to ties between the Hungarian Slovenes and their fellow Slovenes in Cisleithanian Austria. Nevertheless, contacts increased significantly from the start of the 1860s, thanks largely to efforts by Styrian Slovenes.

The problems which the Slovene movement engaged with more seriously from the second half of the 1860s onward included the social or labour issue. The first worker education societies grew up in Slovene territory between 1867 and 1869. At first, they brought trades and handicraft workers together, rather than industrial workers. Their members were both Slovene and German-speaking, and generally took an international view of national issues. The formation of workers’ societies divided the urban middle classes: German and Slovene liberals welcomed their formation and attempted to influence their leadership, while conservatives rejected them, and called on their members to join the Catholic handicraft workers’ societies that had been formed in the 1850s. The first labour strikes in Slovene territory occurred in the 1870s and members of the workers’ societies also attempted to link up with the emerging workers’ movement in Austria.

The anti-Turkish uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875 opened up the question of Habsburg policy in the Balkans, and placed the ‘Yugoslav’ question back on the agenda. The
revolt garnered great sympathy among the Slovene educated and middle classes. Assistance was collected in many Slovene towns for the rebels and tens of Slovenes even went to Bosnia to fight on their side. The Young Slovenes hoped that a powerful Slavic state would arise in place of European Turkey, which would support the Slovene national movement, while the Old Slovenes supported the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the Congress of Berlin, when the occupation became a reality, the Old Slovenes supported the unification of the two newly acquired regions with Croatian and Slovene territories in a southern Slav Illyria. The main points of the Slovene programme, which both sides of the Slovene political spectrum accepted, inevitably remained the abolition of dualism, the federalisation of Austria and a United Slovenia.

Slovene academic and cultural life in the 1870s – as in the 1860s – was closely entwined with national politics. In addition to provincial academic associations, in which Germans and Slovenes would mix, national associations with a purely Slovene base were also formed. Their goal was to promote Slovene technical, cultural and artistic work. For example, alongside the Philharmonic Society, which became a German society, the Glasbena Matica (National Musical Association) was founded in 1872 in Ljubljana. The Slovenska Matica, as the central national academic and cultural association, was expected to oversee the publication of Slovene academic and literary works, but in the 1870s it largely issued textbooks, popular-science handbooks, and popular, less-demanding literary material. Although initially translations and adaptations were predominant among the Matica’s academic publication, its publishing efforts provided vital encouragement in the development of academic and technical terminology in Slovene. The Society of Hermagoras (Družba sv. Mohorja) in Klagenfurt was flourishing and by 1875 already had around 25,000 members. Despite its focus on issuing easy-to-read educational, devotional and didactic works, it expanded its range of books into other areas.

In the second half of the 1860s, the most influential Slovene literary figure was the writer and poet Josip Stritar (1836–1923), who started the literary review Zvon (The Bell) in Vienna in the 1870s. Stritar’s literary work followed a number of European writers and literary movements (Sentimentalism, Romanticism and Realism), and his Zvon was the first Slovene “liberal, purely literary journal” (I. Prijatelj) to subject nationally based literary ideas to autonomous and erudite aesthetic and critical criteria. Stritar found two colleagues and fellow thinkers in Fran Levstik and Josip Jurčič, and was an important influence on the younger generation of writers, such as Ivan Tavčar (1851–1923), Janko Kersnik (1852–97) and the poet Simon Gregorčič (1844–1906). Realism became the predominant style in prose
fiction, while post-Romanticism continued to prevail in poetry. The subject matter of Slovene literary works continued to expand, addressing both history and modernity (socially critical and bourgeois novels and short stories were particularly successful).

The Dramatic Society in Ljubljana did not have its own stage, occasionally appearing at the Estates Theatre, and could not yet boast any particularly notable performances of its own. Its repertoire, comprising simple folk plays and operettas, did not generally match the level of the reading-room performances. Romanticism, which was very closely related to the national movement, was the major influence over musical creativity. Vocal compositions were more prevalent, with instrumental work rather weak. The most popular composers were Davorin Jenko (1835–1914) and Anton Hajdrich (1842–78), known for their melodic and patriotic works, while the extensive opus of Benjamin Ipavec (1829–1908) and his erudite choral and orchestral compositions stood out. In church music, the Cecilian Movement began in the 1870s, rejecting secular musical influences, and tying itself to the ecclesiastical musical traditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Painting maintained its primacy in the figurative arts. The death of the landscape artists Marko Pernhart and Anton Karinger (1829–70) brought an end to the period of transition from Romanticism to Realism, and started a new period which would see Slovene artists turning attention from Italian and Viennese to German and French trends. The outstanding artists from the generation in which modern academic Realism began among Slovenes were the Šubic brothers (Janez, 1850–89, and Jurij, 1855–90), whose works bore comparison to artistic endeavour throughout Europe at that time.

AGRICULTURAL CRISIS AND UNREALISED HOPES OF INDUSTRIALISATION

During the 1860s it became increasingly clear that realising Slovene economic hopes would be extremely difficult. The agricultural crisis continually deepened, despite expert assertions that it was only a period of transition. The modern, new industrial plants that appeared in traditionally successful economic sectors meant a transfer from Slovene to German and foreign hands. Railway construction advanced slowly, but in reality it was never conceived a rail network that would link Slovene territory to the wider economic world. After the major financial crisis of 1873, railway construction in provinces with a Slovene population ground to a halt that would last for two decades.

The countryside in particular was undergoing very difficult times, becoming more
agricultural than it had been in the previous decades and even centuries. The end of cottage industries (manufactories), foundry work, informal trading by farmers, and the decline in carting and domestic crafts left farmers more and more dependent on the sale of their own produce. Most of the farming population continued to try and satisfy its varying needs through its own means, with the help of village artisans, but this could only mitigate rather than eliminate the lack of money. Generally people could just about put enough money to one side or ‘under the mattress’ to pay taxes and reparations for emancipation, but sometimes not, as indicated by enforced tax collection proceedings. State taxes, which increased continually from the start of the 1870s, were a particularly heavy burden on farmers, or peasants as they effectively still were.

The introduction of market conditions in the largely hilly Slovene territory took place very unevenly, given the slow growth of modern road and rail connections, while the slow industrialisation process meant that it was very difficult for the population forced out of agriculture to find employment in towns and in non-agricultural plants. The division of farms and selling off of sections – either because the land was too small and no longer worth cultivating, or due to a need to raise money, for example, to pay debts – continued in the villages and intensified social stratification. Alongside the rapid growth in smallholders, cottars, casual farm and vineyard labourers, and other agricultural workers, a stratum of large, richer farmers developed, who were able to carry out other larger commercial deals alongside their agricultural activities and increase their wealth and influence.

Peasant debt became one of the biggest problems in Slovene rural areas in the second half of the nineteenth century. As elsewhere in Europe and the Monarchy, where there were still no agricultural banks or loan companies, peasants on Slovene territory had to borrow from village usurers or town speculators. Lending to peasants became a profitable activity and an important source of increasing Slovene capital, but peasant borrowing led to genuine ruin for many. In Carniola alone, the miserable cycle of forced auctions saw over 10,000 peasant smallholdings sold between 1868 and 1893 (around 14% of the total number). In these conditions, there was a rapid rise in the number of peasants seeking seasonal work in Croatia, moving to find work in Austrian and German industrial centres, and emigrating to America. Between 1860 and 1880, Janez Bleiweis attempted to stem the flow of emigration to western Europe and America with articles in *Novice* that gave assurances the crisis would pass. He was more in favour of emigration to “Slavic lands”, particularly Serbia and Russia, where Slovenes would feel “more at home” than in the German and American world. But the wave of emigration did not decline, nor did it head to the Slavic east, but instead it grew and
continued to head primarily north and west. By the mid-1890s, around 150,000 people had emigrated from Slovene territory to faster-developing Austrian provinces, Germany, France, North and South America, most of them young men. Between 1893 and 1913, around 100,000 left from the territory of present-day Slovenia; by the outbreak of the First World War, over 20% of the Slovene population had emigrated.

The effective inclusion of peasants in the market economy could only be achieved by the rapid modernisation of agriculture, but the general lack of money meant that cultivation techniques changed very slowly. Although continual crop rotation without fallow predominated, in arable farming, manual labour continued to prevail. Machinery (such as threshing machines and straw cutters) only started to appear in greater numbers on wealthier farms at the end of the century, with iron ploughs gradually replacing wooden ones after 1900. Peasants attempted to increase revenues from normal products through growing fruit and hops, beekeeping, cheesemaking and winemaking. Cattle and pigs were the mainstays of animal husbandry, while sheep-rearing, which had once flourished, collapsed along with domestic craft weaving, due to competition from Australian wool. The difficult living and economic conditions in villages were made worse by natural disasters such as flooding and fires. Although fire insurance became more common, fires sealed the fate of far too many uninsured peasant houses. The number of fire-fighting societies only started to rapidly increase from the 1880s.

This slow economic development meant that the appearance of the Slovene countryside and Slovene towns also changed very slowly in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1869, over 80% of the population on the territory of present-day Slovenia still lived in the countryside; while in 1900, the proportion of the population in the countryside was still over 73%. There were not many new village settlements, so older, ‘clustered’ villages grew. New industrial plants and transport routes did not generally impinge much on the natural environment. The exceptions were settlements along the Südbahn and the upper Carniola railway, where in addition to the Zasavje coalmines, and the modern ironworking furnaces and workshops around present-day Jesenice, chemical factories, glass factories and paper factories were founded or modernised.

The largest and strongest joint-stock companies established in Slovene territory in the 1860s and 1870s were ironworks and coalmines. The Carniolan Industrial Company, founded in 1869 by Ljubljana entrepreneurs, largely German speakers, owned most of the Carniolan ironworking plants, but during the 1870s they were already in crisis, and in 1888 were bought out by Viennese and Berlin entrepreneurs, who changed Jesenice into a modern industrial
centre. The Trbovlje coal mining company, which was founded in 1873 in Vienna by Viennese bankers and Carniolan – largely Ljubljana – entrepreneurs, did not fare much better. The company rapidly expanded, but by 1880 it was bought out by French capital, and thenceforth remained the most important French outpost on Slovene land after the Südbahn, which had been French-owned since 1857.

The main source of Slovene capital remained commercial business, tax farming and loans to peasants, which was generally insufficient for investing in and maintaining large industrial plants. Smaller companies, such as textile factories, steam mills, and glass and leather factories, developed more successfully. After a wave of modernisation in the 1870s and 1880s, the successful ironworking companies not operating in the realm of the large joint-stock companies included the ironworking plant in Štore pri Celju and Ravne na Koroškem, and the Samasso family’s iron-casting business in Ljubljana. In 1873, a state zinc plant opened its doors in Celje, while one of the few larger industrial plants in Ljubljana was the state tobacco factory, founded in 1870.

Yet the much hoped-for economic take-off did not take place. Internal and particularly transit trade via Slovene territory did, however, significantly increase, and Trieste became not only an important Mediterranean port, but also a major European and overseas port, although its direct surroundings did not profit significantly from this success. The free trade and free crafts policy and the Südbahn brought more competitive industrial goods and agricultural products than the area was able to export, while the agricultural crisis, collapse of traditional handicrafts and trades, and the relatively large loss in revenue from carting prevented a more rapid accumulation of domestic capital. In these circumstances, the warnings grew louder that the basic preconditions for industrialisation were a developed money market and a widespread transport network, especially rail.

However, the development of a network of banks and loan societies was relatively slow. The Kranjska Hranilnica savings bank in Ljubljana, which was owned by German wholesalers, and managed to successfully increase its capital, was joined in the 1860s and 1870s by branches of Hungarian, Czech and Viennese banks, though they were very cautious in approving loans. The Slovene Insurance Bank, founded in 1871, had already failed by 1874 due to grandiose management plans and the Austrian financial collapse. The most successful group were the mutual savings societies founded by the Young Slovenes following the Czech and Schulze Delitsch model. Their main purpose was to support industry, trade and crafts, though to a much lesser extent they did assist destitute peasants and handicraft workers. In 1883, they joined the Union of Slovene Savings Banks, which was based in Celje. By the
mid-1890s, this united 81 savings banks with capital of several million crowns.

The growth of the Trieste port and the construction of the Suez Canal (1869), at the end of the 1860s and start of the 1870s, raised new hopes and expectations in Trieste’s hinterland. The members of the Carniolan Chamber of Trades and Crafts were convinced that the provinces close to Trieste would at least become an important international railway hub, if not also a flowering industrial centre. Carniola’s position at the ‘gateway to the Orient’ supposedly made it best placed to benefit. German and Slovene newspapers published ambitious plans for railways that would link Western Europe and Germany with Turkey, Hungary with Italy, and northern Austria and the Czech provinces with Trieste, all crossing the Slovene territories. In 1872, the first pan-Slovene transport and economic plan for the construction of a railway network was produced, which aimed to combine Slovene territory into an economic whole. Yet the authorities in Vienna did not devote any interest or money to the plans of the provinces around Trieste. They instead continued to build lines connecting the Südbahn with Hungary, Croatia, Venetia and Istria. The only lines of importance to Slovene territory were Ljubljana–Jesenice–Tarvisio (1870) and Maribor–Klagenfurt–Villach (1872), which connected Carinthia with Carniola and Lower Styria. The construction of railways in Slovene territory increased only in the 1890s.

In these circumstances, the Slovene middle classes, although they had strengthened somewhat, remained very weak in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Slovene urban classes were formed by a few wholesalers and industrial entrepreneurs, wealthier tradespeople, urban merchants and urbanised wealthy farmers, who had gained wealth from usury and commercial trading. By far the largest section of the Slovene middle classes, however, and the most active in national activities, was made up of educated people and members of the professions.

A POLICY OF SMALL STEPS

The French Slavist, Louis Leger, who visited Ljubljana in 1882, described Slovenes as “petty traders”, and a “very Catholic nation” that was “strongly attached to the dynasty”, but filled with a “moral commitment” to opposing the pressure of Germanisation. Leger drew his conclusion on the Slovenes’ ardent Catholicism from the numerous churches and chapels he observed in towns and the countryside on his travels through Slovene territory. In reality, Slovenes were no more Catholic than their German or Italian neighbours. The influence of the clergy and the Church on Slovene conservative politicians had increased since the 1860s,
while the number of ecclesiastical orders and monasteries had also grown (including the return of the Jesuits to Slovene territory in 1868), while the largest group of Slovenes studying at Austrian universities were generally theology students until the 1890s, far longer than for the Germans and Czechs. Yet the priests were by no means united politically and ideologically, and the laicisation of society continued at pace from the 1860s onwards, as elsewhere in Austria. More liberal laws, the loss of former status within the education system, the termination of the Concordat, and the growth of the middle classes and educated laity all reduced the influence of the Church in public and cultural life, while the influence of liberal and secular viewpoints grew, along with their perception of faith as a personal, rather than a social issue. Priests retained their role as influential promoters of national consciousness, and spiritual and political opinion-makers, especially in smaller settlements and rural areas where there was a long tradition of co-existence between the Church and popular piety, and the Church remained the main arbiter of the rules of social behaviour.

In 1879, the German liberals lost their majority in the Reichsrat in Vienna, and the Emperor appointed Count Edward Taaffe as prime minister. Government pressure relented, and although conditions continued to vary from province to province, the Slovene movement strengthened everywhere. The overall spread in Slovene consciousness still did not completely replace other perceived identities. This did not apply to just the lower strata of society, since the middle and educated classes also often retained a degree of the traditional identification with their province (Land), while also feeling closely connected to the Monarchy and Habsburg dynasty. In the eyes of most Slovenes, the great national enemy was not the state and Emperor, but the non-Slav neighbours i.e. Hungarians, Italians, and – the most dangerous and ‘most unscrupulous’ among them – the Germans. Nevertheless, until the end of the nineteenth century, Slovene national ideologues did divide the Germans into several groups. First were the nemškutarji, who as national traitors and “national thieves” warranted the greatest condemnation. The second group was the admirers of “imperial Germany”, the pan-Germans, prusaki and bismarkovec (Prussians and Bismarck supporters), whose Greater German ideas were generally considered to threaten non-German nations within the Monarchy and the entire state. The third group comprised “true and upstanding Germans”, that is Germans “by descent”, who remained faithful to the House of Habsburg. In the opinion of Slovene national leaders, these were the only Germans with whom it was possible to talk and reach any understanding (until the 1890s, this largely meant the German conservatives – as the Slovenes’ political allies).

Slovenes supported Taaffe’s government and – according to Slovene historians – it
was during the Taaffe mandate that they achieved their greatest gains under the Habsburg Monarchy. The Taaffe government marked a milestone, especially for Carniola, which the government finally recognised as a Slovene province. The end of the government’s support for the German group in Carniola, which they had enjoyed throughout the 1870s, saw its supporters and voters fade away. Careerists from the towns, market towns and villages who had supported the German side during the period of government pressure now moved to the Slovene side. In 1882, Slovenes again acquired a majority on the Ljubljana city council, and in the Carniolan provincial diet in 1883. One after another, Carniolan towns and market towns turned to Slovene candidates, and after 1885, the only significant German outpost left was Kočevje, the centre of the largest German-language island in the province. Since 1883, only Slovenes had been appointed as the Landeshauptmann of Carniola (i.e. president of the provincial diet), and from 1880 to 1892 Carniola also had the first and last Slovene Landespräsident (provincial governor). This office was held by Andrej Winkler, loyal to Vienna, but an undoubtedly Slovene-affiliated official. During his term in office the number of Slovene officials grew, as did the use of Slovene as a language of administration.

Circumstances elsewhere also changed to the Slovenes’ benefit, but much less so than in Carniola. From 1884 in Styria, the deputy governor was a Slovene, and in the 1880s Slovenes again strengthened their position in the rural curia of the Styrian provincial diet, which had been weakened in the previous decade. German representatives continued to predominate in the urban curia, so the major lower Styrian towns and market towns, including Maribor, Celje and Ptuj, remained in German hands. Government proclamations aimed at spreading the use of Slovene in administration were not fully respected, even in Carniola. In Styria and Carinthia, where there were significantly fewer Slovene officials and German opposition to the use of Slovene in public administration was much greater, Slovene efforts to achieve linguistic equality faced far greater problems. German pressure in Styria and Carinthia did not relent. On the contrary, it increased further, resisting Taaffe’s policies, which were perceived by Styrian and Carinthian Germans as artificially buoying up Slovene national development. The German opposition and power was clearly reflected in the census, since, despite undisputed natural growth, the number of Slovenes fell in both provinces, not only in relative but also absolute terms.

The establishment of Slovene in education proceeded at a similar slow pace, and again differed from province to province. Only in Carniola were almost all primary schools Slovene. Elsewhere (with the exception of Carinthia), the number of Slovene primary schools increased. Most lower gymnasiums in Carniola permitted the use of Slovene (by 1873 in
Ljubljana), as did Realschulen and technical schools. Of course, it could only be used as a language of instruction in combination with German, and only in certain subjects. The language of instruction in higher state gymnasia remained German, except in Koper where Italian predominated. The gymnasia generally respected the legal provision of 1849 that Slovene must be a compulsory subject of study for Slovene students, although in some cases only after parents had submitted a special request. In other cases, the use of Slovene in schools and the founding of new schools with Slovene as the language of instruction still encountered considerable problems in the 1880s. Italian and German opposition to expanding instruction in Slovene did not abate, but even increased. The fight for influence over schools and young people acquired a new, organised form. The German School Association, founded in Vienna in 1880 to support German education in Austrian provinces with nationally mixed populations, soon gathered members, with its branches multiplying in Styria and Carinthia. In border areas and those mixed areas with an Italian population, the role of guardian of Italian language and culture was taken on by the association Pro Patria (1886), which was replaced by the Lega Nazionale (1891) when the former was banned. In 1885, Slovenes founded their own Society of Cyril and Methodius, which built and supported schools in border areas. The number of members and branches grew quickly, and the society opened its first school in 1887 in Trieste.

The 1880s were known as the ‘period of unity’ for Slovene politics: the liberals were subordinate to the conservatives, and Slovene deputies in the Reichsrat in Vienna were part of the conservative Hohenwart club. They all agreed on compromises with the Taaffe government, which expected support for its political decisions and moderation in national demands in return. One of the leading figures in Slovene political life at that time was the liberal historian Fran Šuklje (1849–1935), whose position was that political extremism in Austria would never be successful. Šuklje therefore favoured “flexibility” on national issues, a policy of small steps and the expansion of provincial autonomy, but proclaimed the demand for a United Slovenia to be unrealistic. Thanks to the writer Janko Kersnik, who stated in the Carniolan provincial diet that Slovene politics needed “the elasticity of youth”, Šuklje’s circle acquired the nickname the elastikarji. His opponents included older and younger radical liberals. The political views of the latter were revealed in a comment of the writer Ivan Tavčar from 1885 to the effect that a Slovene and Slav could reach a whole range of compromises, but would never manage do so with the Germans. However, under growing pressure from the Catholic camp, Šuklje’s position predominated among the liberals by 1886, and the policy of ‘elasticity’ finally gained the upper hand.
The dominance of the ‘elastic’ view in the liberal ranks and the overwhelming strength of the Catholic side gave Slovene politics a fixed Catholic-conservative character during the 1880s. The political and ideological intolerance that was growing in the conservative camp while Bleiweis still lived only increased after his death (1881). Until his death, Bleiweis enjoyed a reputation as an undisputed political leader, even among his opponents. No such figures came forward after his death, since the liberal elastikar Fran Šuklje and the leading figure of the Catholic camp Canon Karel Klun (1841–1896) both lacked Bleiweis’ leadership capabilities. The Catholic camp was influenced by general developments within the Catholic Church, which addressed social problems with more flexibility under Pope Leo XIII, while increasing its power and influence in opposition to liberal social and economic ideas. In 1884, Jakob Missia (1838–1902) became bishop of Ljubljana. He later reached the office of archbishop (1897) and cardinal (1899). In his own words, Missia wanted to “remake all in Christ”. His leaning towards a Catholic renewal that would base Slovene politics, society and culture on Christian principles was taken further by Anton Mahnič (1850–1920), professor of theology in Gorizia. He called for a clear distinction between Catholic and other views and conviction (a “scheidung der Geister” or separation of minds) and said that instead of depicting “naked life” and reality, literature and art should dedicate themselves to the depiction of “supernatural Christian beauty” and the revelation of divine truth. He rejected any political co-operation with non-Catholic groups, particularly the liberals. As a legitimist, and advocate of divine and historical law, he rejected the principle of national sovereignty, rejected the United Slovenia programme, and saw nationalism as a counter to Christian universalism. Mahnič’s extreme ideas on beauties and art did not even gain many adherents among Catholic artists. More importantly, although more in Carniola than in other Slovene-populated provinces, he had an influence at the political level, which led to the final liberal-Catholic split in the first half of the 1890s, and the formation of modern political parties.

At the same time during the 1880s – as elsewhere in Austria – a third political camp was continuing to take shape: the labour movement. In the first half of the 1880s, the leading figure in the Ljubljana workers’ association was Franc Železnikar (1843–1903), a tailor’s assistant, European traveller, republican and admirer of the Paris Commune, who used the slogan “dynamite and oil” to call on Carniolan workers to prepare for the coming “social revolution”. He and his workers’ association could not convert their words into action. However, in 1884, during a period in which the authorities were clamping down on socialists, Železnikar and his supporters were imprisoned, and he received a lengthy sentence. In 1887, when the Ljubljana workers’ association was reactivated, it joined forces with the Austrian
Social Democratic movement. At the founding congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Party held over the 1888/89 New Year in Hainfeld, there were two representatives for Slovene workers. From that time on, the labour movement in Slovene territory developed within and under the influence of the Austrian Social Democrats.

The greater freedom, in national terms, that the Taaffe government brought in for Slovenes (though largely in Carniola) was a boon for Slovene publishing and writing activity. The growing number of literary publications was matched by new newspapers and journals. The literary journals, the liberal *Ljubljanski zvon* (The Ljubljana Bell) from 1881, and the Catholic *Dom in svet* (The Home and the World) from 1888, maintained a prominent and well-reputed place among the Slovene cultural journals until the Second World War. Between 1884 and 1887, Ivan Hribar (1851–1941), later mayor of Ljubljana, and the writer Ivan Tavčar published the journal *Slovan*, which presented Slavic and Slovene ideas. Radical pan-Slavism was promoted by the journal *Slovenski svet* (The Slavic World), which was published in 1888/99 in Vienna by the ardent Slavophile Fran Podgornik (1846–1904). A completely different point of view, naturally, was put forward by the newspaper *Rimski katolik* (1888–96), edited by Anton Mahnič.

Although most Slovene academics still wrote in German, the number of scientific and academic works in Slovene was increasing every year. The Slovenska Matica continued to publish academic and literary works, while manuals on geography, natural science, physics and medicine were joined by the first books on art history and philosophy in Slovene. It was in this climate that some individual academics started writing in Slovene only. One of the first was the historian Franc Kos (1853–1924), the founding father of Slovene academic historiography.

The policy of small steps, which was subject to criticism from radicals of all colours, was not completely without success. Yet the new era for Slovene politics and culture only really started in the 1890s.
The fall of the Taaffe government in 1893 was followed by a period of uncertainty. Forecasts made by observers at home and abroad that relations between Germans and the non-German nations would quickly sour soon proved to be accurate. One of the first major disputes to exercise the nations in Cisleithanian Austria was the Celje (German: Cilli) gymnasium question. Taaffe’s government, which had introduced Slovene and German parallel classes to the lower gymnasium in Maribor without significant German opposition, promised Slovenes a similar arrangement in the Celje gymnasium in return for Slovene support in the Reichsrat. Yet when the issue of the parallel classes in Celje was actually addressed in 1894, the Celje and Styrian Germans let loose their pent-up rage. The Slovenes turned to other Slavs for support. The dispute over the Celje gymnasium became a state-wide argument between Germans and Slavs, and led to the fall of government which had introduced the parallel Slovene classes (following Reichsrat approval in 1895), along with the resignation of its prime minister, Taaffe’s successor, Count Windischgrätz.

The end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries saw Slovene-German relations becoming increasingly fraught, with the national affiliation of the population in Styria and Carinthia changing, to the major detriment of the Slovenes (the number of inhabitants using the Slovene language fell by 20% between 1880 and 1910 in Carinthia). The main cause for the falling number of people recorded as using Slovene in the Austrian statistics was German economic, social and political dominance. This further shift in the national balance reflected the fact that for various reasons – be they political or material – part of the Slovene population was defining itself as German.

All this supported the conviction of many Slovenes that they were under threat, primarily from Germans, and to a lesser extent from Italians. Conditions on the western Slovene border were somewhat different. In Gorizia and Trieste, the process of Italianisation of Slovene immigrants had almost ceased, for a number of reasons. The Slovene urban middle classes, particularly in Trieste, had grown in status, while the Slovene and Italian working classes co-operated without problems. At the same time, Italian capital was relatively weak and itself threatened by German and Viennese capital, and the Austrian authorities were no more in favour of the Italian national movement than the Slovene, so did not generally support Italianisation efforts. In Trieste and its hinterland, Slovene politicians enjoyed relatively strong support from the Slovene population, and at the beginning of the twentieth century successfully competed with Italian liberals, while Slovenes also made important
advances in Gorizia. Conditions were significantly worse in Istria, where Italian pressure started to grow at the start of the twentieth century.

Increased German pressure on the northern border, growing tensions within the Monarchy and Catholic demands for the ‘separation of minds’ also dominated the Slovene political scene at the start of the 1890s. Moderate politicians from the liberal and Catholic camps were still prepared to make common political cause, but younger and more radical politicians were rejecting the ‘policy of unity’ with more and more determination. The 1891 Reichsrat elections were the last to feature joint candidates from the two Slovene political groups in Carniola. The Catholics blossomed and in 1892 organised the first Slovene Catholic convention in Ljubljana, which set out a Catholic political programme. Circumstances also forced the liberals to organise themselves. In 1891 they founded their own Slovene Association and three years later (1894) proclaimed the founding of the National Party (National Progressive Party from 1905), while their Catholic opponents started to use the name Catholic National Party (Slovene People’s Party from 1905). The period of Liberal-Catholic unity in Carniola had come to an end.

In 1899, a split occurred between the Catholics and liberals in Gorizia, while in Styria the two groups went their own way in 1906/07. The party divisions matched the divisions already marked out in civil society and social life. The Catholics founded the ‘Orli’ (Eagles) association in 1906 to counter the liberal Sokol association, the academic society Leonova Družba (1896) was founded as a counter to the Slovenska Matica, the Slomškova Zveza (Slomšek Union, 1900) was founded in response to the liberal teachers’ organisation, while both sides also had a number of student and academic societies. However, the ‘separation of minds’ did not cover all of Slovene territory. In Trieste, the Slovene middle classes continued to work together in the liberally aligned society Edinost. In Istria, they participated in a joint Slovene-Croat group, in Carinthia in a single conservative-Catholic party, which led some of the Slovene liberals to join their German counterparts. Social Democrats also founded their own party in 1896 to unite Slovene workers with Serbs and Croats in Istria and Dalmatia (known as the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party).

The programme of the Catholic party, with some updates, largely followed Mahnič’s points: “There are three things we must … work for with all our strength: first, socio-economic reform; second, religious education all the way through to university; and third, national rights based on equality.” In its efforts to reach these objectives, the party looked to the Austrian Christian Socialists and their Czech counterparts. They were in favour of changing social and economic legislation to the benefit of farmers and founded farmers’ co-
operatives, and trade and labour associations. In terms of national politics, they supported the demand for language equality and a university. They proclaimed the liberals as their main political opponents, as well as the Social Democrats due to the growth of the labour movement. Although they did not succeed in politically organising “the entire Slovene people” as their leaders hoped and had forecast, in the conditions of intensified agricultural crisis and uncertain economic growth over the final two decades before the First World War, they did manage to take over the countryside, while spreading their influence to workers and middle classes in smaller towns.

Yet the programme the Slovene Catholic movement advocated in the final decade of the nineteenth century to move into the ‘modern era’ did not suit all the party’s grandees. The conservative factions of the party leadership remained devoted to the old estate-led or corporate concept of society, and rejected the example of the Austrian Christian Socialists, who in their opinion did not recognise ecclesiastical and state authorities. In contrast, the more modern and dynamic factions of the party, who realised the importance of social issues, revealed their commitment to Christianity and considered the Christian Socialist movement to be the “only” alternative to “unscrupulous socialism”. Speakers at the First Catholic Convention in Ljubljana (1892) had already referred to the ‘labour’ encyclical of Pope Leo XIII (Rerum novarum, 1891), charging liberalism with the breakdown of the traditional estates-based society and causing poverty, and concluded that the Church had to redress the deteriorated state of society through demands for more just social legislation. “We must consider that we are not offering workers mercy, but justice”, stated Janez Evangelist Krek (1865–1917) at the time, setting out the path he would follow until his death, as the founder, leader and main organiser of the Christian social movement.

Krek, a professor at the theology college in Ljubljana, was a typical representative of a new kind of Austrian socially oriented clergy. He was introduced to Christian Socialist ideas at the start of the 1890s in Vienna. His convictions took shape under the influence of Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, Karl von Vogelsang and the papal encyclical Rerum novarum, and he explained them in numerous books and articles. His Črne bukve kmečkega stanu (Black Book on the State of Peasants, 1895) set out the programme for the Slovene Christian-Socialist movement, while his Socializem (1901) was the first book to present a history of socialism in Slovene. Krek was an opponent of liberal capitalism, but also opposed socialist ideas on the class struggle. His ideal was a corporate state, organised on the principles of solidarity and harmony, and based on agreement between workers and the owners of capital. He later gradually abandoned the idea of a corporate state, and focused on finding a solution to social
conflicts within modern parliamentarianism. In his opinion, the most important means of transforming capitalism was co-operativism.

Krek’s practical economic and political work in the final decade before the First World War earned him a reputation and trust that no other Slovene politician had enjoyed since Bleiweis’ death. He was convinced that farmers and workers could only escape the grip of poverty through effective organisation in “self-defence”. With the help of people who shared his ideas, he urgently advised the foundation of Catholic workers’ associations and farmers’ co-operatives. The Slovene Christian-Socialist Union, which he led, had 462 workers’ associations in 1913. These provided worker education and worked for the material and social improvement of workers’ status. In 1909, again on Krek’s initiative, the Yugoslav Occupational Union was founded, which united Catholic labour organisations. In 1894, Krek followed Raiffeisen’s lead and founded farmers’ co-operatives, and savings and loans banks. Catholic co-operativism slowed down the decline in farming, the sell-off of farms and rural depopulation. Together with the technical schools, which similarly were founded at Krek’s initiative, co-operativism encouraged the modernisation of agriculture.

Krek’s convictions, and particularly his views on the labour issue, were too revolutionary for the conservative factions of the Catholic party. But Christian-Socialist institutions strengthened the party’s electoral hinterland and its political power, so even Krek’s opponents did not completely reject his ideas. Krek did briefly consider founding a separate Christian-Socialist party, but soon abandoned these ideas and remained within the Catholic National Party (Slovene People’s Party from 1905) until his death. He was part of the leadership, a provincial and state deputy, the editor of the Catholic daily Slovenec and other journals, and the organiser and teacher for Catholic students. In the years leading up to the First World War and during the war years, when the party was led by Ivan Šušteršič (1863–1925), relations between the Šušteršič and Krek factions became more intractable. A split was only prevented by the intervention of the Archbishop of Ljubljana, Anton Bonaventura Jeglič (1850–1937).

The debate on electoral reform and the introduction of universal suffrage, to which – in contrast to the liberals – the Slovene Catholics were fully committed, led to the transformation of the Catholic National Party for Carniola into a pan-Slovene political organisation during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1905, the Carniolan Catholic Party therefore changed its name to the Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka – SLS) and proclaimed itself the “representative of the Slovene people”. Yet the extension of the Carniolan Catholics’ political influence to other provinces with Slovene inhabitants was
not without problems. Political and social life took place almost exclusively within the provincial sphere. Efforts by the Slovene Catholic leadership in Ljubljana to expand the activities of the Carniolan Catholic organisations, led by the Catholic National Party, throughout the “Slovene south of the Monarchy” met opposition and resistance, particularly in Carinthia and Gorizia.

The all-encompassing politics of the Catholic camp damaged the liberals most of all. Slovene liberalism was not attuned to the agricultural crisis and social issues, or in favour of broader-based political organisation. Their leaders did speak of support for farmers, and the founding of co-operatives and occupational labour organisations, but felt their main task was to support the urban middle classes, and subordinated liberal co-operativism to that end. They were initially sympathetic to Krek’s co-operatives, but when they saw the votes that they generated for the Catholic party began to reject them. In the first provincial diet elections after the ‘period of unity’ came to an end – in the 1890s – the Carniolan liberals suffered a huge defeat in rural areas, and in Styria and Gorizia, where they enjoyed a better reputation among the rural population, their support also diminished. In the final decade before the First World War, the Carniolan National Progressive Party only put forward candidates in the larger towns and market towns, and supported ‘independent candidates’ in the countryside. Efforts to establish an independent liberal farmers’ party only bore fruit in Gorizia, where the Liberal Agrarian Party was founded in 1907.

The inability of liberal leaders to effectively tackle social issues and the Catholic party divided the liberal camp and provoked fierce criticism from younger educated people and students, who did not approve of the party’s biased focus on the middle classes. Their dissatisfaction increased when, in 1896, the Carniolan liberal leaders, former opponents of Šuklje and critics of the elastikarji, preferred to reach agreement with the large German landowners than to cede any authority to the more powerful Catholic party. The coalition between Slovene liberals and the German party maintained a majority in the Carniolan provincial diet until 1908. The Slovene-German liberal agreement did not generally harm Slovenes interests, since it included guarantees of monetary support for the Slovene theatre, a Slovene school in Postojna, and the establishment of a higher girls’ school in Ljubljana, but the arrangement was difficult to accept for the Slovene public, and was largely rejected. The Catholic party skilfully used this to their benefit in their battle against the liberals.

Part of the student youth wing was so disappointed with the liberal leadership’s policy that they left the party. At the start of the twentieth century, liberal students studying in Graz, Prague and Vienna rallied around the academic journal Omladina and committed themselves
to more radical social and national policies under the slogan “From the nation for the nation”. The ‘National Radical’ movement took off significantly between 1905 and 1907, with its leaders accusing both middle-class parties of neglecting “work among the people”. Influenced by T.G. Masaryk, they stated that broadening the cultural horizons and social status of the population was the main task of the nationally conscious educated classes. In 1906, some joined younger liberals to found the Gospodarska stranka (Party of Business), but two years later it folded, having failed to find a political base. After 1908, the leading members of the national radical movement joined the liberal party, founding a ‘Young Liberal’ wing within the party. Two major figures to emerge from the Young Liberals were Gregor Žerjav (1882–1929) and Vladimir Ravnihar (1871–1954), while the ‘Old Liberals’ were represented by the former ‘Radical’ Ivan Tavčar.

As elsewhere in the Monarchy, the reforms that widened suffrage intensified the fight for votes in Slovene territory in the final two decades before the First World War. The 1896 electoral reform introduced a fifth, universal curia, to the Reichsrat, elected by all male citizens aged over 24. From the beginning of the twentieth century, a universal curia was also gradually introduced to provincial diet elections. In 1907, the curial system was abandoned for elections to the Reichsrat, with equal suffrage being introduced for male citizens. The Reichsrat electoral reforms were generally beneficial for Slovenes. After 1907, they had 24 deputies in the assembly, which matched the proportion of Slovenes in the overall population of the western half of the Monarchy. The situation was poorer in provinces where the electoral constituencies continued to be defined to the detriment of Slovenes (in Carinthia, Gorizia, Styria and Istria). From a party-political point of view, the democratisation of the electoral system primarily benefitted the Catholic party, and furthered weakened the liberals.

While the greatest gains from the electoral reforms across the wider Cisleithanian sphere were achieved by the Austrian Social Democrats, who became the second most powerful party in the Reichsrat after the 1907 elections, they did not manage to get a single representative elected to parliament from Slovene territory. The founders of the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party, formed in 1896 in Ljubljana, wanted to gather all the “Yugoslav paupers” in the Monarchy in a common cause, but the party was essentially Slovene, given the weakness of the workers’ movement in Dalmatia and Istria. The main centres of the social democratic movement were major towns with industrial and mining surroundings, while in Carinthia there was support in rural areas among agricultural workers. In nationally mixed areas, Slovene workers joined the German-Austrian and Italian Social Democratic parties. Slovene and Italian social democrats worked together successfully, while in Carinthia and
southern Styrian towns, the negative position taken by German social democratic organisations prevented similar co-operation.

The Yugoslav Social Democratic Party looked to the Austrian Social Democrats for its programme and practical operations; its leaders, with a few exceptions, were not very familiar with Marxism and often a picture of the German Social Democratic leader, Ferdinand Lassalle, decorated the walls of their offices. In the everyday political struggle, Slovene Social Democrats stood for the democratisation of political life in Austria, for universal and equal rights for men and women, a consistent separation of Church and state, for free, non-confessional lessons at all levels of education, and the realisation of workers’ demands. The party based its political activity on occupational (trade union) organisations, while also organising political gatherings, supporting and organising strikes, and founding co-operative societies and collectives. From 1898, it published its own journal (Rdeči prapor/Red Flag 1898–1911, Zarja/Dawn 1911–15). The larger social democratic occupational organisations also had their own newspapers. The headquarters of the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party was for some time in Ljubljana, and then in Trieste (which had the highest concentration of working class Slovenes).

At the start of the twentieth century, the Social Democrats’ small intellectual core was strengthened by an influx of educated young people who had studied in Prague, and had become proponents of Masaryk’s ideas. These Slovene followers of Masaryk rejected Marxism and emphasised the ethnical and social significance of religion. At the same time, they rejected clericalism, and, like the National Radicals, condemned the lack of interest most liberals displayed for the difficulties of workers and farmers. The new wave of educated members were attracted to the Social Democrats by their practical programme, considering the party’s political and social demands as just, and supporting a gradual and considered social reform. The leading Slovene masarikovec, whose flagship was the journal Naši zapiski (1902–14), were Anton Dermota (1876–1914) and Dragotin Lončar (1876–1954), while Albin Prepeluh (1881–1937) was also close to them in terms of political thought. Prepeluh stated that the heart of the Slovene social and national crisis did not lie in the labour issue but in the agricultural issue, and he called on social democrats to form an original Slovene concept of socialism, in response to actual circumstances.

The central theme of Slovene politics before the First World War was inevitably nationality. The tense relations between the nations of the Monarchy required all three Slovene parties to modernise and redefine their demands in the 1890s. Despite this, the national programme of the Catholic and liberal party was still very poorly developed. Both
spoke of language equality and national autonomy, mentioning United Slovenia opportunistically, and supporting the foundation of new Slovene cultural and educational institutions. The social democrats’ plans were, if anything, even less clear and tangible. Under the influence of their leading ideologue, the writer Etbin Kristan (1867–1953), they suggested that the national issue was not political, but cultural. This led to the idea that national autonomy should be ensured on a personal rather than territorial basis i.e. as the right of everybody to choose to identify themselves with any nation. Kristan himself, however, was unable to clarify in any greater detail how such autonomy could be realised.

After the fall of the Taaffe government and the failure of Count Badeni’s reforms, Slovene co-operation with German conservatives in the Reichsrat came to an end. The Slovene middle-class parties started to look for new allies. The Slovene Catholic party hoped for an alliance with the Austrian Christian Socialists for some time, before their voting with German nationalists on the Celje gymnasium issue quickly put paid to those plans. The “Whitsuntide Programme” (1899), in which Austrian German middle-class parties together rejected the idea of national and linguistic equality, finally revealed that the Czechs and Slovenes had no real allies in the German parties. In these circumstances, all three Slovene political parties turned eastward: the Catholics mainly towards the Croats, while the liberals and social democrats also turned towards the Serbs, and even the Bulgarians. The Catholic party joined the group of Croatian Party of Right members that had formed around the Domovina journal, and together, in 1898, they drew up a programme supporting a ‘trialist’ solution for the Monarchy. This supported the unification of Slovene territories with the regions that the Party of Right considered Croatian (continental Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia). In contrast to the Catholic political leaders, the liberals entertained ideas of ties with Croats and Serbs both within and outside the Monarchy, but could not define their ideas on state policy and the Yugoslav issue with any greater clarity. The position of the Social Democrats was also unclear, as they persisted with the idea that the national question was primarily cultural. The Social Democrats saw approaches towards other South Slavs as the first step towards a gradual linguistic and cultural unification between Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians.

Although a ‘Yugoslav’ policy was a fundamental part of policy for the Slovene middle-class parties and the Social Democrats at the turn of the twentieth century, it was promoted inconsistently, with enthusiasm which varied from year to the year, and was limited to the educated classes and those of the urban middle classes who were more active in the national movement. Interest in events in Croatia, Bosnia Serbia, Macedonia and elsewhere in
the Balkans, already sizeable, now increased significantly. Many excited reports were written on the occasional meetings, events, visits and travels of the nascent Yugoslav movement, before doubt and uncertainty again prevailed. The Slovene parties and newspapers followed the animosities that developed between Croats and Serbs at the turn of the century with regret, and so warmly welcomed their reconciliation and the political union between the respective parties in the Croat-Serb coalition of 1906. The 1903 coup d’état in Serbia that returned the Karadjordjević house to the throne in Belgrade, and the Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia the same year, were both the subject of popular sympathy. Yet the Slovene turn to the east and the Balkans remained an expression of enthusiastic faith in the power and future of the Slavic movement, rather than a rejection of Vienna and Austria.

The formation of middle-class parties and the development of a social democratic movement saw Slovene political life in the 1890s finally develop a modern – tripolar – appearance, matching that of other Austrian and western European nations. The middle-class parties were primarily groups based on political ideology that sought to win supporters from the various social groups within the Slovene population to their side, but did not represent homogeneous social groups. After the split that marked the end of the ‘period of unity’, they were no longer prepared to reach even minimal consensus on common national interests. The image of Slovene society and the Slovene world presented by their leaders was black and white, with the most faithful adherents refusing to judge any events, near and far, in anything but an ideological light. Middle-class party politics in the years before the First World War changed into an inexorable clerical-liberal struggle for power, to which the party leaderships pragmatically subordinated their principles and national objectives. This was seen most clearly in Carniola. The introduction of the universal curia to the Carniolan provincial diet in 1908 brought an end to the period of German-Slovene liberal government, as the Slovene People’s Party achieved a convincing majority. The Catholic movement dominated throughout Slovene territory before the First World War, except in Trieste, Istria and Gorizia, where the liberal-Catholic struggle continued with varying turns of fortune. In the Gorizian provincial diet, the Slovene Catholic Party linked up with the Italian liberals to consolidate its position between 1901 and 1913. This split the Catholic ranks, but raised far less opposition than the Slovene-German liberal pact in Carniola. In 1909, when the Slovene People’s Party renamed itself as the Pan-Slovene People’s Party (Vseslovenska ljudska stranka), the liberal camp seemed finished, and the Catholic leaders were convinced that their final victory had arrived.

As previously mentioned, the Catholic and liberal politicians who led the Slovene national movement in Cisleithanian Austria based their ideas on those of German-Austrians
and Czechs influenced, of course, by domestic disputes and circumstances. On the national question, in contrast to the position of German liberals, whose main criterion for national affiliation was the individual’s personal choice, they maintained the traditional position that nationality was determined by ‘blood’ and ‘language’, and that a person defining themselves differently to their inheritance was a ‘national traitor’. They also took on anti-Semitic vocabulary from German, Czech and other Slavic groups, which both middle-class parties openly used, even though there were no or very few Jews in Slovene territory. Slovene anti-Semitism was a mixture of the traditional Christian anti-Semitism, the anti-Jewish slogans of the Austrian Christian Socialists, and fear of Slovene territories undergoing too rapid a transformation to bourgeois capitalism. It was also based on the conviction that the Jews were closely related to German liberals and committed opponents of the Slav movement.

Few individuals turned towards non-German Europe and the western European capitals before the First World War. At the start of the twentieth century, the idea that if the Slovene educated classes wanted to expand their mental horizons and escape the *formi mentis* of German and central European universities, they should go west, to Paris if possible, and experience the new ideas there, was largely heard among liberal-thinking students. The centenary of the establishment of the Illyrian Provinces (1909) engendered a legend of Napoleon’s support for Slovenes and the South Slavs among the urban middle classes, and further fanned pro-French feeling, particularly among young educated people. A Franco-Illyrian circle even functioned for a brief time in Ljubljana, promoting the study of the French language and interest in France.

Increased interest in the female question was a vital part of the Slovene political entry into the ‘modern’. In 1897, the first Slovene newspaper for women was started in Trieste (called *Slovenka – The Slovene Woman*), presenting modern ideas alongside traditional views of female maternal, household and national duties. The General Slovene Women’s Association was founded in 1901 in Ljubljana. This became the central Slovene women’s organisation before the First World War.

**THE SLOVENE FIN DE SIÈCLE**

Slovenes' social and cultural development advanced at a dynamic rate in the final decades before the First World War. Primary education was modernised and began to thrive after the 1869 school reform, which rapidly increased literacy, and by just before the First World War the population in Slovene territory ranked behind only Germans, Czechs and
Italians in terms of literacy rate within the state. The new middle, technical and vocational schools and the growing number of higher education graduates strengthened the numbers of the secular educated class, and its professional composition become more diverse. Increasing numbers of young academics dedicated themselves to scientific work. Some professions and vocations were only just starting to develop, while others already had a sound basis. The arts also reached an important turning point, with major figures appearing in literature, the figurative arts, music and architecture, who linked Slovene creativity into the European mainstream.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Slovene was a fully formed, versatile language with its own specialist and scientific terminology. Despite this, there was no real improvement in its status in education and administration. From the very start of the constitutional era, in 1861, it had been possible to speak in any language in the Reichsrat in Vienna (Slovene deputies first used Slovene when making the deputies’ oath of allegiance in 1867), but as with representatives of other non-German nations, Slovene deputies only started using their mother tongue to any great extent after 1900. In the provincial diets and diet committees, Slovene only had equal status with German in Carniola, and with Italian in the province of Gorizia. Public offices and courts corresponded in German only (except in the Littoral where Italian was used in part). In principle, they were supposed to act in accordance with the language ability of their clients, but in practice this differed from province to province, and depended on the policy and attitude of local officiandom.

The language of instruction in primary schools was a similar story, being decided by provincial education councils and their committee members. In Carniola, public primary schools were all in Slovene from the Taaffe period onwards, except in the two German-language islands in Kočevje and Bela Peč, and in the provincial capital, Ljubljana. In the Littoral and lower Styria, Slovene-language primary schools predominated in rural areas, but little headway had been made into the towns and market towns since the 1880s. In lower Styrian towns, the establishment of Slovene-language public primary schools was opposed by the German-affiliated urban middle classes, and was also rejected by the Italian majority in Trieste and Gorizia. Despite this, Slovenes in Gorizia successfully fought for a (Slovene) public primary school in 1895, while their efforts to establish municipal primary schools with Slovene as the language of instruction remained unsuccessful. This led the Society of Cyril and Methodius to found three private primary schools in Trieste, and one in Gorizia. The situation in Carinthia was even worse, with Slovenes having just three public primary schools, while in bilingual (utraquist) schools, Slovene was replaced by German after the first few
years. In Venetia and Prekmurje, there were no Slovene primary schools.

The provincial education councils and municipal representatives decided the language of instruction for primary schools, while the decision for the gymnasia was taken by the education ministry. Nevertheless, the status of Slovene was no better in these, and in most, the language was less established than in the primary schools. After the Slovene-German parallel classes in the Celje gymnasion in 1895 had caused so much commotion, Slovenes did not gain any new gymnasion classes in their language in Styria. After 1908, some subjects were studied in Slovene in the higher classes of four Carniolan German-Slovene gymnasia, as well as in the lower classes as before. A private episcopal gymnasion was founded in Šentvid near Ljubljana in 1905, the first to be completely Slovene in the entire Monarchy. The only Slovene state gymnasion was founded in 1913, in Gorizia. Instruction in all others in the Austrian Littoral took place in German and Italian. Instruction in technically oriented Realschulen in Slovene-speaking territory was practically all in German only. The exceptions were the Italian scuola reale in Trieste and the German-Slovene Realschule in Idrija. In Gorizia, the male and female teaching college was also Slovene-language, while the German language predominated in the German-Slovene teaching college in Ljubljana. There was a Slovene girls’ lyceum in Ljubljana, while there was a Slovene Bürgerschule in Postojna, and another was founded in Žalec, in lower Styria, just before the start of the First World War. Lessons also took place in Slovene in some technical and vocational schools.

Demands for a Slovene university had been a fixed element of the Slovene political programme since 1848, but right until the end of the Monarchy in 1918, the Austrian authorities paid them no heed. The movement to found a Slovene university – either in Ljubljana or Trieste, where the Italians were also demanding their own university – gained new strength at the start of the twentieth century, but again to no avail. Until the end of the Monarchy, Slovene students therefore studied in Vienna, Graz and Prague, as well as in Krakow in the final decade before the war. Only a few individuals went to the University of Zagreb, since its degrees were treated as foreign in Austria, due to differences in the education systems of the two halves of the Monarchy. In the thirty years from 1880 to 1910, the number of Slovene students at Austrian universities and higher education colleges rose from around 350 (in 1880) to almost 1,000 per year (in 1913), with the number attending law faculties overtook the number attending theology faculties after 1900. After 1910, there were already more technical science students than students of medicine and philosophy. The first Slovene women to attend the University of Vienna enrolled at the start of the twentieth century.

The spread of literacy and education led to reading becoming a popular pastime.
Increasing numbers of people were turning to newspapers and books, and in 1913 there were five Slovene daily newspapers: four in Ljubljana (the liberal Slovenski narod, Catholic Slovenec, socialist Zarja and the independent liberal Dan/Day) and one in Trieste (the liberal Edinost). At the same time, readers could choose from a wide range of provincial, professional and specialist journals, entertainment and cultural reviews, and weekly and fortnightly publications aimed at a popular audience. Some newspapers even offered illustrated supplements with photographs in the final years before the outbreak of war. The reading culture spread quickly, and its expansion in the last years of the Habsburg Monarchy is reflected in the growth in membership of the Society of Hermagoras. The society had a (predominantly rural) membership of 71,000 in 1895; in 1918 its print-runs, which give a good indication of membership, had reached 91,000 copies. There were also other publishing collections offering recreational reading to a popular readership. Academic, original Slovene and translated literary works were published by Slovenska Matica and various provincial and local associations. The Ljubljana Dramatic Society issued a series of books, and the Slovanska Knjižnica (Slavic Library) was dedicated to increasing readership and awareness of the literature of other Slavic nations (publishing 93 books between 1893 and 1899 alone). Private publishers were also responsible for many more literary works reaching the market.

In these circumstances, literature continued to be the dominant form of artistic expression. The poet-priests Simon Gregorčič and Anton Aškerc (1856–1912) gained a reputation for their verse in the final decades of the nineteenth century, while the best-loved prose writers until the end of the century were Josip Stritar, Janko Kersnik and Ivan Tavčar. Adherents of new literary movements began to challenge the predominance of post-Romanticism in poetry and Realism in prose, with a decisive break coming in 1896 in the naturalistic novel V krvi (In the Blood) by Fran Govekar. That year, Govekar – at the same time as Ivan Cankar – was already using the term ‘modern’ to describe the new literary period. Modernism was used in Slovene literature – as elsewhere in Europe – to describe a wide range of literary trends and styles of the time that formed an artistic whole. With the most important figures of Slovene Modernism – the poets Oton Župančič (1878–1949), Dragotin Kette (1876–99) and Josip Murn (1879–1901), and the poet, writer and playwright Ivan Cankar (1876–1918) – Slovene literature seriously formed part of the latest European literary trends for the first time since Prešeren.

The Modernist artists rejected the patriotic, utilitarian tendencies of most of the Slovene literature that preceded them, and Ivan Cankar was openly critical of bourgeois society, and its morals and manners. In poetry, the Modernists defended the autonomy of art
and patterned their works on folk and Romantic poetry, placing sincere confession above all other values. Ivan Cankar introduced social criticism to his prose and dramatic works, rejecting empty declarations of patriotism, and mocking unprincipled attitudes in politics. Modernism also represented a fundamental break with tradition. Its authors continued to keep abreast of the latest literary trends, via Vienna and Germany, but their models were generally western European rather than German, especially French. Russian influences (Tolstoy first among them) were also notable.

The literature of the Slovene Modernists was stylistically very diverse. They were influenced by trends ranging from Decadence and Impressionism to Symbolism, as well as elements of Realism, Naturalism, Futurism and Expressionism. Initially, they were fiercely rejected, particularly by Carniolan church circles, but this could not stop the movement. The circle of poets, writers, dramatists and essayists opening up to Modernist influences expanded continually after 1900. In terms of the diversity of work, and sheer expressive power, Ivan Cankar outstripped them all, managing to bring together many of the varied trends and currents of the fin de siècle. In his prose and theatrical works, he was the first Slovene writer to reach beyond Slovene borders into the world of contemporary European concepts and motifs. His work was so engaging that Modernism soon also made inroads into the Catholic literary ranks. Some poets and writers remained loyal to Slovene literary tradition and remained tied to Realism. The Slovene-German national struggles were the theme of Lojze Kraigher’s novel Kontrolor Škrobar (Škrobar the Controller). Readers were particularly welcoming of the traditionalist work Pod Svobodnim soncem (Under a Free Sun), based on Sienkiewicz and published in 1906 by Fran Saleški Finžgar.

Old and new trends combined in other cultural and artistic areas in similar fashion, with theatre in particular experiencing major development. Fresh opportunities opened up for Slovene theatrical efforts with the construction of the new Carniolan Provincial Theatre in Ljubljana in 1892. The Dramatic Society, responsible for most Slovene theatrical performances, gained its first professional actors, while its repertoire was heavily influenced by – in addition to monetary difficulties – its audience, which was more receptive to cheerful folk plays than to classical or modern texts. Nevertheless, they still came to see not only Shakespeare, Goethe and Schiller on the Ljubljana stage, but Ibsen too. Amateur theatre groups also operated elsewhere in Slovene territory, even expanding from the towns into rural areas at the end of the nineteenth century.

Romanticism and Impressionism dominated Slovene music, and the journal Novi akordi (1901–1914) was the focal point for Slovene composers, publishing original Slovene
compositions and fostering music criticism. In 1908, the Glasbena Matica (National Musical Association), which organised concerts, was joined on the scene by the Slovene Philharmonic (Slovenska Filharmonija), whose first conductor was the well-known Czech musician Vaclav Talich. Choirs gathered under the auspices of the Union of Slovene Choral Societies (over 300 in 1914). Opera had also been successfully developing in Ljubljana since 1892. The first Slovene opera performance following the opening of the new Carniolan Provincial Theatre was the romantic opera *Teharski plemiči* (The Nobles of Teharje), by the Slovene composer, Benjamin Ipavec. Light operas often featured on the theatre card, and were joined by the works of Rossini, Bizet, Verdi, Wagner and Gounod. Before the First World War, the Slovene opera company also performed in Trieste, and put on operettas in Maribor. Early admirers and imitators of the Lumière brothers also began to appear; in 1905, Karol Grossman (1864–1929), a lawyer from Ljutomer, filmed the first two Slovene documentary shorts.

Modernism arrived in painting at almost the same time as it did in literature. The period of academy Realism, which had produced one of the most important Slovene artists, Ivana Kobilca (1862–1926), was exhausted by the end of the nineteenth century and painting found new expression in the artistic school of Anton Ažbe (1862–1905), who fled Slovene cultural narrow-mindedness to Munich. A new generation of Slovene painters arose, its most important representatives being Rihard Jakopič (1869–1943), Matija Jama (1872–1947), Ivan Grohar (1867–1911) and Matej Sternen (1870–1949); they grasped hold of Impressionism and led a genuine artistic revival, although they were only accepted by the domestic public once they had achieved success in Vienna. The architects Jože Plečnik (1872–1957), Maks Fabiani (1865–1962) and Ivan Jager (1871–1957), who studied under Otto Wagner in Vienna, suffered in a similar fashion. Fabiani was the only one of them to work at home before the First World War. Plečnik worked in Vienna and Prague, while Jager – disappointed with his homeland – emigrated to China at the start of the twentieth century, before moving to the United States.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Modernism had made its way into Slovene culture, despite the difficulties. In other fields, new ideas faced a similar struggle. Young scholars wanting to study science found themselves up against considerable problems. The only institutions on Slovene territory systematically involved in academic and scientific work before 1918 were the museums. Educated culture was also expressed via professional associations, professional journals and popular-science reviews. The Slovenska Matica remained the central Slovene academic association. The lack of adequate scientific institutions meant there were more opportunities in Slovene territory directly before the war in history, social sciences, law and philosophy than in natural sciences, medicine and
technical studies. In 1894/95, Maks Pleteršnik (1840–1923) published a large Slovene-German dictionary, one of the founding works of Slovene lexicography. The expansive work *Zgodovina slovenskega slovstva* (History of Slovene Literature) by Karol Glaser (1845–1913) was issued by the Slovenska Matica in the second half of the 1890s, while Franc Kos’ *Gradivo za slovensko zgodovino v srednjem veku* (Material on Slovene History in the Middle Ages) was published by the Catholic Leonova Družba in 1902. The Society of Hermagoras started to publish volumes of the *Zgodovina slovenskega naroda* (History of the Slovene Nation) by Josip Gruden (1869–1922) in 1910. This was the first large-scale synthesis of Slovene history that did not focus on provincial borders. Matija Murko (1861–1952), student of the Slavist Fran Miklošič, and one of the most reputable Slavists of his time, lectured in Vienna and Graz. The significant growth in the educated classes over the last few decades of the Monarchy saw an increase in the number of Slovene specialists following teaching and scientific careers in Austrian universities and those elsewhere in Europe. Although they lived ‘abroad’, most remained in contact with their Slovene homeland. Some, however, gradually lost touch with their national origins and yielded to their German-speaking environment. This was also the fate of the renowned physicist Jožef Stefan (1835–93), who produced melancholic Slovene verse in his youth, but became an Austrian scientist writing and speaking in German after gaining employment at the University of Vienna.

Political, cultural, and social life in towns and rural areas found expression in the many societies that blossomed in Slovene-populated regions at the end of the nineteenth century, as elsewhere in the Monarchy. They were generally divided according to the national and political affiliations of their members. The most popular were fire-fighting, educational, sporting and choral groups, followed by economic, vocational, humanitarian and national defence societies. Slovene societies still operated from reading room premises in some places, though during the 1890s the reading rooms lost out to party-based educational organisations. Elsewhere, particularly in larger towns, national cultural centres (‘Narodni Domovi’) were founded which had libraries, halls for performances and events, catering facilities, and rooms for social and commercial activities.

Only the wealthiest educated and middle-class people had sufficient time for planned recreation, while most people – who worked 11 to 13 hours a day – had just Sundays for rest and entertainment. Nevertheless, according to some estimates, around one fifth of the active population were involved in sport and gymnastics in the Slovene territories before the First World War. Gymnastics and mountaineering were particularly popular; in 1893, Slovenes left the pro-German Austrian Mountaineering Association and founded their own Slovene
Mountaineering Association, while a Slovene-German contest for mountain outposts started, crowned by the parish priest Jakob Aljaž, from Dovje in upper Carniola, with his purchase of the summit of the highest Slovene mountain and national symbol, Triglav. Cycling societies grew up from the end of the 1880s onwards, and in 1909 the Slovene football club Hermes was founded, while interest in tennis and skiing also increased.

The towns in the Slovene-populated lands were gradually changing in the years before the war. The larger towns of lower Styria retained a German appearance until the fall of the Monarchy in 1918, while most of the towns in the Littoral province remained Italian. Even most Carniolan towns – with Ljubljana at the forefront – remained bilingual centres with their dual nationality clearly apparent in public spaces. Ljubljana underwent major changes in terms of town-planning when, under its mayor, Ivan Hribar, and the Slovene majority on the city council, it started to develop into an unofficial Slovene capital with a modern urban organisation, following its partial destruction in the earthquake of 1895. Between 1896 and 1910, new buildings in the Austrian Secessionist style grew up in Ljubljana’s city centre: administrative buildings, banks, hotels and the first department store. Nevertheless, Trieste – with a population of just under 230,000 in 1910 – was the only urban settlement in the territories with Slovene-speaking inhabitants before the First World War with a genuine city atmosphere. All other towns were far smaller (in 1910, Ljubljana’s population was 41,727; that of Maribor, 27,994; and of Gorizia, 30,995), and despite modernisation, the standard of public utilities remained well behind more developed town centres elsewhere in Austria and further afield.

Tensions were rising between Slovenes and Germans, Italians and Hungarians, and the national struggle was increasingly bitter, but until the fall of the Monarchy most Slovenes remained part of the German, Italian or Hungarian cultural sphere in addition to their own, and the educated and middle classes formed part of a bilingual, and sometimes even trilingual, environment. There was pressure to create unambiguous, single national identities on all sides, and those who failed to identify their national affiliation with sufficient clarity and vigour found it hard to gain any recognition from the ‘national majority’. In a Slovene environment, a Slovene artist or scholar had above all to be a Slovene to win the favour of the national institutions and public, while in majority-German areas a Slovene identity would generally be a disadvantage.
SLOVENE SOCIETY AND ECONOMY BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The census results in 1900 and 1910 were a real shock for the Slovene public, indicating as they did that Carniola was the leading Austrian province in terms of net emigration. In the 64 years between 1846 and 1910, the population of Carniola grew by just 11.3%, which meant that around 130,000 people were ‘missing’, compared to the figure expected from natural growth. The results for the provinces inhabited by Slovenes as a whole were not much better. The population in Cisleithania grew by 57.5% between 1846 and 1910, while the number of Slovenes over that time grew by just 18.8% – the lowest growth of any nation in the Austrian half of the Monarchy. In 1910, there were 1,325,000 people in Cisleithania using Slovene as their everyday language, and their proportion in the lands considered “Slovene” by the Slovene national leaders fell from 88.9% to 76.9%, due largely to the decline in the Slovene population along the northern, Slovene-German linguistic border.

The main cause of the slow Slovene population growth was emigration. This was clearly acknowledged by contemporaries. While the more developed provinces in the western half of the Habsburg Monarchy experienced an economic upturn after 1896, Slovene territory remained an economically passive, dependent part of the state. In agriculture, the Catholic and liberal co-operatives were opening up new opportunities, along with loans societies, the spread of education and general cultural development in rural areas. But farming revenues were still surprisingly low compared to more developed Austrian provinces and western European countries. The production of bread grain in Slovene provinces was half that of the Czechs and almost a third of that in Denmark before the First World War. More rapid agricultural development was prevented by debts and the fragmented nature of farm holdings. At the start of the twentieth century in Slovene territory, 36% of farming households had farms of two hectares or less, 21% had five hectares or less, around a third had farms of between five and 20 hectares, and only just over 1% had farms of over 100 hectares. Crops and livestock generated most of the revenues, with forestry, hunting and fishing bringing in less income.

Major advances were made in the development of industry and trades after 1890, but the lag behind the more developed Austrian provinces and the Czechs increased. With a few exceptions, industrial companies were relatively small compared to companies in the large Austrian industrial centres, and over half of all employees in non-agrarian production still earned their living from craft activities. The decline of crafts that started in the second half of the nineteenth century had bottomed out, while new crafts and trades were developing
(particularly for mechanical products and various services) to supplement and expand industrial supply.

The iron industry underwent the greatest change. The furnaces, foundries and iron workshops that could not be modernised or that were bypassed by the new rail and road routes were finally closed during the 1890s. The Carniolan Industrial Company developed a large, modern ironworks at Škedenj (Servola), near Trieste. High-quality iron ore was delivered by sea and it returned impressive profits. From the start of the twentieth century, the company reduced production at its other factory in Jesenice, which may well have been abandoned were it not for the outbreak of war. The Styrian company Alpine Montangeselschaft summarily abandoned its ironworks in Prevalje around 1900 and moved its workshops to upper Styria. In some places, smaller iron workshops (nail-makers) attempted to unite in cooperatives, but it was not enough to prevent their failure. The new metalworking companies that took off in the twentieth century included the enamelled crockery factory in Celje of the industrialist Adolf Westen.

Almost all the major non-agrarian industry in Slovene territory before the war was related to domestic natural resources and their processing. The exception was the iron industry, which was largely dependent on imported ore. Coal extraction more than doubled between the 1890s and 1914 (from 650,000 to 1,450,000 tonnes per year), while the production of lead and zinc, which were smelted on-site at mines in Mežica in Carinthia, increased, as did production at the mercury mine in Idrija. The wood-processing industry still included sawmills, which placed semi-finished products on the market, while furniture production remained limited to smaller craft workshops. Factories processing agricultural products also started to achieve success. The Kolinska factory started in Ljubljana in 1909 and the Žalec-Laško United Brewery joint-stock company had been founded in lower Styria in 1902. Tanning and leather production were also closely linked to agriculture. Textile production underwent fewer changes, and remained a very fragmented industry, with very small craft plants predominant, particularly in the production of clothing. Glass factories and cellulose and paper-mills were among the non-agrarian industries that adapted to new market conditions more successfully. A number of chemical factories also started to place products on the market. Construction began on a large, modern chemical factory in Ruše (for Austrian military use, *inter alia*) just before the war, but production did not start until 1918.

Water and steam remained the most important sources of power. The first power plant in Slovene-populated regions started operations in Škofja Loka in 1894, and three years later a small thermal power station was built in Ljubljana to provide street lighting. After 1901,
Ljubljana’s main electricity consumer was the city tramway, and individual electricity consumption grew only slowly. Electricity advanced into the sphere of craft and industry at a similarly slow pace. One of the earliest large industrial plants to introduce electricity was the lead and zinc mine in Mežica (1907), followed just before the war by the Westen enamelled crockery factory in Celje (1913). The first larger hydro-electrical plant was built during the First World War. The Zavrsnica hydroelectric plant in Carniola was officially opened in 1915, and was built and paid for by the Carniolan provincial government. The first large hydroelectric plant on the Drava river was built at Fala, in 1918, by German-Austrian and Swiss investors.

This burgeoning economic development led to a revival of railway construction in the 1890s, for the first time since the economic crisis of 1873. No mention was made this time of ambitious ideas to turn Carniola into an international rail hub, but, by the war, the railway lines that had been part of the 1872 Illyrian railways plan had finally been built. In 1906, the second rail connection towards Trieste was built, an idea that had been discussed since the sale of the Südbahn to French owners in the mid-nineteenth century. The line ran from Villach via a tunnel under the Karavanke mountains to Jesenice, then followed the valley of the Sava Bohinjka valley via the Bohinj tunnel into the Soča valley and on to Gorizia and Trieste. It was an exceptional engineering achievement for its time. Branch lines were added to the large transit railway lines, with a denser rail network finally starting to develop in Slovene territory at the start of the century. However, the new lines proved to be much less economically beneficial than their initiators and supporters had expected. While the railway was still under construction, people in many of the market towns and settlements started to calculate and plan what they would import once the lines opened to traffic, but, in many places, the goods the trains brought from the industrially more developed areas of Austria and abroad often took away the market they already had.

The largest industries and joint-stock companies were not only in non-Slovene hands, but were often owned by capital from well beyond the local province, including German (from Vienna, Graz and the German Empire), French, Italian, Czech and Swiss investment. According to some accounts, the ratio of foreign to domestic capital invested in industry in Slovene territory around 1914 was around 7 or 8:1, according to others it was as high as 10:1. German capital linked to large banks in Germany soon gained significant control in Trieste as well, displacing Italian capital. The first successful Slovene bank – the Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka – was founded by liberals in 1900, with backing from the Czech Živnostenska Banka. The bank’s management was controlled by liberal grandees, while its leading banking staff
were Czechs. The liberals were also involved in founding the Jadranska Banka in Trieste, which joined forces with the Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka to invest in various industrial and maritime companies. The Mestna Hranilnica (City Savings Bank) in Ljubljana, which opened its doors in 1889, was also in liberal hands. It competed with the German-backed Kranjska Hranilnica (Carniolan Savings Bank) and by 1910 had developed a network of savings banks in most of the larger Slovene towns and market towns.

Catholic monetary and banking institutions were based on the capital of Krek’s co-operatives. The Catholic Ljudska Posojilnica (People’s Loans Bank) founded in 1895 was joined five years later (1900) by the Vzajemna Zavarovalnica (Mutual Insurance Company), which was the first Slovene institution of its kind. The Carniolan Provincial Diet then founded the Kranjska Deželna Banka (Carniolan Provincial Bank) in 1910, with the majority support of the Slovene People’s Party. Despite these impressive moves, Slovene financial capital remained in its infancy before the First World War, particularly in comparison to German capital, and that which was flowing in from elsewhere in the Monarchy and from abroad. Larger, more ambitious investments by Slovene finance and banking institutions were relatively rare. Export and transit trade was still predominantly in foreign hands, though local business people predominated in internal trade. According to calculations made in 1918 by Milko Brezigar, before the war, Carniola, lower Styria, and the Slovene part of Carinthia produced around 3% more agricultural goods than they consumed, while their deficit in non-agrarian sectors was almost 7%. Total domestic production was therefore about 0.3% less than consumption, while imports exceeded exports by 3.5%. The main export sectors were timber, paper and leather industry, livestock, the iron and mining industries, while the main import sectors were textiles and chemicals. Fuel (oil, petrol) and tobacco also constituted a significant proportion of imports.

The economy in Slovene territory before 1918 did not yet form a ‘national economic whole’. The banks, joint-stock companies and a few larger firms operated on a wider scale, but the vast majority of economic activity remained within provincial boundaries until the very end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Ljubljana was indeed the unofficial Slovene cultural and political capital, but in no way at all was it a centre that could economically unite Slovene territory. The most important business, transport and economic centre in the Slovene regions was Trieste, which became much more closely linked to its hinterland after losing its free-port status in 1891. In 1910, Trieste had 56,916 Slovene inhabitants (slightly over 25% of the city’s total population and over 6,000 more than Ljubljana, including its suburbs), making it the largest ‘Slovene town’ of the time. Yet Slovenes were generally part of the lower urban
social classes, and were in a significant minority among the wealthier, commercially active middle classes. The proportion of Slovene capital in the Triestine economy had increased since the end of the nineteenth century, but was still far behind German and Italian investment, and even Croatian. In general, the Triestine hinterland was economically far more tied to Trieste than Trieste to the hinterland. For the population in these surrounding areas, Trieste was the largest market and a place offering employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, while the port of Trieste and its industries largely lived off trade and business with Vienna, the industrialised areas of the Monarchy and abroad, and as such had relatively little impact on economic development between the Alps and the Adriatic. The towns along the Slovene coast from Muggia to Piran remained in the shadow of Austria’s great port city.

Although the social composition of the Slovene population had undergone rapid change since the end of the nineteenth century, and its urban strata had increased, Slovene territory still had few large urban centres due to the slower pace of industrialisation. In 1910, in addition to Trieste, there were still just five towns with over 10,000 inhabitants: Ljubljana, Maribor, Klagenfurt, Gorizia and Villach. A number of older towns such as Kranj, Novo Mesto and Kamnik had lost their importance in the new economic climate. The educated classes kept their leading role in Slovene national, cultural and political life, and continued to grow faster than the merchant, business and moneyed middle classes throughout the last decades of the Monarchy. Nevertheless, even in the growth of the academically educated middle class, Slovenes lagged behind the more socially developed nations of the Monarchy (Germans, Italians, Czechs and Poles). The central Slovene province of Carniola had a lower percentage of people with higher education than any of its neighbouring provinces. Women only exceptionally took their place in professions requiring an education, with the exception of teaching.

The industrial working class was largest in Trieste (c. 41,000 people), while concentrations of craft or factory workers elsewhere in Slovene territory were far smaller, with a total of around 86,000 craft and industry workers within the territory of present-day Slovenia at that time. The Slovene regions were among the least industrialised in the state and they stayed predominantly agricultural until the curtain came down on Austro-Hungary; in 1910, 67% of the population lived in the countryside.

**THE FINAL YEARS OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY**

In January 1909, the Carniolan provincial diet passed a declaration in which deputies of the Catholic and liberal parties welcomed the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into
Austro-Hungary and expressed their hope that it was the “first step towards the unification of all the South Slavs of our monarchy in an independent legal union under the sceptre of the Habsburg dynasty.” Ivan Šušteršič took the opportunity to call for the unification of all “southern” Habsburg provinces from Trieste to the Drina, while Janez Evangelist Krek sympathetically called the Serbs “our Neapolitans”, and predicted that the Serbs would change their attitude to the Monarchy if it reformed and united the South Slavs within its border into a separate, autonomous Yugoslav polity. The liberal leader Karel Triller (1862–1926), also spoke up and, after reaffirming Slovene loyalty to the dynasty, added that if Austria failed to act quickly and justly in resolving national issues, it could be shaken by a “new Piedmont and a new Cavour.”

Slovene-German relations deteriorated rapidly in the last decade before the First World War, with both sides working to acquire popular support by means of mass meetings and celebrations, as well as tit-for-tat accusations in the press and at public events. German nationalists were still particularly vocal in Carinthia, where in 1908 they held public demonstrations in Klagenfurt to demand that administration should take place in German only. Tensions were also increasing in the towns of lower Styria, which the German parties and their supporters were proclaiming as ancient German settlements. When in 1908 the Society of Cyril and Methodius convened an assembly in Ptuj to demonstrate that Slovenes considered it part of their lands fighting broke out. Germans from Ptuj and its surroundings, aided by the gendarmerie, attacked the delegates who had travelled by train. Large anti-German demonstrations took place in Ljubljana just a few days later, in response to the events in Ptuj. The demonstrators broke the windows of German shops and inns, tore down German signs, and shouted anti-German slogans. Landespräsident Schwarz called the army out and, on the evening of 20 September 1908, they fired on the demonstrators, killing two of them. It was the first (and last) time during the Habsburg Monarchy that fatalities occurred in demonstrations on Slovene territory, and the victims’ funeral turned into a mass anti-German gathering.

These events and political developments in Austro-Hungary, the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe had a major impact on Slovene political affiliations. For the Slovene elite and the majority of the Slovene population, the events were further evidence that the greatest threat to the Slovene national future came from Germans and the German Drang nach Süden (push to the south). In their view, the German-Slovene clash was just another part of the ‘thousand-year’ struggle between Slavs and Germans that was approaching a decisive phase and would end sooner or later in a Slavic victory. Yet the Neoslavist movement that spread
from Bohemia at the start of the twentieth century did not put down deep roots among the Slovenes. Its main proponent was Ivan Hribar, who in the spirit of its Young Czech originators, supported a movement for closer Slavic ties in culture, economics and politics, the federalisation of the Monarchy, and a foreign-policy reorientation away from Germany towards Russia. There were many, particularly in the educated classes, who openly expressed their Slavic identity, learnt other Slavic languages, and forged ties with Slavs inside and outside the Monarchy. Nevertheless, the number of sympathisers for Neoslavism remained small, while the Yugoslav movement flourished following the annexation crisis.

Although individuals mentioned the possibility of the break-up of Austro-Hungary, no one but a few extremists wanted it or imagined it could happen soon. The Habsburgs had ruled over Slovene territory for over half a millennium and the Dual Monarchy seemed an irreplaceable, permanent historical polity, which protected Slovenes against German and Italian territorial ambitions, however dissatisfied they might feel within it. The dissatisfaction with the policy of the ruling elite and the Reichsrat in Vienna did not shake the trust in the Emperor and the dynasty, and the appointment of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who was not well-disposed to the Hungarians, as heir to throne raised new hopes (particularly in the ranks of the Slovene People’s Party), and speculation on his sympathies for trialism, and the third – South Slav – unit of the Monarchy. Ivan Šušeršič, who made every possible attempt to make contact with the imperial heir, had sent a letter to Franz Ferdinand in 1909 in which he sought to demonstrate that the “dynastic interest … overlapped with the interests of the Yugoslavs”, and that if the Monarchy wanted to maintain its pre-eminence in the Balkans, it must unite the Yugoslav provinces “in a third political entity”. According to Šušteršič, this would encompass Croatia with Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb provinces of Hungary and the “Croat and Slovene provinces of Cisleithania: Dalmatia, the Littoral, Carniola, and the Slovene-settled parts of Styria and Carinthia”.

In the early twentieth century, Yugoslavism therefore became one of the main themes of Slovene state politics, but ideas on which peoples would join and how were no clearer or more tangible than in the decades before. Both Slovene middle-class parties spoke about trialism and federalism, and supported the creation of a separate South Slav political entity within the Monarchy, but in their views on potential Croat allies and particularly in their attitude to the Serbs, the two sides differed considerably. In 1911/12, the Pan-Slovene People’s Party renewed its alliance with the Croat Party of Right and in 1912 they even formed a joint “Croat-Slovene Party of Right”. The expectations that this union with the Party of Right raised among Slovene Catholic politicians were, from the very start, completely
unfounded. A liberal Croat-Serb coalition had a majority in the sabor; the Croatian parliament in Zagreb and without them there could be no talk of “joint Croat-Slovene policy”. Ideas of a lasting Catholic-Party of Right alliance were also unrealistic given that the position and interests of the two nations and parties were too diverse. A Croat-Slovene party could not survive in such circumstances. One of the few tangible results of the union between the two parties was the strengthened co-operation within the Croat-Slovene Reichsrat club in Vienna, which lasted until the start of the First World War and was revived in 1917.

The liberals, meanwhile, attempted to approach liberal Croatian groups and the Croat-Serb coalition, but were also enthusiastic about ties with the Serbs. They were not affronted by Serb Orthodoxy. In contrast, the most enthusiastic among them wrote that Serb Orthodoxy was an advantage, since the Orthodox Church was less violent than the Catholic Church and more closely connected to believers and the ‘nation’. Yet liberal attempts to find Croat and Serb political allies were also met with relative failure. The Croat-Serb coalition did not demonstrate any interest in co-operation with the Slovenes, and came up with a Croat version of trialism, which favoured a union of the Croat provinces and the creation of a separate South Slav unit without the Slovenes. The Social Democrats had more success in finding friends in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, and in November 1909 in Ljubljana they organised the first conference of Yugoslav Social Democrats. At the conference, they adopted the Tivoli Resolution (named after Hotel Tivoli in the park of the same name where the conference took place), which advocated the union of all Yugoslavs “regardless of differences in faith, script, dialect or language” within a single nation; but it was too abstract to be of any use within a political campaign, so response was muted and its moment soon passed.

The First Balkan War began in 1912/13 and rapidly radicalised Slovene views on the Yugoslav question. The convincing victory over Turkey for the small Balkan states – Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece – was warmly welcomed. A committee was founded in Ljubljana to gather assistance for the anti-Turk allies and also sent volunteers to Serbia. Sympathy for Serbia increased in both middle-class parties, and at the same time the opinion was also offered that Austria had already missed its chance to settle the Yugoslav question, and that it could be settled with or without Austria. The Second Balkan War (summer 1913), in which Bulgaria fought against Serbia, Montenegro and Greece over the spoils of war, was therefore a great disappointment to all those who had placed their hopes in the Balkans and the east. Sympathy for the Bulgarians chilled, while in the eyes of many Slovenes, Serbia was the actual and the moral victor of the Balkan Wars, which heightened its reputation and prestige.
Nevertheless, a genuine pro-Serb position among Slovenes – even during the Balkan Wars – was found only in limited radical and Young Liberal circles, and particularly among high school-aged young people, who published the paper *Preporod* (Revival) in Ljubljana in 1912/13. The *Preporodovci* were the only Slovene political group before the First World War to take a completely anti-Austrian position and called for a Yugoslav state outside the Monarchy. Its political ideas were not only rejected by all Slovene political parties, but also by almost all the most prominent Slovene scholars. Even the writer Ivan Cankar, who used a speech in Ljubljana in 1913 entitled “Slovenes and Yugoslavs” to respond to events in the Balkans, called for the formation of a “federal Yugoslav republic,” and earned himself a week’s imprisonment for the statement “Leave Austria in her own shit! We should be like Mazzini in Italy,” remained very isolated in his views. Yet in contrast to the *Preporodovci*, he remained far from advocating the idea of the single Yugoslav nation. Cankar decisively rejected ideas of a joint Slovene-Croat or Slovene-Croat-Serb nation that had been fateful divided by history, and that could only protect its future by linguistic and cultural union. Cankar wrote: “by blood we are brothers, by language at least cousins, but by culture, which is the fruit of centuries of separate development, we are more foreign to each than one of our upper Carniolan farmers is to a Tyrolean, or a Gorizian vineyard labourer is to a Friulian.” In Cankar’s view, the Yugoslav issue was exclusively political, and any ideas of abandoning the Slovene language for Croatian or Serbo-Croatian or the gradual fusion of South Slav languages and cultures were completely unacceptable.

Cankar did not limit his criticism to the *Preporodovci*. The idea that Yugoslavs formed a single nation – or should do so sooner or later – was met with approval in the last decade before the First World War by the educated classes and politicians in all three Slovene political camps. Their proponents used a range of arguments to justify the idea from western European national political theory: the unification of the dialectically diverse Germans into a single German nation, the unfavourable climate of international relations for smaller nations, and the South Slav linguistic brotherhood. In truth, these arguments were backed by a sense of insecurity about the smallness of the Slovene nation, and the fear that Croats and Serbs would leave the Slovenes out of their plans for a union. The liberal educated classes promoted the neo-Illyrian movement in the decade before the war, led by the Slavist Fran Ilešič (1871–1941), a committed advocate of linguistic and cultural integration between Slovenes and the other Yugoslav nations. According to Ilešič, the objective of his fellow Slovenes should be “complete unity with the Croats”, since on their own Slovenes “meant nothing”, but could act as “excellent yeast for Yugoslavism”. Yet not even Ilešič was prepared to abandon Slovene
immediately, and favoured the use of Serb-Croatian predominantly for academic texts. Some individuals in the Social Democrat and Catholic camps put forward similar positions.

Yugoslav enthusiasts who determinedly defended the Slovene language and culture against the Germans and Italians, but were prepared to make more concessions and accept a gradual ‘linguistic and cultural’ merger as part of the integration with Croats and Serbs, were in a minority before 1914, with little wider support. Most Slovenes knew very little about the Croats and Serbs. For them, developing ties with Croats and making moves towards the Serbs and the Balkans were primarily part of a search for allies who would support them in resistance to the Germans and Italians, and help them achieve the traditional Slovene political objective of a United Slovenia and national autonomy. Rural voters, in particular, were closer to the position of the Pan-Slovene People’s Party, which advocated a political union of the Austrian Yugoslavs in a Slovene-Croat state. The party did not feature a wide range of views on Yugoslavism. Both Catholic leaders – Šušteršič and Krek – supported federalism (or trialism) and a Croat-Slovene union, and the Pan-Slovene People’s Party advocated trialism and Yugoslav positions in the Reichsrat from the 1908 annexation crisis.

After the Hohenwart club fell apart, the Reichsrat deputies of the two Slovene middle-class parties briefly joined forces, but separated in 1901 and would remain so until 1917, although they would periodically come together informally. Following the 1907 elections, the Slovene Catholic camp had 17 and the liberals 7 of a total of 516 Cisleithanian deputies in the Reichsrat. The leader of the Pan-Slovene People’s Party, Ivan Šušteršič, proved to be a master of parliamentary tactics, and for some time nurtured hope that he might even be made minister for postal services. From 1911, he led the 27-member Croat-Slovene parliamentary club, which united the Catholic Pan-Slovenes, Dalmatian Party of Right members and Istrian deputies. In 1912, Šušteršič stepped down as head of the club on being appointed governor of Carniola. From 1914, another Slovene would lead the Croat-Slovene parliamentary club, Anton Korošec (1871–1940) – like Krek, a priest – who thus became the third force in the Pan-Slovene People’s Party after Šušteršič and Krek.

The assassination of the imperial heir Archduke Franz Ferdinand, on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo, caused widespread shock and grief among Slovenes. The prevailing view was that it was an unforgivable act perpetrated under the influence of Belgrade and Serb foreign policy, which would inevitably damage the Yugoslav movement and the position of Slovenes in the Monarchy. Rumours of Franz Ferdinand’s planned reforms and his willingness to resolve the Yugoslav issue increased anti-Serb attitudes. Slovene Catholics and liberals were the most resolute in their condemnation of the murder in Sarajevo. Šušteršič was particularly outraged,
laying blame for the assassination at Serbia’s door and calling for a fight against domestic “traitors, agitators and seducers.” Krek and Korošec were more moderate, restricting themselves to expressions of condolence and loyalty to the Habsburg house. The Social Democrats did not take a position on the assassination, but Henrik Tuma (1858–1935) spoke for many by stating that the party had nothing in common with the Habsburg archduke and Austrian-German nationalists.

The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia on 28 July 1914 was opposed by the liberals, as well as the Social Democrats, but this in no way dampened the enthusiastic, patriotic spirit that accompanied the subsequent mobilisation, particularly in towns. Slovene soldiers went to war with national flags and ribbons on their hats, accompanied by singing and flowers, as elsewhere in the Monarchy. They were convinced that the war would be over by winter and they would all be home by Christmas. A considerable number of the early draft (which included volunteers) was sent to Galicia, where they were taken prisoner by the Russians after the early Austrian defeats of autumn 1914. Slovenes served in every division of the Austrian army and in 50 of the 141 regiments. Slovene men and boys fought mainly in the Russian theatre, and in the Soča valley (the Isonzo Front) and the Tyrol after Italy joined the war. Many served with distinction, though many others deserted, sickened by the horrors or war or weary of soldiering. From the very start of the war, tens of Slovenes with Serb sympathies (including some of the Preporodovci) fled to the Karadjordjević kingdom, joining those who had left for Serbia during the Balkan wars as volunteers in the Serb army. This volunteer movement also spread among the South Slav prisoners-of-war in Russia after the major Serb defeats of 1915. Around 4,000 Slovenes joined or were forced into the volunteer units, but most of them returned to captivity or deserted due to the terrible conditions, the violence of Serb offices and pressure from Serb authorities to take Serb citizenship. By 1918, there were just 234 Slovenes in the Serb army.

After the government in Vienna introduced emergency economic, political censorship and police measures, Slovene territory was also on a war footing. The authorities prohibited numerous newspapers and societies, imprisoned or interned Slovene and Yugoslav nationalists, and heightened the pressure and supervision of educated people, the political elite and public events. The arrested and persecuted included some of the best-known figures from Slovene culture and politics, from Ivan Cankar to the liberal grandee Ivan Hribar and neo-Ilyrian Fran Ilešič. In December 1914, young contributors to the Preporod journal were brought before court, while in spring 1915 a military court was established in Ljubljana, which also tried civilians. Many were accused of espionage, and some were even executed.
The fighting only reached Slovene-populated areas in May and June 1915, when Italian troops occupied the western parts of Gorizia and the Soča valley, following the Italian declaration of war on Austro-Hungary. Immediately after hostilities began, around 80,000 Slovenes fled from the Soča (Isonzo) Front to Carniola, Styria and refugee camps in Austria, while the Italian authorities deported around 12,000 Slovenes into the Italian interior from the occupied zone. The first wave of refugees was followed by two smaller ones. The fighting along the Soča – the largest military attack on the Slovene territory in all Slovene history – saw 200,000 soldiers and civilians die, and lasted almost two and a half years. It only came to an end in October 1917, when the combined Austro-Hungary and German forces broke through the Italian positions at Kobarid, a village whose Italian name, Caporetto, remains a synonym for catastrophic defeat.

Slovene middle-class politicians lacked a clear policy during the first years of the war. Their leaders and Reichsrat deputies frequently demanded that the government recall the Reichsrat, which had stopped meeting since spring 1914, while in Vienna they also protested against the persecution and imprisonment of Slovenes. In spring 1915, the Catholic leaders joined Croat politicians in appealing to the pope for support. The Italian entry into the war and occupation of territory on the western Slovene border in 1915 further confused the leaders of the Pan-Slovene People’s Party. In moments of uncertainty, they were even prepared to abandon the pre-war plans for a trialist monarchy, accept German as the language of state and support the centralist reform ideas of Austria’s military leaders; in return, they asked only that the government recognise autonomy for Slovene national schools.

Slovene emigrants who were in western Europe when war broke out, or who fled there once it started, were the only Slovenes to openly commit to pro-Yugoslav positions during the first half of the war. Four of them – the lawyers Bogumil Vošnjak and Josip Jedlowski, from Gorizia and Trieste respectively, the ethnologist Niko Zupanič, and later the jurist Gustav Gregorin – joined the Yugoslav Committee, founded on 30 April 1915 in Paris by Croat emigrants from Austro-Hungary. Its objective was “the liberation of all Yugoslavs from the Austro-Hungarian yoke and unification with our free brothers of Serbia and Montenegro”. The committee’s founders and members attempted in every way possible to prevent implementation of the secret Treaty of London, in which the Entente allies had promised Italy large areas of Habsburg territory – including a considerable amount of the Dalmatian coast, and Croatian and Slovene provinces – in return for its entry into the war. The work of the Yugoslav Committee and its Slovene members was supported by the liberal-aligned Slovene émigrés in the United States. Socialist émigrés issued the Chicago Declaration in June 1917,
calling for the unification of the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians within a federal Yugoslav republic on the basis of self-determination.

Following the murder of the Austrian prime minister, Count Stürghk, and the death of Franz Joseph in autumn 1916, conditions in Austria began to change. Internal political pressure relaxed slightly and, in the spring of 1917, the new emperor, Charles I, recalled the Reichsrat, against a backdrop of universal shortages and exhaustion with the war. Slovene and Croat deputies contacted the Czechs and reached an agreement on mutual support. At the same time, the debate on the various possibilities of a Croat-Slovene union was reopened in the Croat-Slovene club and the Pan-Slovene People’s Party. The idea that all of the South Slav deputies should combine in a single parliamentary club, and that the programme with which they opened the parliament – similarly to the Czechs and Ukrainians – should be Yugoslav rather than just Croat-Slovene, had been developing for some time, but was only seriously discussed two or three weeks before the session was to open. Thirty-three Slovene, Croat and Serb deputies from Cisleithania and Dalmatia united in a Yugoslav club on the day before the Reichsrat reopened, and at the formal opening, on 30 May 1917, its president, Anton Korošec, read the May Declaration, which “on the basis of the national principle and Croat state law” supported the unification of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in a democratic and “independent state entity” under the Habsburgs.

The demands in the May Declaration were not new, and indeed were reminiscent of the Carniolan provincial diet’s declaration of 1909. What was new was the support of all Slovene, Croat and Serb parties in the Reichsrat. Acceptance of a Yugoslav framework also signalled the end of plans by the Slovene Catholics and Croat Party of Right for a Slovene-Croat union. Even so, the statement by the Yugoslav club did not initially receive much reaction; in summer 1917, the club leadership’s expectation that the government would understand its position led them to follow a conciliatory policy. At the end of August, the Slovenes gained their first and last government minister in the Habsburg Monarchy, with the appointment of a high-ranking state official, Dr Ivan Žolgar, as a minister without portfolio.

Yet by autumn 1917, it was already clear that Austria would not consider constitutional reform or accede to the Slovene and Yugoslav demands. The Yugoslav club went over to the opposition while, in Ljubljana, Bishop Jeglič and the leaders of the two middle-class parties lent their support to the May Declaration, launching a mass movement that encompassed town meetings and the collection of petitions supporting the policies of the Slovene and Yugoslav deputies throughout Slovene territory. The president of the Yugoslav club, Anton Korošec, who also assumed leadership of the Pan-Slovene People’s Party at the
end of 1917, became the undisputed leader of Slovene politics. From autumn 1917, Slovene deputies in the Reichsrat repeatedly stated that the May Declaration represented the “minimum” level of their demands, pointing out that other solutions were possible, even without the government and Austria, while calling for peace and fundamental constitutional reform. The aggression of German nationalists, and the unwillingness of the government to reach any sort of compromise, severely eroded the belief of many individuals in the Monarchy and their loyalty to the throne. In January 1918, the Yugoslav club attempted to place the Yugoslav question on the international agenda by sending a letter to the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk, calling for the recognition of their right to self-determination, clarifying their demands, and rejecting Italy’s territorial claims.

The May Movement reached its peak with the formal presentation of 200,000 signatures in support of the May Declaration and the Yugoslav club to its president, Anton Korošec, in Ljubljana on 25 March 1918. The Slovenes took the initiative in the movement for a Yugoslav entity within the Habsburg Monarchy into their own hands, but there was no comparable expression of the popular will in Istria, Dalmatia or continental Croatia. The only group not to support the policy of the Yugoslav club was the Social Democrats, who persisted with the Tivoli Resolution and rejected co-operation with the two middle-class parties. This led the Young Social Democrat group to break away from their party and join the Yugoslav movement in spring 1918. The political persecution, shortages, requisitions, growing anti-war feeling, and high casualties among Slovene troops (it is estimated that 35,000 inhabitants of the then Slovene territory had lost their lives in military engagement by end of the war) undoubtedly contributed to mass participation in the petitions to support the Yugoslav club and the demand for ‘Yugoslavia’. The petitions supporting the May Declaration also represented the first mass action by women in Slovene history; in fact, women who had remained alone when their husbands and sons had gone to war represented the largest group of signatories, and saw the petitions as a way to express their desire for the immediate restoration of peace. News of anti-war attitudes and discontent in the army was arriving from all over the Monarchy at the same time. In February 1918, sailors in the Bay of Kotor mutinied, followed in May by soldiers in Judenburg, Murau and Radgona; Slovenes were involved in all four cases. For most of those signing their support for the May Declaration, the commitment to ‘Yugoslavia’ was not just from a desire for peace, but also a decision in favour of a national state that would realise Slovene national aspirations, and protect the Slovene people against pressure from Germans and Italians. Considerable numbers in spring 1918, however, still thought Slovenes should remain under Habsburg rule.

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In May 1918, the Austrian government prohibited agitation in support of the May Declaration and, together with the emperor, assured the German parties that they would not relinquish access to the Adriatic. In response, the Slovene Social Democrats reconsidered their position and joined the May Movement. At the same time, preparations were underway to create a National Council (Narodni Svet) as a central, non-partisan representative body for the Slovene provinces and Istria. It was founded on 17 and 18 August 1918 in Ljubljana, and was swiftly followed by the formation of provincial and local national councils. On 6 October 1918, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was formed in Zagreb as the highest representative body of South Slavs within the Monarchy. The president of both the Zagreb National Council (Narodno Vijeće) and the Ljubljana version was Anton Korošec.

Thus, even before the collapse of the Monarchy, the first autonomous Slovene and Yugoslav institutions existed in parallel with the Austrian powers, though no one had yet clearly conceived of what form ‘Yugoslavia’ and the relations between its constituent nations would take. This debate was started in earnest in October 1918 – over three weeks before the Monarchy’s ultimate collapse – by Fran Šuklje, who prepared a draft outline of the formation of the “desired state” for the founding committee of the National Council in Ljubljana. This proposal was not for a monarchy, but for a republic that would include the Yugoslav regions of Austro-Hungary divided into three parts: a United Slovenia with Istria, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina with Dalmatia. Each of the three units would be autonomous, governing its own internal administration. Slovenia’s administrative divisions would be based on the Austrian tradition, and remain divided into the historic regions and established administrative units. The liberal leaders forcefully rejected Šuklje’s ideas, which he had published in a newspaper with Korošec’s consent. They criticised his plan as “too Austrian” and “insufficiently Yugoslav”. “If we imagine a Yugoslav state, we must not imagine it as containing a separate Slovene, separate Croat and separate Serb group,” wrote Ivan Tavčar. “This state must be built from the very start on the founding principle that it is home to just one nation ... Our future state must be formed exclusively from a single foundation stone.”

The discussion halted at this point, six days before the demise of the Habsburg Monarchy, the speed of which greatly surprised Slovene politicians. The end of Austro-Hungary was welcomed in Ljubljana on 29 October 1918 by huge celebrations. Crowds cried out “Yugoslavia”, and called out the name of Woodrow Wilson, the US President, and the slogan “samoodločba” or self-determination. No one mentioned the Karadjordjevićs and only the indefatigable Slavophile Ivan Hribar found time in his speech to praise the “genial” Serb premier, Nikola Pašić.
YUGOSLAVIA: BUILT ON ONE FOUNDATION STONE OR THREE?

The formation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on 29 October 1918 was a turning point in Slovene history. The new state only actually existed for just over a month, far too brief an existence to organise in detail its internal relations and powers, but politically and administratively it was a ‘confederal republic’, in which Slovenes governed themselves for the first time. On 31 October 1918, a national government (Narodna vlada) was formed in Ljubljana, appointed by the central National Council in Zagreb, on the basis of proposals from the Ljubljana National Council. The national government ran the Slovene part of the state until the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was united with the Kingdom of Serbia on 1 December 1918 to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. All three Slovene parties were involved in the government, and 12 departments governed individual areas of public administration. These departments organised the administration of justice, internal affairs, education, health, social welfare, culture and even national defence. The highest legislative authority, foreign policy and military matters came within the competence of the National Council in Zagreb, but it struggled to carry out all its tasks in the difficult circumstances of the post-war period. The national government in Ljubljana therefore also organised the Slovene army, and made direct contacts with a number of European states.

The State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (Država Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov) had its own territory, but its state borders were not clearly defined. The Carinthian Germans strongly opposed Slovene demands for the partition of Carinthia. The Germans in Styria held a similar view, with the German town council in Maribor calling for the town and its surroundings to be joined to the new Austrian state. At the start of November, the Italians were already starting to occupy territory granted to them by the Treaty of London. After incorporating Trieste and Gorizia, they moved up to the border demarcated by the Treaty of London, and soon beyond this line, taking up a position just 20 kilometres from Ljubljana (at Vrhnika), where a unit of liberated Serb prisoners-of-war opposed them.

The national government in Ljubljana was initially hesitant over the border issue. Slovene leaders optimistically trusted that the post-war borders of the new state would be decided on the basis of linguistic and ethnic criteria and the principle of national self-determination, and counted on the support of the Entente states. Military action was therefore initially only taken to protect the Slovene borders in Styria, where Major Rudolf Maister (1874–1934) assumed military command in Maribor on behalf of the regional National Council at the start of November. Maister, who was subsequently raised to the rank of general
by the National Council, organised three volunteer battalions by the end of that month and occupied the Spielfeld/Špilje-Radgona border, which later became the Yugoslav-Austria state border. On 12 November 1918, the decision was taken in Ljubljana to make a similar military intervention in Carinthia. Slovene volunteers, supported by Serbian former prisoners-of-war, occupied Carinthian territory south of the Drava, as well as a few areas north of the river. The national government failed to agree on how much of Carinthia it should claim, so in the first half of December it rejected a proposal by the provincial government in Klagenfurt to make the Drava the demarcation line, and the issue of the Carinthian border remained unresolved. Zagreb and Ljubljana did not dare take more forceful action against the Entente ally, Italy. In both capitals, they were well aware that the border issue with Italy would be particularly difficult to resolve due to the Treaty of London, but at the same time still believed that the Entente powers would support Slovene and Croatian demands, once they were made aware of the linguistic-ethnic situation in disputed areas.

At the end of October 1918 – even before the proclamation of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs – a three-member delegation of the National Council in Zagreb had travelled to Switzerland, led by their president, Anton Korošec. These representatives were surprised by news of Austria-Hungary’s swift collapse in Geneva, where they had only just set out their positions in preparation for a meeting with members of the Yugoslav Committee and representatives of the Serbian government. The Yugoslav Committee and Serbian government had held meetings on the Greek island of Corfu in 1917, the result of which was the Corfu Declaration on the unification of a “three-named” nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a “democratic and parliamentary kingdom” under the Karadjordjević dynasty, though the Serbian government was vacillating between the idea of a Greater Serbia or Yugoslavia, which led to major disagreements between Serbian parties, the Serbian prime minister, Nikola Pašić, and the Yugoslav Committee. Despite this, the negotiations initially seemed successful; the Serbian government recognised the National Council in Zagreb as the government of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the former Austria-Hungary. At the same time, the selected representatives of Yugoslavs from the former Monarchy, Yugoslav émigrés, and the Kingdom of Serbia signed the Geneva Declaration on the unification of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and the Kingdom of Serbia as a federal state, in which both state entities – until the election of a constitutional assembly that would decide on the future formation of the state – would have wide-reaching autonomy.

But the Geneva Declaration was dead in the water within a week. Members of the Serbian government in Belgrade were not prepared to consider the constitutional formation of
the state or the dynasty as open to negotiations, nor would they recognise that the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and the Kingdom of Serbia were uniting as two equal, sovereign states. Korošec and his two colleagues travelled on to Paris from Switzerland in mid-November, where they met French leaders, who recommended that the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs should join the Kingdom of Serbia as soon as possible. Although they did not receive any specific promises in Paris, they left France full of optimism, only returning home at the beginning of December 1918, when the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and the Kingdom of Serbia had already been united. The president of the State’s National Council, Anton Korošec, was therefore abroad for the state’s entire lifetime, a fact that would not be without consequence for the State’s and Slovene politics.

Events at home meanwhile were moving rapidly. The unification of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia was supported by all three political parties, but their ideas on how quickly unification should happen and what form it should take differed vastly. The Slovene People’s Party (SLS) and Social Democrats were in favour of a federal republic and a detailed prior agreement on its constitutional form, while the liberals supported a monarchy and stated that the question of “the form of the state should not disrupt” state unity, since the political, cultural and economic future of the “Yugoslav nation” could only be assured by strong central authority and a fully united state. The debate also divided cultural figures, who could no longer agree on whether Slovenes formed a distinct nation or one of three tribes within a single Yugoslav nation. While some of the educated classes maintained that Slovenes were a nation and must have wide-ranging cultural autonomy within the new state, some liberal commentators rejected “separatist tendencies” and called for “immediate … unification of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Serbian state.”

This was also the dominant view in the National Council in Zagreb, under the influence of the Croatian Serbs and their leader, Svetozar Pribićević. Proponents of a quick, unconditional union with Serbia skilfully used fears of the Italians and rumours of secret efforts to restore the Habsburg Monarchy to widen support for their views. On 24 November 1918, influenced by developments in the National Council, the SLS conceded, and citing “difficult circumstances” supported “immediate union”. Zagreb appointed a delegation to travel to Belgrade and acknowledge Prince-Regent Aleksandar’s pre-eminence, while standing by the points of the Corfu Declaration, which stated that a constituent assembly would decide on the final constitutional form of the state. The National Council’s delegation travelled to the Serbian capital on 27 November 1918.
On 1 December 1918, the envoys of the National Council of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs appeared before Prince-Regent Aleksandar to read a statement they had finalised only a day before, and which no longer contained any mention of the constituent assembly having the final say on the organisation of the state. The declaration informed the Prince-Regent of the desire of the people of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs for union with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro in a “single state” under the authority of King Petar Karadjordjević, and supporting a democratically elected constituent assembly. The Regent responded by proclaiming the unification and the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kraljevina Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev), promising a democratic constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, and affirming that political parties would participate in the composition of the government that would represent the united homeland.

The “proclamation of unification” on 1 December 1918 was not met with the same level of celebration as had greeted news of the end of Austria-Hungary, but there were no vocal protests. The general conviction was that the unresolved border issues with Austria and Italy meant there was no real choice. Anton Korošec, who arrived in Belgrade two days after the formal union and expressed his disappointment at the rush to reach a decision, was quickly accepted in Serbian political circles with considerable ceremony. On 20 December 1918, the first government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was appointed by order of Prince-Regent Aleksandar, headed by the Serbian radical, Stojan Protić. The 20 ministers included 2 Slovenes, Anton Korošec, a minister without portfolio and deputy prime minister, and the liberal, Albert Kramer (1882–1943), who was minister for the constituent assembly.

One of the first measures taken by the central Yugoslav government was to terminate the autonomous regional governments, and to limit the powers of the provincial administrative bodies in the territory of the former State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The State’s National Council in Zagreb ceased functioning, and the regional governments in Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Slovenia stepped down. On 20 January 1919, Prince-Regent Aleksandar appointed a new provincial government in Ljubljana, which had significantly fewer powers than its predecessor. The provincial government was subordinate to the central government bodies in Belgrade. By spring 1919, the Slovenes – like the other Yugoslav regions of the former Austro-Hungary – had lost the autonomous institutions and elements of statehood they had acquired in the final months of the Habsburg Monarchy and the first few months after its collapse. Gradually the Slovene army that had formed on the creation of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in
November 1918 was disbanded, and military command in Slovene territory was assumed by Serb officers.

The reduced powers of the provincial government in Ljubljana caused the first major dispute between Ljubljana and Belgrade at the start of 1919. At the same time, relations between the Slovene parties, which had co-operated with relative success since May 1918, deteriorated. Slovene political leaders found themselves in a completely new political situation with the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was very different to the Habsburg Monarchy. The transition to the new political reality was easiest for the liberals. They enjoyed a good reputation and considerable sympathy in Belgrade, due to their pro-Yugoslav and pro-monarchy positions, which they tried to use to consolidate their political influence at the Yugoslav and Slovene levels. In their search for political allies, they first supported the founding of a single Yugoslav Democratic Party (Jugoslovanska demokratska stranka), which was joined in February 1919 by liberal parties from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina, and which then combined with Serb liberal parties in a state-wide Democratic Party, uniting all the liberal parties in the kingdom in a single democratic-centralist bloc. This significantly strengthened their position in Belgrade and in Slovenia, where the backing of powerful state-wide allies made it easier to face up to the Catholic and Social Democratic parties. In mid-1919, the liberals supported the establishment of the Independent Agrarian Party (Samostojna kmetijska stranka – SKS) as an attempt to spread their influence into rural area, but the SKS, despite liberal leanings, soon set out on its own, rather independent, political path.

Belgrade was less trusting of the Slovene People’s Party, which remained the largest Slovene political party after 1918. The party was seen by Serbian politicians and at court as conservative, republican and opposed to Serbian Yugoslavism, and this reputation was willingly spread by its liberal opponents. But the Slovene Catholic politicians found the new state equally alien. The Orthodox dynasty, a majority Orthodox population with predominant liberal tendencies, and the Greater Serbia ideas of Belgrade’s political elite represented a serious threat in their eyes to Catholic national politics and Catholic predominance in Slovenia. The SLS leadership was therefore constantly embroiled in political strategising and attempts to find allies, particularly among the Radicals and at the royal court. In Ljubljana, it supported demands for greater Slovene autonomy and opposition to centralism, while consolidating the party’s status and leading role in Slovene political life. SLS policy in such circumstances was extremely pragmatic and changed frequently. The influence of the church hierarchy on its policies, which had weakened at the time of the May Declaration movement...
in 1917/18, was further reduced after 1 December 1918, and control of the party remained in the hands of a select group of grandees, headed by Anton Korošec.

The third political grouping, the social democratic camp, also underwent major change. The Social Democrat leadership maintained its policy of co-operation with other Slovene parties after 1 December 1918, while supporting the idea of a “unitary” state, which would grant “reasonable” autonomy to individual parts. However, the policy of inter-party conciliation and Social Democrat co-operation in the provincial government in Ljubljana was already opposed by more radical ‘Young Social Democrats’ in spring 1919, who opposed “opportunistic ministerialism”. The Slovene Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratska stranka) divided into two streams, both of which sought partners in the Yugoslav labour and social democratic movement. Although much of the Slovene social-democratic supporting working class remained faithful to the Austrian reformed socialist heritage, supporters of more radical communist ideas that had arrived in Slovenia from other parts of the Yugoslav state began to grow in number, particularly in Carniola and the mining towns of Zasavje. In spring 1920, the left of the party retaliated to pressure to renounce their positions by leaving to form the Workers’ Socialist Party of Slovenia, which united with its communist-oriented, Yugoslav sister party (which was renamed as the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in June of the same year). At the same time, relations worsened between the centralist and autonomist factions in the Social Democrat leadership. When the centralist faction prevailed during the same year, many of the autonomists left the party and founded the National Socialist Party (Narodna socialistična stranka) with like-minded people from the liberal camp.

The major social, economic and historical and cultural differences between regions of the Yugoslav state led to tensions between national groups during the first months after unification, which developed into mass protest movements against Serbian pressure to centralise, and bloody conflicts. In Croatia, Stjepan Radić, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was growing in reputation and popularity. He denied the legitimacy of the 1 December proclamation of unification, and supported autonomy for Croatia within a confederal Yugoslav republic. In Montenegro, supporters of the deposed Montenegrin Petrović dynasty and Karadjordjević sympathisers engaged in out-and-out war. Violent clashes occurred between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and relations between national groups also deteriorated significantly in Kosovo and Macedonia. Slovenia was one of the few regions of the new kingdom not to witness outbreaks of national dissatisfaction in the spring of 1919. “Slovenes do not have time to think of separatist tendencies,” Anton Korošec stated in February 1919 to Belgrade critics of the SLS, and stressed: “our first task is to save [our]
territory and consolidate the entire state.” Despite their support for autonomy, these views prevented Slovene Catholic leaders from reaching serious agreement with the Croatian parties and Radić. Radić’s views were too radical for them, and Slovene-Croatian relations soon grew complicated in other ways after unification. There was no enthusiasm in Croatia for SLS ideas of a joint Yugoslav Catholic party, nor was there much understanding for Slovene problems with the food supply. As with the liberals, this led almost from the start to Slovene Catholic leaders feeling more at home in Belgrade, where they could negotiate with Serbian Radicals and the court for various concessions, than in Zagreb.

However, dissatisfaction with the policies of the Serbian parties and the central government increased in Slovenia month by month. In the interim national parliament that sat for the first time in Belgrade on 1 March 1919, the Slovenes were awarded just 32 seats out of 270, causing open resentment among the Slovene public. Criticism increased when sessions of the interim assembly in Belgrade started being interrupted and the legislative function was assumed by the government during the lengthy periods between assemblies. The central ministries were ineffectual and increased administrative confusion with poorly thought-out measures that failed to take differences between the regions into account. The Bishop of Ljubljana, Anton Bonaventura Jeglič, who in December 1919 lamented the “sad anniversary” of the Yugoslav kingdom in his diary, was by no means alone in his disappointment at the disorganised state of trading, the prevalent corruption, inflation and impending famine. A considerable section of the Slovene population felt like Jeglič, including some who did not share his anti-liberal political views.

The new administrative, political and national circumstances that developed following the collapse of Austria-Hungary led to realignments and new tensions within the Slovene territory. The old provincial boundaries were replaced by newly demarcated state borders that cut off traditional transport and trade routes. Ljubljana finally became the Slovene political and economic capital in October 1918, assuming the role of the former provincial administrative centres. The consequences of these changes had a particular impact in Slovene Styria (Štajerska), where the problems of forming a new administration and the food supply bolstered old provincial prejudices, and led to rivalry between the Slovene Styrian towns and the one-time Carniolan and now Slovene capital, Ljubljana, which was felt particularly keenly in Maribor. Maribor, Celje, Ptuj and other Slovene Styrian towns that prior to 1918 had had a German majority population rapidly changed their national and linguistic profile. According to census data, in 1910 there were 73,000 Germans in Lower, or Slovene, Styria and 28,000 in Carniola; by 1921, there were just 22,500 in Slovene Styria, and 16,500 in Carniola, due to
aggressive Slovenisation – involving assimilation or emigration – of the German-speaking population. As elsewhere in the Kingdom, the difficult social and economic circumstances significantly increased social unrest in the years that followed the First World War. Talk of Bolshevism was relatively common, influenced by prisoners-of-war returning from Russia, and the nearby revolution in Hungary, while miners and other workers also began to strike. The strike movement reached its peak with the all-Yugoslav railway strike in spring 1920, when the gendarmerie fired on demonstrators in Ljubljana, killing 13 and wounding over 30 people.

In the eyes of the Slovene public and political class, one of the most important and most urgent issues to be resolved was the question of the Slovene borders. While calm reigned along the Italo-Slovene demarcation line of November 1918, fighting continued in Carinthia until a truce in the second half of January 1919, and it was agreed that US military observers would define the demarcation line between the Slovene and Austrian forces, after reviewing the disputed territory. The US envoys did visit Carinthia and proposed the Karavanke mountains as the demarcation line, which caused outrage in Ljubljana. On 29 April 1919, Slovene military units launched an offensive to move the cease-fire line north, but the Austrians stood firm. A month later – 28 May 1919 – the Slovene army, supported by Serb units, renewed the offensive, pushing the Austrians back over the Drava, and on 6 June occupied Klagenfurt (Celovec) and the Zollfeld plain (Gosposvetsko polje). The Slovene and Serb military gains were meaningless, however, since the Peace Conference in Paris had already decided on 30 May 1919 that Carinthian residents would decide on the future of the Slovene-German bilingual areas by plebiscite.

The decision to organise a plebiscite in Carinthia was a major defeat for Yugoslav diplomats, who had sought unconditional international recognition for demarcation along the Slovene-German ethnic-linguistic border. The plebiscite area was divided into two zones. Zone A, which had a majority Slovene population (and to which the Yugoslav army had withdrawn), was administered by the Kingdom of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, while the northern Zone B (Klagenfurt and surroundings) was under Austrian administration. It was decided that the inhabitants of Zone A would vote first, with a plebiscite only being held in Zone B if a majority in Zone A voted to join the Yugoslav state. On 10 October 1920, 59.04% of voters (including around 12,000 Slovenes) voted to join south Carinthia to the new Austrian state. A number of factors influenced the Yugoslav failure in the plebiscite: on one side, Austrian propaganda, which pointed out the benefits of the Austrian republic and democracy, skilfully exploited the internal contradictions and problems of the nascent
Yugoslav state, and promised national protection to the Slovenes; on the other was the poor and even violent Yugoslav administration in Zone A, and the powerful provincial consciousness of the local population, who found it difficult to conceive of the old province of Carinthia being divided. A month after the Carinthian plebiscite (12 November 1920), diplomats drew up the Yugoslav-Italian border at a peace conference between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Italy in the Italian resort of Rapallo. Once again, the Yugoslavs, who had largely based their claim on a division along the previous Austro-Italian border, left empty-handed. The Rapallo border was even less favourable for Slovenes than the proposal in the Treaty of London, giving Italy Tarvisio (Trbiž), Postojna and Mt Snežnik.

Slovenes perceived the loss of the Carinthian plebiscite and the Rapallo border as a national catastrophe. The general sense of dejection was not lifted by the relatively favourable Austro-Yugoslav division in Styria (Štajerska), or the Paris peace conference conclusion which gave the Yugoslav kingdom Prekmurje and the Prekmurje Slovenes. After the borders were settled in 1920, the Slovene population was divided across four states. In 1921, there were 985,155 Slovenes in Yugoslav Slovenia, while, according to estimates by Slovene historians, over 400,000 lived in neighbouring states (over 300,000 in Italy, around 80,000 in Austria, and between 7,000 and 8,000 in Hungary). The loss of Carinthia (Koroška) was particularly painful for the Slovene public, since it had a special place in Slovene national mythology and memory as the centre of the early medieval Carantanian state. At the same time, some experts put forward the long-term view that the losses to the north – to the Germans and Austria – would be more fateful than the losses to Italy in the west, since the experiences of Italianisation and Germanisation under the Habsburg Monarchy had taught them that there was a greater possibility of the Slovene Littoral and the Karst (Primorska and Kras) returning than the Slovene areas of Carinthia.

The mood in the run-up to the elections to the Constituent Assembly five months later – 28 November 1920 – was extremely downbeat following the constant internal political squabbling, and major territorial losses to Italy and Austria. The main winner in the elections in Slovenia was the SLS, which won over one third of all votes, and was followed by the Independent Farmers’ Party (SKS), the Yugoslav Social Democrat Party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), and the National Socialist Party. The liberals received only 7.67% of the vote, though the Democratic Party was the election winner at the state level, which strengthened their position in Slovenia. Slovene parties had 40 delegates to the Constituent Assembly, of a total of 419.

With the start of work in the Constituent Assembly on 12 December 1920, the
discussion on the future formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes moved into the decisive period. The clash between centralist and autonomist supporters intensified throughout the state. The main Slovene proponent of autonomy remained the SLS, which prepared its own constitutional plan. The plan, based on the German (Weimar) constitution, aimed at achieving a compromise between federalist and centralist views. It won widespread support throughout Slovenia. In February 1921, a group of 43 cultural and academic figures issued a special declaration supporting demands for autonomy. This launched a dynamic movement in support of autonomy and against the idea of Slovene culture being subsumed into that of the Serbs and Croats.

Until 1921, there were two large, clearly defined national political blocs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The first, centralist, bloc had most support, primarily from Serbian parties and the court. It supported the position of a unitary South Slav state based on a “single foundation stone”, and made reference to the French nation state model (l’état-nation). The second, federalist, camp enjoyed majority support among the non-Serbian nations, and particularly in the western, formerly Habsburg part of the state. The six months of ongoing debate in the Constituent Assembly ended on 28 June 1921, the Serbian national holiday, St. Vitus’ Day (Vidovdan), when the centralist Vidovdan Constitution was ratified in Belgrade with a slight, ordinary majority, under firm government pressure. Of the Slovene parties, only the liberals and delegates from the SKS voted in favour. The National Socialist Party and Social Democrats voted against. Representatives of the SLS had walked out of the assembly before the vote, in protest against their autonomist proposals being rejected. The Communists also did not participate in the voting in protest against the government ban on communist organisations and newspapers.

The Vidovdan Constitution was clearly a liberal document. It guaranteed the traditional rights of citizenship, legally defined the autonomy of the judiciary and separated church and state. At the same time, it gave the monarch considerable powers, and enshrined Yugoslav unity in law. According to its provisions, Slovenes, Serbs and Croats formed three “tribes” of a single (Yugoslav) nation, but it did not recognise any of the other nations. Instead of recognising the diverse national composition of the state, the Kingdom was divided into 33 districts or oblasti, which were directly subordinate to the central authorities in Belgrade, based on the model of French departments. Slovene territory within the state was divided into two parts – the Ljubljana oblast and Maribor oblast. Like the rest, the ‘Slovene’ districts had no autonomous powers. They were administrative units of the Yugoslav national territory and constituent parts of its administrative and political organisation.
The idea that the Yugoslav kingdom founded in 1918 could be effectively organised as a Balkan version of France was, of course, completely unrealistic. The Vidovdan Constitution was a straitjacket for all non-Serbian nations, and even for the Serbs of Vojvodina, and the federalist Montenegrins. “The political theory from which the Vidovdan Constitution was born, was not based on reality,” stated Albin Prepeluh in 1921. In his view, “the further development of this state [was] not possible on this basis.” Events were to show that most Slovene voters and most of the Slovene population shared Prepeluh’s assessment.

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: TOWARDS AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

The collapse of Austria-Hungary and the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes led to a major shift in economic circumstances in Slovene territory. The new state borders cut off the centuries-old north-south trade and transport axis that connected Vienna and Graz with Trieste via Slovene territory. The Rapallo border with Italy removed Yugoslav Slovenia’s connection to the coast and sea, while the border with Austria seriously impaired the traditional economic links with regions to the north. At the same time, the Slovene economy now had trade and transport routes heading east into the new kingdom, with a new Ljubljana-Zagreb-Belgrade economic axis taking shape.

The loss of Primorska (the Slovene Littoral) and Trieste was a huge blow for the Slovenes. Profitable enterprises such as the mercury mine in Idrija remained on the Italian side of the border, and the loss of Trieste was not just a lost port, but also a major market, and the only truly modern Slovene business centre of the day. At the same time, conditions for the development of industry and trade in Slovene territory within the new kingdom were not unfavourable. The Slovene region had been among the least industrially developed in the Habsburg Monarchy, forming part of its agricultural periphery. In contrast, on joining the Yugoslav state, it now found itself the most technologically and industrially advanced part of the new country. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes offered Slovene companies and entrepreneurs a new market, hungry for industrial consumer goods, which encouraged

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2 Translator’s note: The end of Austrian hegemony and the creation of a Yugoslav state is an appropriate point from which to use Slovene regional names (e.g. Notranjska rather than the anachronistic Inner Carniola), which is the established, though not yet universal, modern usage in English, found in literature ranging from EU reports and programmes to UK tourist brochures. Primorska, Štajerska, etc. therefore refer to the territory of Slovenia’s present-day regions, which can easily be found in reference works. This transition is mirrored partially in the Slovene language with Kranjska, for example, generally understood as a historical term. The place-names used in modern atlases continue to be the main guide to usage for towns and other features outside present-day Slovenia.
industrial growth and the development of non-agricultural activities.

Following the final definition of the borders in 1920, Slovene territory represented just 6.5% of Yugoslav territory (under 16,000 km²), and in 1931 had 10% of the kingdom’s population (1,144,000). Slovene industry, however, generated 28% of the total value of Yugoslav industrial production before the Second World War. Industrial development was particularly rapid in the 1920s, when most of the new factories were established. After the major economic crisis at the beginning of the 1930s, entrepreneurial zeal faded somewhat, but in just over two decades (1918–1940) the number of factories in Yugoslav Slovenia almost doubled. Many companies modernised and increased production, and smaller tradespeople also experienced a major upturn in business. Conditions for agricultural development were far worse, with the new state borders signalling the loss of traditional markets. Slovene farmers found it difficult to compete with the low prices of produce from the eastern and southern parts of the kingdom. The wide range of cheap agricultural produce reduced the income of Slovene farmers, plunging them into debt and deepening the crisis in village life.

Slovene leaders had started to prepare themselves for economic independence even before the Austrian Monarchy had come to an end. The Ljubljana National Council founded in August 1918 had had an economic section, which addressed three main issues: integrating the co-operative movement and concentrating Slovene capital, resolving the currency and financing problem, and achieving nationalisation, which would ensure that industrial plant and enterprises in Slovene territory came into Slovene hands. While efforts to concentrate co-operatives and to establish a united co-operative bank did not succeed due to differing party interests, the currency and financing reforms of 1918–1920 were largely successful. Following the proclamation of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, old Austrian banknotes were stamped to protect them against the devalued Austrian crown, and after the formation of the Yugoslav Kingdom, negotiations started in Belgrade on the conversion rate between the Yugoslav crown and the dinar, ending in 1920, with agreement on an exchange rate of four Yugoslav crowns to one dinar. This unfavourable exchange rate for affected savers and people receiving annuities, who felt cheated. The fall in the dinar’s value due to inflation only increased dissatisfaction.

Nationalisation also proved difficult. By the end of 1918, the national government in Ljubljana had already introduced controls over companies and land owned by foreign citizens, and passed regulations on the operations of foreign companies in its territory. These stated that Yugoslav citizens must be in a majority on the management bodies of foreign companies, at least 55% of capital must be Yugoslav, and 75% of shares deposited with
domestic (Yugoslav) banks. These measures had little impact, however. In spring 1919, the central government limited the recording and liquidation of foreign assets to the property of citizens of countries hostile to Serbia during the war. Foreign owners of companies also managed to circumvent the regulations by gaining Yugoslav citizenship, reselling shares and creating fictive Yugoslav shareholders. After 1918, some large companies remained in majority foreign ownership, such as the French-owned mining firm in Trbovlje, the Trboveljska Premogokopna Družba, and the Kranjska Industrijska Družba (Carniolan Industrial Company), which was Italian until 1929. Foreign capital was also involved in the textile industry. At the end of the 1930s, one third of capital in the Slovene economy was non-Yugoslav in origin. Austrian and Czech capital was most common, and Austrian and Czech banks also had stakes in the two most important Slovene banks. The Češka Živnostenska Banka owned one fifth of the largest Slovene bank, Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka, while the Viennese Credit-Anstalt Bank held 88% of shares in one of the principle Slovene monetary institutions – Kreditni Zavod za Trgovino in Industrijo – until the crisis of 1931 forced it to sell its stake to a Slovene consortium.

However, the tentative and unsuccessful nationalisation did not prevent the successful strengthening of Slovene capital and Slovene enterprise after 1918. The inflationary first half of the 1920s was the founding period for Slovene banks, with Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka still first among them. The most important of the newly established banking institutions was the Zadružna Gospodarska Banka (Co-operative Commercial Bank), which started in 1920. The Slovene banks were closely linked to domestic companies and actively supported “Slovenisation” of the economy. Entrepreneurs founded small banks, while savings banks and credit co-operatives played an important role, even outdoing the banks in terms of transactions and holdings. The two large co-operative unions predominated in rural areas even after the First World War; the Catholic Zadružna Zveza (Co-operative Union) was larger and more successful than the liberal Zveza Slovenskih Zadrug (Union of Slovene Co-operatives).

In 1924, a stock market opened in Ljubljana, and banks from other parts of the Yugoslav Kingdom also opened their doors in Slovene territory alongside foreign banks. The 1925 failure of the Slavenska Banka in Zagreb – which had a Slovene director and close links with Slovene banks – caused consternation among savers, and signalled the approaching end of the banking boom. Some smaller banks failed in the latter half of the 1920s, but Slovene banking only hit serious difficulties in the 1929 crisis. In the first half of the 1930s, the financial strength of Slovene banks fell to below half of its previous level. By the end of the 1930s, Yugoslav Slovenia had 10 domestic (Slovene) banks and 18 foreign bank branches (in 1918,
there had been just three domestic banks and nine foreign branches).

Yugoslav Slovenia had other aspects supporting industrial development. Railways were already in place – only 60 km of additional track was added between the wars. There was an extensive road network, although in many areas it was poorly maintained. Car use was still a rarity, and road transport could not yet compete with rail. The air connection between Ljubljana and Belgrade (1933) and international air route to Vienna and Berlin (1934) had more prestige value than actual economic importance. Postal, telegraph and telephone services were, like the railways, state-run and well developed. The rapid industrialisation was also supported by effective electrification. The electricity network spread rapidly in towns and rural areas, but the preponderance of private, local and factory-based power plants meant they only gradually developed into a more unified system. The construction of new electricity plants – including thermal power plants – ensured the power supply kept pace with commercial requirements. The main source of industrial power was still coal, with sales to industry doubling between 1920 and 1937. The Slovene mines produced brown coal and lignite in excess of the needs of the Slovene economy; over half was sold to other regions of the state.

Textile production underwent the biggest upturn of any industrial sector. The economic crisis of 1929 did not have significant impact on the textile industry, and Slovene factories were responsible for 37% of all Yugoslav textile production before the Second World War. A number of other areas of production enjoyed success; the food industry more than doubled between 1918 and 1939, but growth was slower for timber, paper, chemical and construction companies, which suffered more from the crisis. Slovene shoes were famed throughout the country. Iron was processed by the Kranjska Industrska Družba, and at the ironworks in Štore pri Celju and Ravne na Koroškem. Metal products were produced in 43 large metalworking plants, the largest of which was the Westen enamelled crockery factory in Celje.

Despite this relatively rapid industrial growth, Slovenia had just seven factories that employed over a thousand workers before the Second World War, and small and medium-sized companies predominated (70% of companies had 200 employees or fewer). In 1931, over 26% of Yugoslav Slovenes were employed in industry and trades, while over 60% still made their living from agriculture. Although agriculture could not boast success comparable to the industrial growth, it did achieve notable results over the 1920–40 period. Yield per hectare increased and, although still significantly behind western Europe, was far in excess of yields in other Yugoslav regions. Standardisation and better care for pastures increased
livestock quality. Agricultural education was provided via training courses and agricultural schools. Purchasing and selling co-operatives, specialised vocational societies, farming organisations and a farming press were all very important.

The modernisation of agriculture was slow, and when the post-war upturn passed, the Slovene countryside experienced a profound crisis. Its cause – in addition to the competition from other parts of the country and the loss of the previous Austrian markets – was the small, fragmented nature of farms, which was not significantly improved by the agrarian reform of the 1920s. Large landowners still held most arable land, and wealthier farmers benefited from the sell-off of expropriated land. Yugoslav Slovenia remained a country of small farms, with 57% of agricultural holdings under 5 hectares in size, while farms of over 50 hectares represented just 1% of the total number. The expropriation of forests was even slower and more ineffective than the expropriation of large landowners’ estates. The agrarian reform encompassed 38% of large estates, but just an eighth of the total forested area. Large landowners that managed to avoid expropriation of most of their forest land included the noble families of Thurn, Attems, Auersperg and Windischgrätz, the Kranjska Industrijska Družba, and the diocese of Ljubljana.

When agricultural produce prices began to fall in the mid-1920s, farmers tried to borrow their way out of trouble. Farmers’ debts rose quickly, reaching a critical level by 1932. The state came to farmers’ aid by announcing a moratorium on debt repayment of four years. It then paid off half the debt, with the borrowers required to pay the remainder over a 12-year period, which, of course, had an impact on creditors and banks. The status of farmers was better in resort areas, where tourism proved commercially profitable and successful. The most popular tourist destinations were Bled, Bohinj, Kranjska Gora and the thermal spas of Rogaška Slatina, Dobrna, Laško, Dolenjske Toplice and Čateške Toplice. Rural areas remained overpopulated with almost 80% of Slovenes still living in the countryside in 1931. There were not enough jobs in industry for those looking for work, and migration from Slovene regions was significantly higher than from the other Yugoslav regions. Between 1921 and 1937, around 50,000 people left Yugoslav Slovenia, with only just over 27,000 returning, which was a major feature of population development. From 1921 to 1931, the population in Yugoslav Slovenia increased by just 8.5% (compared to a figure of 16.3% for the rest of the kingdom), while the average figure across the entire territory of present-day Slovenia was even lower (7.1%), with Primorska and the province of Gorizia undergoing a wave of emigration, as Slovenes fled the fascist regime for Yugoslavia or overseas, particularly to Argentina.
The slow population growth also affected urban development. Ljubljana’s population in 1931 was 59,765 and by 1945 it had stopped growing altogether. In 1931, Maribor had 33,000 inhabitants, while Celje’s population was 17,255, and Kranj’s was 4,191 (8,122 including its surroundings). The external appearance of the larger towns changed more quickly than the population grew. Ljubljana acquired political and cultural institutions as well as new administrative, commercial and monetary institutions. The Ljubljana exhibition grounds were also constructed, and new business and residential buildings rose up in the town centre. The highest was the 60m-high neboličnik or skyscraper (1933), the pride of urban modernisation in the eyes of its admirers. The towns of Štajerska (Maribor, Celje and Ptuj), which had had a largely German appearance in 1918, had now become Slovene. The number of Germans rapidly fell according to census figures (from 6,595 in Maribor in 1921 to 2,741 in 1931, while by 1921 only 848 remained in Celje), though they retained significant economic power.

In a Yugoslav kingdom, the Slovene economy was very much part of a Yugoslav economy. Slovene politicians and entrepreneurs continually protested against the tax burden on industry and Belgrade’s customs and credit policies, which favoured the less-developed (southeast) regions of the state over the industrially developed (northwest) regions. There were large differences in national income; at the end of the 1930s, annual national income was 4,000 dinars per person in Slovenia compared to a national average of just 2,800 dinars per person. The Slovene belief that they were contributing a disproportionately large share to the state coffers was summed up by Anton Korošec in 1927 before the Belgrade assembly in a statement that gained currency among Slovenes: “This is the way it goes today: Serbs rule, Croats debate, and Slovenes pay.”

Yet despite the administrative, political and economic centralisation, the Slovene economy in post-1918 Yugoslavia still had many characteristics of a “national economy”. The nationalisation attempts of 1918 had been conceived as a process of Slovenising companies and commerce. Despite the administrative and political division of Slovene territory, various economic interest groups, and enterprise and vocational associations were organised on a national basis, a feature that also applied to many institutions. The politicians, business people and economists who considered the economy, compiled economic data and planned its development over the period from 1918 to 1941 also spoke, wrote and talked about (Yugoslav) Slovenia as a national economic whole.
In the first decade of the Yugoslav Kingdom, voters went to the polls four times, and the parliament (skupščina, skupština in Serbo-Croat) was dissolved early four times. The Vidovdan Constitution only deepened the divisions that had riven the state since its founding. In Croatia, Stjepan Radić and his Croatian Republican Peasant Party combined with other groups in a Croatian Bloc, which was supported by the majority of the Croatian population and did not recognise the decisions of the constituent assembly. In September 1922, some of the Serbian Democrats made contact with Croats and toyed with the idea of uniting forces to change the constitution. This split the Democratic Party. The autonomist Slovene parties and Bosnian Muslims joined the opposition to the Vidovan system.

The Prince-Regent, who, following the death of King Petar I, became King Aleksandar, joined with Serbian Radicals and first outmanoeuvred their opponents, and then attempted to defeat the Croats through force. At the start of 1925, Radić and his closest associates were imprisoned and charged with treason. Another twist followed some months later, when Radić changed direction and joined the government. This was followed by a year and a half of uncertainty and scandals, which exacerbated friction between the court and Serbian Radicals. At the start of 1927, when the Croatian Peasant Party finally left the government, Radić surprisingly joined forces with the leading opponent of Croatian autonomy to date – the leader of the Croatian Serbs, Svetozar Pribičević.

The encounters between proponents of the Vidovan system and their opponents were no longer mitigated by any restraint. The atmosphere became extremely tense after the Croatian departure from government, and on 20 June 1928 tragedy struck. After a fierce exchange of accusations in parliament, a Serbian Radical deputy from Montenegro, Puniša Račić, fired a revolver at deputies of the Croatian Peasant Party: two died instantly, and Stjepan Radić died two months later in Zagreb. King Aleksandar attempted to achieve conciliation by appointing the SLS leader, Anton Korošec, as prime minister, but Croatian anger did not abate, and on 31 December 1928 Korošec resigned. A week later, after the Orthodox Christmas on 6 January 1929, the king dissolved parliament and took control of the state into his own hands.

In all, the Vidovan parliamentary system lasted seven and a half years. The Vidovdan Constitution, centralism, federalism and the Slovene issue were then – together with the disputes between the traditional Slovene political camps – the central themes of Slovene politics. The largest Slovene party, the Slovene People’s Party (SLS) stood for a clear,
autonomist position and, with the exception of 1924, when Anton Korošec was education minister for about 100 days, remained in opposition until 1927. The party’s main support came from the farming and rural population. Unlike Radić and the Croat Bloc, the SLS did not deny the legitimacy of the Vidovan system, but supported fundamental constitutional changes. Its opposition to the Vidovan Constitution was not just on national grounds, but was also a reflection of its ideological, anti-liberal background. Catholic leaders rejected in particular the constitutional provisions that prevented the clergy from using their ecclesiastical office for the purposes of party and political life. These provisions also restricted church influence in education and changed the catechism into an optional school subject. The Catholic Church’s hierarchy, which after the finalising of the state borders had just two dioceses in the Slovene part of the Yugoslav Kingdom (the Lavantine (Maribor) and Ljubljana dioceses), were also involved in this discussion. These two dioceses were also responsible for parishes of the Klagenfurt, Seckau and Szombathely dioceses that fell within the Yugoslav state, while the Trieste-Koper (Capodistria) diocese, Gorizia archdiocese and a large part of the Ljubljana diocese remained within Italy. At the end of August 1923, the SLS organised a large rally – the fifth Catholic Convention – in Ljubljana, in support of the Church’s position and policies, at which speakers called for a “restoration” of Catholic culture and Catholic values among Slovenes.

However, the Catholic camp was not as united as its leaders would have it. After the SLS went into opposition (1921), disputes between party leaders and the supporters of more democratic ideas based on Krek’s heritage briefly died down, but the differences between conservatives and Christian Socialists, who had support in the Catholic labour organisations (especially the trade union-like Yugoslav Occupational Union), and from 1922 the Krek-inspired youth wing and journals, proved too great in the long term. The Christian Socialists – the name had been revived in 1920 by the socially engaged lawyer Andrej Gosar (1887–1970) – rejected “materialist” socialism and communism, as well as capitalist materialism. They saw a democratic social state with a market economy as the way out of social problems. This policy helped them develop into an independent political group among workers, but in the mid-1920s a dispute again arose with the leadership of the SLS. The subsequent return of the SLS to government in 1927 and the Marxist tendencies of younger activists in the Yugoslav Occupational Union led to even greater arguments. The new, more radical, generation of Christian Socialists had a major intellectual base among young educated Catholics, particularly those involved in the newspapers Križ na gori (The Cross on the Mountain, 1924–27) and Križ (The Cross, 1928–30), which – influenced by the German young Catholic
movement – supported the renewal of Christian life and rejected the political and social practice of the SLS and Catholic Church hierarchy.

The liberal camp was even more at odds than the Catholics. The dominant policies of Yugoslavism and centralism, differences in attitudes to the Serbian parties and agricultural issues, as well as various financial interests and affairs divided the liberal ranks. The main Slovene liberal group consistently supported Vidovdan centralism and co-operated in most of the centralist governments. For the liberal leaders, and the liberal ‘elders’ who founded the National Progressive Party (Narodna napredna stranka) in 1923, the creation of a federal Yugoslavia would signal the beginning of its end. They argued that if the “Yugoslav tribe” divided into “independent statelets” it would become easy prey for avaricious neighbours. They rejected autonomist plans on economic grounds and said that, having come together after being divided for so long, the “Yugoslav nation” needed a sound state as a basis, for which they were prepared to sacrifice to some extent their own separate national identity and independence, while expecting the same of the Serbs and Croats. Slovene liberal leaders were convinced that Yugoslav “national and state unity” could only be achieved through full political equality for all three “constituent tribes”. This led them to reject Pašić’s Greater Serbia Radicals and Croatian enmity to the Serbs with the same vigour with which they opposed Slovene autonomism.

Many liberal supporters and voters sincerely supported this position, convinced that the creation of a Yugoslav state had ushered in the era of a “great Yugoslav nation”. Yet the implacable liberal opposition to autonomism was also based on practical, party-political logic: fear of the SLS and its predominance in Slovenia. ‘Old’ and ‘Young Liberal’ leaders alike affirmed that an autonomous Slovenia would be a “papist, clerical [and] Germano-Italian” province. They labelled Catholic supporters of autonomism as anti-Yugoslav and pro-Austrian, and lionised Serbia’s contribution to founding the common state while playing down Slovene and Croatian efforts to the same end. After 1923, the most extreme members of the liberal camp – particularly those who had fled from Italian oppression in Primorska – included members of the militant Yugoslav nationalist organisation ORJUNA, founded in Split in 1921 to fight Italian irredentism. It operated within the Yugoslav Kingdom to defend the Vidovan system and oppose communism. As early as 1921, a National Radical Party had been founded in Kočevje as a branch of the most powerful Serbian party, but it did not have much impact on Slovene political life.

The Socialists were no more able to form a united front than the two middle-class camps. After the founding of the Community Party, Slovene Social Democrats joined the
Socialist Party of Yugoslavia in 1921. They adopted a reformist programme and largely supported its Yugoslav policy on the national issue. Industrial workers were the main supporters of the socialist movement. After the government’s special ban against the Communists – the obznana of 1920 – and the State Protection Law (1921), the Communist party was made illegal and the Communists began to operate in various parties, under various names. This significantly weakened Communist movement in Slovenia at the start of the 1920s and the number of party members fell from several thousand communist-aligned socialists in 1920 to well below a hundred. The Communist leaders Lovro Klemenčič (1891–1928) and Vladislav Fabijančič (1894–1950), in contrast to leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party (Komunistična partija Jugoslavije – KPJ), rejected the single Yugoslav nation policy and supported co-operation between Communists and other socialist groups, and were subsequently kicked out of the party in 1923. But a few months later, the KPJ leadership changed its views and, influenced by Soviet views, adopted a new federalist national programme recognising the individuality of the different Balkan nations, and committing itself to their union in a Danube-Balkan federation. In the second half of the 1920s, Slovene Communists also advocated federal and autonomist positions. A permanent Socialist-Communist alliance did not develop, but relations between the two groups were more tolerant than elsewhere in the Yugoslav state.

The number of political parties in Slovenia continued to grow until 1927, with new parties tending to appear before elections. There were 7 parties vying for votes in 1920, 11 in 1923, and 14 in 1925. They included a number of republican and agrarian parties, which indicated the dissatisfaction and uncertainty among the rural population. But the peasant movement was fragmented and the peasant and republican parties did not win wider or lasting support from voters. The writer Anton Novačan (1887–1951), founder of the Agrarian Party (Zemljoradniška stranka in Croat, 1921) and then the Slovene Republican Party (Slovenska republikanska stranka, 1922), which supported a sovereign agrarian republic, experienced a complete wipe-out in the parliamentary elections in 1923. Greater success was enjoyed – especially in Štajerska and Prekmurje – by Stjepan Radič, whose Croatian Republican Peasant Party put up candidates in an attempt to spread its influence into Slovene areas; nevertheless the Slovene pro-Radič group remained small. In 1924, the Slovene Republican Peasants’ and Workers’ Party (Slovenska republikanska stranka kmetov in delavcev), founded by Albin Prepeluh’s autonomists, joined up with the Croatian Republic Peasants’ Party. Radič’s rejection of republicanism, and his turnaround in recognising the Vidovan Constitution in 1925, caused considerable confusion among Slovene republicans. His gradual withdrawal
from the political scene in the second half of the 1920s also drained the Slovene republican movement of its strength.

Following the creation of the Yugoslav state, the traditional Slovene parties re-established the co-operative, educational, cultural and sport associations that had operated along party lines before the First World War, adapting them to the new circumstances or founding new parties. The new and smaller parties copied their older and larger forebears and attempted to spread their influence by co-ordinating their core support and sympathisers through a range of organisations. These formed a major component of party political life, and reached into many different areas of society. Most parties and associations issued journals and publications with varying degrees of frequency, while larger parties worked hard to recruit industrial workers into their ranks. The labour movement’s trade union was also emulated by the two middle-class parties in the form of the Catholic Yugoslav Occupational Union (Jugoslovanska strokovna zveza) and the liberal National Socialist Union (Narodno socialna zveza). The Yugoslav Occupational Union was the second most powerful trade union group in Yugoslav Slovenia (the largest was the socialist Strokovna komisija). The status of workers and officials improved after 1918, but the effect of the economic uncertainties that led to a deflationary period was, in real terms, a fall in pay for workers and officials. From 1921 to 1923, Slovenia underwent a new wave of strikes, which reached its height with the mass strike by the miners of the Trboveljska Premogokopna Družba in 1923. Like a number of others, this strike was organised by Communists, who operated in so-called independent trade unions after the government ban. In collaboration with the authorities, the company management ended the strike by force. The Trbovlje miners’ strike was the last major labour strike of the 1920s in the Slovene oblasti of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

The Slovene political scene gradually adjusted to the new circumstances that followed the First World War. The political transformation and ‘Slovenisation’ of the economy was accompanied by the normal party disputes and expressions of dissatisfaction with the ‘Ljubljana-centric’ focus of the elite there – criticism coming especially from Štajerska and Maribor – and by scandals and affairs that significantly increased the sense of corruption and a lack of accountability. Most of the scandals related to liberals and the liberal party. Criticisms and disappointment were expressed by the educated classes that the Slovenes in general would never truly reach democratic and political maturity. This assessment was not applied to the liberals themselves, who retained a high opinion of their own abilities. In the opinion of the geographer and historian Anton Melik (1890–1966), the Slovene populace particularly lacked “political education” and teaching “on the basic rights of human
existence”. In 1919, he wrote in *Ljubljanski zvon*: “I will only declare us a politically mature nation when individual political action covers every human issue and problem, right and duty and human relations to social organisations of the nation and state,” and went on to state: “Significant political education will therefore be needed …”

Factional disputes between Slovenes from the Ljubljana and Maribor *oblasti* were exacerbated by refugees from Primorska, who had fled to the old Austrian provinces of Carniola and Styria during the war, and continued to flow into Yugoslav Slovenia after the Italian occupation of Primorska (the Slovene Littoral). In the 1920s, there were around 10,000 refugees from Primorska in Yugoslav Slovenia, and their numbers would grow further. The Primorska refugees sought accommodation and jobs, and were favoured by the authorities as they were generally supporters of the Vidovdan system and a “sound and powerful” Yugoslav state. After the Slovene defeat in the Carinthian plebiscite, relations between Slovenes and Germans in Štajerska also grew tenser. In 1921, the authorities banned the German organisations Südmark and the Deutscher Schulverein as well as the symbols of the Habsburg and German ruling dynasties, and also proclaimed German and Austrian patriotic and nationalist songs as treasonous. Between 1922 and 1929, the Germans in Štajerska gathered in the Political and Economic Society of Germans in Slovenia, centred on Maribor; they also had their own newspapers in Maribor, Celje and Kočevje. But pressure on the German minority continued in education and through the nationalisation of German assets, and only relented after 1927. Slovene and Yugoslav authorities based their policy towards the German minority on German-Austrian policy to Slovenes in Austrian Carinthia. Negotiations took place in Austrian Carinthia between 1925 and 1927, which promised Slovenes a limited level of cultural autonomy and this led to a brief improvement in the attitude to Germans in Slovenia. At the end of the 1920s, relations between the German minority and Slovene authorities again grew worse. In 1930, after a civil case lasting over a decade regarding the German cultural centre in Celje, which had been nationalised by Slovene authorities, Germans in Slovenia even turned for help to the League of Nations in Geneva, adding an international dimension to local disputes.

At the end of 1922, King Aleksandar and the Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, dissolved the parliament due to opposition from autonomist and federalist parties, calling new elections in March 1923. These indicated that the autonomist and federalist movement had increased in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina since the adoption of the Vidovan Constitution. The electoral campaign in Slovenia was essentially a battle between positions for and against the Vidovan Constitution, and the absolute winner with 60% of the vote was the SLS.
The SLS was also the absolute winner in the 1925 elections (57%), when the liberals strengthened slightly to 12% of the vote. The 1925 parliamentary elections took place in a very tense climate. Newspapers in Ljubljana and Zagreb were full of articles about Serbian authoritarianism and militarism, the wastefulness of the Belgrade merchant class and its corruption, while Belgrade journalists wrote about Croatian and Slovene separatism, selfishness and pro-Austrian feeling. The many negative images that Yugoslav nations would have of each other in the coming decades were formed in the 1920s.

After the Vidovdan Constitution was adopted, the Belgrade government had divided the state into 33 oblasti (districts). The Ljubljana oblast covered most of traditional Carniola (Kranjska) as well as three court districts in Štajerska (and even the Croatian court district of Kastav for some time), while the Maribor oblast covered most of Štajerska, Koroška (the Yugoslav part of Carinthia), Prekmurje and Medjimurje (in present-day Croatia). The oblasti were headed by Belgrade appointees known as veliki župani. Local self-governing bodies were supposed to operate within the oblasti, but elections to these assemblies only took place in 1927. Korošec and the SLS leadership saw an opportunity for themselves in the new system. In negotiations with King Aleksandar and Radicals, they renounced their demands for a revised constitution, and in return demanded an expansion in the financial powers of the autonomous oblasti. The Radicals agreed to their terms and in February 1927 the SLS was back in government.

The 1927 elections to the oblast assemblies again indicated that the autonomist policy of the SLS enjoyed the support of most of the Slovene population. In the Ljubljana and Maribor oblasti, the Catholic party won 82 out of 117 deputies, and took full charge of the districts. The two assemblies attempted to work together and overcome the administrative division of Yugoslav Slovenia, and extended their actions to areas not strictly within their jurisdiction by law. This was enabled by new legislation passed by the parliament in 1928, giving oblasti more autonomy, and government policy, which rewarded the SLS for their support and co-operation. The status of the health, agricultural, social, education and cultural institutions that came under the jurisdiction of the oblasti improved significantly and rapidly. In addition to the offices of state administration, the two oblasti also set up offices subordinate to the self-governing assemblies, which re-established two-tier administration. Although the SLS leadership’s acceptance of the Vidovan system and participation in the government led its opponents and critics to accuse it of having abandoned the original autonomist programme, voters in the September 1927 parliamentary elections revealed mass popular support for Korošec’s policy of “broad self-government with strong financial
backing.” The SLS again won around 60% of the vote (the liberals coming second with 15.49%).

The tensions within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes reached boiling point the following year. The government coalition formed after the 1927 parliamentary elections by the Radicals, some of the Democrats, the Muslim party and the SLS, had a two-thirds majority, but for the first time since the Yugoslav state had been founded, the Croatian Serbs and Croats were united in opposition. Radić and Pribićević, his new ally, pitilessly attacked the government, and more than ever before the Belgrade parliament was witness to fierce battles of words, threats and insults. It was in this tense and hateful climate that Puniša Račić fired his fateful shots at the opposition bench on 20 June 1928.

At the time of the shooting, Korošec was minister of the interior, which led Radić’s enraged supporters to lay part of the blame at his door. The King’s decision to ask Korošec to form a new government – the first and only non-Serb to hold the position in the first Yugoslavia – could not therefore bridge the gap between Belgrade and Zagreb; in fact it only served to deepen mistrust between Zagreb and Ljubljana. Korošec accepted and was convinced that he would be able to restore the lost balance and keep the gains that the autonomous oblasti had brought to his party and Slovenia. But his government was no match for the circumstances aligned against it. In August 1928, the opposition sat in Zagreb and rejected the parliament’s right to rule on behalf of the northwestern part of the state, supporting the transformation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into a federal state that would ensure equality for “all individual historic states and national polities.” The Slovenes signing the opposition statement were the Agrarians, and – in quite an about-face – the liberals. Radić’s death had deepened the political crisis further.

At the end of October 1928, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes celebrated its tenth anniversary against a backdrop of universal uncertainty. The first radio station in Slovenia was officially opened to mark the anniversary. But celebrations of the “liberation” revealed that Slovenia was just as divided as the rest of the state. From a Yugoslav point of view, the question was, of course, how to keep the state together. In November 1928, the king received French approval for a coup d’état. When Korošec resigned as prime minister at the end of 1928, the court hesitated no longer. On 6 January 1929, Aleksandar’s manifesto was published, stating that “there must no longer be any mediator between nation and king.” The Vidovdan Constitution was repealed, the parliament was dissolved, and the chief of the royal guard, General Petar Živković, was appointed as prime minister of a new government, accountable only to the king.
Just over a decade after the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the nascent development of modern, democratic and parliamentary trends on Slovene and Yugoslav territory was halted, and parliamentary democracy along western European lines disappeared for over 60 years.

A NEW CULTURAL REALITY

In the years following the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of a Yugoslav state, much of the Slovene public was convinced that Slovenes had broken with German culture once and for all, and that in future they would no longer have contact with Germans, even economically. “The national liberation now achieved represents the greatest transformation in our lives since we came under Franco-German rule one thousand years ago,” wrote Anton Melik, the geographer, in *Ljubljanski zvon* in 1919; “the new era represents a significant change from the course along which our actions have previously moved; the milieu in which individual lives will be different, the entire civilisational discourse in which our people function will be changed.” Melik considered that Slovenes should turn to Yugoslavia and western Europe, and that the formation of a new Slovene “civilisational alignment” would come from “Serbian and Croatian literature” and, above all, “the teaching and use” of French – the language, which held “first place ... in international discourse.”

After 1918, Yugoslav Slovenes genuinely experienced a completely new cultural ambience. The creation of a Yugoslav state opened up new horizons and numerous new opportunities for Slovene cultural development, although the strict centralism and backwardness of the Karadjordjević kingdom also represented an obstacle to Slovene ambitions and desires. According to the 1921 census, the literacy rate of the Slovene part of the Yugoslav Kingdom was 90%, while in the rest of the state the average rate was just 40%. Primary education was much more developed in Slovenia than in the southeast and central regions of the state, though differences in secondary and higher education were much narrower; indeed, Zagreb and Belgrade both had a university. From the very beginning, there were differences between Slovene aspirations and the expectations of the undeveloped areas of the state that were difficult to bridge. In Belgrade, most money allocated to education and culture was spent on basic cultural activities, raising literacy and providing primary education, while in Ljubljana the state worked to Slovenise and modernise secondary education, build the University of Ljubljana, and to found the cultural and educational institutions the Slovenes had lacked within the Habsburg Monarchy.
For the first two years after the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, educational and cultural policy in Yugoslav Slovenia was in the hands of the national government in Ljubljana (the provincial government from 1919). The Commission for Public Instruction and Worship (responsible for educational affairs) was headed by a Catholic politician and scholar, Karel Verstovšek (1871–1923), who dedicated all available resources to the Slovenisation of education. In November 1918, Slovene was already the exclusive language of instruction in primary and secondary education, including the previously bilingual secondary schools and teaching colleges. The reorganisation of German secondary schools and teaching colleges as Slovene institutions was slower, taking until 1923, the last secondary school year with German as the language of instruction. At the same time as Slovenising the curriculum, the new education authorities were dismissing German-speaking (Hungarian in Prekmurje) teachers and replacing them with Slovene speakers. The teaching of German came to an end with the establishment of Slovene as the language of instruction, and it was replaced as a foreign language by French and Serbo-Croat. At the same time, the syllabus for other subjects changed, particularly history and geography. The fact that the authorities did not show any particular understanding for the German and Hungarian minorities, despite growing concern for Slovenes in Austria and Italy, did not arouse much public response. In the 1937/38 academic year, Germans in Slovenia had 30 minority classes with over 1,200 pupils, while there were almost as many lacking any provision of teaching in German.

After 1918, the *meščanske šole* (general vocational secondary schools, *Bürgerschulen*) expanded most, while growth in *ljudske šole* (‘popular’ primary schools) was slower. Nevertheless, primary schools also underwent considerable changes and were better developed than their equivalents in the rest of the country until the Second World War. The number of pupils at the gymnasium schools and students at teacher training colleges grew by over 150% (from below 5,000 in 1918 to over 12,000 in 1939), with increasing numbers of female pupils and students. From 1918 to 1939, four gymnasium schools opened their doors: one in Murska Sobota, and three girls’ schools (in Ljubljana and Maribor). Despite opposition from humanist scholars, the transformation of classics-oriented gymnasium schools into *Realschulen* based on the German model (which taught more practical subjects and living languages) meant the *realna gimnazija* became the predominant type of secondary school. In towns, there were also trades schools and commercial schools. In Ljubljana, the former trades school (*obrtna šola*) became a lower technical school, while in 1920 a four-year commercial secondary school (*trgovska akademija*) was founded.
The most important gain in the field of education was undoubtedly the University of Ljubljana. This was established in 1919 by the central government in Belgrade, thanks to the work of a small circle of influential figures. The university commission (vseučiliška komisija) that the national government in Ljubljana had founded in November 1918 was initially hesitant and reported that it would take several years of preparation for work in faculties to start, while the liberals also opposed the rapid establishment of a university, since preparations were in Catholic hands. However, supporters of immediate establishment succeeded, with Korošec’s help, in acquiring Belgrade’s consent and in August 1919 the first 18 professors were appointed to the University of Ljubljana’s five faculties (law, philosophy, theology, engineering, and medicine). Most of the professors had worked at Austrian universities and technical colleges. Over a quarter of the first intake of university lecturers and assistant professors were non-Slovenes (Croats, Serbs, Czechs and Russians). The first rector was the mathematician Josip Plemelj (1873–1967), and the rectorship then informally passed around the faculties. In 1922, the Englishwoman Fanny Copeland (1872–1970) started lecturing on the English language; she was the first female lecturer at the university. At the start of the 1930s, she was followed by the first female professor, the philosopher Alma Sodnikova (1896–1965). Although the University of Ljubljana had to struggle against major difficulties, with finances and finding teaching space, right up until the Second World War, and individual faculties were often threatened with closure by Belgrade, it soon became the central institution of Slovene cultural and scientific life. At the start of the 1930s, there were 78 professors and assistant professors, and that figure had risen to 95 a decade later. The number of students increased from 900 in 1919 to 2,400 in 1938.

When, at the end of 1920, and with the help of centralist liberals, the government in Belgrade made the offices of the provincial government, including the Commission for Public Instruction and Worship, subordinate to central government, the process of Slovenisation was already almost complete. Efforts to simplify the education system and legislation did, however, continue, and still provoked people’s passions well into the 1930s. In the cultural struggle between autonomists and centralists, or between Catholics and liberals, the SLS and Catholic Church circles openly linked their support for Slovene cultural autonomy with efforts to increase the Church’s influence. The battle spread to the two main teachers’ organisation (the liberal Association of Yugoslav Teachers and the Catholic Slomšek Union), reaching its height with the extreme centralist and restrictive policy of the education minister, Svetozar Pribićević, which had a major impact on cultural institutions as well as schools. The education authorities in Belgrade introduced disciplinary measures and reassignment for
teachers that did not demonstrate sufficiently sound Yugoslav credentials, and in 1924 Minister Pribićević pronounced Catholic youth societies as “separatist” and even prohibited teachers and pupils from joining them. Relations started to calm in the second half of the 1920s, when the SLS joined the government, but the truce was short-lived. In the 1930s, education policy in Yugoslavia was unilaterally directed towards the formation and consolidation of “the spiritual unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” National and Slovene themes disappeared from textbooks, and teachers and pupils who continued to clearly express their Slovene identity were reassigned or excluded.

It is not then surprising that questions regarding the future of Slovenes and the Slovene language were a central theme of Slovene cultural and educational discussions. These unequivocally revealed that proponents of extreme Yugoslav positions, advocating Slovene national and linguistic union with Croats and Serbs, had few supporters, even among the liberal intelligentsia, while demands to maintain and continue the development of Slovene national individuality and the Slovene language had overwhelming support. “How would Serbs in Serbia respond to a demand to abandon their language or use another Slavic language, such as Russian or Polish?” wondered the law professor Leonid Pitamic (1885–1971), who also pointed out that “almost all” educated Slovenes understood Serbo-Croat and even read Cyrillic, while Serbs and Croats had no desire to learn Slovene. Pressure for linguistic and cultural unification were particularly opposed in Catholic and Christian Socialist circles, but even the most radical supporters of Slovene linguistic independence and cultural autonomy never questioned Slovene inclusion in the Yugoslav state.

In Belgrade, Slovene representatives themselves initially chose to forego use of their mother tongue in pre-parliamentary and parliamentary discussions, but later deputies from the autonomist parties would occasionally make demonstrative use of Slovene to express their disagreement with the centralist policy and measures. Serbo-Croat was also the language of the army and state administration in Belgrade. In Yugoslav Slovenia, however, Slovene was the exclusive language of administration, education, public life and culture. From 1918 to 1941, Slovenes were therefore a genuine linguistic island in (at least officially) a Serbo-Croat-speaking state. The universal use of Slovene strengthened Slovene self-confidence and awareness, and encouraged a cultural awakening proclaimed as historic even at the time. It also marked Slovene cultural contacts with other parts of the country, which were very one-sided. While Slovenes were relatively well-informed about Serbian and Croatian cultural events, and Serbo-Croat books, even in Cyrillic, found many Slovene readers, Slovene cultural events – due to a lack of familiarity with Slovene and disparagement of the ‘Slovene
dialect’ – were not well known in the rest of the Yugoslav kingdom, and cultural co-operation between the major centres of Belgrade and Zagreb and Slovenia was unsystematic and meagre.

The Yugoslav public therefore remained largely unaware of the rapid cultural development underway in the Slovene part of the state, although after 1918 old Slovene cultural institutions were revived and new ones established, opening their doors one after the other. The National Theatre in Ljubljana acquired a theatre and opera stage, and in 1919 the National Theatre in Maribor started work. The National Gallery Association (1918) was founded in Ljubljana, and became the central Slovene arts institution. The foundation of the Music Conservatory in Ljubljana (1919), the restoration of the Glasbena Matica musical centre and the transfer of the Ljubljana Philharmonic Society (Filharmonična družba) into Slovene hands laid new bases for musical life in Slovenia. The Carniolan Provincial Museum was renamed the National Museum and joined by the Ethnographic Museum in 1923, while a provincial museum also operated in Maribor. Efforts to establish the National and University Library (Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica – NUK) took longer. Until it was established, in the latter half of the 1930s, the main library institutions were the study libraries in Ljubljana and Maribor, while academic literature was also kept by libraries in museums, associations, faculties and other institutions. Like the NUK saga, the struggle for the Slovene Academy of Arts and Science (Slovenska Akademija znanosti in umetnosti – SAZU) lasted almost until the end of the 1930s, with no support given by the Zagreb or Belgrade academies. The government order on an academy of arts and sciences for Ljubljana was only issued in Belgrade in 1938.

Most academic, cultural, educational, recreational and social activity still took place in societies after 1918. The Slovenska Matica retained its position of prestige as one of the oldest societies, and after 1928 developed a dynamic publishing arm. Members of various professions and vocations came together in professional and vocational societies. The mass movements were the cultural and educational societies, which – as with the sporting, humanitarian and economic associations – worked along party lines. In 1927, Yugoslav Slovenia had 4,300 societies, one for every 250 people. The most numerous were the Catholic societies which were united within the Educational Union (Prosvetna zveza). The French Institute established in Ljubljana in 1921 gained a very good reputation in Slovene cultural life. Russian émigrés also opened their own society – the Ruska Matica – in 1924. After the First World War, hundreds of Russians settled in Ljubljana and around Yugoslav Slovenia, and some became successful scientists, university lecturers and artists.
The rapid Slovene cultural development after the First World War is also illustrated by data on the growth of newspapers and publishing. In 1919, there were 87 different newspapers or periodicals in Yugoslav Slovenia; twenty years later, the number had risen to 245. Central place among the literary reviews was maintained by the liberal *Ljubljanski zvon* and Catholic *Dom in svet*, which were joined in the 1930s by the liberal, later left-aligned, journal *Sodobnost* (Contemporaneity, 1933–41), Christian and democratic *Dejanje* (Acts, 1938–41) and the Marxist *Književnost* (Literature, 1932–35).

In literature, Modernism gave way after 1918 to Expressionism, which became the most powerful stream of Slovene literary creativity for over a decade. New trends arose in poetry, and to some extent in theatre, but less so in prose, with these influences combining with elements of previous movements: Naturalism, Neo-Romanticism, Decadence, and Symbolism. The central figure of the literary avant-garde was the poet Anton Podbevšek (1898–1981), who also toyed with Futurism. The post-war literary avant-garde peaked in the work of Srečko Kosovel (1904–26), which combined impressionist, symbolist, expressionist and constructivist elements. The motifs of Kosovel’s expressionist poetry included feelings of chaos, approaching catastrophe and the collapse of civilisation, which would be followed by an era of a new, ethically cleansed humanity.

In prose writing – in addition to poets who also turned their hand to prose compositions – the main proponents of Expressionism were Ivan Pregelj (1883–1960), a writer from an older generation, and in drama Slavko Grum (1901–49), whose play *Dogodek v mestu Gogi* (An Event in the Town of Goga, 1928) was the most important of its time. Expressionism and Avant-gardism, of course, only had an impact on a selection of writers and poets. Many writers followed established literary movements or sought out a middle path between these and newer trends. The poets Alojz Gradnik (1882–1967) and Fran Albreht (1889–1963) carried Modernism forward, while the prose writers Juš Kozak (1892–1864) and France Bevk (1890–1970) also looked to Ivan Cankar and the Modernists as a model, while influences ranging from Symbolism to Expressionism can be felt in the works of Stanko Majcen (1888–1970). Of the figures who had enjoyed popularity before the war, Fran Saleški Finžgar (1871–1962) continued to find appreciative audiences for his folk plays. National, political and social themes also came together in the stories and novels of Vladimir Levstik (1886–1953).

Social problems, ideological and political clashes, and growing Marxist influences led to the appearance of Neo-Realism or Social Realism in Slovene artistic works, more noticeably in prose and drama than in poetry at the end of the 1920s. Its main proponents
were Mile Klopčič and Igo Gruden (1882–1967). Social criticism formed the basis for the sketches, stories and novels set among peasants and workers by Miško Kranjec (1908–83), Prežihov Voranc (the *nom de plume* of Lovro Kuhar, 1893–1950) and Ivan Potrč (1913–89), while Ciril Kosmač (1910–80) and France Bevk were closely linked with national and social themes. In contrast with prose works, Social Realist plays addressed modern bourgeois and historical themes. The writer and director Bratko Kreft (1905–96) delved into Slovene history with a cycle of plays from a modern Marxist perspective, while the plays of Ferdo Kozak (1894–1957) and Ivo Brnčič (1912–43) portrayed the hypocrisy of bourgeois society. The rise of Social Realism was met by polemical debate between its supporters and proponents of other literary streams. Among the notable Catholic writers of the time were Anton Vodnik (1901–1965) and Božo Vodušek (1905–1978), whose *Odčarani svet* (*Disenchanted World*, 1939) was the most significant poetry collection of its day, while Edvard Kocbek (1904–81) was already attracting attention. The author drawing from the widest palette, from Nietzschean philosophy to psychoanalysis, was Vladimir Bartol (1903–67), whose historical novel *Alamut* (1938) was a profound analysis of modern totalitarianism.

The visual arts were also characterised by considerable creative diversity and a somewhat tardier engagement with western European trends and models. The best-known representatives of Expressionism and Avant-gardism in art were the brothers France (1895–1960) and Tone Kralj (1900–1975), who were joined by Veno Pilon (1896–1970), Božidar Jakac (1899–1989), Avgust Černigoj (1898–1985) and Miha Maleš (1903–1987). All developed their painting abroad, particularly in Germany, Italy and France, and offered engaging responses to artistic movements from Cubism, via Constructivism, to Surrealism. Avgust Černigoj, who visited the Weimar Bauhaus in 1924, was forced to leave Ljubljana and move to Trieste after an avant-garde leftist exhibition. Expressionism in Slovene visual art started to give way in the mid-1920s to the realism-inspired idea of *nova stvarnost* (*new reality*), which in a few years was subsumed into Neo-Realism or Social Realism. The most notable Realists, in addition to those previously involved in Expressionism, were another two brothers, Drago (1899–1981) and Nande Vidmar (1901–1982), as well as the younger pair of France Mihelič (1907–98) and Maksim Sedej (1901–82). In sculpture, the influence of the Croatian master Ivan Meštrović could be seen in the work of Lojze Dolinar (1893–1970), Tine Kos (1894–1979) and France Gorše (1897–1986).

Expressionism and Avant-gardism in music were closely connected to Marij Kogoj, who established himself as a master of compositions for vocal solo and piano. His masterwork was the opera *Črne maske* (*Black Masks*, first performed in 1929), one of the
greatest achievements in Slovene opera. At the end of the 1920s, Slavko Osterc (1895–1941) emerged as the second most important musician of the period, after an education at the Prague Conservatory. He was celebrated as a composer of orchestral works, a teacher, and a proponent of Slovene music opening itself up to the world. Kogoj and Osterc both had a major impact on younger composers; Kogoj’s pupils included Matija Bravničar and Srečko Koporc, Osterc was followed by Karol Pahor, Pavel Šivic and Primož Ramovš. The most important of the post-Romantics was Lucijan Marija Škerjanc (1900–73), while Anton Lajovic (1878–1960), a leading organiser of Slovene musical culture between the wars, followed more traditional paths. The period was still dominated by the burgeoning field of vocal and choral music, with choirs throughout Slovenia, but until the formation of the radio orchestra in 1935 even Ljubljana did not have a permanent symphony ensemble. The diversity of concerts on offer was due largely to foreign symphony orchestras, and foreigners also initially predominated in the Ljubljana opera orchestra and ballet ensemble. Chamber musicians fared better. Slovene instrumentalists and ballet soloists became established in the 1920s and 1930s, and Slovene opera singers also began to break through. In the 1920s, and particularly the 1930s, jazz and dance ensembles became popular.

Declining state support left the National Theatre in Ljubljana with serious money problems. Nevertheless, its drama section still managed to build up its own company and repertoire. In the first post-war decade, classical works were performed on the stage at Ljubljana Drama, as well as new European and Slovene plays, while in the 1930s a move was made towards more demanding modern productions. The period saw the rise of a new, artistically convincing and talented generation of actors, who attracted a large audience to the theatre. Plays were also staged outside the professional realm by amateur dramatic groups and cultural societies.

The foundation of the University of Ljubljana and other new scientific institutions also led to the take-off of academic and scientific work after 1918. This is attested by the hundreds of monographs and studies, from the whole gamut of academic and scientific disciplines, published in independent publications and academic journals. The leading Slovene philosopher of the time, France Veber (1890–1975), a pupil of the Austrian Alexius Meinong, published 11 volumes between 1921 and 1931. In the social and economic sphere, the Christian Socialist theoretician, Andrej Gosar, produced a huge work in favour of a fairer social order. Fundamental works of synthetic history were written by Dragotin Lončar, Ljudmil Hauptman (1884–1968) and Milko Kos (1892–1972), syntheses of literary history by France Kidrič, Ivan Prijatelj and Anton Slodnjak (1899–1983), and art history monographs by
Izidor Cankar (1886–1957) and France Stele (1886–1972). Metod Dolenc (1875–1941) was the author of a legal history of the Slovene territory, while the geographer Anton Melik (1890–1966) published his first comprehensive geographical work during this fruitful period. In 1935, the linguists Anton Breznik (1881–1944) and Fran Ramovš (1890–1952) published *Slovenski pravopis* (Slovene Orthography, a prestigious, authoritative and prescriptive work on the Slovene language). One of the most outstanding bodies of work among the numerous translations produced over the period was that of Anton Sovre (1885–1962), who translated Sophocles, Plato, Marcus Aurelius and Augustine into Slovene. In 1925, volumes of a new translation of the Bible were issued, and in the first half of the 1930s Borchardt’s adaptation made Marx’s *Das Kapital* available to Slovene readers.

The new constructions and renovations of town centres opened up many new opportunities in architecture. A chair at the Technical Faculty in Ljubljana, later formed the basis for Slovenia’s architectural academy. The central figures of post-war Slovene architecture were Jože Plečnik and Ivan Vurnik (1884–1971), who had a major impact on its development as university lecturers and active architects. Vurnik’s search for a national style originally led him to focus on Expressionism (under Czech influences, and even Cubism). Plečnik, whose town planning, public buildings, monuments and promenades left an indelible mark on Ljubljana above all, remained faithful to classical traditions. Architects who followed the more modern functionalist movement were originally in the shadow of the two masters, but in the 1930s they were already making their mark in Ljubljana and Maribor.

Everyday life was gradually beginning to change in towns and the countryside. Wealthier urban middle class people generally retained earlier patterns of life, meeting in the usual places, such as theatres, coffee houses and at concerts, promenading and at dances. Cinema and radio also became popular; even the less wealthy visited cinemas, but at the end of the 1930s still just a minority could afford a radio. Business people and wealthy grandees joined elite associations such as branches of the Rotary Club and automobile clubs. As before the war, walks, trips, gymnastics and sport were the most common forms of recreation for town dwellers. In 1935 in the Drava banovina, effectively the Slovene province of the time, gymnastics and physical exercise associations had 70,000 members, more than one third of which were women, while 60,000 people were members of other sport societies.

Slovene education was also subject to significant ideological and political divisions after 1918. The Catholic camp traditionally had a weaker influence than liberals in the creative cultural sphere, but some educated Catholics – before and after the First World War – took a more relaxed and modern stand on art, and Catholic intellectuals played a major role in
Slovenising education, establishing the university and the formation of a number of academic disciplines. In the 1920s, a generational renewal found Christian Socialists and the young artists connected to the journals Križ na gori and Križ (The Cross on the Mountain and The Cross, which earned them the nickname križarji or crusaders) within the Catholic ranks. Some of their views on social and economic issue grew closer to Marxism, while the ‘crusaders’ spiritually and artistically moved towards Expressionism. Splits in the Catholic camp were widened by the corporatist Papal encyclical Quadragesimo anno and moves being made by the ecclesiastical and Catholic leadership towards authoritarian, corporate ideas at the start of the 1930s. A clash between the intellectuals who formed the bastion of radical political Catholicism and learnèd Catholic democrats openly split the Catholic intelligentsia. In the forefront was the combative generation of Catholics connected to the older ideologues, whose extreme positions included rejecting parliamentary democracy and dalliances with Fascism. The more centralist and democratically aligned groups of Catholic intellectuals were therefore forced to the political periphery.

Liberal ideology still predominated among the educated classes and intelligentsia. Liberal sympathisers were also in the majority in cultural institutions, at the university and among teachers in general, though only a minority were linked to a liberal political party. The centralist, Yugoslav policy of the liberal leaders stopped the educated classes from joining their party, and the Vidovan system and subsequent authoritarian regime deepened differences between liberal politicians and most of the national Slovene intelligentsia. This was ideologically addressed in the debate launched in 1932 by the critic and translator, Josip Vidmar, whose pamphlet Kulturni problemi slovenstva (The Cultural Problems of Slovenstvo3), which proclaimed nationality and language as the basis of human culture and called on people to work for a Slovenia that would be a “home of beauty and soul”. Vidmar’s opposition to liberal Yugoslavism won wide public support. An attempt by the poet Oton Župančič to place himself outside the narrow-minded obsession with the Slovene world was judged a priori as a failure in the atmosphere of relentless centralist pressure. His statement, made during the visit of the American-Slovene writer Louis Adamič (1898–1951) – who wrote in English – that a writer could remain faithful to the nation even if no longer writing in its language, led to floods of criticism and a split within Ljubljanski zvon, which published Župančič’s article. Some editors left the editorial board and in 1933 founded the monthly

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3 Translator’s note: slovenstvo means literally Slovenehood or Slovenedom, and is defined by the academy dictionary as: “belonging to the Slovene nation; Slovene culture and thought; people of Slovene nationality.”
Sodobnost, which was dedicated to the “defence of slovenstvo”. Educated Catholics and liberals also co-operated successfully in a number of societies, but this generally required some form of prior agreement.

Socialists and Communists had less support among the educated classes. The Socialists’ centralist policy led to a group of renowned, autonomist intellectuals leaving their ranks in the 1920s, while, to begin with, the impact of the Communists on cultural life was insignificant. However, the number of young educated people interested in Marxism and Communism started to grow in the 1930s. Many in the younger generation of activists who assumed control of smaller Slovene Communist groups were from middle class and educated backgrounds. Under their influence, Communists in Yugoslav Slovenia started to address the national issue in the early 1930s, and their leading ideologist, Edvard Kardelj (1910–79), set out his views on the matter in Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja (The Evolution of the Slovene National Question, 1939). But ideological and political intolerance, and the uncritical admiration of the Soviet Union from some communist sympathisers and intellectuals, was already raising doubts and criticism. The undemocratic Communist conduct and uncritical attitude towards Moscow of the Communist leadership led to major differences between Communists, Christian Socialists, nationally oriented educated liberals and left-leaning students at the University of Ljubljana.

In the final decade before the Second World War, Slovenes in Yugoslav Slovenia were more open to, and more closely connected to, western Europe than ever before, but they remained absorbed in their own situation, their status within Yugoslavia and internal Slovene disputes and divisions. Yugoslav centralist pressure, the increase in fascist violence in Italy and the rise of Nazism in Germany fuelled the feelings of uncertainty in the creative community. After the Anschluss moved the border of the German Reich to the Karavanke, in 1938, Slovenes found themselves in the pincers of two aggressive, traditional enemies and there was an unconcealed sense of a nation under threat. This, and the growing social crisis, swelled the ranks of non-party aligned intellectuals who, conscious of the approaching war, were attempting to overcome ideological and political divisions and reach agreement on the most urgent national issues. Their influence on the political situation remained relatively small, however, since political development was heading in the opposite direction: towards intolerance, exclusivity, and polarisation. At the fateful moment, when the Second World War spread into Slovene territory, the idea – expressed by the poet Edvard Kocbek in 1941 – that “a free person who wants to operate reasonably in today’s world, must first take up a historical and only then an ideological position” was only heeded by part of the Slovene
intelligentsia, a fact that tragically marked the course of the war in all its complexity, and has
had a long-term influence on post-war Slovene development and divisions until the present
day.

THE THIRTIES

After the proclamation of a royal dictatorship in 1929, the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with the nations eliminated
from the name of the state, and national symbols banned. The territory was reorganised into
nine regional units called banovine, which were given geographical names, eight being named
after rivers. Except for Drava, and to a lesser extent Vardar, the banovine divided ethnic or
national groups as a matter of policy, with Serbs in the majority in five of them. The Drava
banovina approximated most closely to the territory of a single nation, covering virtually all
the Yugoslav Slovenes, except the inhabitants of Bela Krajina, this state of affairs supposedly
a reward to the Catholic leader Anton Korošec for co-operating in the dictatorial government.
In 1931, Bela Krajina was also added to the Drava banovina, having previously been part of
the largely Croatian Sava banovina. After this change, the Drava banovina covered
15,809 km² and had 1,144,298 inhabitants (94.15% Slovene). In September 1931, Yugoslavia
had a new constitution, imposed by the king. The new constitution proclaimed a number of
political and social freedoms, but consolidated a centralised monarchy during the period of
dictatorship.

The dictatorship abolished the oblasti and their self-governing powers, and state
officials – bans – were appointed as heads of the newly created banovine. They were
appointed by the king, and were directly accountable to the minister for the interior and other
officials in Belgrade. The bans had wide-ranging powers, taking charge of all administrative
affairs, as well as economic, financial, social, health, construction and cultural matters.
Banovina councils were formed, but only functioned as advisory bodies; they were appointed
by the minister of the interior in Belgrade from representatives of banovina districts. The
royal constitution set out a limited level of self-government for the banovine, elections to
banovina councils and committees, and a special law that would regulate their organisation
and powers, but by the war no government had actually attempted to implement even the
reduced rights of self-government. The role of the banovina council in the Drava banovina
increased only in the second half of the 1930s, when the SLS moved from opposition to
government, and Catholic politicians managed to augment the powers of the council and
committees and their influence.

The royal dictatorship was accepted with a sense of relief in January 1929 by Slovene party leaders and business people. National arguments and disputes in the parliament in the second half of the 1920s had shaken confidence in the parliamentary system, and the dissolution of the parliament and prohibition on parties did not lead to major protests. On the contrary, the reunification of Yugoslav Slovenes in a single administrative unit raised new hopes, while the violent government suppression of political opponents – nationalists on one side, communists on the other – affected Zagreb and Belgrade more than Ljubljana. The largest local outcry was caused by Korošec joining General Živković’s government. Korošec’s participation in the government was loudly opposed by young members of the Catholic camp. Korošec himself remained in the government until September 1930, when he realised that there was no longer any benefit to be derived from co-operating with Belgrade and the court, but the SLS still had one government minister until the proclamation of the royal constitution in autumn 1931.

The 1931 royal constitution clearly demonstrated that the court and ruling elite had no plans for democratisation or major changes in state policy. It confirmed the administrative division introduced by the dictatorship, and introduced a bicameral parliament with a national assembly and senate, while the considerable royal power was further strengthened. The government was directly responsible to the king and not to parliament, and the constitution did not give legal immunity to deputies. Parties were still prohibited, and a separate electoral act set out national electoral lists. The most important opposition parties in the kingdom rejected the constitution and called for a boycott of the elections, but the court and government would not countenance an open electoral battle. The elections of 8 November 1931 featured only candidates from General Živković’s list. In the Drava banovina, 52.1% of the electorate voted, compared to a national average of 65.4%.

In order to prevent the restoration of prohibited political parties and acquire a level of external legitimacy, the government founded a countrywide party – the Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy – renamed as the Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslovanska nacionalna stranka – JNS) in 1933. Its leaders came from the Serbian Radical and Democrat parties, which the liberals joined in the Drava banovina. After the resignation of the SLS representative, Slovene liberals joined the government and assumed the main offices in the Drava banovina in 1931. The leading role in opposition to Belgrade centralism again fell to the SLS, which, like other parties, continued its political work despite the official ban. The SLS joined other parties opposing the government and the royal court from other parts of the
country, and on home ground encouraged a movement that acquired mass support in 1932. At celebrations in Ljubljana in May 1932 to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the May Declaration and Anton Korošec’s sixtieth birthday, participants wrapped themselves in prohibited Slovene flags and called out the slogan: “Independent Slovenia”.

At the end of 1932, opposition parties in Croatia and Serbia issued the ‘Zagreb points’ or punktacije, setting out demands for democracy and a reorganised state. The particularly radical Croatian points were those openly criticising Serbian hegemony, and supporting a federal state and calling for a return to the starting point of 1918. On New Year’s Eve 1932, the SLS prepared its own Slovene Declaration, which – rather naively – reawakened the United Slovenia programme. The main objective of the policy was to proclaim the unification of Slovene ethnic territory, spread across four countries, in a “political whole”, while stating that only Slovenes in Yugoslavia could achieve this. The Slovene punktacije addressed the strengthening of national individuality, Slovene financial independence, social cohesion, political and cultural freedom and Yugoslavia as a democratic community of self-governing national units, and gained great popular sympathy; but a programme aimed at redrawing state borders in the tense, delicately poised climate of the late-1930s was no basis for realistic political action.

The government responded violently to the federalist punktacije. The Croatian leader Vladko Maček was tried and imprisoned and many of the Slovene Catholic leaders were subjected to confinement in Bosnia, Serbia or Croatia. The liberal newspapers labelled the Slovene Declaration as “separatist”, and the leadership of the Drava banovina confirmed its loyalty to the government and king with a submissive declaration and a ban on some Catholic societies. The aggravated relations were not helped by mass liberal and Catholic conventions, which could not cover up the political crisis, the deteriorating social situation, and the disastrous consequences of the economic depression. Despite strict police regulations limiting public gatherings, farmers’ dissatisfaction was matched by unrest among workers, and between 1931 and 1933 the wave of protests also included the University of Ljubljana. Demonstrations were held against the authoritarian regime and threats of closure for individual faculties, and in favour of political freedoms and recognition of national rights, bringing Catholic, liberal and left wing students together in a common ‘Slovene front’. The harshest critics of the regime and party-politicking included writers from the literary periodicals, who castigated the parties and “nationally lukewarm” educated Slovenes for not displaying a more robust national consciousness. Although other voices were heard, objecting to a perceived overemphasis on the threat to the nation, the national question remained one of
the central themes of Slovene politics and culture in the mid-1930s. In 1934 even the Yugoslav Communist leadership stated that “most working people in Slovenia are not fighting for communism, but for an independent Slovenia”, that is for “the right to control their own fate and money themselves.” The assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseilles in October 1934 caused a wave of sincere public outrage, but also strengthened the numbers of those who thought that a democratic solution to national disputes was a precondition for greater stability, and the best chance of resolving the complex of other social and political problems in the country.

The major political and ideological clashes that unsettled Yugoslavia and Europe from the end of the 1920s led to splits in the Slovene parties. The largest and most powerful party, the SLS, still had its base in the farming community, among a significant number of workers, the lower urban classes and a circle of educated Slovenes, while economically it was supported by the co-operative movement and commercial and financial institutions through which it invested in industry. After the party was disbanded during the dictatorship, its members continued to work in Catholic organisations and societies. They persisted with autonomist, cultural and social views, and in the cultural struggle lined up against liberalism, Marxism and Yugoslavism. The conservative Catholic wing was notably strengthened by a change in the hierarchy of the Ljubljana diocese, where in 1930 Bishop Jeglič was replaced by the uncertain and vacillating personality of Gregorij Rožman (1883–1959), and acquired institutional support within the group Catholic Action (Katoliška akcija). This was founded at the end of the 1920s as an organisation for lay Catholics to contribute to the apostolic work of the Church, but following the publication of the Quadragesimo anno encyclical it became increasingly political. The leaders of Catholic Action and supporters of radical Catholicism supported a new “separation of minds” with their political and ideological exclusivity, corporate social ideas, and emphasis on Catholicism as a foundation of national culture and identity, which no longer aimed only at a separation between Catholics and other ideological groups, but also a separation in Catholic ranks.

The radical Catholic offensive had far more supporters in Ljubljana diocese than in the Lavantine (Maribor) diocese, where Bishop Ivan Jožef Tomažič (1876–1949) supported the position that the “church and priesthood must be above political parties”. The leadership of Catholic Action in Ljubljana was therefore openly critical of the Maribor ecclesiastical authorities on many occasions. Conservative efforts to discipline members of the Catholic camp deepened divisions in their ranks and even strengthened groups turning towards Marxism critiques of capitalism. In the early 1930s, the leaders of the Christian Socialist
Yugoslav Occupational Union rejected the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* and ideas of a corporate state, and proclaimed their union as an anti-capitalist workers’ organisation pursuing the principles of reformed socialism with a Christian ethos. The attempt by the SLS leadership to bring the Yugoslav Occupational Union back under its control ended with a split and the Union’s final separation from the SLS. The leadership of the Catholic SLS, which could not accept its independence, founded a new trade union subordinate to the party, and until the end of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia continued its attempts to impose ideological and political unity on Catholics. In the second half of the 1930s, Anton Korošec offered stern warnings about communists, Jews and freemasons, and called on the Church, schools, political parties and the widest possible range of associations to join the fight against communism.

King Aleksandar’s death was followed by a partial political reconciliation across Yugoslavia. In 1936, Catholic Action was formally re-organised as an elite, hierarchical national organisation, with the Catholic renewal of society as its objective. Various societies united with it – from youth and student to workers’ and agricultural organisations. Its work centred on opposition to communism and the left in general. The leadership of Slovene Catholic Action (the Slovene modifier was added in 1936) was extremely authoritarian, leading to friction between its member organisations, which it tackled in disputes that ramped up conflicts within the Catholic camp. The most militant grouping within Catholic Action was the Union of Catholic Students (Zveza katoliških dijakov), originally named the Youth Union of Christ the King (Zveza mladecv Kristusa kralja), which formed crack groups to perform apostolic work and used the journal *Mi mladi borci* (Young Fighters) to spread Catholic Action’s ideas among young people. They constantly fought not only with the Christian Socialists and Communists, but also with the Catholic student society Straža (The Watch), led by the professor of theology Lambert Ehrlich (1878–1942). Ehrlich’s *stražarji* or guards were also committed opponents of Marxism and communism, but rejected demands to subordinate themselves to Slovene Catholic Action. The divisions within the Catholic camp were perpetuated by disputes over the Spanish Civil War. In 1937, the ecclesiastical elite in Ljubljana and leadership of the SLS forced the editors of the Catholic journal *Dom in svet* to resign after it published an article by the poet Edvard Kocbek which critically assessed the role of the Church in the Spanish Civil War and proclaimed heresy as heroism. This finally split the SLS leadership from the progressive Catholic intelligentsia.

The liberal political elite – which participated in the government in the first half of the 1930s and supported Yugoslavism and centralism – were also facing more and more critical attacks from within their own camp. Professionals and wealthy men from towns and the
countryside retained control of the liberal camp, basing their power on liberal economic organisations and banks, while the wider social hinterland of the liberals comprised the intelligentsia and teaching profession. Following the SLS’s *punktacije*, the liberal leaders moved back from their full support for centralism, proposing a limited degree of decentralisation and increased self-government for the banovine, while continuing to warn against clericalism and accusing Catholic autonomists of moving towards “political and economic autarchy”. They also supported movements and newspapers that promoted Yugoslav nationalism. The government’s Yugoslav National Party (JNS) was unsuccessful in the 1935 elections and when Anton Koročec joined the new government, the political power of the Slovene liberals effectively collapsed. On the brink of war in the early 1940s, the Slovene liberal camp was no more, splintered into numerous groups with a shared provenance, but very different positions on fundamental political and national issues.

In the 1930s, there were also very few links between labour, socialist and Marxist groups and parties. The Socialist Party of Yugoslavia (Socialistična stranka Jugoslavije – SSJ), which had the support of the majority of the Slovene working class, was, like other parties, disbanded on the introduction of the dictatorship. However, the Socialists kept their trade unions, in which two-thirds of Slovene industrial workers were organised. Slovene Socialists – as in the rest of Yugoslavia – stood for gradual social reforms and rejected communism. At the same time, they opposed the social and economic policies of liberalism, clericalism and the Church as an institution. Their ideal was a secular, democratic society with modern labour legislation and a modern, socially unrestricted education system. They decisively rejected fascism and Nazism, and sympathised with the Spanish republican movement and anti-fascist movements around Europe. They did not collaborate with the Communists, apart from a brief period in 1936. They also rejected co-operation with the Yugoslav Occupational Union, which they accused of being clerical and “classless”. The dismissive attitude to the Church and their ‘supranational’ Yugoslav policy prevented them from establishing themselves more firmly in Slovene political life.

The Communists were even less important until the middle of the 1930s. The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistična partija Jugoslavije – KPJ) moved abroad during the dictatorship to avoid persecution. The return of a regional KPJ leadership to Slovenia did not occur until 1934. With the resumption of political work in the first half of the 1930s, Slovene Communists agreed that the solution to the national question could not be left to the middle-class parties. Following moves by Slovene Communists in Moscow, in 1934 the communist parties of Yugoslavia, Austria, and Italy adopted a common
statement, similar to the Catholic *punktacije*, which condemned the carve-up of Slovene territory and supported Slovene demands for self-determination. Opening up the national issue gained sympathy for the left and the Communists, however until the mid-1930s they had no major influence over the political situation in Yugoslav Slovenia.

In 1935 there were approximately 480 organised Communists in Yugoslav Slovenia. Their importance only increased with their inclusion in the national defence and ‘popular front’ movement in the second half of the 1930s. The idea of combining anti-fascist forces was not new and did not come from Communist ranks alone. But the movement gained ardent support among Slovene Communists, after June 1935, when the KSJ leaders called for a popular front alliance in preparations for the 7th Comintern Congress. In autumn 1935, the Communists in the Drava banovina joined the Peasant and Workers’ Movement, which brought together Vladko Maček’s Croatian movement, the Christian Socialists, Socialists and National Democrats. The new allies organised numerous major public manifestations, but without noticeable political success. In 1937, the Socialists left the peasant and workers’ union, accusing the Communists of attempting a political takeover. In reality, the illegal Slovene communist organisation underwent a profound crisis in 1936/37. Misunderstandings with the Yugoslav Communist leadership led some Slovenes to propose withdrawing from the KPJ to found independent Slovene communist organisations that dealt directly with Comintern, along the lines of the Communist Party of Catalonia. The Yugoslav Communist leadership initially prevented the independence of the Slovene Communists, but in 1937 allowed the formation of Slovene and Croatian Communist Parties within the united KPJ. On the formation of the Slovene Communist Party (Komunistična stranka Slovenije – KPS) the Communists supported the association of all Slovenes in a “Free Slovenia” and set out a programme that would also be acceptable to some other political groups. Around 300 committed supporters of the popular front and the Spanish republic left, with Communist help, for Spain in the second half of the 1930s, to fight as volunteers.

As with many Yugoslav Communists, a section of the Slovene Communist leadership was trained in the Soviet Union, so Slovene Communists tended to faithfully follow Moscow and the Comintern in major political decisions. After the Soviet-German pact of 1939, they abandoned the conciliatory popular front and national talk, and returned along with their Yugoslav counterparts to class and internationalist slogans. This weakened their political influence and also led to friction within the Communist ranks. The alliance between Moscow and Berlin, and slogans about Paris and London as centres of “reaction”, put local Communist leaders in an unpleasant dilemma, since they were well aware of the danger posed to Slovenes
by Germany and Italy. They therefore supported Soviet policy, clearly stating that socialist ideals were more important than the national interest, but also maintained their anti-fascist and national defence policy.

Women’s societies also joined the national defence movement in the latter half of the 1930s. The Communists, like the Socialists, held the position that the ‘women’s question’ was one element of the ‘social question’, and could only be resolved by the struggle for a fairer society, but at the same time they needed female support and allied themselves with women’s associations. The women’s movement flourished in the Slovene part of the Yugoslav kingdom in the 1920s and 1930s. Most of the Slovene women’s societies – including the Universal Women’s Society in Ljubljana which had been founded before the First World War – were included in the National Women’s Union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, founded in 1919, which changed its name in 1929 to the Yugoslav Women’s League (Jugoslovanska ženska zveza). The Union was religiously and politically undefined, though liberal views predominated, and it gradually opened up to socialist-oriented members. The Union supported legally assured equality with men and equal inclusion in national and political life.

This was also the objective of the more socialist and feminist-oriented ‘Ženski Pokret’ (Women’s Movement, 1926–41). The Catholic camp had the Christian Women’s Union (Krščanska ženska zveza) and another group operating outside the Yugoslav Women’s League was the socialist Union of Working Women and Girls (Zveza delavskih žen in deklet, 1924–35), which often came under Communist influence, and co-operated in strikes and with labour organisations. The larger women’s associations – like some professional women’s societies – issued their own journals, and in 1931 the liberal daily Jutro (Morning) started issuing a supplement called Žena v sodobnem svetu (Women in the Modern World). Women’s organisations supported a range of social and charity campaigns by means of letter-writing and protests, while also organising public gatherings and manifestations to support demands for civil, social and political equality. In 1933, Ženski Pokret even organised a gathering to support the legalisation of abortion (for social reasons) in Ljubljana. One of the central personalities in the Slovene women’s movement between the wars and a leader of Ženski Pokret was the teacher and ‘defectologist’ Angela Vode (1892–1985), who divided public opinion in the mid-to-late 1930s with two major works on the female question, Ženska v današnji družbi (Women in Today’s Society, 1934) and Spol in usoda (Sex and Destiny, 1938/39).

After the death of King Aleksandar in 1934, government affairs in Yugoslavia were run by three regents, supporting King Petar II, who was still a minor. The most important of
these was Aleksandar’s cousin, Prince Paul (Pavel in Slovene, Pavle in Serbo-Croat). In October 1934, the regents permitted Korošec to return to Ljubljana from confinement in Dalmatia, while the leader of the Croatian Peasants’ Party, Vladko Maček, and some other opponents were also pardoned. At the start of 1935, the government dismissed the National Assembly and called elections for May 1935. The government list won, but the opposition, led by Vladko Maček, managed to gather 37% of the votes, despite considerable pressure from the establishment. Turnout in the Drava banovina was lower than elsewhere in the state; the government party, supported by the liberals, won 83.46%, while Maček’s list won 14.82%. The SLS did not participate in the elections.

Political conditions in the state deteriorated after the elections. The Croatian Peasants’ Party and Vladko Maček demanded new elections. Prince Paul joined up with a number of major political leaders to find a way out of the crisis, and even turned to Maček once more, but Maček demanded a repeal of the 1931 constitution and the reorganisation of the state on federal lines. The prince entrusted the formation of the government to the Serbian Radical, Milan Stojadinović, who had risen to prominence as finance minister, and had an international reputation as a finance expert. In June 1935, Stojadinović formed a government which included members of the SLS and the Bosnian Muslims of Mehmed Spaho as well as Stojadinović’s own Serbian Radicals. At the same time, a new government party was founded, the Yugoslav Radical Union (Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica – JRZ). Unlike the government Yugoslav National Party, which was conceived as a ‘supra-party’ organisation and moved to the opposition once the Stojadinović government had been approved, the JRZ clearly comprised three traditionally national parties. In the areas of the country from which the coalition parties came, it was popular and well-supported, but it was seen in Croatia as an “encirclement of Croatia”, and rejected as a union of “bankers, clerics, and Islamic feudalists.”

Stojadinović, who led the government until 1939, was most successful in the economic field. There was a genuine improvement in economic conditions in the second half of the 1930s. But the new prime minister’s internal and foreign policy quickly lost him his support and reputation. After 1935, Yugoslavia noticeably distanced itself from its previous allies – France, Great Britain and the countries of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia and Romania) – and moved towards Italy and Germany. At the same time, Stojadinović was completely ineffectual in resolving the main political problem at home: the Croat question. Vladko Maček and his party persisted in their demand for a fundamental federal reorganisation of the state, which led negotiations between Croats, the government and the court down a cul-de-sac. The
government decision in 1937, after years of negotiation to finally ratify a Concordat with the Vatican which included regulating the status of the Catholic Church and legalising Catholic Action, turned much of the Orthodox Serbian population against Stojadinović.

In 1938, Stojadinović, who was still convinced of his strength, called an election, but the government candidates did not acquit themselves well. Maček’s opposition list, which was joined by Stojadinović’s main opponents, won 1.4 million votes, with the government only gaining 200,000 more. The government party won 78.70% of the vote in the Drava banovina. The positive result for the government among Slovene voters was due to pressure from the SLS, which warned “grumblers” not to support Maček and the opposition. Nevertheless, Stojadinović blamed the minister of the interior, Anton Korošec, for the electoral failure, accusing him of failing to apply sufficient pressure on civil servants, and Korošec was forced to resign in 1938. The opposition was too strong, and differences between Stojadinović and Prince Paul grew wider; Stojadinović’s second government fell in February 1939.

Although Korošec was minister of the interior for almost three and half years, he had almost no influence over Stojadinović’s policy. His joining the government launched a wave of criticism and anger in the Slovene public. Opponents – even in the Catholic camp – accused him of abandoning the punctacije programme, and some senior figures left the SLS leadership due to Korošec’s return to Belgrade. Co-operation with Stojadinović prevented the SLS from direct agreement with the main proponents of federalism, and the main opposition, Maček’s Croatian Peasants’ Party. This pushed Slovene Catholics out of the loop in negotiations on fundamental matters of state. Nevertheless, in the final years before the Second World War, the SLS generally maintained its electoral base and its political advantage over the other Slovene parties. Together with the Church, it could still muster tens of thousands at public events and manifestations.

Despite the Catholic party’s political power and influence in the second half of the 1930s, it did not have complete political control in the Drava banovina. Liberals retained support in towns and among educated Slovenes, who joined the opposition lining up against Stojadinović. At the same time, new movements and societies established themselves. The national and democratic Slovensko Društro (Slovene Society) formed with the newspaper Slovenija as its flagship. The wave of social unrest that built up in the Drava banovina in the mid-thirties reached its peak in 1936 with a large textile strike led by the Christian Socialists. From 1935 until the German occupation, the national defence movement developed with support from various political groups. The movement appeared under different names, and by organising mass events, pre-electoral conventions, town meetings, trips and cultural and
sporting events supported the improvement of social conditions and the exercising of Slovene national will. The groups co-operating in the national-defence manifestations along with the Communists were trade union organisations, Socialists, Christian Socialists, the anti-centralist wing of Sokol, supporters from the SLS, and intellectuals and students. The political thread that linked this diverse group was well-illustrated by the lines of a protest poem: “What say you Slovenes, would you have Rome and Belgrade, imperial Vienna, white generals rule us forever? Stand up son of the village common, stand up Slovene peasant, shoulder to shoulder with the workers, and build our Slovene home.”

After Stojadinović left government, the Serbian Radical Dragiša Cvetković took the reins in Belgrade, and finally, in summer 1939, reached an agreement with the Croats, the Sporazum, with the support of Prince Paul. Vladko Maček entered government, and a resolution was passed establishing an autonomous Croatian banovina. Although numerous details were still unclear, there was no doubt that the court and government in Belgrade, under French and British pressure, and the threat of approaching war, had agreed to a profound administrative and political transformation of the kingdom, and opened up the path to federalisation. The SLS demanded a Slovene banovina, and Korošec, who after leaving the government joined the negotiations between the Croats and Belgrade, spoke in praise of Prince Paul and Vladko Maček and declared that “Slovenes [wanted] to see Yugoslavia reorganised as soon as possible,” in the manner “now being arranged in Croatia”. But in mid-1940, Korošec again joined the government (this time as education minister at Prince Paul’s behest), which saw the SLS change its policy again and ‘tactically’ drop the demands for “a Slovene banovina”.

In spring 1940, the government increased control over its political opponents, and a wave of persecution hit the Drava banovina. A large number of Communists and their sympathisers were imprisoned, and some were interned in prison camps. The two major Slovene parties solidly maintained their anti-Communist stance, and rejected even the most basic discussions of national defence with the Communists. Korošec and other members of the SLS’s conservative core did not hide their sympathy for the Fascist model of authoritarian rule, but they all recognised the risk posed to Slovenes by their Italian and German neighbours. In 1939, Yugoslavia declared itself as neutral, but as the war spread it became clear that it would be difficult to stay out of it. Extreme German nationalists in Austrian Carinthia and Styria, who had called for a revision of the Yugoslav-Austrian border in the 1920s, and proclaimed parts of Slovene territory as German “cultural land” (some claimed up to the watershed between the Drava and Sava, others to the Sava, a third group all the way to
the Adriatic), increased their demands after the Anschluss in 1938. At the same time, the work of the German intelligence services and German offices supposedly involved in the status of Yugoslavia’s German minority was stepped up. Members of the German minority in the Drava banovina who had joined the Swabian-German Cultural Association (Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund) in 1931, enthusiastically welcomed Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933. Until the interior minister, Anton Korošec banned most local Kulturbund organisations in 1936, they openly expressed sympathy for Nazism. After the restoration of the Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund in 1939, Nazi ideas spread among them even more quickly than before, and membership rose rapidly. In the final years before the Second World War, Kulturbund members demonstratively celebrated German Nazi holidays, dressed in brown German uniforms and greeted each other with Sieg Heil.

In autumn 1940, the Belgrade government introduced restrictions and limited trade in foodstuffs due to the threat of coming war. From the fall of Czechoslovakia, and particularly after the German victory over France, passionate debates about the course of events took place within the SLS, where it was agreed that every effort should be made to preserve Yugoslavia, though there was already the expectation that it would likely fall. Korošec put forward the position that if Yugoslavia collapsed after conflict with Germany and Italy, it should do everything to avoid the partition of the Drava banovina, and ensure that it was taken by a single occupier. This was primarily understood to mean succumbing to Germany, and gaining a similar status for Slovenia as Slovakia held following Germany’s break up of Czechoslovakia. But in December 1940, Korošec, aged 69, died suddenly. With his death, a national and party leader was lost on the eve of war, a man whose shameless political strategising and extreme pragmatism had gained numerous enemies, but whose skill and reputation in Belgrade and elsewhere in the kingdom had long outdone other Slovene politicians and rivals. His death was a major loss, not only for the SLS, but also for the entire Slovene middle-class political community.

Slovenes in the Drava banovina found themselves on the brink of the Second World War with no clear wartime plans, and with no agreement on how to act under an occupation. Slovene politics had undergone fundamental changes in the 1930s, yet the Slovene political arena had not expanded, but narrowed. The traditional political camps – liberals, Catholics and socialists – that had politically divided and defined Slovenes since the end of the nineteenth century were in a state of disintegration. Political developments in Europe, and the approaching war, had led to the formation of two new, irreconcilable political blocs. On one side were the two traditional party groupings, the liberals and Catholics, which were
incapable of joining forces in any effective manner and were united only by their rejection of any union with the left and Communists, however informal or expedient. On the other side was an alliance of various anti-fascist and national groups, including the Communists, which were dissatisfied with the parliamentary political parties and political conditions at home and in Europe. Relations between the two blocs were continually deteriorating, as enthusiasm changed to fanaticism, intolerance to hatred.

In Kranjska (Carniola), where the conservative groups were stronger, divisions ran deeper and rivalries were fiercer than in Štajerska. But, as in the decades before, the situation in Kranjska was also to have a decisive influence on the course of Slovene politics in the run-up to the Second World War. The two larger Slovene middle-class parties rejected collaboration with left-wing groups and left the initiative in the national defence and anti-fascist movement to the left; this meant that they missed an opportunity before the outbreak of war to take the initiative in wartime organisation of the general population. When on 25 March 1941, the government in Belgrade entered the Tripartite Pact, the leading Slovene Catholic politicians supported its decision, because they were convinced that Yugoslavia could in this way avoid war. On 26 March, mass demonstrations against the pact with Hitler were already underway in Belgrade. The following night, a group of officers organised a military coup overthrowing the government and the king’s regents, and declared Aleksandar’s 17-year old son, Petar, of age. Events in Belgrade surprised and confused Slovene leaders and the Slovene public. In the last days before the German attack on Yugoslavia, the SLS attempted to establish contact with the German and Slovakian embassies in Belgrade, while suggesting the idea of a joint Croat-Slovene state to Vladko Maček and the Croatian Peasants’ Party should Yugoslavia fall. Maček and his collaborators showed no interest in the suggestion, and any attempts to reach agreement on conduct during a state of occupation between Slovene leaders were overtaken by war.

Despite this, before the arrival of foreign troops on Slovene soil, no one countenanced collaboration with the occupier. At a meeting in the Ban’s Palace on 30 March 1941, the SLS leadership even unequivocally agreed that “in the event of enemy occupation, no committee member of the party, higher or lower, will ever collaborate with the enemy, directly or indirectly, nor will anyone call for collaboration, however terrible the pressure, even if life hangs in the balance…”

The Second World War engulfed Slovenia just one week later.
SLOVENES OUTSIDE YUGOSLAVIA – SLOVENES IN ITALY

The life of Slovenes who remained outside the Yugoslav state after the borders of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had been defined naturally followed a rather different path to that of Slovenes inside the kingdom. The largest number – around 300,000 – lived in Italy. The territory with a Slovene population, occupied in 1918 by the Italian army and officially part of Italy after the Treaty of Rapallo, was called Venezia Giulia by the Italians, and Julijska Benečija (Julian Venice) or Julijska Krajina (Julian March) by Slovenes. In 1921, the Julian March had a population of a little over 900,000. According to the 1910 Austrian census, 50% were Slovene, while according to the 1921 Italian census, Slovenes and Croats together represented 38.7%. It included the former Austrian provinces of Gorizia and Gradisca, Trieste and Istra, as well as the districts of Idrija and Postojna (part of Carniola under Austro-Hungary), and the district of Tarvisio (Trbiž, Tarvis), which had been part of Carnithia under Austro-Hungary.

The Julian March faced a difficult economic situation at the end of the First World War. The Soča (Isonzo) valley had already been devastated by First World War battles, and the new state borders cut off the traditional trade and traffic connections to the north, which affected coastal areas, and Trieste in particular. The port of Trieste lost its hinterland, and there was no replacement for it in Italy. Trade via the port of Trieste halved compared to pre-war figures, and this also caused a collapse in maritime and rail traffic. Trieste’s trade would only pick up once more in the 1930s, buoyed by the flow of military goods. Italian financiers and industrialists looked to industry for solutions to the economic problems. They revived part of pre-war industrial production, while buying up companies and financial institutions made foreign-owned by the designation of the new borders. The ironworks in Škedenj (Servola) near Trieste, branches of Slovene banks and other economic institutions came into Italian ownership. Industrial development received a major boost in 1927 when the Trieste municipality was proclaimed a free port. The 1929 crisis again slowed development, but from the mid-1930s the growth in the military economy brought about another economic boom.

Nevertheless, the Julian March did not regain its pre-war economic level between the wars, or replace the losses suffered in agriculture, trade and other areas, which had been caused by its changed international political situation. This had a major impact on the Slovene population, which was dominated by workers and small farmers. With the new state borders, farmers in Primorska (the Slovene Littoral) and the province of Gorizia lost their former markets, and much of their savings, since the conversion rate of Austrian crowns to Italian lire
was even worse than the rate offered in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The government further harmed the farming population when it limited the payment of war compensation in 1920, and then settled the damages in bonds of very little value. The tax situation offered no respite, and the new tax system introduced in 1924 was stricter than under the Habsburg Monarchy. The situation of the population in the border area was made more difficult by regulations restricting the sale and change in ownership of land for military and security reasons.

To mitigate the agricultural crisis, in 1920 the authorities founded a national institute “for renewal and agricultural regeneration,” which under the influence of Italian nationalists bought Slovene and Croat-owned land from their indebted owners and introduced Italian settlers. This form of Italianisation was initially opposed by Slovenes with some success through the extensive network of co-operatives and lending societies that had developed at the start of the century, and which reappeared after the war between 1924 and 1928. In 1928, there were 414 Slovene co-operatives in the Julian March, 149 of which were lending societies joined in co-operative unions based in Gorizia and Trieste. Slovene savers and owners of capital also invested money in branches of Slovene banks and a branch of the Czech Živnostenska Banka. But in the second half of the 1920s these closed their doors one after the other, and by 1930 the Fascist authorities had dissolved them or incorporated Slovene co-operatives and savings banks into Fascist institutions and organisations. With this, the Slovene movement in Italy lost its economic base.

The effects of the economic crisis experienced in the Julian March after the First World War were, of course, not confined to the agricultural population. The fluctuations in industry and trade also had a major impact on the many Slovene industrial, shipbuilding and port workers in Trieste. The fall in production and trade led to unemployment, which peaked in the first half of the 1930s (30,000 in 1933). This further increased emigration, which affected all social strata after Fascist oppression increased in 1926 and during the economic crisis. During the first post-war years, emigration primarily involved officials, railway workers, and teachers who had come to Primorska, the province of Gorizia and Istria in the time of Austria-Hungary, and intellectuals who were persecuted by the Italian authorities for their Slovene and Yugoslav ideas. In the second half of the 1920s, the circle of emigrants expanded, with unemployed workers and indebted and destitute farmers also leaving their homes. As Slovenes moved to Yugoslavia, Western Europe and South America, Italians moved into the Julian March to take up positions in administration, the military and carabinieri (the gendarmerie or military police). This did not significantly affect the ethnic
make-up of the population over the two decades between the wars – except in Trieste, where the number of Slovenes fell significantly – since rural populations were predominately Slovene. The social makeup of the population did change, though, as the farmers became wage-earners – joining the ‘proletariat’ – workers and the unemployed emigrated, and the Italian authorities broke up or subordinated the Slovene middle class. The educated Slovenes who remained despite the hardship included clergy, professionals, and retired teachers and officials.

The Julian March had been incorporated into Italy in 1921 on the basis of the Treaty of Rapallo. Immediately after occupying areas with a Slovene population, the Italian authorities abolished the national councils that had formed – as elsewhere in Slovene territory – during the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. Initially, the pre-war municipal bodies were restored, but after the incorporation into Italy, Italian administration and legislation spread across the newly acquired territory. In 1923, the Julian March was divided into provinces (provincie) following the standard Italian administrative pattern. Before the Treaty of Rapallo, the government attempted to win over the border population in a number of ways, but it was intractable in its dealings with any Slovenes and Croats who openly expressed national sentiment or sympathies with the new Yugoslav state. The persecution involved courts martial, imprisonment, exile to Yugoslavia, confiscation of printed materials, and prohibition on public gatherings.

The Italian middle-class parties unanimously supported the Treaty of London and the incorporation of the Julian March into Italy. The republicans and the (Catholic) people’s party were the only ones in addition to the socialists prepared to recognise national rights for the non-Italian population – though only from the conviction that this would quicken their assimilation. The tense climate caused by social dissatisfaction, the growing influence of labour and socialist organisations, and uncertainty regarding the border negotiations fed the growing Italian nationalism, and in 1919 – immediately after the arrival of Mussolini’s Fascist group in Milan – opened the door to Fascism. The Fascist movement in Trieste and its surroundings originally directed its action against Socialists and Communists, but the intimidation soon spread to the Slovene and Croatian population. On 13 July 1920, after clashes in Trieste, the Fascists burnt down the Slovene ‘Narodni Dom’, the headquarters of Slovene political, cultural and economic organisations. Their violent suppression of a major strike in Trieste in autumn 1920 consolidated their reputation among Italian nationalists. With Fascist numbers growing, they made inroads into trade unions, founded their own commercial co-operatives, and in the spring began a concerted offensive against labour and Slovene
organisations. Armed Fascist groups also went into Slovene and Croatian villages in the countryside, terrorising the population with threats and destruction. The authorities, which considered ‘Slavo-communism’ a significant threat, generally did nothing to prevent Fascist violence. This enabled the Fascists in the Julian March to take control of areas populated by Slovenes and Croats, even before their assumption of power throughout Italy in October 1922.

In 1918, Slovenes and Croats had awaited the Italian army with reservations but without posing any resistance, as most of them felt the occupation would be temporary, and that a peace conference would award territory with a Slovene and Croat majority to the Kingdom of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, based on the principle of self-determination. In 1919, the Slovene parties, which had ceased to function after the Italian occupation, coalesced in the political association Edinost (Unity) which, along the lines of the pre-war Triestine organisation of the same name, attempted to take an ideologically neutral stance and had no special political programme to protect Slovenes and Croats from the pressures of Italianisation. It supported their linguistic and educational rights and promoted the protection and regeneration of national, cultural and economic institutions. This policy failed to win widespread support in the difficult social, economic and national circumstances. People preferred the more tangible and decisive answers to their problems offered by the Italian Socialist Party, which radicalised its positions and in 1919 became a section of Comintern. Until mid-1920, the Socialists were dominant in the Julian March, and their forceful slogans and well-developed economic, cultural and educational activities attracted to their ranks not only Slovene workers, but also educated Slovenes, including teachers, whose disillusionment with the vague policies of the traditional parties had already led to a willingness to embrace socialism before the war. Italian socialists in general recognised the non-Italian nations’ right to self-determination, and supported their demands for equality. In 1919, they were joined by the Slovene socialists, who then functioned within the Italian Socialist Party (and primarily the Communist Party of Italy after 1921), and whose activities included publishing their own newspaper.

The situation changed rapidly after the Julian March was incorporated into Italy in 1921. Socialist influence waned, pressure from Italian nationalism increased, and disappointed Slovenes – who blamed the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for the ‘Primorska disaster’ – called for patience and attempted to adapt to the new circumstances. The change in the balance of power was clearly reflected in the 1921 elections to the Chamber of Deputies in Rome. The Italian national bloc and the Edinost political society, which entered
the elections under the name Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslovanska narodna stranka), won approximately the same number of votes in the Julian March (around one third), but their power differed significantly from area to area. The Yugoslav National Party won almost 60% of the vote in the province of Gorizia, a little over 20% in Istria, and 8.8% in Trieste, while the Italian national bloc won convincingly in Trieste (45.43%) and Istria (55.3%). The communists and socialists had significant support in Trieste (around 32% combined), somewhat less in Gorizia (over 24%) and were weakest in Istria (between 10 and 11%). The Yugoslav National Party therefore gained five deputies – despite the electoral geometry being skewed in favour of the Italian nationalist bloc – which was clearly a great success. Yet the Fascists, who gained power in autumn 1922, changed electoral legislation in mid-1923 and altered the boundaries of electoral districts. After the Fascist assumption of power, of the Italian middle-class parties only the republicans and some of the democrats remained in opposition in the Julian March. The Socialist Party was now powerless, and the communists had been made illegal. In the 1924 parliamentary elections, the National Fascist Party won 60% of the vote, the Slavic list won less than 20%, and the communists just over 10%. The elections left Slovenes with just two representatives in the Chamber of Deputies in Rome.

The Fascist takeover only increased the pressure on non-Italian communities. In the eyes of the Fascist authorities and Italian nationalists, the Julian March and other territories acquired after the First World War were geographically and historically part of Italy, so they did not hide their aim of rapidly Italianising the non-Italian population. The use of Slovene was prohibited in the courts of Trieste in spring 1922 and in Gorizia in 1923. From the 1923/24 academic year, Italian became the sole language of instruction in non-Italian primary schools. The plan was for the Italianisation of primary and secondary schools (in 1923, there were still around 400 Slovene and Croatian schools with approximately 52,000 pupils) to take five years; it was achieved within just four. From 1925, schools could no longer provide additional lessons in non-Italian mother tongues. At the same time, the Fascist authorities Italianised place names, family names and personal names. Fascist youth, student and trade union organisations, which offered their members numerous benefits, made a significant contribution to the Italianisation process, and this led to the spread of Fascism among Slovenes. Slovene members included officials, teachers and workers, and in some places farmers as well. By the end of 1922, Slovene Fascists in Gorizia had formed a Slovene “government party”. This ceased functioning in 1925, but there were still Slovene members of Fascist trade unions and associations.

The initial unity of the Slovene political society, Edinost, was broken in 1923, when
the Gorizian Christian Socialists founded an independent society for the province of Gorizia. The reasons for the split were ideological and political. The liberal leadership of Edinost in Trieste persisted in its struggle for national rights and limited itself to protests against measures by the Italian authorities against national minorities, while the Gorizian Christian Socialists had bigger plans and attempted to consolidate the economic base of the Slovene population with an ambitious co-operative programme. The division into two parties, each with its own journals, publishing and printing followed the separation by province (Gorizia and surroundings and the then Italian parts of Carniola and Carinthia on one side, and Trieste and Istria on the other). Many of the pre-war Slovene associations had resumed activities before the rise of Fascism, but they also divided along party lines following the liberal-Christian Socialist split. Many cultural and educational societies still operated outside these two parties, however. In 1927, when the Fascist authorities abolished all Slovene and Croatian associations, the number of Slovene societies in the Julian March forced to close was between 300 and 400.

Despite the political and party divisions, Slovene leaders and parliamentary deputies maintained a united front in dealings with Italian parties and authorities. They avowed their loyalty to the government and Italian state before the Chamber of Deputies and authorities, while rejecting the pressures to Italianise, and supporting national rights, and even turned directly to Mussolini on several occasions. The central figure of Slovene politics in Trieste was the lawyer Josip Vilfan (1878–1955), the long-term president of Edinost, while the Christian Socialist leaders in Gorizia were the priest Virgilij Šček (1889–1948) and the lawyer Engelbert Besednjak (1894–1968). All three also sat in the Chamber of Deputies in Rome.

The clergy had an exceptionally important role in Slovene resistance to Italianisation and Fascism. In 1920, the association Priesthood of St. Paul (Zbor svečenikov Sv. Pavla), which united most Slovene and Croatian priests, was reactivated; one of its first acts was to send a letter to the Pope with a request to found a special Slavic archdiocese that would include the Slovene and Croatian areas within Italian borders. Italian pressure had already led Andrej Karlin (1857–1933), the Slovene bishop of Trieste-Koper (Capodistria), to resign in 1919. The Holy See did not pay any heed to the request by the Priesthood of St. Paul for a special Slavic archdiocese, but in 1923 Luigi Fogar (1882–1971) was appointed bishop of Trieste-Koper, and until his resignation under pressure from the Vatican and the Fascist authorities in 1936, he supported the preservation of the Slovene and Croatian languages in church and in the catechism.

After Karlin stepped down, the only Slovene bishop in Italy was Franšiček Borgia
Sedej (1854–1931, archbishop of Gorizia from 1906). Sedej rejected the Church’s identification with politics and took a balanced and tolerant attitude to all believers: Slovene, Italian and Friulian. He firmly opposed the appointment of Italian priests to parishes with a Slovene majority and the removal of Slovene catechism from schools. He supported priests who moved Slovene catechism to church premises, rather than teaching in Italian. When, in 1928, the Fascist authorities prohibited the use of Slovene in the earliest school classes, Sedej issued a special missive calling for the teaching of Christian catechism in the mother tongue, and founded parish schools, which were the only form of Slovene instruction in the Julian March until Italy’s capitulation in 1943. This caused outrage among Italian nationalists and made opposition to the Gorizian archbishop even more extreme. In 1931, Sedej stood down, following persuasion from the Vatican, but despite promises that his successor would be a nationally moderate and tolerant church dignitary, the Holy See appointed Giovanni Sirotti to the post of apostolic administrator for the archdiocese of Gorizia, a man not well-disposed to Slovene-speaking believers.

Once Fascist power had been consolidated and most democratic institutions removed, the Fascist leaders in the border areas committed themselves to accelerating the Italianisation of non-Italian communities, and including their members in Fascist ranks. In the second half of 1927, after Italian democratic parties had been closed down, Slovene and Croatian associations were banned. The co-operatives and economic organisations met a similar fate (the exceptions being the savings bank Tržaška Hranilnica and the commercial trades co-operative Trgovsko-Obrtna Zadruga, which operated until 1940). By 1928, Slovene had been completed removed from primary schools, and from 1926 to 1928 most Slovene newspapers were closed down, as part of a general clampdown on press freedom throughout Italy. Slovene books continued to be published, but under the strict control of the censors. The authorities obstructed their sale, previously permitted publications were seized, and imports from Yugoslavia banned. Pressure on Slovene politicians and activities increased, with increasing numbers imprisoned and confined, with some going ‘underground’ or fleeing abroad (most commonly to Yugoslavia). Among those who moved abroad after the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved in 1928 were the two deputies, Josip Vilfan in that year, and Engelbert Besednjak in 1931. From the end of the 1920s, the only educated Slovenes left in the Julian March “almost entirely in place” were the clergy. They were seen by Fascist leaders as the prime culprits for the slow progress of the Italianisation of Slovene population, as they not only kept the catechism, preaching, and prayers in Slovene, but also openly opposed forced Italianisation and Slovenes joining Fascist organisations.
Young people who considered that force should be met with force and despaired at the Fascist oppression and powerlessness of the Slovene political parties faced with Italian nationalism began to respond in the 1920s. The secret society TIGR (an acronym of the towns and areas it was dedicated to liberating: Trieste, Istria, Gorizia, Rijeka) was first founded in 1924, with support from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but was initially short-lived. It was followed by other secret groups, and, three years later, by two new, more organised, illegal associations based in Trieste and Gorizia (the Trieste group was called ‘Borba’, or struggle, while the Gorizia group revived the TIGR name). They were largely joined by people from the national liberal ranks, and supported the incorporation of the Slovene and Croat parts of the Julian March into Yugoslavia.

Financial support came from within the Yugoslav state, where the groups had links to Yugoslav nationalist organisations and associations of Primorska emigrants. They organised social gatherings, trips and courses, and distributed anti-Italian material, illegal newspapers and pamphlets; at the same time, they organised violent action against Fascist militia, carabinieri, and police informers, and attacked civil and military targets. Their members had carried out almost 100 assassinations or attempted assassinations and acts of aggression by 1930 (some members also spied on behalf of Yugoslavia). The Italian authorities first uncovered members of these groups after shots were fired during elections in Pula at the southern tip of Istria in 1929. One was condemned to death and four to lengthy terms in prison. The police also caught members of Borba in the Slovene part of the Julian March after their attack on the Triestine fascist newspaper in 1930. After a trial in Trieste, which raised considerable public awareness, four were shot, and twelve sentenced to imprisonment. A group of 30 people was tried in Rome. Other members of the two clandestine groups gathered in an organisation known from 1931 as the Revolutionary Organisation of the Slovene and Croatian Nation in Italy. The leadership abandoned the policy of armed aggression and assassination, and dedicated itself to nationally driven and illegal work among the population at large. In the 1930s, the organisation operated over and above party divisions, and was prepared to work with any group committed to achieving the incorporation of the Slovene and Croatian parts of the Julian March into Yugoslavia.

From the mid-1920s, the Communists also operated illegally in the Julian March, promulgating revolutionary and anti-fascist ideas and gaining supporters via clandestine trade union organisations, anti-fascist committees and the illegal press. In 1924, a group of young communists supported the solution of the Slovene and Croatian question in line with Comintern recommendations i.e. by recognising self-determination, breaking away from Italy,
and forming a workers’ and farmers’ Balkan republic. This idea was adopted two years later by the Communist Party of Italy. The idea of a special Slovene-Croat organisation within the Communist Party of Italy was even put forward during discussions, but it was never established. Slovene communists in the Julian March were originally members of a single Communist Party of Italy, but in 1934 the party, respecting Comintern tactics, recommitted itself to national self-determination in a joint statement with the Yugoslav and Austrian Communists supporting the unification of the Slovene nation. The Communists rejected the Slovene middle-class parties in the Julian March, and also largely rejected the actions of clandestine Slovene organisations, seeing the TIGR movement in particular as unwanted competition. A change in the Communist attitude to these Slovene ‘national revolutionaries’ came only after a Comintern directive on the formation of popular fronts in 1935, which led the Communist Party of Italy to reach an agreement on support and co-operation with the clandestine groups.

Members of the Priesthood of St. Paul and the Christian-Socialist Edinost group in Gorizia formed their own illegal organisation at the start of the 1930s. In contrast to the TIGR and communist groups, which had relatively few active members, the illegal Catholic organisations had several thousand people in their ranks. The leadership of the clandestine Christian organisation itself had over 50 members (primarily priests from the Priesthood of St. Paul), while the organisation was divided into sections responsible for political and educational areas. The organisation prepared weekly reports on conditions in the Julian March and sent them to Vilfan and Besednjak, who held important functions in the Congress of European Nationalities in Vienna (Vilfan was president of the Congress, while Besednjak was president of the International Union of National Minority Journalists). The leadership also wrote a letter in Latin to the Pope and over 1,200 ecclesiastical dignitaries around the world describing the difficult position of the ‘Slovene’ Church in Italy. In addition to national defence, the clandestine Christian organisation also had clear anti-fascist objectives. Its leaders enjoyed sufficient influence and repute in the 1930s for former liberal opponents to join their ranks.

With the increasing Fascist violence, political divisions also disappeared from everyday life. Although in some parts of the Julian March, the authorities managed to persuade significant numbers of the population to join Fascist organisations via pressure and material inducements, Fascism had few adherents and collaborators among Slovenes. Most Slovenes were defiantly anti-fascist. The Slovene language had been removed from public life, but remained the means of communication in the family, and among relatives, close
friends and in church. After their cultural and national societies were dissolved, Slovenes met socially at home, on secret trips and at meetings and in churches, which remained one of the few public spaces where Slovene could still be heard. The lack of other outlets gave poetry and singing particular importance in terms of expressions of national sentiment. The authorities were well aware of this, and persecuted public and choral singing in Slovene; after 1932, this was also forbidden in processions outside church. At the end of the 1920s and start of the 1930s, several people were convicted of singing in Slovene, and in 1937, a group of Fascists forced members of a choir from the Gorizia area to drink engine oil, which led to the death of the choirmaster, Alojz Bratuž. The anti-fascist and anti-Italian attitude of the Slovene and Croatian population increased after Italy’s military invasion of Ethiopia in 1935; many young men fled to Yugoslavia to avoid the draft.

The government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1929) financially supported the Slovene and Croatian minority in the Julian March, as advocated by Slovene Catholic and liberal politicians in Belgrade. The initiator of the campaign to benefit the Slovene and Croatian minorities in Italy was Anton Korošec, who was in close contact with Engelbert Besednjak and a personal friend. In the 1930s, after moving to Yugoslavia and on to Vienna, Besednjak also spent time in Belgrade where he was on good terms with the king and the court. Also supportive of the Slovene and Croatian minority in Italy was the bishop of Ljubljana, Gregorij Rožman, who took several letters on the status of Slovenes and Croats in the Julian March to the Vatican. The lawyer Ivan Marija Čok (1886–1948) played an important role for the liberals in contacts between emigrants from Primorska in Yugoslavia, the government in Belgrade, and Slovenes in Italy. He originally participated in the clandestine Slovene revolutionary organisation in Trieste before fleeing to Yugoslavia, where he became the president of the Union of Yugoslav Emigrants from the Julian March (Zveza jugoslovanskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine) in 1931.

The Slovene movement in the Julian March was always closely linked to Yugoslav Slovenia and even to the Yugoslav ruling elite. This connection was particularly strong among Catholic groups, although political development in the Catholic camp in Yugoslav Slovenia differed considerably from that among Slovene Catholics in Italy. While conservatives dominated Slovene Catholic politics in Yugoslavia, Christian Socialism was the main force among Primorska Slovenes. The Slovene Christian Socialist leadership in the Julian March was ideologically and politically quite united, but in Ljubljana was largely founded on people who opposed the leading Slovene Catholic politicians in Kranjska.

The Christian Socialists were the largest politically organised mass movement among
Slovenes in Italy in the 1930s, but the escalating international tensions and the approach of world war led other political groups to reform in the late 1930s. Members of the clandestine TIGR organisation collected weapons and sent confidential military reports via Yugoslavia to western democracies. In 1940, they resumed their numerous attacks on railway and military targets. At the same time, the Communists were putting Comintern policy into practice and expanding their circle of allies, and attempting to integrate them into a more united anti-fascist front. In 1939/40, they genuinely moved closer to the ‘national revolutionaries’ (TIGR) and partially to the Christian Socialist youth, and at the end of 1939 the Trieste liberals and Gorizian Christian Socialists founded a joint National Council of Slovenes and Croats in the Julian March. Within a few months the Italian police had managed to break up these forms of contact, dealing the Slovene movement a serious blow. They uncovered a number of illegal depots and arrested around 300 Slovene anti-fascists. The authorities brought 60 of them before the courts and, at the second Trieste trial at the end of 1941, 9 people were condemned to death (5 were executed), and over 50 were sentenced to imprisonment of varying lengths. The arrests, the trials in Trieste and the internment of Slovenes on the outbreak of hostilities with Yugoslavia significantly weakened all Slovene political groups in the Julian March in 1941.

SLOVENES IN THE FIRST AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

The inter-war experiences of the approximately 80,000 Slovenes who remained (according to estimates by Slovene historians) in Austria after the Carinthian plebiscite of 10 October 1920 differed significantly from those of the Slovenes in the Julian March. The first Austrian republic was a German state, and not well disposed to national minorities. Nevertheless, until 1933 it had a liberal-democratic parliamentary system that, on paper, guaranteed freedom of speech and association for the non-German population. Conditions for Slovenes in Austrian Carinthia and their politicians immediately after the First World War – as in the period leading up to it – were largely marked by pressure from Carinthian Germans and the traditional composition of their part of society; there were significantly fewer educated and middle class people than in central Slovenia or in Trieste and Gorizia. The internal Slovene divisions were significantly influenced by the fact that around 12,000 Slovenes had voted to remain in an Austrian state in the 1920 plebiscite, which German nationalists used to split and weaken the Slovene minority.
The language and other rights of minorities in the first Austrian republic were protected by old and new laws. The famed Article 19 of the 1867 nationality law, which mentioned national equality and the protection of each ethnic entity’s nationality and language was part of the constitution of the First Austrian Republic until 1934, while the provisions of the Saint Germain peace treaty on the protection of religious, racial and linguistic rights were also constituent parts of the Austrian constitution and constitutional law. Carinthian Slovenes were also guaranteed linguistic rights – particularly in relation to education in the mother tongue – by provincial laws and regulations. Carinthian political parties promised that they would respect these rights before the 1920 plebiscite, and on 28 September 1920 the Carinthian provincial assembly even adopted a formal statement proclaiming “reconciliation and justice” and confirming that it “desired to protect, today and forever, the linguistic and national character of the Slovene peoples.”

Yet these promises proved illusory. After the plebiscite, Carinthian German politicians soon ignored reconciliation and assurances of protecting Slovene national characteristics, and Carinthian Slovenes lost even the rights they had had in the Habsburg Monarchy. German became the sole language of public administration and business – as throughout Austria – and most bilingual place names and other signs gradually disappeared. At the same time, the Austrian authorities dismissed and oppressed Slovene teachers and removed or replaced almost half the Slovene clergy. In 1921, the provincial education council in Klagenfurt rejected requests for the re-establishment of private Slovene schools (there had been three before the war) and up to the mid-1920s, other attempts to restore Slovene primary education also failed. Slovene parents and children could only choose between German and bilingual (utraquist) primary schools. Austrian Carinthia had inherited these from the Habsburg Monarchy, but Slovene was generally only used as an auxiliary language in the first years of teaching. Post-plebiscite Carinthian German policy faithfully pursued that sketched out on 25 November 1920 at a formal session of the provincial assembly in Klagenfurt by the Landeshauptmann or president of the assembly, Arthur Lemisch. He said that in the “regeneration of the homeland, one must not forget the 15,278 people who voted for union with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” and that within a generation the “Carinthian people,” education and Church should, with the help of “German civilisation … change those who had been seduced … [back into German] Carinthians,” since “German civilisation” had made Carinthia a southern German land.

According to some Austrian historians, the Carinthian Slovenes had the strongest political consciousness of all the first Austrian republic’s minorities, but the plebiscite vote
and new state borders between the Austrian republic and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes weakened them and caused further political divisions. Direct contacts with Slovenes south of the Karavanke mountains were broken off and Carinthian Slovene leaders were left to rely on their own resources. At the same time, an almost insurmountable mistrust arose between those who had supported union with Yugoslavia, and those who had voted for Austria. In 1921, the former Catholic Political and Economic Society for Slovenes in Austrian Carinthia, which had operated within the SLS until 1920, formally separated and dropped the title ‘Catholic’ from its name to win as many Slovenes as possible to its side. It appeared in the elections to the provincial assembly as the Carinthian Slovene Party (Koroška slovenska stranka) and won over 9,800 votes (around 65% of the number of votes cast for unification with Yugoslavia in 1920), which gained it two seats in the assembly. In the first half of the 1920s, the society developed into two groups. The more liberal wing attempted to keep a critical distance in relation to the Catholic Church and ecclesiastical hierarchy, while the more conservative wing supported close co-operation with the Church. The Society was supported by holders of smaller and medium-sized farms, and operated via organisers who were usually members of the clergy. In these circumstances, many Slovene industrial and farm workers continued to look for political support among the social democrats, while more liberal, wealthier farmers and business people looked to the German liberal ‘rural federation’ or Landbund. After the plebiscite, the Austrian Social Democratic Party and the German nationalist Landbund both skilfully manoeuvred to increase their influence among the Slovene population.

The Carinthian (Austrian) Social Democratic Party had a majority in the provincial assembly until 1923, and openly defended the “indivisibility of Carinthia,” though it did not support extreme German positions. Its attitude to Slovenes was adapted to the mood of the voters. The party did not offer decisive opposition to the Slovene demands, but – except in a discussion on the issue of cultural autonomy in 1925 to 1927 – did not offer them any clear support. The main opponents of Slovenes among the Carinthian German parties were the Greater German People’s Party and the liberal Carinthian Farmers’ Party, which changed its name to the Landbund in 1922. Carinthian German politicians rarely used the provincial assembly as the stage for their anti-Slovene messages. Their position was clearly set out by Vinzenz Schumy, the leader of the Landbund and Carinthian Landeshauptmann after 1923, who said that the Germanisation of the Slovenes should take place peacefully without “creating martyrs.” Practical Germanisation actions were largely carried out by the Kärntner Heimatdienst (the Carinthian Homeland Service, which changed its name to the Heimatbund...
in 1924), an organisation formed before the plebiscite by the German parties represented in the provincial assembly and intended to achieve an Austrian (German) victory.

The Heimatdienst, led among others by the later Nazis, Hans Steinhacher and Alois Maier Kaibitsch, became the most active proponents of anti-Slovene actions. Initially it also had the support of the Social Democrats, who left in 1924 due to the growing anti-Semitism and authoritarianism, and aligned themselves against their former allies. The most important points of the Heimatdienst programme were to preserve the memory of the (German) Carinthian resistance against Slovene and Yugoslav units in 1918/19 and promote love for the “indivisible Carinthian homeland”, while its leaders also attempted to acquire support among less nationally conscious or undefined Slovenes and Slovenes who supported German parties for a variety of reasons. In Carinthian German nationalist circles, the idea gradually formed that in addition to ‘national Slovenes’ and German Carinthians living north of the Karavanke mountain, there was also a special ‘German-friendly’ ethno-linguistic group of Wends, who spoke a mixed Slavo-Germanic language and did not hide their identification with German culture, which they had confirmed by voting for Austria in the 1920 plebiscite. This Wend theory, which was ‘proved’ in detail in 1927 by the head of the Carinthian provincial archive, Martin Wutte, became a favourite German tool for pressuring the minority and trying to divide it.

The pressures were economic as well as political. Austrian Carinthia, and particularly its southerly, Slovene-populated area, was among the most poorly developed parts of the First Austrian Republic. Only two of the old ironwork plants had survived the crisis of the second half of the nineteenth century (in Ferlach and Feistritz im Rosental) both of which employed between 250 and 300 people. The traditional craft of rifle making also lived on in Ferlach, while in Arnoldstein there was a lead and zinc mine and the foundry Bleiberger Bergwerks Union (Plajberška rudarska družba). Sawmills and timber companies operated successfully near the large southern Carinthian forests, and there were tourist facilities on Wörthersee and some other lakes. However, agriculture remained the main source of income for the majority of the population. Slovene farmers, with mainly small and medium-sized holdings, were supported by Slovene co-operatives, which were united in 1921 in the Carinthian Co-operative Union (Zveza koroških zadruga). Nevertheless, this of course could not prevent the sale of farms and emigration. Some of the neglected and indebted Slovene farms were purchased by the Heimatbund and the Kärntner Bodensvermittlungsstelle, a Carinthian land agency linked to German national organisations in Germany, which handled the land for Germans from Poland, Sudetenland and Germany (until 1933, just under 200 Slovene
possession covering a total of 4,500 hectares were transferred to German hands, while in the 1930s the German government offered financial support for German immigrants to Carinthia). The foundation of the Carinthian Chamber of Agriculture in 1932 led to the formation of the Kmečka Zveza (Farmers’ Union), a professional and vocational association for Slovene Carinthian farmers, which achieved considerable success in elections to the Chamber of Agriculture. The Carinthian Chamber of Agriculture was the only professional chamber in the province in which Slovenes had adequate representation between the wars.

The major tool of Germanisation was education. After the plebiscite, there were almost no more Slovene teachers in the southern, bilingual part of Austrian Carinthia. Even in the bilingual schools, where pupils were predominantly Slovene (around 90%), many teachers did not know Slovene. Pupil numbers began to fall due to growing anti-Slovene pressure, as did the number of bilingual schools (from 84 in 1918 to 67 in 1936). Slovene educational and cultural organisations tried to take a stand against the consequences of German Carinthian policies aimed at reducing their national rights. In 1922, the pre-war Slovene Christian Socialist Union (Slovenska krščansko-socialna zveza, renamed in 1933 as the Prosvetna zveza, Educational Union) was revived, uniting over 40 educational and cultural societies. The union (largely led by clergy) organised lectures, household and educational courses, nurtured choral singing, staged theatrical performances and had its own library. A major hub of educated Slovenes formed in Vienna, where the Carinthian Slovene Academic Club was founded in 1923 by Carinthian students of Slovene origin.

After 1920, Slovenes in Austria – like their fellow Slovenes in the Julian March – acquired Slovene books and publications from the Yugoslav kingdom, as there was no real possibility of printing and publishing them in Austrian Carinthia. The Society of Hermagoras (Mohorjeva družba) had transferred its headquarters to the Yugoslav side of the border in 1919 (first to Prevalje and then to Celje) and the branch in Klagenfurt was able to retain only 3,000 to 4,000 members. The weekly journal Koroški Slovenec, the paper of the Political and Economic Society for Carinthian Slovenes, was printed in Vienna. A devotional monthly named Nedelja (Sunday) was the only Klagenfurt-based Slovene journal from 1926. The Gurk diocese did not express any great sympathy for Slovene desires and, despite Slovene protests, replaced a number of Slovene priests with Germans in bilingual territory, but was occasionally prepared to let Slovene clergy remain. Representatives of the Carinthian Slovenes also fought for concessions from the Austrian authorities via the Congress of European Minorities and direct negotiations with Germans in Yugoslavia. Their main financial support came from Ljubljana. The Slovene minority in Austrian Carinthia received
less attention in the Yugoslav capital than Slovenes and Croats in Italy, but they received universal sympathy and support in Ljubljana.

More serious attempts to regulate the status of the Slovene minority only came in the mid-1920s. The initiative for talks between the Carinthian German parties and the leadership of the Political and Economic Society for Slovenes in Carinthia came from the Social Democratic Party and representatives of the German minority in Yugoslav Slovenia, who hoped that changes in the Austrian policy towards the Carinthian Slovenes would help improve the lot of Germans in Yugoslavia. The first idea was to adopt an Estonian concept and introduce a nationality register (cadastre) to Carinthia, which would use census data based on ethno-linguistic criteria (ethnicity, linguistic affiliation, electoral roll) to define the minority, which would then acquire a certain amount of cultural autonomy. But the Carinthian German parties moved the discussion from cultural autonomy to the issue of minority schools, and took the position that each individual’s entry in the nationality register should determine their affiliation with a minority. In Austrian Carinthia, this would mean continuing to divide the minority into ‘national Slovenes’ and Wends, which was difficult for Slovenes to accept. Their representatives only supported the nationality register – influenced by the Congress of European Minorities, which sat in Geneva – at the end of the 1920s, and on condition that bilingual schools be turned into Slovene schools. This proposal – despite efforts by the Social Democrats and Christian Socialists to reach a compromise – was not acceptable to the German nationalists. In 1929, they persuaded the other (German) parties to join their side and negotiations ended. In 1930, the Carinthian provincial government abolished the Slovene language as an obligatory subject at the Klagenfurt gymnasium, and Austrian Carinthia celebrated the tenth anniversary of the plebiscite in an entirely German spirit.

In the 1930s, pressure from the Yugoslav Germans led to the debate on increasing the status and use of Slovene in the bilingual schools being reopened in Klagenfurt and Vienna, but without success. In 1933, given their disappointment at the actions of the German parties, most Slovene Carinthian Catholic politicians supported the authoritarian-corporatist regime of Engelbert Dollfuss and the ‘self-dissolution’ of the Austrian parliament. They hoped that the new Austrian authority, which referenced the papal encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, would realise their hopes of ‘Slovene Christian politics’. In reality, Slovene gains between 1934 and 1938 were negligible (there were representatives in the ruling, state-wide Vaterlandsfront, while the number of Slovenes in Carinthia provincial representative bodies and the number of Slovene societies also grew). But the new regime also banned the Political and Economic Society for Slovenes in Carinthia, along with other political associations throughout Austria,
and restricted the use of Slovene place names. The 1934 census was an important indicator of the political climate in the province, according to which the number of Slovenes in Austrian Carinthia had fallen by almost 13,000 since 1923 (32,292 Slovenes in 1923, and 26,792 in 1934). The leadership of the Slovenska Prosvetna Zveza, the only organisation representing Carinthian Slovenes after the Political and Economic Society for Slovenes in Carinthia was disbanded, had little room for manoeuvre in such conditions and continued to seek compromise. The opponents of this policy included a small number of young farmers and workers, who moved closer to the Communist Party of Austria, and attempted to form their own programme based on the declaration issued by Yugoslav, Austrian and Italian Communists on the Slovene question in 1934. But the police discovered their plans and in 1935 the main proponents of the campaign were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

The *Anschluss* in 1938 radically worsened the status of the Carinthian Slovenes. A year after the *Anschluss*, one tenth of Carinthia’s population had already joined the Nazi party. The Nazis did not carry out large-scale persecutions of Slovenes before the German invasion of Yugoslavia as they did not want to harm relations with Belgrade, but they did impose a harsh regime. In 1938/39, the new Nazi authorities imprisoned or transferred the more prominent Slovene leaders and teachers, closed down the bilingual schools, restricted the work and seized the assets of Slovene co-operatives, and banned public events in Slovene. At the same time, they prevented Slovenes from purchasing land and prepared an ambitious plan for the settlement of Germans from elsewhere (including South Tyrol) in bilingual areas of southern Carinthia. A major element of anti-Slovene policy was the creation of ‘harvest’ nursery schools (*Erntekindergarten*), specifically intended to provide children with a German upbringing. In 1939, the Nazis carried out a census to obtain a clearer picture of Carinthia’s national make-up, and a Wendish option was again included along with German and Slovene. Despite this, significantly more Carinthian Slovenes were recorded (44,708) than in either of the preceding censuses, though this count was largely a preparation for their expulsion between 1941 and 1945.

After the First World War, there were also Slovenes living in Hungary, Western Europe, Egypt, the United States and South America. The size of the small Slovene minority in the Rába region, known as Porabje in Slovene – the territory between the Rába river and Szentgotthárd (Monošter) in southwest Hungary – fell rapidly during the 1920s and 1930s. Historically, geographically and culturally, the Porabje region was closely linked with Prekmurje, but in 1919, when Prekmurje became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that link was severed. In 1920, the number of people with Slovene as their
mother tongue in Porabje and Szentgotthárd was 6,087, but by 1941 their number had fallen to 4,816. There are two reasons for this fall: emigration and assimilation. Porabje was an economically passive area, which people left to seek work, and many Slovenes moved to larger Hungarian towns, including Budapest. Assimilation pressures in Hungary between the world wars also dogged the community at every step. In primary schools, only a few hours a week could be dedicated to the mother tongue of a minority, with teaching carried out overwhelmingly in Hungarian despite the requirement to provide bilingual classes agreed in the Treaty of Trianon, and an agreement on nationally mixed areas signed in Vienna, on the basis of which a national regulation had also been issued in 1923. Minority languages, including Slovene, had no other official recognition in public life. Place names and surnames were Magyarised, while there was official support for an explanation similar to the Carinthian Wendish theory, according to which the Porabje Slovenes were not Slavic, but a separate nation of Vends or Wends – a remnant of one-time Celtic groups.

Tens of thousands of Slovene migrants also lived and worked in western Europe. At first, the largest numbers were in Germany (around 40,000), and in the 1920s, as the chances of migrating to the United States were reduced, the migration flow spread significantly towards France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Those seeking work in western Europe generally had little education if any, and most left home with the idea of going abroad only temporarily. Slovenes had their own newspapers and societies in some of the towns and regions in which they settled, or else participated in Yugoslav émigré associations and newspapers.

The largest number of Slovene migrants lived in the United States of America. In 1920, there were a little over 208,000 (including the generation born in the US), but by 1940 their numbers had fallen to 185,000 due to restrictions on immigration (and despite the growth of a second American-born generation). Slovene emigrants to North America – the US and Canada – were largely of farming stock, and found work in the mining and metalworking industries. They had their own support organisations, schools, societies, cultural groups, choirs, newspapers, churches and clergy. Slovene settlers reached 34 American states (with the highest numbers in Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio) and three Canadian provinces. Between the two world wars, Cleveland, Ohio, became their most important centre, and a Slovene quarter developed along St. Clair Avenue. The life of these immigrants, their contacts and homesickness were described by poets and writers who formed the editorial boards of Slovene papers. The work of Ivan Molek (1882–1962) stood out among this group, and Louis Adamič also established himself within the American literary world. In the latter years of the
First World War, a major movement grew up among Slovene émigrés in the United States supporting a Yugoslav republic and fair borders for Slovenes in relation to Austria and Italy; this campaigning also continued for a few years after the war. Nevertheless, many American Slovenes had sympathy for the Karadjordjević kingdom, and even supported the regime after 1929.

In the 1920s and 1930s, and particularly after migration to the United States was almost entirely stopped after 1924, due to restriction imposed by the US government, the number of Slovenes seeking work in South America grew significantly. Before the Second World War, around 25,000 Slovenes migrated to Argentina alone, including 22,000 from Italy’s Julian March, and 1,500 from Prekmurje. Slovenes in Argentina also had their own societies, cultural centres and newspapers. Other Slovenes migrated to Brazil and Uruguay, and, in smaller numbers, to other South American countries. There were also around 7,000 Slovene women living and working in Egypt before the Second World War, largely in domestic service as wet nurses, nannies and maids.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR – OCCUPATION

For Yugoslavia, the Second World War began on 6 April 1941, when German troops crossed the Yugoslav border, with no prior declaration of war. The German units were followed by military companies from Yugoslavia’s neighbours. The Italian army moved into the Drava banovina, while on 16 April Hungarian soldiers moved into Prekmurje, after an initial German occupation.

Yugoslav units at first attempted to defend the state border, but after the German breakthrough retreated into the interior. With the start of military operations, volunteers came forward in towns and larger settlements, and included members of many different political groups – even Communists, which meant that the volunteer ranks included people who a year or two later would be taking up arms against each in a merciless struggle. The April battles in the Drava banovina lasted just six days. The Italian forces gradually occupied the Slovene territory claimed by Italy, though they advanced more slowly than the Germans; on the afternoon of 11 April, they marched into Ljubljana. By the time the official surrender of Yugoslavia was signed on 17 April 1941, the Drava banovina had already ceased to exist for over a week.

Yugoslav Slovenia was therefore divided by three occupying forces in 1941. The German army occupied Gorenjska, Štajerska (with the border south of the Sava), part of
Dolenjska and the Mežiška Dolina valley. The Italians occupied Ljubljana and its surroundings, the parts of Notranjska not incorporated in Italy by the Rapallo border, and most of Dolenjska, while the Hungarians occupied most of Prekmurje. If one considers the territory of the Drava banovina carved up between the occupiers in 1941, and the areas with a Slovene population that were already part of the German Reich or Kingdom of Italy before the war started, Slovene-populated land was divided into eleven regional administrative units.

The German occupiers divided Slovene territory into two units: Untersteiermark or Lower Styria and “the occupied territory of Carinthia and Carniola.” The civil administration was directly subordinate to Berlin, and began to implement Heinrich Himmler’s Germanisation plan immediately after occupation. The aim was to Germanise occupied areas by changing place names, surnames and given names, imposing German as the only language of public communications, gradually destroying Slovene cultural heritage and seizing state, social, and in part also private, assets. The German occupiers divided the population based on race and political views into full German citizens, provisional citizens and inhabitants without citizenship (which matched the division into Germans, Wends and Slovenes), while they also planned to deport between 220,000 and 260,000 Slovenes, who were to be “replaced” by 60,000 to 100,000 immigrants of German nationality.

The Italian regime in the Province of Ljubljana (Provincia di Lubiana), which covered Notranjska (up to the pre-war Yugoslav-Italian border), most of Dolenjska and Ljubljana and surroundings up to the Sava river, was relatively ‘more lenient’ than the German. The Italian authorities did not arrive with plans to deport the local population and the inhabitants of the Province of Ljubljana were granted full Italian citizenship after its annexation to the Kingdom of Italy on 3 May 1941. At the same time – despite nationalist propaganda and promotion of Italian cultural achievements – the new territory was left a certain amount of autonomy and bilingualism was permitted. But the attitude to Slovenes in the provinces of Gorizia and Trieste, where the Slovene-speaking population had no rights as a national group, did not change. The regime in Prekmurje was also harsh; the Hungarians permitted the partial use of the Prekmurje dialect of Slovene, but Hungarian was the only official public language. The Hungarian authorities annexed Prekmurje to Hungary on 16 December 1941 and granted the local population Hungarian citizenship, but also imprisoned and interned many of the more prominent Slovenes. The Germans and Italians also planned to formalise the annexation of the occupied regions in law. The Germans delayed however and did not formally annex the occupied territory, while Mussolini and the Italian king did not sign the law incorporating the Province of Ljubljana into Italy until April 1943.
At the start of the war, there were no groups of Slovenes aligned with the occupying forces or supportive of the Axis powers. The leaders of the Catholic Slovene People’s Party (SLS) agreed before the fighting started that in case of war they would send representatives abroad, and operate legally and illegally at home. They also persisted with the idea that the partition of Slovene territory should be avoided, and they should ensure it was taken by a single occupying power. Once hostilities began and contact with the central Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade had been broken, representatives of the political parties headed by the Ban, Marko Natlačen, founded a National Council (Narodni svet), which was intended to assume authority over the former Drava banovina and represent its inhabitants in negotiations with the occupiers. But the National Council was in no position to assume authority, since the Italians were already in control by 11 April.

Natlačen had no choice but to welcome Italian military commanders, before going to Celje – in line with the SLS policy that the Drava banovina should fall to just one occupier – to attempt to convince the Germans to occupy all of Yugoslav Slovenia and give it the status held by Slovakia and the ‘independent’ State of Croatia. The German commander in Celje refused to even meet the Ban. The National Council and Natlačen therefore restricted their contact to the Italians, proclaiming their loyalty and sent a similar request to Mussolini to maintain the integrity of their territory. Mussolini, of course, was powerless to change the borders between the occupying powers, but supported the co-operation of Slovene representatives in administering the territory occupied by the Italian army.

When the National Council was founded on 6 April 1941, the Communists also offered to participate, but the offer was rejected by the Council stating that they were not a legal political party. The attitude of the Slovene and Yugoslav Communist Party leadership to the war and occupation was initially extremely unclear. The leading ideologist of the Slovene Communists, Edvard Kardelj, said in October 1940 that his party would support resistance against any occupying force, if it was in the interest of the revolution and the Soviet Union. This position, linked to a naïve expectation that a social revolution would break out in Germany, was still held by the Yugoslav and Slovene Communist party leadership in spring 1941, so after the German invasion of Yugoslavia still only a limited number of the leading Communists unambiguously positioned themselves against the Germans, and the Communists who participated as volunteers in the April war, were mainly students. They were also the main proponents after the collapse of Yugoslavia of co-operation between the Communists, patriotic liberal groups, Catholic groups critical of the SLS, and a number of artists and writers, which led to the formation of the Liberation or Anti-imperialist Front on 26 April.
The objectives of the front, first called the Liberation Front, renamed by leading Communists as the Anti-Imperialist Front, before reverting to the name Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Front – OF) following the German attack on the Soviet Union at the end of July 1941, were drawn up at the founding meeting in Ljubljana by a member of the Slovene Communist leadership, Boris Kidrič (1912–53). He supported a mass uprising based on the conviction that Slovenes should take responsibility for their own liberation. According to Kidrič, the real “hope” for Slovenia and Yugoslavia was the Soviet Union, and the Slovenes should not unite with one side or the other in an “imperialist” war between the Axis powers and western democracies. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, some other political groups that did not equate to the traditional parties also joined the movement sparked by the founding of the OF. Some of these associations and people had co-operated with Communists in the 1930s, others not, such as some former Yugoslav ministers and representatives of cultural, women’s, sport and vocational organisations. The groups that joined the OF after the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities were very ideologically and politically diverse, but were united by a dissatisfaction with pre-war conditions in Slovenia and Yugoslavia, and were vehemently anti-fascist and opposed to the occupation.

When German units started to occupy Slovene territory, members of the German Kulturbund in the towns of Štajerska prepared an enthusiastic welcome. On 26 April 1941, Adolf Hitler visited Maribor and called on the occupying authorities to carry out the Germanisation of Lower Styria as quickly as possible. The German occupiers – together with local Germans – also warmly accepted a significant number of Slovenes, who hoped the German regime would improve their economic position and quality of life. Similar illusions were held by some in Dolenjska, where, disappointed at finding themselves on the Italian side, people protested against the German-Italian partition.

The naïve idea that the economic might of the Germans would make their occupation preferable to that of the Italians was rapidly dispelled. The German authorities immediately began imprisoning known and politically prominent Slovenes, helped in Štajerska by information from members of the German minority. In June 1941, the first wave of deportations and persecutions followed. By the end of July 1942, the Germans had deported around 55,000 people from Gorenjska and Štajerska (around 37,000 to Germany, 10,000 to Croatia and 7,500 to Serbia), while 17,000 had fled (mainly into the Province of Ljubljana). Over 170 Slovene families (917 people) were deported from pre-war Austrian Carinthia. The people deported from Štajerska and Gorenjska included many educated people, particularly
priests, while those who remained – with a few exceptions – did not receive German citizenship but only the status of protected inhabitants of the German Reich (i.e. with limited rights). German violence therefore led to spontaneous resistance, even before the Communists and the Anti-Imperialistic Front joined battle. Lightly armed groups of refugees who withdrew into the forests won support among the populace.

In contrast to the German authorities, at the start of the war the Italians attempted to win over educated Slovenes and the clergy in the Province of Ljubljana. The Italian authorities also attempted to incorporate the newly acquired areas into the Italian state and fascist system, but considered it best to proceed slowly. On occupation, they prohibited political parties, introduced restrictive measures and persecuted Primorska Slovenes, who had fled to Yugoslavia from the Julian March (Venezia Giulia) between 1920 and 1941. In the Province of Ljubljana, however, they introduced bilingualism and granted administrative and cultural autonomy. Its male population was exempt from military service, and almost all the Slovene social, economic and cultural infrastructure remained in place. In 1941, the Province of Ljubljana was therefore the only part of Slovene territory which retained a Slovene appearance – albeit under stricture – and a public Slovene cultural life.

The Italian occupiers intended to subordinate the Slovene cultural and social elite via a considered policy of patronage. These plans were based on a belief in the supremacy of Italian culture, which on coming into contact with the ‘weaker’ Slovene culture would accelerate Slovene assimilation into the ‘higher culture’ of an Italian nation, steeped in the Fascist spirit. The Italians permitted the central Slovene cultural institutions – alongside the schools and university – to continue their work, invited Italian artists, scientists and politicians to Ljubljana, and organised cultural events, while “drawing attention to” the historical links between Slovene and Italian culture. This policy did not meet with much enthusiasm, but nor did it meet with vocal protest. At the beginning of the occupation, educated and Church circles did not take a definitive stand against the Italian authorities. Compared with the German occupation policy, the Italians were indisputably the ‘lesser evil’, and the general opinion was that the occupation was temporary and should be lived through with as few victims as possible. The attitude of educated people and the Church authorities to the Italian occupiers began to change in the second half of 1941, after the German attack on the Soviet Union, and after the Italians had openly changed to a policy of ‘fascistisation’ and Italianisation for Slovene institutions and organisations.

The leaders of the traditional parties thought and acted similarly to much of the educated class in the Province of Ljubljana. On 26 May 1941, Ban Natlačen and the liberal
politician Ivan Pucelj joined a 14-member council (*consulta*), intended to co-operate with the Italian high commissioner in the administration of Ljubljana. At the end of May 1941, younger members of the SLS and the liberal camp formed illegal legions (*legije*) to clandestinely prepare for armed resistance. Following the example of Colonel Draža Mihailović in Serbia, recognised by all larger Slovene parties as the commanding officer of the Yugoslav army remnants, former officers formed illegal, ‘Chetnik’ units. But leading Slovene politicians maintained their wait-and-see policy and believed the war would be long-lasting. The members of the *consulta* visited Mussolini at the beginning of June 1941 in Rome and presented him an official notice of gratitude. The bishop of Ljubljana, Gregorij Rožman, sent similar statements of loyalty to the Italian authorities. The actions of the Ljubljana politicians and diocese were skilfully used for Italian propaganda, so Natlačen’s excessive loyalty was criticised even by party colleagues, and Rožman’s likewise by priests in Primorska. Slovene party leaders were in contact with Slovenes in the Yugoslav government in exile in London, which they considered the only legitimate representative of the fallen Yugoslav kingdom.

The Communist Party and the Anti-Imperialist Front were also still waiting for the Germans to attack the Soviet Union. In Štajerska and the Province of Ljubljana, the first local organisations of the Anti-Imperialist Front were formed in May and June. There were even some spontaneous attacks on the occupying police and soldiers, and the Communist leadership formed a special military commission and charged it with preparing for the coming struggle. Yet Yugoslav and Slovene Communist leaders only reached the final decision to start an armed conflict on 22 June 1941, when German troops marched into Soviet territory. Slovene Communist leaders issued a proclamation, published by the illegal newspaper *Slovenski poročevalec* (The Slovene Reporter) after the German attack, calling for a fight for freedom “on the ruins of imperialism,” supporting the “unification of the partitioned Slovene territory,” the exercise of the “right of the Slovene nation to self-determination” and “harmony and unity among the enslaved nations of Yugoslavia and the entire Balkans in the fight for freedom.” The mainstay of the “fight of the Slovene and all oppressed nations” was to be the Soviet Union. At the end of June, the Communist pronouncements were upheld at a meeting of the Anti-Imperialist Front by representatives of its founding groups – the Catholics, liberal members of Sokol and cultural groupings. The renaming of the Anti-imperialist Front as the Liberation Front (OF) was confirmed, and a decision was taken by the Communists that their military commission would become the main military command of the “Slovene Partisan units.”
Nevertheless, the OF leadership still hesitated and only fully committed itself to an armed struggle at the end of July 1941, once the Soviet ‘Great Patriotic War’ had started. The Communists who took control of the armed resistance were convinced – unlike politicians from the bourgeois parties – that the war would not last long, as they believed that the Red Army would rapidly defeat the German aggressors. Different assessments of the length and future course of the war inevitably had a major impact on the positions taken by people and political parties, and the dilemma of whether to wait patiently or take up arms deepened the divisions between the supporters of the OF and its opponents.

ARMED UPRISING, VIOLENT RETALIATION, AND THE START OF THE CIVIL WAR

The uprising against the occupier started in Gorenjska, where small groups of Partisans set up roadblocks, disrupted communication lines and attacked German police stations. In summer 1941, resistance units also formed in Štajerska, Dolenjska and the area around Ljubljana. The first resistance units were dominated by Communists and their sympathisers, while the Christian Socialists in the OF and Partisan units also played an important part in recruiting fighters. However, the main command was firmly in Communist hands and in July 1941 it had already prepared a set of rules on the organisation of Partisan units. This was patterned along the lines of the international brigade in Spain, and included the position of political commissioner (responsible for political supervision of military units), which was only filled by Communists. The rules used the term ‘Partisan’ for the resistance fighters, while the Communist leaders called for “universal resistance” covering “all Slovene territory.” By autumn 1941, there were 19 Partisan units in Slovene territory with around 700 fighters, who attacked enemy positions, withdrawing to safety after engagements. The idea of active resistance to the occupying force found popular support in towns. It was supported by the young and the educated in the Province of Ljubljana, and Ljubljana with its large network of OF committees became the centre of resistance activity.

The occupying authorities responded to resistance actions with force. By late autumn 1941, the Germans had broken or taken out of action most Partisan units in Gorenjska and Štajerska, and in August 1941 the first four prisoners were shot (the number would reach 849 by the end of the war) near Begunje in Gorenjska, where the occupiers set up one of the bloodiest prisons on Slovene territory. Captured OF activists and hostages were shot in increasing numbers in Štajerska as well, and nationally conscious Slovenes were imprisoned,
exiled and sent to concentration camps. In September 1941, the Italian authorities in the Province of Ljubljana made their regime more oppressive, introducing confinement for political suspects and a court of summary justice for captured resistance fighters.

However, in autumn 1941, the Slovene Communist leadership – despite the violence of the occupiers and the meagre military successes of the resistance movement – decided that the time had come for further serious action. On 16 September, the OF presidium (Vrhovni plenum), which included representatives of all the OF member groups, was renamed as the Slovene National Liberation Committee (Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni odbor – SNOO) and proclaimed as the highest body of the “authority of the people,” and the only one “to represent, organise and lead the Slovene nation” in time of war. SNOO produced some far-reaching decisions immediately after its formation. It proclaimed Slovene Partisan units as an army with its own command within the Partisan Army of Yugoslavia, and ordered a “national tax” on the population, which it portrayed as a “loan for freedom.” It also passed a resolution on the “protection of the Slovene nation and its liberation and unification movement,” which anticipated a settling of scores with “traitors” and opponents of the OF. In August 1941, the Communist Party had already founded the Security and Intelligence Service (Varnostno-obveščevalna služba – VOS), which was run by the inner core of the Communist leadership. In autumn 1941, on the basis of the SNOO resolution, VOS began to ‘liquidate’ individuals deemed by the Communists to be ‘informers’ and ‘political opponents’. Communist leaders decided on VOS actions in private, without detailed discussions with their OF allies.

The leaders and members of the traditional political parties anxiously followed the upsurge in resistance action and the occupying forces’ violent retaliation against the OF, which they took to confirm their assessment that an armed uprising was senseless. Naturally, they also saw the proclamation of the OF leadership as the only representative of the Slovene nation as a clear threat. Their view was that the OF was just a tool of the Communist Party and their preparations for revolution, and found evidence for this in articles in the illegal press describing them as the “traitorous gentry” and in flyers and anti-occupational slogans with Communist insignia. However, they still failed to choose a course of action backing clear opposition to the occupation, which might have confirmed their political authority. They underestimated the general population’s support for the resistance, and the power and influence of the Communists, and uncritically pursued Yugoslav policy laid down in London and elsewhere in the West, which, on the prompting of Western allies, counselled patiently waiting.

Natlačen and Pucelj, as representatives of the two leading Slovene political parties, left
the *consulta* in September and publicly stated their disagreement with a body that had no influence on Italian occupational policy. At the same time, the Catholic and liberal leaders agreed on a political programme, which they secretly sent to the Slovene representatives in the Yugoslav government in London. The programme proclaimed the Slovene political objective to be the unification of all Slovene-inhabited areas in a new democratic and federal kingdom of Yugoslavia. At the end of September, Lambert Ehrlich, spiritual leader of the pre-war Catholic club, *Straža*, put together his own programme. On numerous occasions, Ehrlich tried and failed to persuade Natlačen to set up an illegal national government. In his declaration, Ehrlich called for the liberation of “all Slovenes” from the rule of foreign authorities and the unification of all Slovene provinces in an “independent Slovene state.” This would be linked with Croatia, Serbia and even Bulgaria in a “union of South Slav countries – Yugoslavia” or would join a confederation of states in the territory between the Baltic, Adriatic and Aegean seas. Ehrlich considered that one possibility was a completely independent Slovene state that as a “cultural, economic and transport link between the West, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” would become the “Switzerland of Eastern Europe.”

Ehrlich’s followers, the *stražarji*, handed his proposal to Natlačen in September, and also sent it to the Slovene representatives in London, who did not issue a response, and were clearly not particularly enthusiastic about it. Catholic leaders in Ljubljana were particularly reserved, and also made no official response to Ehrlich’s declaration. Together with liberal leaders, they persisted with agreed policies, while repeating – partly under British pressure – that it was still too early for any resistance. They argued that the policies of the Communists and the OF were in conflict with Yugoslav and Allied interests, and more and more openly declared OF adherents to be irresponsible and even criminal. In October 1941, in the Province of Ljubljana, the diocese of Ljubljana and some of the clergy joined the critics of the OF with a pastoral letter from Bishop Rožman condemning actions taken against the occupying forces by “irrational people.”

By the end of 1941, two opposing political blocs had formed in Slovene territory – though at first mainly within the Province of Ljubljana – already openly hostile to each other, while between them was a mass of undefined people, which both sides tried to win over. In November 1941, the OF leadership condensed its programme into seven points. This affirmed the decision for “immediate resistance” against the occupying forces and the commitment to United Slovenia idea, Yugoslavism, and the brotherhood of “the Slavic nations under the leadership of the great Russian nation,” while also stating that the OF’s struggle against the
occupier was changing the “Slovene national character,” forging a new kind of Slovene: a fighter and revolutionary. The seven points committed the groups making up the OF to mutual loyalty and stated that after the war the OF would assume authority and introduce a “people’s democracy.” The type of state and social arrangements were not yet defined in detail, but in two points which were added by the OF leadership at the start of 1942 they made reference to Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, and stated that the “nation itself” would decide these matters after the war. In autumn 1941, the OF increased its illegal activity, and the number of activists, propaganda campaigns and incidents of sabotage grew.

From autumn 1941, the Yugoslav Communist leadership also called on the OF leaders to step up the armed resistance. At the beginning of the war, contacts between Slovene Communists and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) and the Supreme Command (glavni or vrhovni štab) of the “national liberation detachments of Yugoslavia” in Serbia were irregular and tentative. One important link between the Communist leadership in Slovenia and the KPJ leadership in Serbia was Edvard Kardelj, a member of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Partisan Army, who from Serbia exhorted Slovene leaders to be politically aware and to mobilise the population. Towards the end of 1941, influenced by such calls and convinced that the Red Army’s victory would be swift, Slovene Communist leaders decided to escalate efforts against opponents of resistance and to attempt risky, new military engagements. By January 1942, members of VOS and Partisans in Ljubljana and elsewhere in Slovene territory had killed over 120 people, who were referred to, following Soviet precedent, as “White Guards” (belogardisti). At the beginning of 1942, the OF called for a boycott of Italian cultural and other public events and a cultural ‘blackout’, which further divided opinion. In December 1941, during a harsh winter, the Partisan Command restarted its campaign of major military engagement, primarily in Gorenjska where after some initial successes, armed German units caused major Partisan losses. The battle for Dražgoše, the village to which the Partisans’ Cankar Battalion retreated on 9 January 1942, only to abandon it three days later to a superior German force, revealed the weaknesses of Partisan military strategy. The Germans captured the village and destroyed it, killing or deporting any inhabitant that had not fled.

By the beginning of 1942, the Communist leadership’s uncompromising policy and resistance led to splits and major reservations among its most ardent advocates. The arbitrary settling of scores with opponents, references to the Soviet Union, accusations of treason against Yugoslav politicians-in-exile, and poorly planned armed actions with a high toll of human life all raised doubts about the sincerity of the Communist Party and its willingness to
reach agreement in consensus with the other groups within the OF. Critics of Communist radicalism within the OF recognised Communist achievements in organising the resistance and even their “leading role” in the movement, but also warned against excess “promotion of belligerence” and pointed out that the war was still far from over. “Given the state in which we now find ourselves, our armed actions should be limited to self-defence,” the national democrat Lojze Ude (1896–1982) wrote in January 1942. Ude, who was without doubt a supporter of the resistance, but harboured some reservations, believed that the elimination of OF opponents carried out by the Communist security service represented a greater evil than the ‘informers’ themselves. He favoured their “sentencing in regular criminal procedures after liberation,” while calling for the organisation of a “Slovene (resistance) army” that would aim to “protect Slovene borders.”

Meanwhile, the occupying forces stepped up the pressure on the population. The German authorities deported around 36,000 people between December 1941 and July 1942 from the territory between the Sotla and Sava rivers, moving German families into the emptied villages, mainly the Kočevarji or Gottschee Germans from the Province of Ljubljana (around 12,000), who were moved to the Reich at their own request. The number of people executed, imprisoned and sent to German concentration camps grew rapidly, and the Gestapo persecuted the family members and relatives of OF activists and fighters as well as the combatants themselves. In summer 1942, the Germans started to mobilise young men in Gorenjska and Štajerska into the German armed forces. At the same time, conditions in the Province of Ljubljana deteriorated significantly. In January 1942, Mussolini had entrusted the enforcement of law and order in the region to the army. One month later, the Italians surrounded Ljubljana with a 41 km-long barrier of barbed wire to prevent its inhabitants from unsupervised contact with the city’s surroundings. Hundreds of Ljubljana’s inhabitants were imprisoned after a large number of raids, and over 4,000 people were taken to Italian concentration camps (in Gonars, Visco, Renici d’Anghiari, and on the island of Rab). At the same time, the Italian army followed the German example and started to destroy and burn entire villages in the fight against the Partisans and the population that supported them. In spring 1942, the Italian authorities expanded the violent campaign to the Julian March and filled prisons in Trieste and northern Italian towns with Slovenes.

Nevertheless, in spring 1942, the Partisan movement had gained new strength and by July Partisan units controlled significant territory within the Province of Ljubljana. This development was partly due to the Italian tactic of withdrawing military units to larger settlements, and restricting itself to protecting major roads and communications routes, and
punitive expeditions outside its fortified encampments. The rapid upturn in the fight against
the occupying forces was a convincing expression of the popular support enjoyed by the
resistance movement, which even opponents of the OF recognised. Between March and May
1942 alone, Partisan forces in the Province of Ljubljana grew from 700 to around 2,500 in
number, and partisan units were also formed in Gorenjska, Štajerska and Primorska. In mid-
1942, the first OF units north of the Karavanke mountains were formed by Carinthian
Slovenes. The Slovene Partisan command organised the army into companies, battalions and
detachments (čete, bataljone, odrede), as with Partisan units elsewhere in Yugoslavia. To
emphasise the national defence objective of the movement, new units were named after
Slovene poets and writers, following the example of the Ivan Cankar company and battalion,
which had formed in 1941.

The Partisan fighters were mainly farmers and workers, and there were far more
Catholics than Communists. In the Partisan squads in the Province of Ljubljana and the ‘field
committees’ of the OF, which assumed authority over areas controlled by Partisan companies
in 1942, Communists were actually in the minority. The OF field committees – under the
influence of the Communist leadership which considered that the time had arrived for new
“popular authority” to be represented and implemented – organised elections to national
liberation committees in May 1942. In spring 1942, the OF leadership and most of the
Communist leaders moved out of Ljubljana to territory controlled by Partisan units, and a
month later the OF executive committee founded the National Liberation Council
(Narodnoosvobodilni svet), which, as a “temporary democratic people’s government,” would
take care of the administrative, economic, educational and military matters in “liberated
territory.”

The success and growth of the Partisan movement in spring and summer 1942
increased the conviction among leading Communists and their most committed activists that a
decisive military conflict was approaching, and the time was coming for a change from the
initial, liberation phase, to the second “revolutionary” phase of the struggle. In this
atmosphere, they were completely un receptive to critics who warned of excessive
belligerence and the extremely harmful consequences for the future of Slovenia of the rash
elimination of opponents. The Communist security service killed 60 people in the first few
months of 1942 in Ljubljana alone; people who the Communist leadership had proclaimed as
collaborators and informers, while, elsewhere in the Province of Ljubljana, Partisan units and
OF activists killed several hundred more. The OF leadership also threatened to kill anyone
attempting to organise an armed group outside of OF auspices. In some places, Communists,
convinced that the time for revolution had come, took authority completely into their own hands. At the same time, they expressed their mistrust of the Catholic population more and more openly, and accused their allies of being too hesitant and too caught up in their own interests. This led to tensions within Partisan units and the OF leadership, which in parts of Dolenjska and Notranjska had already led to violent encounters with Catholic activists, who began to leave the Partisan ranks, though only on an individual basis.

Communist violence and the deteriorating relations between Communists and their fellow combatants strengthened opponents of the armed resistance, who saw in these events further proof of their claims about the Communists’ dominance of the Partisan movement, who they accused of attempting to carry out a revolution “with all its horrors” during an occupation. Slovene People’s Party (SLS) representatives reported from the countryside that Partisans were becoming a greater enemy to the Catholic population than the occupying forces, and to some extent the SLS began to encourage this idea. The party newspapers issued in Ljubljana described the OF movement as completely Communist despite the large numbers of Catholics among the Partisans and this had a great influence on public opinion. The idea that the Slovene nation had gained another internal enemy alongside the occupying forces was also publicly expressed by Slovene politicians in London. Slovene political leaders in London and Ljubljana even took the position that the traditional Slovene parties should close their ranks even tighter. In March 1942, their representatives in Ljubljana founded a joint illegal body, the Slovenska Zaveza (Slovene Pact or Covenant). The group recognised Slovene political representatives in London as the legitimate authority over Slovenia, and units commanded by General Mihailović as the legitimate army in Yugoslav territory. Its founders invited the Communists to participate, which was already completely unrealistic. Attempts by more modern OF members and the traditional party camps to reach agreement with the OF on a truce to avoid a fratricidal conflict between Slovenes failed, and the SLS gradually assumed the leadership of the Slovenska Zaveza.

THE LIBERATION WAR, REVOLUTION AND COLLABORATION

A number of the Slovene politicians who so far had only rejected the OF and the Partisans in words and through propaganda, determined in spring 1942 to take further, fateful measures. They declared an open war on the Communists and the OF and sought support for that war from the Italian occupying forces. The first to take this step were members of Straža, the pre-war Catholic academy club. The stražarji and their mentor Lambert Ehrlich were
among the most uncompromising opponents of the OF, and from the beginning of the resistance against the occupying forces accused the Communists of exploiting the movement to realise their own plans for revolution. The Communists’ violence against their opponents seemed to confirm their accusations.

In March 1942, the stražarji were already co-operating with the Italian police to track down and interrogate OF members. In spring 1942, Ehrlich severely criticised Italian occupational policy. In a letter to the Italian representatives, he stated that Italian authority over the Province of Ljubljana was temporary, despite its incorporation into Italy, since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia still had an internationally recognised government in London, and had not been totally defeated, which meant that the future of Slovene territory could only be settled by a peace conference after the war. At the same time, however, he invited the Italian authorities to form an autonomous Slovene security service to protect the population against Partisan and Communist violence. The mayor of Ljubljana, Juro Adlešič, the former ban, Marko Natlačen, Bishop Rožman, and the former Yugoslav general, Leon Rupnik (1880–1946), all made similar proposals to the Italians; Rupnik justified his idea for Slovene ‘security’ units on military grounds. At the same time, a partially spontaneous, partially organised resistance to the Partisan movement grew up in a number of places in Dolenjska. The organised armed anti-Partisan groups were supported by clergy, while in some areas priests opposed the formation of anti-Partisan squads and clearly came out in favour of the Partisan side.

The question of the appropriate response to the Partisan movement and of Slovene policy under occupation therefore also led to divisions among the Catholic clergy. In Štajerska, the Germans acted with extreme violence against priests from the very start of the war, imprisoning and deporting them, and even executing many of them. In Maribor, Bishop Tomažič was confined and isolated. In 1941, Tomažič had called on priests and believers to refrain from “unlawful” acts against the occupiers, but he was not prepared to co-operate with the Germans, and in many places those priests remaining in the Lavantine diocese after the German deportations supported and joined the resistance movement. The situation was similar in Primorska, where most Slovene priests were totally anti-Fascist, though they had reservations about the Communists, who they were prepared to make contact with, but without any great commitment. Large-scale co-operation between the occupying forces and the Catholic Church and clergy therefore only took place in the Province of Ljubljana, where, in autumn 1941, Bishop Rožman had already rejected any alliance with the Communists, citing the papal encyclical Divini redemptoris. After the assassination of Lambert Ehrlich,
shot by VOS agents in May 1942, and the liquidation of a number of priests, Rožman rejected the OF and Partisans outright. Although later it intervened on numerous occasions with the occupying authorities on behalf of prisoners who were known resistance supporters, it did not heed calls from envoys of the OF and moderates in the liberal and Catholic parties, who attempted to persuade the Church hierarchy not to take sides in the escalating civil war. Yet part of the clergy continued to support the Partisan movement, even in the Province of Ljubljana. They performed religious ceremonies for fighters and their units, and ensured that sacramental life was as normal as possible in territories occupied by resistance units.

The Italian authorities were well aware that even opponents of the OF and Partisans did not support the occupation, and that their real political objective was to restore Slovenia within a democratic Yugoslav state, expanded to include the Slovene-populated areas of the Julian March and Austrian Carinthia. Yet, in summer 1942, they accepted an offer from Slovene political leaders, who suggested the formation of anti-Partisan units. The armed groups that already existed were legalised, while new groups were provided with arms and equipment. From July 1942, the number of ‘vaške straže’ (Village Guards) opposing the Partisans in the surroundings of Ljubljana, and in Dolenjska and Notranjska began to grow. Although guards were initially charged with defensive duties, they also collaborated on Italian military operations. Participation in the units was voluntary at first, but pressure to join them quickly increased. The most ardent organisers were SLS activists and priests. Along with the Catholic party they had the largest influence over the anti-Partisan units, and opposed attempts by liberal and Chetnik leaders to use the guards to strengthen the Chetnik movement. In August 1942, the Italian authorities incorporated the Village Guards into the Milizia Volontaria Anticomunista (MVAC), which was led by a special military office in Ljubljana; the units were under the supervision of Italian officers.

In an anti-resistance offensive lasting just over four months in summer and autumn 1942, the Italians managed to conduct a thorough sweep of the Province of Ljubljana, but meanwhile a fratricidal conflict broke out on their territory – the Slovene civil war. The Italian army broke up Partisan units on numerous occasions and, particularly at the start of the offensive, acted with extreme violence against the civilian population. Members of the Village Guards and other anti-Partisan units actively collaborated in the detection, persecution and killing of OF members and Partisan fighters. By the end of October 1942, 26,000 inhabitants of the Province of Ljubljana were in Italian prison camps, while over 1,000 had been shot by occupying soldiers and their Slovene allies during the offensive, with hundreds also falling in battle. Despite these loses, the OF leadership and Partisan command still managed to break
through the Italian encirclement and retreat to the hills southwest of Ljubljana. The major Italian offensive, and the German military actions taking place at the same time against resistance units in Gorenjska and Štajerska, therefore failed to achieve their objective. Italians strengthened their control of areas in the Province of Ljubljana previously held by Partisan units and frightened and demoralised the population, but they did not destroy the OF and Partisan movement.

After German and Italian military pressure relented slightly, and the Red Army finally achieved its desperately hard-fought victory at Stalingrad, the Slovene Communist leadership was convinced that the time had come to fully consolidate the leading position it held within the resistance movement. They were particularly aggravated by their Catholic allies, who had played an important role in revitalising the Partisan army after the Italian offensive, as their reputation had attracted most of the new recruits. The political strength of the Catholic group and its efforts to maintain its own political organisation increased, while difficulties increased in relations with the Communists, who were not prepared to allow any of their allies the same organisational independence they themselves enjoyed. The conception of the OF as a coalition of allies opposing the occupying forces as equals was simply unacceptable for the Communist leadership, which saw the fight against occupation as the precursor to revolution. From autumn 1942 the Slovene Communist leaders were also under heightened pressure from the Yugoslav Partisan and Communist leadership. Previously, they had largely stayed out of Slovene affairs, but with the expansion of the Partisan movement throughout the former Yugoslavia, they wanted to strengthen their military and political organisation. Nowhere else in Yugoslav territory did the Partisan movement have a plural composition like the Slovene Liberation Front (OF), so the KPJ leadership decided that the Slovene resistance movement should be brought under firmer Communist control.

At the end of February 1943, Slovene Communist leaders therefore demanded that the Catholic and liberal representatives in the OF sign a statement (known as the Dolomite Declaration due to being signed in the Polhov Gradec Dolomites), in which they recognised the Communists’ leading role in the resistance movement and its right to its own political party, while renouncing the right to political organisations, or even activists, of their own, reducing their adherents’ status to mere members of OF units. The Dolomite Declaration marks the point at which the Communists formally subordinated their allies. Initially, some leading members of the Catholic and liberal groups opposed the decision. However, Communist leaders threatened anyone who opposed the declaration with isolation and even liquidation.
The successes of the resistance campaign in spring 1943 contributed significantly to defusing the situation within the leadership of the Slovene Partisan movement in the aftermath of the Communist ‘putsch’. Partisan units achieved several military successes, and new partisan units were formed, not just in the Province of Ljubljana, but also elsewhere, and particularly in Gorenjska and Primorska. The Partisan leadership reorganised its units and focused its attacks on rail and road connections, in the expectation of an Allied landing on the Adriatic coast. In June 1943 Major William Jones arrived at the high command of the Slovene resistance units located in the Kočevje forest as the envoy of a British-American military mission, and one month later the Slovene Partisans received their first consignment of arms from the Allies.

Meanwhile, the civil war was spreading. After VOS assassinated Natlačan, the former ban, in October 1942 and the Italian authorities shot 24 hostages in Ljubljana in retaliation, the Communists ended their policy of liquidating prominent opponents. During the Italian offensive, Communist violence against the civilian population in Dolenjska and Notranjska increased, but it was no longer possible to stop the spread of the anti-Partisan Village Guards. In May 1943, the movement already included 6,000 men in the Province of Ljubljana. In spring 1943, the leaders of the traditional parties – like the OF leadership – were convinced that a decisive turning point in the war and a major Allied landing were approaching. They therefore decided to concentrate their forces and prepare for a major confrontation with the Communists, who they considered to be their main opponents.

Against this backdrop, the efforts of individuals calling for opposing parties to reach a truce and reconciliation were unsuccessful. At the start of 1943, under pressure from those around him, Bishop Rožman broke off contact with Catholics in the OF, and again condemned the Partisan movement as a godless Communist movement. But in spring of the same year, the demands for negotiations between representatives of the two largest Slovene political parties and the OF leadership started to come from London as well. Slovene politicians in London, who found themselves in an uncomfortable position due to the collaboration of the party political leaders with the Italians, persuaded the opponents of the Liberation Front to attempt to agree a truce with the Communists and their allies and stop the civil war. But there was no real desire for a truce on the ground. In May 1943, Bishop Rožman also supported the initiative for a truce between the OF and its Slovene opponents, and in June moderates from the Catholic and liberal camps also added their voices. But the OF leadership now explained its opponents’ willingness to negotiate as an admission of weakness, and the Communist leadership completely rejected direct negotiations with ‘White Guards’.
Clashes between Partisans and their Slovene opponents led to an increasingly fateful division of the civilian population in the Province of Ljubljana, who in many places found themselves on one of the warring sides, without always having made a clear personal decision or having a clear picture of events. It was against this backdrop of intractable national division that, on 8 September 1943 and over the days that followed, news began to spread across Slovene territory of Italy’s capitulation.

PARTISAN ASCENDANCY AND RUPNIK’S LJUBLJANA

The Partisan army was well-prepared for the Italian collapse. The Partisan leadership made contact with the Italian military command in May 1943, and reached an agreement with Italian officers in Dolenjska that Partisan squads would allow their units to withdraw towards the sea and Italy unmolested, provided that they handed over their weapons. Partisan units in the interior of the Province of Ljubljana and in Primorska disarmed a considerable proportion of the Italian fighting force, seizing significant amounts of heavy weaponry, which previously they had not had at their disposal. The OF leadership also proclaimed a general mobilisation, and with this new draft, volunteers and returnees from Italian prison camps, they increased their military power. After the Italian capitulation there were five Partisan divisions on Slovene territory with around 20,000 troops. At the same time, the Slovene population in Primorska signed up to resistance units en masse. The National Liberation Council (NOS) assumed authority over the territory under the control of Partisan companies, and on 16 September 1943 the OF presidium proclaimed the incorporation of Primorska in a “free and united Slovenia within a free and democratic Yugoslavia.” There was no fratricidal conflict between Slovenes in Primorska (as there had been in the Province of Ljubljana) due to the pre-war experiences of Fascism, which had affected every strata of society and created universal anti-Fascist feeling, as well as the more open and tolerant conduct by Catholic and Communist leaders in comparison with central Slovenia.

In contrast to the Partisan movement, which took off following the Italian cave-in, the anti-Partisan and anti-Communist units found themselves confronting major difficulties. After the Italian withdrawal, some members of the Village Guards retreated to German strongholds and to Ljubljana, which was occupied by German soldiers on the day the Italians surrendered. Another group of Village Guards joined the Slovene Chetniks in expectation of an Allied landing in Istria, and dug themselves into defensive positions in the village of Grčarice and in Turjak castle, to the south of Ljubljana. The Partisan army captured these strongholds and
over 1,200 opponents. Despite an agreement within the OF leadership that the leaders of anti-
Partisan units would face trial, and fighters would be added to Partisan squads or left to go
home, Partisans executed 400 of the prisoners (including the injured) without trial, and around
250 were condemned to death by a Partisan court martial. After the Italian capitulation, over
900 genuine and alleged opponents of the Slovene resistance were liquidated by Partisan
units. The bloody settling of accounts by anti-Partisan squads deepened divisions within
Slovene society.

The Germans included the Slovene territory previously occupied by the Italians within
a new Adriatic Coast Operational Zone centred on Trieste, with six regions including the
Province of Ljubljana. The existing borders were maintained, and the German authorities
granted the province limited powers of self-governance, as with other regions in the
operational zone. The reason for this policy, significantly different from the German regime in
Štajerska, Koroška, and Gorenjska, was the increased demands of the European theatre of
war, requiring greater numbers of German soldiers. The German authorities placed a former
mayor of Ljubljana, General Leon Rupnik, in charge of the city. He was subordinate to the
commissioner of the operational zone, Friedrich Rainer, in Trieste. Rupnik also had German
advisors.

Under Rupnik, the Province of Ljubljana acquired, in some aspects, more autonomy
under the Italians. The other regions of the Adriatic Coast Operational Zone in which
Slovenes lived had prefects of Italian nationality. The Germans, despite Italian opposition,
also permitted Slovene municipal administrations in those regions, Slovene schools and even
Slovene anti-Partisan squads. At the same time they acted with extreme violence against the
Partisan movement and its sympathisers. German police and SS units destroyed villages and
settlements, shot and hanged hostages and in the Risiera, or rice factory, in Trieste, set up a
prison camp in which they killed thousands of Jews, Slovenes and Italians.

Most Slovene party politicians in the Province of Ljubljana did not want to co-operate
directly with the regime. Rupnik’s confidants and collaborators were largely younger men
from the liberal and Catholic ranks. Rupnik was fascinated by German military power and, at
least at the start, believed that Hitler would succeed in establishing a new European order, led
by Germany. He saw Slovenia’s future as an autonomous Slovene unit under a German
protectorate, and communism and the Partisan movement as its main opponents. Together
with leaders of the Village Guards, in September 1943 he supported the establishment of
armed units combining the existing and new anti-Partisan and anti-Communist fighters under
the name Slovensko Domobranstvo (Slovene Home Guard). In agreement with the Germans,
who armed and paid them as an auxiliary police force, the ‘Domobranci’ could only function on the territory of the Province of Ljubljana. At the same time, the occupying forces supported the formation of similar units in Primorska and Gorenjska. The Domobranci had a Slovene leadership, but the German command decided on major military operations. Former Village Guard members and other opponents of the Partisan movements joined their ranks, with many members being young boys and men, who avoided the Partisan or German draft by joining the Domobranci. In summer 1944, there were around 13,500 men in Domobranci units in the Province of Ljubljana, while in Primorska there were approximately 2,000, with a further 2,500 in Gorenjska. Rupnik and his supporters did not make enquiries into the nature of the Nazi regime and its crimes against the Jews, Roma and other Slavic nations. Their model was Vichy France, and the Domobranci were proclaimed as a national army, and the core of a new, anti-Communist movement. Some of the Domobranci units performed policing tasks, imprisoning and persecuting activists and OF fighters. The Domobranci police handed over many of those arrested to the Germans, who then sent them to the concentration camps.

The Domobranci had military control of the surroundings of Ljubljana, where they had most support from the population, and they also had powerful strongholds in Dolenjska and Notranjska, but a considerable proportion of the Province of Ljubljana was still controlled by Partisan forces. Following the Italian capitulation, the leadership of the OF and Partisan movement convened an assembly of national representatives from all over Slovene territory, to provide the movement with a broad legitimising base. The assembly, which was intended to function as a resistance parliament, met in Kočevje at the start of October 1943 with 640 delegates from all over Slovenia, as well as representatives from the Yugoslav Partisan and Communist leadership. Those present elected the Slovene National Liberation Committee (Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni odbor – SNOO) as the highest body of the new ‘Slovene authority’ and passed a resolution on Slovenia’s inclusion in a Yugoslavia that guaranteed equality to all its nations. A delegation was selected to travel in November 1943 to the Bosnian town of Jajce to represent the Slovene movement in the supreme body of the Yugoslav Partisan movement: the Anti-Fascist Liberation Council for Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).

Until 1943, the links between Slovene resistance leaders and the upper echelons of the Yugoslav Partisan and Communist movement were quite fraught. Edvard Kardelj, who spent most of the war close to Tito, was responsible for the majority of contacts along Communist channels. The pressure to unify and centralise the Partisan movement, which had been growing since autumn 1942, was at first rejected by Slovene Partisan leaders. Slovene envoys at the AVNOJ meeting held in Jajce on 29 and 30 November 1943 agreed that the new
Yugoslavia should be a federation based on the right of constituent nations to self-determination and secession, which was accepted and upheld by other delegates. The Yugoslav leadership, headed by Tito, assured the Slovene delegation that Slovenes could retain their own military in the post-war Yugoslavia, and would enjoy a considerable amount of economic autonomy. Nevertheless, efforts to unify the Yugoslav Partisan movement only grew stronger after the Jajce meeting. In spring 1944, the VOS security service was centralised (its tasks were assumed by the central Yugoslav organisation, OZNA, the Department for Protection of the People), and pressure to centralise continued on military and various political levels. The leading Slovene Communists did not always agree with the procedures and decisions of the Yugoslav Partisan leadership, but generally accepted them, as integration with the Yugoslav movement bolstered their power and status.

In the second half of September 1943, the Germans attempted to extend their control of the territory that had fallen into Partisan hands after Italy’s capitulation with a major offensive. The battles that shook the Province of Ljubljana, Primorska and Gorenjska, and that continued into winter 1943, inflicted heavy losses on the resistance movement. But the Partisan units successfully replenished their ranks and, after the withdrawal of the German and Domobranci units, reassumed control of the territories lost. Military action was extended to areas where the Partisan movement had developed only slowly. In March 1944, the Anglo-American mission to the resistance headquarters hidden in the Kočevje forest was joined by envoys from the Red Army. They met considerable enthusiasm from the Slovene Communists, who had been growing impatient due to Soviet hesitation in its support for the Yugoslav Partisans.

In spring 1944, Communist leaders, again convinced that the end of the war was near, carefully planned their assumption of power and a post-war political order, which would prevent the return of a multi-party system, and ensure the creation of a ‘people’s’ government under Communist leadership. In February 1944, SNOO met in Črnomelj, changing its name to the Slovene National Liberation Council (Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni svet – SNOS) and declaring itself as the supreme Slovene legislative and representative body. Its presidency acted as a ‘partisan government’. The Communist elite and OF leadership gradually established a new administrative, judicial and political authority with its own apparatus, officials and hierarchy. The political police had a key role in the developing system, which was ostensibly intended to protect the Partisan movement from agents of the occupying forces, but in reality was largely a Communist tool for dealing with opponents.

In spring 1944, Rupnik’s Domobranci also made an attempt to strengthen their ranks.
The general command of the Domobranci forces decided their internal unity could be strengthened by a military oath. At the Germans’ request, the text of the oath sworn by the Domobranci on 20 April 1944 at an official ceremony in Ljubljana (the oath was repeated in January 1945 for members of the Domobranci who joined up after the first ceremony) included a formulation of commitment to the “common struggle with the German armed forces under the command of the führer of Greater Germany,” and “against Communism and its allies,” which provoked significant comment among the Slovene public at the time. The bishop of Ljubljana, Gregorij Rožman, participated in the swearing-in ceremony alongside Rupnik and high-ranking Domobranci and German officers. There were few German sympathisers among Rupnik’s supporters and collaborators, so the oath can clearly be taken as an expression of the Domobranci leadership’s dependence on the Germans. The oath had negative consequences for Rupnik and the Domobranci from the very beginning. For the Partisan resistance leaders, it was more proof of collaboration with the Germans, and for the leaders of the traditional parties it was a further reason for avoiding co-operation with Rupnik. Great Britain also completely rejected Rupnik and the Domobranci, and, moreover, sympathy for Tito and the Yugoslav Partisans had been growing there since the beginning of 1944. The situation also deepened differences between Slovene politicians-in-exile who, in light of the Partisan successes and the course of war in the Yugoslav theatre, more and more openly condemned collaboration and called on party leaders in the homeland to attempt to reach agreement with the OF and Partisan leaders.

In the second half of 1944, all sides of the conflict were involved in preparations for the end of the war. Following the June 1944 agreement on mutual support and co-operation between Josip Broz Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the head of the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, which gave the Yugoslav Partisan movement Allied recognition, the Slovene Partisan leadership proclaimed an amnesty for members of the Domobranci and other anti-Partisan groups. After Tito had visited the Allied command in Italy in August 1944 and met the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in Naples, the Slovene and Yugoslav Communist leaderships were even more convinced that there would be an Allied landing in the Adriatic or Balkans. This led them to make plans for the work of Slovene resistance authorities under an Allied occupation, and prepare for the anticipated occupation of Trieste and Primorska. In January 1944, the Partisans founded a scientific institute, led by the historian Fran Zwitter (1905–88), and in co-operation with many experts gathered material for the purposes of post-war border and inter-state negotiations. Their objective was to use academically grounded documentation to define the national and linguistic borders of the new
United Slovenia, which was to become an autonomous unit of a federal Yugoslavia, as well as gathering material for the anticipated peace conference.

At the same time, however, hostilities and conflict continued throughout Slovene territory. The Germans attempted to ‘clear’ the area between Italy, the Adriatic and Alps of Partisans before the arrival of Allied forces, and stepped up pressure on the civilian population, as well as the resistance. Partisan units attacked and destroyed lines of communication and attempted to expand and consolidate the liberated zones. Members of the secret and security services continued to expose opponents and dispatch them without any recourse to justice. In spring 1944, the Gestapo discovered British-linked informers in Slovenia and Croatia, and between June and October 1944 they imprisoned some hundreds of activists and members of Slovene Catholic and liberal illegal groups and sent them to concentration camps. In these circumstances, the Slovenska Zaveza ceased operations in summer 1944.

THE LAST MONTHS OF THE WAR: THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED

In autumn 1944, the leaders of the two largest political parties began to prepare for the expected German defeat. At least part of the leadership was well aware that Allied recognition of the Partisan army and its own failure to organise more active resistance made its position extremely insecure. At the beginning of December 1944, the leaders formed a National Committee (Narodni odbor), which was intended to assume Slovene political leadership. Like their Communist rivals, they made serious preparation to assume power after the war, but they had no military forces behind them, since the Domobranci remained under the control of Rupnik and the Germans, and nor did they have much support from the population at large, with whom they had largely lost direct contact during the war. Their political plans and desires were based primarily on the hope that Slovene areas would be occupied after the war by the Western Allies and that the pre-war parties would be recognised as legitimate Slovene representatives. With this in mind, some of the politicians-in-exile turned to the British, beseeching them to occupy Slovene territory as soon as possible and prevent a Communist takeover.

After October 1944, when the Yugoslav Partisan Army had occupied Belgrade with the help of the Red Army, it became clear that the war would have a completely different endgame to that envisaged by the traditional Slovene political parties. At the end of March
1945, on its way to Austria, the Red Army liberated Prekmurje together with Prekmurje Partisans – its first and last appearance in Slovene territory. In April, the Fourth Yugoslav Army crossed the Croatia-Slovene border on its march to Istria and Trieste. The unification of the Slovene Partisan Army – which had numbered 37,000 in spring 1945 – with the Yugoslav People’s Army in April and May 1945 signalled the end of Slovene military independence, with Slovene and Yugoslav Partisan units placed under joint command. Their first goal was to race the Anglo-American troops and be first to occupy areas on the Slovene western and northern borders that had belonged to Austria and Italy from 1920, following the Carinthian plebiscite and the Treaty of Rapallo. On 1 May 1945, after fierce battles and with the support of the Slovene resistance movement strengthened by Italian Partisans, they took most of Trieste, one day before New Zealand troops arrived. On the same day, they marched into Gorizia, and one week later – on 8 May 1945 – they occupied Klagenfurt at the same time as British army units.

On 3 May 1945, the National Committee (Narodni odbor) convened a meeting in Ljubljana of pre-war Slovene deputies and a number of party loyalists. Those gathered issued a proclamation, calling themselves a “Slovene parliament,” making reference to various Allied statements and declaring “the national state of Slovenia as a constituent part of a democratic, and federal Kingdom of Yugoslavia.” The delegates called on the Partisans and population at large to support reconciliation and the cessation of hostilities. Of course, this all was of precious little import, given the supremacy of the Partisan Army. When on 5 May 1945 the Germans handed authority over Ljubljana to the National Committee, General Rupnik, Bishop Rožman and the most prominent party leaders were already preparing to flee to Austria. On the same day, the Slovene Partisan government was proclaimed in Ajdovščina, headed by Boris Kidrič. Four days later, Partisan units took control of Ljubljana.

The Second World War claimed a heavy toll of victims in Slovenia, as throughout the entire territory of Yugoslavia. According to research by the Slovene Institute of Recent History, at least 95,000 people living in the territory of present-day Slovenia in 1941 lost their lives in the period to 1946. The victims of war included over 27,000 Partisan combatants, around 36,000 civilians, approximately 3,500 members of anti-Partisan units and over 12,000 men drafted into the German and Italian armies. The dead included approximately 1,000 Germans and around 550 Jews from Slovene territory. During the war, the German occupying forces alone incarcerated 40,000 people, drafted between 30,000 and 40,000 people into the German army, sent 15,000 to concentration and other camps (including Dachau, Auschwitz, and Mathausen), and shot 3,400 as ‘hostages’. Tens of people were sentenced to death by the
Italian authorities, who also shot 145 hostages. Hungarian violence in Prekmurje was on a lesser scale due to the lower level of resistance. Over 14,000 Slovene civilians and members of anti-Partisan units were killed without trial by the new Slovene and Yugoslav authorities after the war had ended. If one counts the victims of the post-war massacres along with the victims of war, at least 9.8% of the population in the territory of present-day Slovenia lost their lives between 1941 and 1946 (with the highest casualties suffered in the Province of Ljubljana and in Gorenjska). Estimates of the losses of the occupying forces (over 6,000 Germans and somewhat under 1,500 Italians who fell on Slovene soil) seem relatively low in comparison with these figures.

The war had a severe impact on the economy and materially exhausted the population. All three of the occupying forces that divided the Drava banovina in 1941 attempted to exploit its economic potential to the full. The Germans redirected mining and industrial plant in Štajerska and Gorenjska to war production, which initially led to economic growth and increased the number of jobs. They also invested in energy sources, infrastructure and industry of interest to the war effort. There was no major industry in the Province of Ljubljana, so the Italians largely exploited the forests. The last months of the war caused most material and economic damage, when all sides in the fighting plus Allied air power destroyed transport, communications, industrial and other infrastructure and facilities.

The main burden of material and food supplies for the Partisan Army was borne by the farming population. The so-called “national tax” and “loan for freedom”, introduced by SNOO in autumn 1941, was soon insufficient, so Partisan intendents made use of both forced and voluntary purchases, and requisitioning. Sanitation and health services posed a particular problem. During the war, there were 121 clandestine Partisan hospital units operating in Slovene territory. Sanitary materials and medicines were partially acquired from supporters and the supplies of the occupying forces, and partially from Allied assistance.

Slovene schools only operated in the Province of Ljubljana in the first two years of the war. Unlike the Germans, who stopped Slovene education immediately after occupation, the Italians did not make significant changes to the school system. In addition to primary education, teacher training colleges, vocational schools, the university and other cultural institutions also continued to function in the Province of Ljubljana. Rupnik’s administration attempted to return the education system to its pre-war state after the Italian capitulation. After Italy left the war, Slovene schools were also opened in Primorska and the province of Gorizia. In spring 1942, the Partisan movement started organising its own school system. Partisan schools, of course, depended very much on the flow of battle and wartime conditions,
but flourished after the Italian capitulation.

Throughout the war – at first mainly in the Province of Ljubljana and in Primorska and elsewhere only after Italy’s withdrawal – Slovene cultural and academic life continued at least in some form. All the larger and more important anti-Partisan and resistance political groups had their own newspapers, and academic publications and even literature continued to be published. Researchers and artists who did not participate significantly in either of the warring sides, generally avoiding current themes, either adapted to the political status quo, or particularly in literature, expressed horror at the atrocities of war. At the same time, most intellectuals clearly defined their position on the dilemma between the Partisan and anti-Partisan movements. The poet, France Balantič (1921–43), who died in the anti-Partisan struggle, became a symbolic hero of the anti-Communist camp. An active cultural scene also developed in Partisan ranks and Partisan-controlled territory, especially after the Italians left the war. The OF leadership (its president from January 1943 was the literary critic Josip Vidmar), which was well aware of the central importance of culture to Slovene public life, tried to attract as many noted intellectuals and artists into Partisan ranks as possible. Partisan-controlled territory had an academic institution, a national theatre, an art club, instrumental ensembles and choirs, and the Partisan presses published a series of academic and literary publications. Although resistance art was significantly marked by war and politics, the artistic products from Partisan units, from prisons, from exile and from concentration camps included horrendous, shocking testimonies and accounts.

The tragic developments of the war, which led to a civil war between 1941 and 1945 and Communist supremacy over Slovene territory, had their roots in pre-war Yugoslav and Slovene political insecurities, in the lack of a democratic tradition among Slovenes, and above all in the social weakness and political and ideological divisions within the Slovene middle class, which was still incapable of a clear and united definition of national interest even when war broke out. Only the lack of authority, hesitance, and the failure of the Slovene party elite to define national policy objectives in any detail at the beginning of the war, or to rally the resistance-oriented population to their banner, can explain the rapid success of just over 1,000 Communists, who organised mass resistance against the occupiers between 1941 and 1945 and moulded that into a Communist revolution. The civil war that broke out in Slovenia during the occupation was, ideologically and politically, the result of the conflict between two authoritarian ideologies: Bolshevik communism and Catholic clericalism. Even in 1943, the number of Slovene Communists was surprisingly small (just 1,212 in total, including 550 in Partisan units). A significant increase in the membership of the Slovene Communist Party
only came after the Italian capitulation (in spring 1944, the Slovene Communist Party had 8,373 members). The democratic groups and individuals who aligned themselves with the Communists in the struggle against the occupation did not share their revolutionary ideas. But the conviction that post-war Slovenia and Yugoslavia must not only be nationally, but also socially fairer, as well as more democratic, than before the war, also enjoyed wide support among the non-Communist allies in the liberation movement. Many of them openly labelled the Communist efforts for political supremacy as extremism, but argued that it could be tempered after the war, and they took the revolutionary slogans as a reform-oriented policy that would prevent a return to pre-war Yugoslav and Slovene conditions and open the path for Slovenes to a society of greater social equality and freedom.

An assessment of conditions in Slovene territory during the Second World War must of course include a consideration of the Yugoslav framework. After the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Communist-led Partisan movement was the only resistance movement to encompass most of pre-war Yugoslav territory. The traditional Slovene parties and political groups – with a few exceptions – continued to advocate the restoration of Yugoslavia throughout the war, but their contact with Yugoslavia largely ran via the Western Allies and London. Slovene Communists had an advantage in this respect, which was a further aid to victory. They largely communicated with associates in Yugoslav territory, and only contacted those abroad in urgent cases. This meant that in 1945, while the Yugoslav party leaders in exile and at home were only just formulating their new political strategies and alliances, the Communists were the only political force with a set of supporters, influence and prestige that covered all of Yugoslavia.

THE VICTORS’ TRIUMPH

“Long-awaited Yugoslav army on liberated Slovene soil …” wrote the priest and author, Fran Saleški Finžgar, on 9 May 1945, on the liberation of Ljubljana: “… Bring with you an olive branch of peace, which will flourish in a new era of truth and justice, with hard work and sweat, and respect for true freedom, which lies in willingly serving just laws to the benefit of our community. In this common harmony let not violence unite us – let everything be the fruit of sincere and unselfish love.” Yet, he added: “Let’s not deceive ourselves or others with ideas of a coming golden age… the gold of this age is still deeply buried and bloody blisters will come before it can be extracted.”

The Slovene population looked forward to the end of the war with excitement and
relief, tempered in many places by unease and fear. In the towns and countryside, Partisan units were welcomed with singing and flowers, but at the same time – especially in central Slovenia – long columns of refugees were following the retreating German forces. The victors, who predicted a rapid rebuilding of the ruined homeland and a nationally and socially fairer society than before the war, enjoyed mass public support. But little heed was paid to calls for tolerance and non-violent patriotism. The post-war reprisals against collaborators and opponents of the Partisan movement in Slovenia were as cruel and merciless as elsewhere in Yugoslavia. On 5 May 1945, Boris Kidrič, after becoming the head of the first post-war Slovene government, did speak out against uncontrolled retaliation against “the masses who have been led astray,” but at the same time he predicted an “uncompromising war on national traitors.” The same mixed messages were given out by other Slovene and Yugoslav leaders, Tito to the fore, who stated that there would be no mercy in the reckoning with collaborators, while – fearful of the unpredictable consequences of mob violence – attempting to keep that reckoning under their own control.

Immediately after liberation, the new authorities began to use activists, national liberation committees, the police and secret police started oppressive measures against real and supposed collaborators and opponents of the Partisan movement and of communism throughout the territory they controlled. The number of people imprisoned, dispatched to camps and executed without trial or following procedures of summary justice in the first few post-war months is still very difficult to gauge. In Štajerska and Prekmurje, the campaign of violence was also directed against members of the German minority, active members of wartime German organisations and any Gottschee Germans (Kočevarji) who had not joined the German retreat. In May and June 1945, hundreds were imprisoned, killed or sent to concentration camps. In autumn 1945, there were over 3,500 Germans from Štajerska and Prekmurje in prisons and prison camps, and between 7,400 and 9,000 Volksdeutscher and Slovenes who had declared themselves to be German during the war and joined German organisations were exiled by Slovene or Yugoslav authorities in 1945/46. Similar violence against Italian speakers and Slovenes’ genuine and assumed opponents was carried out by the new Slovene and Yugoslav authorities in Primorska.

Most of the Domobranci fled to Austrian Carinthia in May 1945 together with the leaders of the traditional parties and other opponents of the Partisans and Communists, and surrendered to the British. The refugees included many farmers and uneducated people (particularly from the Province of Ljubljana), who had fled from the Partisans under the influence of anti-Communist propaganda, and stories – some real, some invented – of Partisan
atrocities. They were joined in the refugee camps in Austria and Italy by inmates of German concentration camps, those returning from forced labour in Germany, prisoners-of-war and people who had studied in German or Italian schools during the war – in short, those who did not want to return home for ideological reasons or for fear of the Communists. At the end of May 1945, there were between 20,000 and 25,000 refugees of Slovene nationality in Austria and Italy. The party and Domobranici leaders expected that the British would treat Domobranci as soldiers in the Yugoslav royal army, or at worst as prisoners-of-war. These expectations were unfounded.

In the middle of May 1945, the Allied Forces Headquarters for the Mediterranean in Caserta decided that members of Yugoslav anti-partisan units retreating to Austria would be returned to Yugoslavia. There were many reasons for the British decision. One of the main reasons was the fact that there was no sympathy in the British military, or among the British ruling class and public, for refugees suspected of collaborating with the Germans. The decision to repatriate the refugees in Austrian Carinthia was also extremely pragmatic: controlling the refugee camps in southern Austria and providing them with supplies was causing the British military authorities considerable difficulty, which returning many thousands to their homelands would alleviate.

In the final days of May 1945, the British handed over tens of thousands of those who had fled to Austria to the Yugoslav authorities. Among their number were around 11,000 Slovenes, mainly Domobranci and their officers, as well as 500 to 600 civilians, who were assured by British officers that they would be transferred to Italy. The returnees were received by the Yugoslav army and the secret police (OZNA), who took them to holding cells and prison camps. There, OZNA agents divided them into groups, with a small number released or sent before a court martial, while over 10,000 of them, together with the genuine and alleged opponents of the Partisan struggle captured on Slovene territory, were summarily put to death. The number of people executed without trial therefore exceeded 14,000. The Yugoslav army also killed a huge number (as yet undetermined) of Croatian refugees in Slovene territory, and military personnel and civilians handed over to Yugoslav authorities by the British. As with similar massacres in Croatia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the decision on the mass killing of the returned members of anti-partisan military units was taken by the Yugoslav Communist leadership, but undoubtedly they were not carried out without approval from the central Slovene Communist leadership. In the eyes of the Communist leaders, the returned refugees were collaborators, traitors and dangerous political opponents who could threaten the new ruling powers and nascent revolutionary process in the tense post-war international climate,
so, as in many other matters, they followed the Soviet lead in dealing with their imprisoned charges. The consequences of this extreme action were tragic in human terms and had a major impact on population numbers. If one adds the number of Germans and Italians who were killed, exiled or who took flight (around 15,000 Germans from Štajerska and Kočevje left Slovenia before the end of hostilities) to the number of Slovenes killed or who fled, the loss of population on Slovene territory between 1941 and 1946 exceeds 146,000 people.

The Communist command largely managed to keep the mass executions secret. When some prisoners and Domobranci were released from prison camps in an amnesty in August 1945, this strengthened the credibility of official explanations that others who remained incarcerated and missing were undergoing further ‘re-education’. However, amid fervent post-war enthusiasm at defeating the occupying forces and a climate of growing tension between Yugoslavia and the Allied Forces, Rupnik’s former supporters and soldiers did not receive much understanding or sympathy among the population at large, even among those who did not identify with communism. The public mood was dominated by patriotism and a willingness to defend Slovene areas in the Julian March and Austrian Carinthia, which the Slovene army had been forced to leave in May and June 1945 under pressure from the Allies. There was also optimism and enthusiasm for the restoration of the homeland, which was widely expected to be a fairer society than pre-war Yugoslavia. In the first months after the war, even some notable opponents of communism still believed that the violence was only a transitory phenomenon, and that the elections would usher in major changes, with the will of the electorate forcing the Communists to accept democratic parliamentarianism.

These expectations were influenced in part by the fact that the Yugoslav Communist and Partisan leadership had relented under Allied pressure after the Yalta Conference, and in March 1945 had settled on an interim Yugoslav government that included pre-war politicians and political party representatives. This government, with Josip Broz Tito as prime minister (his foreign minister was the former ban of Croatia, Ivan Šubašić, who had until then been the head of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London), proclaimed its objective as the complete liberation of pre-war Yugoslavia and areas populated by Croats and Slovenes that had remained outside the borders of the Karadjordjević kingdom after the First World War. It forecast the recovery of the economy, respect for private initiative and democratic elections to positions of authority in federal units. It expressly rejected retribution against “war criminals” and “national traitors” and advocated their punishment in accordance with the principle of justice and the interests of “law and order” within the state. In summer 1945, a multiparty system was legally restored on the basis of the Tito-Šubašić agreement, but only a few parties
in Serbia, Croatia, Serbian areas of Bosnia, and Montenegro resumed activities. In August 1945, the Yugoslav leadership fulfilled the final commitment imposed by the ‘Big Three’ at Yalta. It convened an interim assembly, with the 371 members of AVNOJ and 118 pre-war deputies, party representatives and ‘independent persons’, who had not collaborated with occupying forces or opposed the Partisan movement during the war.

Communist concessions to British pressure, pre-war politicians and the reformed parties were in reality only for outward appearances. The Communist and Partisan leaders who had already established the new authority during the war were not prepared to share their new-found political power with anyone, and kept a firm hand on the reins of power. The Communist Party did not formally constitute a political party, but acted more conspiratorially, ‘behind the scenes’. Yet all the major issues of state policy, post-war reconstruction and the new central government administration were decided by the small Communist elite, headed by the ten-member politburo of the KPJ. The central committees of federal units and the party bodies subordinate to them were responsible for implementing these decisions. The executive and other state bodies were largely conduits of Communist policy, which operated on a centralised and hierarchical basis, despite the federal nature of the state. Some sections of the state system – such as the army, the security service (OZNA), and to some extent the police – were not subordinate to any external control, and were only accountable to the core of the Communist leadership. In August 1945, the Popular Front (Ljudska fronta) was formed to politically mobilise the population, offering a widely acceptable programme: upholding the gains of the liberation struggle, fair borders for the new Yugoslavia, “brotherhood and unity” between its nations, the reconstruction of the homeland, and an improvement in the economic and social standing of all its inhabitants. Members of the Popular Front included individuals and a few Serbian and Croatian political parties, as well as mass organisations such as the Women’s Anti-Fascist Front, Youth Union, and Association of Trade Unions, which were firmly in Communist hands.

In public, Communist leaders called for political unity and the defence of the “people’s democracy,” but counter to agreements made within the state leadership labelled the emerging opposition reactionary and hostile, even openly oppressing it – particularly in Croatia – before the end of the interim assembly’s session.

The Yugoslav Communist leaders did not hide the fact that they saw the Soviet Union as their only true ally, and they fervently praised its political system, the Red Army, and Stalin. In April 1945, Tito signed a Yugoslav-Soviet friendship pact in Moscow, together with Šubašić and other colleagues. Yugoslav relations with Great Britain and the Allies deteriorated
significantly one month later over the issue of Trieste and Carinthia. At the Potsdam Conference, in July 1945, the Big Three could no longer reach agreement on a common admonition calling on Tito and Belgrade to respect existing agreements. At the beginning of August, the Communist leadership in Belgrade even won public sympathy in the West when it declared an amnesty (which of course only applied to some of those imprisoned, and was too late for those killed in secret). This enabled it to exercise its own will with all the more vigour in the interim assembly that convened on 10 August. Despite the efforts of a small group of opposition delegates, Tito and his colleagues were able to use fast-track procedures to pass a series of laws that fundamentally changed the administrative, economic and social structure of the state. These included a law laying down sanctions for “crimes against the people and the state.” It was reminiscent of pre-war dictatorial royal decrees, quashing any spontaneous expression of national feelings and imposing the unilateral slogan of “brotherhood and unity” to prevent open discussion of inter-war events and national conflicts.

At the end of its session, the interim assembly also passed a law providing for a multi-party system and freedom of association, but all other legislation and even the course of the assembly’s work confirmed and consolidated Communist supremacy. A few opposition delegates futilely protested against these developments, which led to attacks on the opposition and its members. In October, Šubašić left the government, which brought an end to the pretence of a coalition between the Communists and the opposition. The elections act adopted by the interim assembly lowered the voting age to 18, and extended suffrage to women and soldiers. At the same time, not only collaborators and opponents of the Partisan movement, but also their close relatives, lost the right to vote. In the elections held on 11 November 1945, voters had two choices: a box for the Popular Front and an ‘empty box’ offering a protest vote without any alternative candidates. Due to the high level of illiteracy in less-developed areas of the state, voters expressed their will with coloured balls. The results differed from republic to republic (the Popular Front receiving its lowest proportion of the vote in Slovenia), but, as expected, a majority voted for the Popular Front. Although abuses occurred in many places, it is clear that the opposition had no chance of success in the face of aggressive Communist pressure. At its first session on 29 November 1945, the newly elected Constituent Assembly finally revoked all rights of the Karadjordjević dynasty, abolished the monarchy and renamed the provisional Federal Democratic Yugoslavia as the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna ljudska republika Jugoslavija – FLRJ). The Soviet Union recognised the ‘new’ Yugoslavia immediately, with Great Britain and the US following suit in December 1945, despite open reservations about the Communist regime.
The anti-Communist opposition was much weaker in Slovenia than in Serbia and Croatia. The party leaders who had operated in Slovenia during the war and who had not supported the Partisan movement had largely fled to Austria and Italy in early May 1945. During the preparations for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the liberal group led by Črtomir Nagode (1903–47), who had had some links with the Communists before the war, was the only one to attempt to legally organise itself; it had already broken off from the Communists in 1941 because of their hostile attitude to Mihajlović’s Chetniks and aggressive leadership of the Partisan war effort. The liberal Črtomir Nagode was an anti-fascist and admirer of the Soviet Union, and a number of democratic-minded intellectuals joined his circle. The group had contact with British diplomats and representatives of the opposition groups in Belgrade. But Communist pressure was too much, and the number of people willing to risk conflict with the new authorities too small. After opposition groups in Belgrade decided not to participate in the elections, and the failed talks with members of pre-war Slovene parties, Nagode’s group also gave up their plans of an independent electoral campaign in October 1945.

As elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the Communists built their post-war power in Slovenia on the foundations laid during the final years of the war. The number of members of the Communist Party of Slovenia (Komunistična partija Slovenije – KPS) was still low in 1945 (no more than 8,000); leading administrative and political positions were therefore given to the Communists’ most loyal comrades from the Partisan ranks, in addition to KPS members. This selected group was trusted far more by the Communist leaders than other members of the resistance or victims of the occupying forces (activists in towns, prisoners, internees, exiles and emigrants). This led to the rapid development after the war of a hierarchy among Partisans and victims of the occupying powers, with Partisan fighters at the top and other members of the resistance below them. After the German occupiers had left, bodies of the liberation movement had taken charge in towns and the countryside (the lowest levels of SNOO and the OF committees), while the army had assumed control where this had not been possible. Candidates for political office at every level were vetted with great care. The main criterion for suitability was their conduct during the occupation and attitude to the Partisan movement. The Commission for Policy and Propaganda (called Agitprop along Soviet lines) took control of cultural life and education, operating in Ljubljana, as in Belgrade and the other federal capitals, within the Central Committee of the Communist Party, popularising Communist slogans and ideology.

All major political decisions were made by a handful of people within the Communist
leadership formed by the KPS politburo, which strictly followed party instructions from Belgrade. The new Slovene leaders accepted without particular objection that Communists first had to consolidate their power in Yugoslavia with a co-ordinated centralised policy, and only then, when “the authority of the people” was no longer threatened, could the independence of the federal units begin to increase. Edvard Kardelj supervised and guided the work of the Slovene politburo from Belgrade, where he remained the leading ideologist of Yugoslav and Slovene Communist policy after the war. The KPS leaders attempted, at least for outward appearances, to maintain an open and pluralist, ‘Popular Front’ appearance for the new authorities, and left some important positions to leaders of the ‘allied groups’ who had worked within the OF and national liberation movement during the war. But, at the same time, they vigorously rejected any idea of restoring their political independence. The OF became a mass political organisation in the new state and an instrument for exercising Communist policy, which ensured the official candidates were elected to the ‘national liberation committees’ and Constituent Assembly in the elections of summer and autumn 1945.

For the Communist leadership, the preparations for the elections were a test of its new powers and a “final clean-up” of political opponents. But the election results were quite a disappointment despite all the pressure applied to voters. Over 95% of eligible voters took part in the local elections in summer 1945, but turnout for the Constituent Assembly elections in November the same year was much less impressive, with ‘just’ 81% of eligible Slovenes casting their vote. The election results were even worse from the new authority’s point of view. As much as 17% of the electorate circled the empty box, and in some areas the total was much higher (the Popular Front won less than 50% of the vote in some parts of northeast Slovenia).

In Belgrade, the main blame for the ‘bad’ results was attributed to the KPS leaders, who were accused of failing to do their job, unlike Communists elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Edvard Kardelj accused them of “liberalism in their attitude to former foes” and excessive “adherence to the letter of the law,” as well as nationalism and a lack of revolutionary dedication. In Kardelj’s opinion, one of the KPS’s major weaknesses lay in its “petite bourgeois composition,” as supposedly it had largely attracted intellectuals to its ranks during the war. The Slovene Communist leaders self-critically agreed with Kardelj’s comments and committed themselves to radicalising their approach to ‘enemies’ and ‘reactionism’. The Slovene Communists therefore became far stricter at the end of 1945. They strengthened their power at every level, and from day to day increased their economic involvement. Like the rest of Yugoslavia, Slovenia faced major economic problems after the war, but the KPJ leadership
in Belgrade demanded that, as the most developed of the federal units, it should not only reconstruct and industrialise rapidly, but should also co-operate to the maximum extent possible in the reconstruction of less developed and undeveloped parts of the state.

After hostilities ended, the authorities in Slovenia started to rebuild transport routes, energy infrastructure, and large industrial plants, since the passage of transport through Slovene territory, the provision of much-needed power, and the regeneration of industrial production was vital to the entire state. Again following the Soviet model, industrial sectors, electrification and coal mining had priority over agriculture in the Yugoslav recovery plans. The economic recovery was understood in Belgrade from the beginning as an introduction to industrialisation, which would rapidly propel Yugoslavia, largely still an agricultural society, into the industrial future. The bias towards industrial development and the provision of energy deepened the crisis in the food supply; this heightened the problems directly affecting the population at large. Despite assistance from UNRRA (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency), in autumn 1945 Slovenia was already facing universal shortages. Supply problems were exacerbated by officially sanctioned looting of private shops, workshops and companies, and their expropriation from shopkeepers, tradespeople and entrepreneurs. This was initially directed against Germans, and then included Slovenes who had been collaborators, had rejected the Partisan movement or opposed Communism. The government also attempted to win over the poorer rural population with a decision on agrarian reform and the break up of large estates and church lands, but small agricultural producers were unable to fill the deficit caused by the nationalisation of the large agricultural estates.

Political, social and economic conditions remained extremely uncertain, and the authorities and general population continued to feel under threat, feelings which were intensified by the complications over the Yugoslav and hence Slovene borders with Austria and Italy. Under pressure from the Allies, the Yugoslav army withdrew from south Carinthia and Klagenfurt in May 1945 to the old Yugoslav-Austrian border fixed by the Carinthian plebiscite. In June 1945, when it became clear that the Soviet Union would not support Yugoslav demands for Trieste, Belgrade had to approve the withdrawal of its troops from Trieste, Gorizia and Pula, and accept the division of the Julian March (Venezia Giulia) into two zones. Zone A, which included the districts of Trieste, Gorizia and Pula, and the right bank of the Soča valley as far as Bovec and Predel, came under Anglo-American administration, while Zone B, which included the rest of the Istrian and Primorska territory up to the 1920 Rapallo border, was administered by the Yugoslavs. Yugoslav and Slovene leaders, who had from the beginning proclaimed the incorporation of the Julian March and
Slovene-populated areas of Austrian Carinthia into Yugoslavia one of the aims of the Partisan struggle, saw the Allied position that border changes could only be decided by peace conferences as a grave injustice. This made the already fractious relations between Yugoslavia and the Anglo-American alliance worse, while Stalin’s decision not to risk conflict with London and Washington over Yugoslav border disputes also cooled relations between Belgrade and Moscow for a number of months.

In Belgrade, the leadership was well aware that Yugoslavia would almost certainly lose Trieste if its future were decided by a peace conference. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1945, they increased the propaganda war against the Allies, and Great Britain in particular, which was now seen as the main opponent of Yugoslav demands. The leadership accused the British of protecting escaped collaborators, and warned of Allied border demarcation plans that would again leave Italy with wide swathes of territory populated by Slovenes and Croats. The withdrawal of Yugoslav units from Zone A did achieve one of the British and American objectives, since forcing the Yugoslavs out of Trieste stopped the Communist advance to the West. At the same time, the dispute strengthened the Yugoslav Communist regime, offering proof that the Allies supported Italian territorial claims, and that only the new Partisan-Communist powers could prevent a repeat of the national injustice suffered by Slovenes and Croats when borders were fixed after the First World War. In these circumstances, the mass protests organised by the Yugoslav authorities to support its border demands and criticisms of the Allies were by no means just Communist propaganda exercises, but also an expression of the sincere outrage of a population whose experiences under Italian and German occupation had led them to see the incorporation of the Julian March, Trieste and south Carinthia into Yugoslavia as the natural outcome of the Partisan and Allied military victory.

Meanwhile, on 31 January 1946, the delegates to the Constituent Assembly in Belgrade unanimously ratified the new Yugoslav constitution. The constitution proclaimed Yugoslavia as a “federal people’s state, republican in form” and “a community of peoples with equal rights, which on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federal state.” The authors of the constitution, with Kardelj foremost among them, used the 1936 Soviet Constitution as a guide for their text. Although the words ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ did not appear, the constitution proclaimed that the main foundation of the state and national economy was “general and popular” property. It also enshrined state support for agricultural collectives in law, restricted private ownership, and stated that land could only be owned by the person who
cultivated it, which meant that large estates could not be privately owned.

The constitution contained a number of traditional liberal principles: it separated the Church and state, and mentioned fundamental democratic freedoms (freedom of the press, freedom of speech and of association, and religious freedom), the equality of all citizens and “personal integrity.” Under the constitution, the supreme organ of state and representative of popular sovereignty was the Federal People’s Assembly, comprising two chambers: delegates to the Federal Chamber were elected by the entire electorate, while the federal units (six republics and two autonomous provinces) sent representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities. The republics had their own constitutions, which summarised the federal constitutional provisions and defined the federal units as “people’s states.” Slovene territory in Yugoslavia was named the People’s Republic of Slovenia (Ljudska republika Slovenija); through this provision, Slovenia became the official and legally valid name of a political entity for the first time in history.

However, many of the terms of the constitution, particularly those on democratic freedoms, had almost no influence on political practice. The Communist party – not even mentioned in the constitution – was the real political force within the state, while executive power lay in the hands of the federal government, led by Josip Broz Tito, which was a faithful tool for exercising the Communist leadership’s policy. After the elections, the Communist leaders no longer hid the fact that their objective was a new socialist state on the Soviet model, and openly advocated an economic and social renewal that would not only prevent a return of the wartime atrocities, but that would also make a radical break with the pre-war Slovene and Yugoslav reality. From the very beginning, the state and Communist leaders passed important political and administrative decisions, without recourse to institutions with constitutional jurisdiction. One such decision, passed without the assembly’s approval, defined the internal borders between the republics. Although according to the constitution, the resolution on the borders of the Yugoslav republics was supposed to be approved by the Federal Assembly, this did not happen due to disagreements between the representatives of the republics – with the exception of parts of the Croatian-Bosnian and Slovene-Croatian borders in Istria. The majority of the internal borders never received federal legal sanction, and generally followed those drawn up in 1944/45 by the Communist and Partisan leadership. Most of the border between Slovenia and Croatia was decided in this manner, with the republican executives in Ljubljana and Zagreb later agreeing independently on disputed sections.

The weakest part of the new constitutional order and legislation was the organisation
of the judiciary. This reflected the state of the judiciary as it had developed up until the start of 1946, and also took into account the view of the new rulers that judges must be changed and replaced by ‘the people’. Civil courts started to function in Slovenia at the end of September 1945. Before that, those accused of collaboration and treason were tried before courts martial and court of ‘national honour’. The court of ‘national honour’, which operated in the summer of 1945, sentenced the accused to the loss of their political rights and rights as citizens, banned them from public service or work and seized their assets or sentenced them to forced labour; courts martial also sentenced people to death.

When, in autumn 1945, regular civil courts started to operate, the Communist leadership subjected them to a wave of criticisms, accusing them of excessive formalism and a failure to perform their work in line with a ‘popular sense of justice’. The authorities replaced some of the judges and attempted to make up for the lack of legal experts committed to the regime with lay judges (i.e. judges without a legal or even higher education), while excluding courts from the investigation procedure, which was entrusted in full to the prosecution services and OZNA (which was renamed in March 1946 as the State Security Administration, UDBA). The constitution and appropriate legislation introduced in 1946 legalised this state of affairs. The state prosecution service was organised on centralised, hierarchical lines, while the term-in-office for judges in local or district courts was set at two years, and at four years for supreme courts.

These measures and political pressure produced rapid results, although in some places judges objected. At the end of December 1945, a major trial was organised in Ljubljana of officers of the Domobranci forces, leaders of the wartime party legions, and supporters of Mihailović’s Chetniks in Slovenia. In an emotionally charged atmosphere, ramped up further by newspaper and radio reporters and other official propaganda outlets, 17 people were sentenced to death (five of whom were actually executed). Tracking down and convicting opponents of the resistance during the war, and of the authorities after it, became an essential element of the new social and political reality. The first wave of post-war trials in Slovenia reached its peak in August 1946, when General Leon Rupnik and the German SS commander Erwin Rösener were sentenced to death, while lengthy prison sentences were pronounced in absentia against Miha Krek, leader of the Slovene People’s Party, and Gregorij Rožman, bishop of Ljubljana.

The Slovene authorities used Bishop Rožman’s conviction to settle scores with the wartime leadership of the diocese of Ljubljana and the anti-Partisan clergy; they were convicted of treason, collaboration and “suppressing the liberation struggle.” This deepened
divisions among Catholics, while aggravating relations between the ‘people’s authority’ and the Catholic church, after a brief period following the war when it seemed that an understanding could be reached between them. Initially, the Partisan and Communist leaders publicly recognised that Catholics had participated *en masse* in the liberation war and had made a decisive contribution to the Partisan victory. At the request of the Slovene government, the leadership of the diocese of Ljubljana, led after Bishop Rožman’s flight by the vicar general, Anton Vovk, issued a special statement in July 1945 confirming its loyalty to the new authorities, condemning the actions of clergy during the occupation, and advocating the end of “hatred, retribution and injustice.” Yet the truce was superficial and short-lived. In the eyes of the new rulers, the Catholic Church was the only opponent worthy of respect, while the senior Church hierarchy called the new regime an “atheist-materialist” threat to their influence and mission. The post-war political powerbrokers therefore sought to restrict the Church’s activities at every turn. Using the separation of Church and state as a pretext, it impeded teaching of the catechism, nationalised the Church’s educational and charitable institutions, dismissed nuns and monks from hospitals and schools, and nationalised Church property. On their side, the Slovene bishops cooled relations with the Communists when they added their signature to a pastoral letter by Yugoslav bishops in September 1945, during preparations for elections to the Constituent Assembly. The letter rejected the regime’s anti-Church policies, advocated the preservation of rights that the Church had held before the Second World War, and demanded the return of nationalised property. After autumn 1945, oppression of the Church and clergy intensified, and public criticisms of Church policy were no longer limited to the conduct of the Church hierarchy during the war, but increasingly grew into general accusations against the Church and its overriding ‘reactionary’ nature.

Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of the population was optimistic about the future and actively participated in the reconstruction of the ruined homeland. People, and particularly the young, took part in the political rallies and mass labour actions organised by the regime along Soviet lines, not only because of political pressure, but also from the sincere conviction that they were helping to build a better and fairer world. It was on this patriotic energy that the Communists founded a new political mythology: the cult of Partisan resistance and the “brotherhood and unity” forged within it, and the cult of revolution, the Communist Party, and its leader. These elements were portrayed as the essential foundation of the ‘people’s democracy’, state stability and peaceful – brotherly – co-existence between the Yugoslav nations.
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Despite outward unity in relations between Ljubljana and Belgrade, major disagreements arose as early as 1945. The first critical reactions from Ljubljana were in response to federal economic and financial decisions, and the Communist leadership’s efforts to achieve a centralised economy as soon as possible. The federal economic plans, which were accompanied by detailed regulations and the foundation of state-wide enterprises, were met with open opposition by the subordinate Slovene ministries. Dissatisfaction increased in 1946, when the federal government demanded that Slovenia transfer revenue surpluses to the federal treasury, and also took over the administration of the most important industrial companies, deciding there would be no major investment in Slovene industry over the next five years. The ministerial offices in Ljubljana opposed this policy and claimed that the federal economic regulations were economically damaging. The Slovene Communist leaders did not support these criticisms, however, and attempted to do Belgrade’s bidding. The Communist leaders took the same line as the central Yugoslav authorities – that economic matters should be “organised on a strictly central basis” and that it should “give the south everything they request.” Until the “other republics [catch up] in revolutionary leaps [or] even overtake” the developed republics, said Boris Kidrič, investment should focus on the economically less developed areas, while the “burden of industrialisation” should be borne by the “developed republics.”

These statements eased Kidrič into the position of Yugoslav minister of industry in 1946. Before that, he had spent some months in the Soviet Union, where he became familiar with the results of Soviet economic planning. Soviet experiences confirmed his conviction that the Yugoslav leap into the industrial future could also only be achieved with a centrally planned economy. The five-year plan prepared under his direction by a special planning commission regulated economic life in the country down to an extremely detailed level. At that time, the Federal Assembly passed two nationalisation laws, which brought a further 1,200 companies, shops and hotels – in addition to those already looted – into state ownership in Slovenia. Their nationalisation, division and irrational use further harmed the economic situation. The federal government was therefore already forced to depart from the adopted programmes and principles in 1947, the first year of the five-year plan.

The critical economic situation was made worse by the state of agriculture and the countryside. In 1949 the Communist economic planners, who had tried to bring farmers together in collectives in the first years after the war – at the height of the crisis in Yugoslav-
Soviet relations, and no doubt in part to prove their Leninist-Bolshevik credentials – decided to introduce a policy of agricultural collectivisation. Until 1951, when collectivisation in Slovene collapsed, 8,600 agricultural holdings had joined peasant-worker co-operatives (around 5% of the agricultural population and 4% of agricultural land). Although the attempt at collectivised Soviet-style *kolkhozisation* was abandoned in Slovenia after just two years, the consequences for agriculture and the supply of agricultural produce were a catastrophe.

The state’s policy of plundering, nationalisation and farm collectivisation turned it into a giant monopoly and the main economic force. The economy was turned into a subordinate system, directed and managed by the highest ranks of state and political leadership. The federal units – the republics and the two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo with Metohija) – ratified their own constitutions in 1947 (17 January 1947 in Slovenia) and had their own assemblies, ministries and governments, with voters directly electing delegates to the republic, municipal and local community representative bodies as well as to the Federal Assembly in Belgrade. However, at this point the Federal Assembly was not very important in the hierarchical Yugoslav state and political structure, in which decision-making was one way and top-down. The military, police and secret police (UDBA) remained accountable only to their own hierarchies and the highest state and Communist bodies.

The power of the state and Communist efforts to strengthen it were clearly expressed via language policy. The federal and republic constitutions explicitly defined language use and equality in courts, while Serbo-Croat was officially enshrined in law as the only language of command and instruction in the army, which was organised on a supranational and extraterritorial basis. Nevertheless, Serbo-Croat was the language of communication in federal administrative and political bodies, the Federal Assembly, in communications between state and republic offices, central forums of the KPJ and other political organisations i.e. everywhere where representatives of different nations and federal units met. From a Slovene point of view, linguistic practice in post-war Yugoslavia did not represent a major advance on the situation in the pre-war kingdom. Slovene was and remained the language of administration, courts, education and public communication within the Republic of Slovenia, but outside it had no validity.

The language question did not cause much controversy soon after the war in Yugoslavia, and Serbo-Croat was also widely accepted in Slovenia as the Yugoslav lingua franca. In fact, the Slovene public was far more agitated over the borders with Italy and Austria. Allied negotiations on the reconstruction of Austria and its borders with its neighbours – which included Yugoslavia – came to a halt in 1945, and preparations for a
peace treaty with Italy continued at conferences of foreign ministers and at a peace conference convened from July to October 1946 in Paris. Based in part on material prepared by Slovene experts (largely within the Partisans’ scientific institute during the war), Yugoslav negotiators advocated a border combining the old Habsburg-Italian borders and the Slovene-Romance linguistic border, while they were prepared to grant Trieste – given its Italian majority – the status of a seventh Yugoslav republic. The Allies of course rejected such claims, and a French-backed compromise made headway at the peace conference. In autumn 1947, Yugoslavia acquired the entire Zone B of the Julian March, and the Karst (Kras), the Vipava valley, Soča (Isonzo) valley and Goriška Brda from Zone A. At the same time, the Free Territory of Trieste was established as a special buffer state under UN sponsorship, divided into two zones, like the Julian March before it. Zone A, which included Trieste and its surroundings and the territory towards Monfalcone (Tržič), was administered by the Anglo-American alliance, while Zone B, which ran approximately from the present-day Italo-Slovene border to Novigrad in Istria, was administered by the Yugoslav military.

This was seen by the Yugoslav and Italian political elites as a ‘halfway solution’, reflecting the fact that the border between the countries was not just an international boundary, but also the dividing line between two politic blocs, and the cause of considerable disappointment on both sides. The peace conference gave Yugoslavia over 7,000 km² of Julian March territory (3,820 km² of which had a large Slovene majority and was therefore added to Slovenia), which in some ways was a delayed payback of the Allies’ debt to Tito and the Yugoslav Partisans for their war against the Axis forces. Yet the uncertain future of Trieste and the incorporation of Gorizia into Italy caused manifest disappointment not only among the Yugoslav political elite, but also among the Yugoslav, and particularly Slovene, population at large. In Slovene eyes, Gorizia (Gorica) was an ancient Slovene town, and Trieste – despite its undisputed Italian majority – formed a piece with its hinterland, and represented Slovenia’s outlet on the world. The Yugoslav regime organised mass protests against the peace conference’s conclusions, and again these were not merely the fruit of political pressure, but also of a widespread conviction that Slovenia had suffered another national injustice in Paris. In line with the peace conference, the Yugoslav government had allowed Italian citizens and Italian speakers in the territory awarded to Yugoslavia by the conference to choose to leave for Italy. From the Italian capitulation in 1943 until the end of the 1940s, over 21,000 people left Istria and Primorska for Italy. These included former Italian officials and indigenous Istrian Italians, who left their homes for economic and political reasons, and because of the anti-Italian atmosphere. A small number of Slovenes who rejected the Communist regime also
opted to go to Italy. This mass departure significantly changed the ethnic make-up of Slovene Istria and Primorska. According to the first post-war census, in 1948, the People’s Republic of Slovenia population was 1,391,873 (9% of the total Yugoslav population), and was 97% Slovene. The largest non-Slovene group was the 16,069 Croats, while there were a little over 7,000 Serbs and 14,987 non-Slavs (Italians, Germans and Hungarians).

As elsewhere in the state, a new ruling elite developed in Slovenia after the Second World War, gradually developing into a Communist “new class” (as it was later named by Milovan Đilas). It was strictly hierarchical, and position in that hierarchy determined not only personal power and influence, but also material status. The new authorities introduced a wage system based on position rather than qualifications, to reward individuals who did not have appropriate education for their jobs, as well as offering additional benefits to the most loyal supporters. This naturally went against the proclaimed policy of reducing social differences, which was supposed to include a standard state wage policy. Like the prices of household goods, by the start of the 1950s, wages were set by the state and were the same throughout the country.

Living conditions changed only slowly for most people. The new regime passed numerous social laws, giving women and men constitutional and legal equality and introducing state child support. In 1945, universal health insurance was introduced for all employees, as well as the unemployed and pensioners. But there was not enough money to improve service quality and build new social and health institutions at a faster pace. In 1948, Yugoslavia had the highest rate of tuberculosis in Europe and the disease remained one of the main health problems in Slovenia throughout the latter half of the 1940s. The decision by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) to stop sending assistance to Yugoslavia due to abuses increased the difficulty of supplying basic household goods in mid-1947. The shortages were felt in towns and rural areas alike. Even so, there was no let up in the pressure to compete in dedication to work and productivity. The authorities developed a cult of physical work along Soviet lines, rewarded people achieving beyond the required performance, and mobilised the population politically by including them in mass organisations open to both sexes and all classes and generations.

At the same time, the state-party elite was upping the violence and political pressure against their real and imagined opponents, with trial after trial of individuals and groups who had either wronged the OF and Partisans, or the new post-war order. In summer 1947, the authorities in Ljubljana held the first major trial against wartime political allies, and post-war political dissidents. The core of the defendants, accused of crimes against the state and spying
for the British and Americans comprised intellectuals who had opposed the wartime occupation, but who broke from Communist leaders and policy during the war or directly after it. For the Communist leadership, which directed the judicial process, the trial was a symbolic reckoning with the democratically minded, non-Communist intelligentsia. Although the charges were a complete fabrication, the court sentenced three of the accused to death (the main defendant, Črtomir Nagode, was executed), while others were handed long prison sentences.

Just some months later – at the end of April 1948 – the Slovene leadership took a new step towards replicating Soviet judicial and political repression. In Ljubljana, former prisoners from the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps were brought into court and accused of becoming Gestapo agents in the camps, and continuing espionage and treasonous activity after the war, including sabotage. All the accused had been Communists before the war, of activists or Partisans, and some had even fought in Spain. The first ‘Dachau trial’ was followed by more. Over the period 1948–50, judges sentenced 15 former camp inmates to death (11 of whom were executed), 3 died in a remand prison, and 20 were sentenced to long-term imprisonment. The Slovene political elite turned the trial against the main defendants into a major media event in April 1948, which indicates its political importance. The ‘Dachau trials’ were a faithful copy of the Soviet ‘engineer trials’, with defendants largely being engineers and technicians. Under compulsion, most defendants, with a few notable exceptions, confessed to the crimes they were accused of, which was something new, even in the harsh political climate of the time in Slovenia and Yugoslavia.

Slovene Communist leaders outdid their counterparts from other Yugoslav republics in their zeal to ‘uncover’ and convict ‘enemies’, as there were no equivalent trials elsewhere. The Slovene haste to unmask ‘traitors’ and ‘spies’ was not only an expression of the zeal of the local Communist leaders to replicate Soviet practice; the trials of former concentration camp inmates were largely the product of internal Slovene political disputes, designed on one hand to show that the Communist Party was capable of strictly punishing weakness within its own ranks, and on the other to strengthen the Titoist core of the KPS, by eliminating all those who did not unconditionally support the leadership. In this light, the Dachau trials also served to purge the Communist elite. The Slovene political rulers went further than those in other republics and the federal heads in Belgrade, primarily in starting, even before the Tito-Stalin split, to make examples of and remove from the party and public life those individuals who had failed to be sufficiently reliable and loyal.

The dispute that arose between Moscow and Belgrade in 1948 had been some time in
the making. The Soviet-Yugoslav split was not based on ideological differences, but dispute over who was ultimately in charge in Yugoslavia, the Balkans and the Communist camp. The Yugoslav leaders were – despite vocal professions of their ‘love’ for the Soviet Union – convinced of their strength, which they had demonstrated in the Partisan struggle; they envisaged Soviet-Yugoslav relations as an equal partnership and pursued their own internal and external policy. The disagreements between the Kremlin and the Yugoslav Communist elite, which started during the war, and grew after it, came to a head as Tito made clear his ambition to install himself as leader of the Balkan or Danube Communist countries. In spring 1948, this led the Kremlin to accuse Tito and the Yugoslav Communists of anti-Soviet policies and abandoning the class struggle. The Yugoslav leaders initially attempted to cover up the dispute, informing only the very inner circle. Meanwhile, in response to Moscow, they confirmed their allegiance to the Soviet Union and other Communist states, and their respect for their independence and sovereignty. In May 1948, however, Moscow threw a whole set of new accusations against Belgrade, and was joined by other Communist parties, including even the Italian and French organisations. Just one month later, a meeting was held in Bucharest of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’ Parties (Cominform, but referred to as the Informbiro in Yugoslavia), which acted as the international forum for Communist parties. Cominform expelled the KPJ for “betrayal and nationalism” and called on Yugoslav Communists to rise up against their leaders and install a new, internationalist leadership.

Only now was the dispute made public, sending shock waves throughout Yugoslavia. After years of propaganda, the Soviet Union enjoyed an immense reputation, and not only among Communists. Numerous pictures of Stalin had long been hung in public spaces, with slogans lauding the leading socialist state as the promised land, and an example to the Yugoslav nations. This made Soviet accusations of betrayal against the Yugoslav leaders seem like a bolt from the blue. The Yugoslav leadership were aware of this as they made an unusual policy move for Communist parties at the time. The Cominform statement expelling the KPJ was published and publicly rejected. At the same time, a party congress was convened in Belgrade, in July 1948. Over 2,000 delegates unanimously supported the Yugoslav Communist and state leadership, shouting out Tito and Stalin’s names. In autumn 1948, congresses of Communist organisations in the republics confirmed the resolution and loyalty to Tito and the Yugoslav leaders.

When it was expelled from the international Communist community in 1948, the KPJ already had 468,175 members (37,960 in Slovenia). The decisive break with Moscow and the resolute ‘no’ to Stalin and Moscow inevitably led to doubts and questions among the
members, and many Communist and non-Communists felt the rupture should not be exacerbated and a compromise should be reached, by at least acknowledging some ‘errors’. Tito and the Yugoslav rulers, however, were well aware that any concessions would lead to their political and physical elimination. Tito and his colleagues therefore did not permit any discussion of their positions, and severely clamped down on anyone who did not swear unconditional allegiance. From autumn 1948 onwards, the KPJ expelled around 60,000 of its members, with over 16,000 imprisoned and sent to special camps (the best known of them being on Goli Otok – Barren Island – in the Adriatic). In Slovenia, around 2,200 people were suspected of being Cominform sympathisers, and between 700 and 800 were subject to police and judicial repression, significantly fewer than in other parts of Yugoslavia.

This did not make their fate any less tragic. Like the Yugoslav leaders, the KPS leadership exploited the political uncertainty following the dispute with the Soviet Union to exclude not only actual but also potential opponents from public life. In reality, there were very few supporters of Moscow among the Slovenes imprisoned and sent to camps. Most of them were members of the older, pre-Tito generation of Communists, and people who had criticised the post-war Slovene and Yugoslav reality. The judicial procedures were harshly pragmatic and perfunctory, and the accused had no chance of defending themselves. Most of those convicted spent several years in the camps. Many did not survive the physical and mental hardships, and those who returned were under police surveillance for many years, right into the 1980s.

Yugoslavia paid a high human cost for the break with Moscow. After its exclusion from the Communist bloc it found itself in complete international isolation. In autumn 1948, Belgrade diplomats acquired urgently needed support from Great Britain, but the Soviet and Communist boycott threatened Yugoslav industrial plans, which worsened an already critical situation. The state of uncertainty was further heightened by threats of military intervention from Moscow, and Soviet endorsement of opponents of the Tito regime. Facing this situation, the Yugoslav ruling elite’s only option was a radical transformation in its external policy. They abandoned their anti-Western stance, condemned the Soviet Union as guilty of provoking political tensions in Europe and Asia and proclaimed the Yugoslav federation as an “unobligated and independent state,” beholden to neither East nor West. This was, of course, completely unrealistic, since Yugoslavia was dependent on Western aid following the split with Moscow. Suffering hardships and shortages, it slowly and carefully started to open up towards the West, and its diplomats also turned towards Asia and Africa in the search for ‘friends’. The leadership also attempted to improve relations with its western neighbours. To
this end, after the decision by the Paris peace conference that Austria would regain its 1938 borders, Yugoslavia gave up its claims on the Slovene-inhabited parts of Austrian Styria and Carinthia. In 1951, the presidency of the Federal Assembly issued a resolution ending the official state of war with Austria.

The dispute with Stalin and Moscow led to another, more serious, problem for the Yugoslav leadership. The break with the Soviets had to be given an ideological basis, forcing an explanation of why Soviet socialism, so lauded after the war, was no longer the Yugoslav model and ideal. The inner circle of Tito’s colleagues taking on this task again included the two Slovenes, Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič, with the leading role among Tito’s four main ideologists (the other two were Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Bakarić) belonging to Kardelj. Together, they concluded that Belgrade’s dispute with Stalin and Moscow was not a coincidence or merely the result of a ‘hegemonistic’ Soviet foreign policy, but went much deeper. The Soviet state and party bureaucracy, they said, aimed at concentrating all political and economic power in its hands, changing social ownership into state ownership and taking complete charge of the state and all its assets. This development unavoidably led to one person – Stalin – gaining unrestricted power, which they claimed was a complete contradiction of the basic principles of Marxism. It was their conviction that the Yugoslav Communists were the only ones to remain faithful to these principles. They stated that the only true alternative to the Soviet system of state socialism lay in the weakening or “withering away” of the state (as envisaged by Marx and Engels), the participation of producers in the management of enterprises and local communities and a Communist party that would actively connect with the “working masses” in building “democratic socialism.” This was to be the path down which Yugoslavia and its Communist party would now travel.

The turnaround in national policy and ideology was followed by tangible policy measures. In mid-1950, the Federal Assembly in Belgrade passed the Law on the Management of State Economic Associations, which proclaimed these enterprises as socially owned, and – according to the law’s authors – handed them to the “workers.” The new regulations ushered in the formation of “workers’ councils” throughout the country. The workers’ councils were to actively participate in managing enterprises and directing production on behalf of employees. Major changes were also made in public administration. In 1949–51, almost 100,000 administrative positions were terminated, in line with the new policy of reducing the state and the power of the ‘bureaucracy’, with powers transferred from the federal to republic level, and from the republic to municipal level, while the remit of local or municipal authorities was expanded. The consequence of these changes was to gradually
free Yugoslav economic policy from the grip of central planning, and to bring more liberal, more market-oriented principles into economic life. The main proponent and organiser of the new economic system was again Boris Kidrič, father of the first Yugoslav five-year plan, who was led by the new circumstances and a less antagonistic assessment of Western capitalism to the conclusion that there was no longer a need for strict centralised state control of the economy.

The new policy of decentralising the federal state met with approval from some Communist leaders and members, but also faced objectives and criticism that the new political course was a return to “capitalist anarchy.” The Yugoslav political elite decisively rejected this criticism and in 1952, at the Sixth Congress of the KPJ in Zagreb, the policy was introduced without compromise. The KPJ, which again strengthened its membership after the rejection of Stalin and Moscow, now had almost 780,000 members (around 52,000 in Slovenia). The massive growth reduced the proportion of older Communists and workers, with more and more younger activists and officials coming through. The emulation of the Soviet Union in the first years after the war was denounced as an aberration, and the introduction of socialist self-management (samoupravljanje) was proclaimed as a turning point in post-war Yugoslav development. The Communist Party was renamed, on the basis of Marx’s idea of a Communist league, as the League of Communists (Zveza komunistov). The party also stated that in future the Communists could no longer have the final say in political and social life. The party should set the direction for others to follow, but its members should work to achieve objectives primarily through persuasion and setting an example. At the very top, Tito affirmed that “there is no socialism without free individuals.”

Yet political practice and everyday life bore little relation to widely proclaimed slogans and principles. At the beginning of the 1950s, a new criminal code was adopted, which placed more focus on protecting the rights of the individual. However, no one in the leading political circles genuinely considered relinquishing power. Most national income continued to flow into state coffers, while the workers’ councils still had only limited competence within enterprises. The secret police service – like the military – retained special status and remained a tool of the ruling elite; the violent settling of scores with political and ideological opponents was still far from being over. This was felt not only by the real or imagined Cominform supporters, who were severely oppressed by the authorities, but also Catholic priests and Catholic scholars and institutions, the victim of renewed pressure on the Church at the start of the 1950s.

In the first years after the war, the Communist authorities restricted the Catholic
Church’s educational and charity activities, while the clergy were subjected to police and judicial repression, and most Catholic institutions, newspapers and societies were terminated. In line with Communist ideology, they also denounced religion as an outdated form of human delusion, de-christianised the calendar and promoted the replacement of place names of religious origins. The catechism was not yet legally eliminated from schools, and the theological faculty – though formally excluded – continued to operate within the University of Ljubljana. At the height of tensions with Moscow, at the end of the 1940s, the regime relented somewhat in its anti-church policy; in 1949, the Slovene political leadership approved the formation of the clerical Cyril and Methodius Society, which was intended to unite Catholic priests who supported values of the anti-occupation resistance, and the post-war social order. The church hierarchy and diocese did not recognise the society, but did not expressly ban people from joining.

At the start of the 1950s, problems flared up again between the Catholic Church and the state, due to a dispute with the Vatican, which peaked with the severing of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and the Holy See in 1952. This was followed by a new wave of anti-church propaganda that also affected Slovenia, including serious attacks not only on the Church hierarchy and individual priests, but also on religion, religious believers and the Catholic intelligentsia. In 1952, the catechism was finally removed from schools, the theology faculty was kicked out of the University of Ljubljana and Christmas ceased to be a public holiday. In this way, the authorities restricted religious instruction while also turning up the pressure on civil servants not to participate in religious ceremonies. The Slovene Communist leadership exploited the breakdown in relations with the Church to settle political scores with well-reputed Christian scholars who had joined the resistance movement and retained public influence after the war but had not yet been brought into line. In 1952, a loyal, though always critical, ally, the poet Edvard Kocbek, was banished from the political scene, preventing him from publishing his work under his own name for almost a decade.

But the ideological and political tension soon started to dissipate. A new, more open mood was spreading, particularly in cultural life, which permitted public expressions of views and ideas that were critical of the state. Against this background, the most prominent Croatian writer of the time, Miroslav Krleža, used the Congress of Yugoslav Writers held in Ljubljana in autumn 1952 as a platform to reject a cultural policy that put forward social realism as the only true form of socialist artistic expression and to support “creative freedom.” Just a few weeks later, at the Sixth Congress of Yugoslav Communists in Zagreb, the Agitprop propaganda agency was abolished. This of course did not mean that the Communist elite had
given up their control over culture, only that they had decided on more indirect, less obvious ways of directing artistic and cultural activity. The freer political and cultural ambience encouraged a lively intellectual movement that rapidly produced results. In 1951, the literary journal Beseda (The Word) was started in Ljubljana, which rejected official artistic doctrine, and gradually opened up to both older literary tradition and modern aesthetic and literary trends. In 1952, the first issue of the fortnightly Naši razgledi (Our Points of View) came out; it was the work of a group of Communist intellectuals, who took a critical position on Stalin’s Soviet Union and post-war Yugoslav policy. The thaw was also felt in other cultural, artistic and academic fields. When this opening up was extended to direct contacts with the West, more information, with far less filtering by the party on Western European political, social and cultural events, began to enter Yugoslavia, along with foreign newspapers, books and films.

The reforms at the start of the 1950s left the Yugoslav political elite, in their newly renamed League of Communists, untouched in their position of unchallenged ideological and political supremacy, but represented a radical turnaround in post-war Yugoslav and Slovene development. A more modern form of socialism for Yugoslavia emerged, in contrast to practice in the Soviet Union, despite the regime’s frequent vacillation between more liberal and more authoritarian positions.

SLOW PROGRESS ALONG THE SELF-MANAGEMENT PATH

The Yugoslav self-management system was a unique form of ‘socialist syncretism’, with its own ideologists, headed by Edvard Kardelj, who attempted to combine Marxist, anarchist, socialist and Bolshevik ideas that contained extreme mutual contradictions. The Communist elite in Belgrade was convinced that with “self-management-based democracy” they would be advancing along a completely new and original version of socialism, the only one that would lead to a political and socially balanced, and an economically successful future. But in political practice, they remained closely linked to the Bolshevik pattern. The utopian vision of a decentralised ‘self-managing society’ in which all the ‘producers’ would manage and decide matters under the direction of a single party, still strictly centralised in the future, created a unrealistic, authoritarian dualism that was a continual source of new tensions and conflicts.

The direction in which Yugoslavia would develop, following the adoption of the first proclamations and laws which set out the retreat from ‘state’ to ‘democratic’ socialism, was still not completely clear even in the inner circles of the ruling elite. When they saw the actual
consequences of the changes being implemented, Tito and Kardelj forcefully pointed out that, given the stagnated conditions and territory and the “wide range of different ideologies burdening much of our population,” a “self-managing democracy” could only be a long-term political vision. The political leadership in Belgrade therefore emphasised that the self-management policy and re-reading of Marxist classics could not bring into question the leading role of Communists or the party. “We must not make new errors that would lead to another extreme,” warned Tito. “[We must] make decisions that ensure we continually move towards the democratisation of our system…and [we shall] in no case change the course... of our development towards socialism, towards socialist democracy.”

Given the variance in the ideas of the Yugoslav leaders, the reforms approved at the start of the 1950s were naturally inconsistent and contradictory, and those who launched the reform process were soon applying the brakes. The centralising pressure did relent and the powers of the republics and local (municipal) bodies increased, but the Communist elite and subordinate officials maintained their power in full, despite the reduced size of the bureaucracy. This applied to public administration, culture, science and education as much as it did to politics and the economy. The partial dismantling of the administration and economic planning system did give enterprises more independence, but the investment funds and decisions on basic economic conditions remained in the hands of central state bodies. Even the ‘constitutional law on the fundamental social and political formation of the state,” adopted by the federal and republic assemblies in January 1953, had contradictory effects. In line with the new policy of “worker self-management,” the law amended the 1946 constitution, decentralising the state administration, proclaiming social ownership and “self-management” as the foundations of the Yugoslav state system and introducing the term “socialism” to the constitution. However, decentralisation and the introduction of municipal self-management increased the role and importance of municipalities at the expense of the federal units (republics and autonomous provinces). The Chamber of Nationalities in the Federal Assembly was replaced by the Chamber of Producers, which comprised directly elected representatives of employees in numbers that reflected the relative importance of their sector to total domestic economic production. The Federal Assembly was still bicameral, made up of the Federal Chamber and Chamber of Producers, with voters electing delegates directly to each, while the former Chamber of Nationalities, which comprised representatives from the assemblies of the republics and autonomous provinces, was reduced in size and would only sit as and when required.

The reformers in the Yugoslav political leadership claimed that the new political
system and “workers’ self-management” would open the doors to more direct co-operation “of working people” in decision-making and power, while decentralisation and ‘democratisation’ would make the realisation of national aims and rights more effective. Externally, the new political relations were also expressed in the new name of the executive political bodies, which were now called the executive councils (rather than the government as previously). All these changes could have little effect, given that the ruling KPJ underwent little change and remained a hierarchical and authoritarian organisation. The unwillingness of the leading Communists to take greater steps towards the pluralisation of political life was illustrated by the dilemma over the transformation of the Popular Front, which from 1953 was to bear the new name the Socialist Alliance of Working People (Socialistična zveza delovnega ljudstva – SZDL), gathering together “all working people” as a broad-based political organisation. Claims in Slovenia that this Socialist Alliance would become a “mass, popular forum,” where anyone could express their opinion, soon raised hopes of a revival of the pre-war and wartime people’s front, when the Popular or Liberation Front (OF) had still been a plural alliance of different political groups. This kind of thinking was completely unacceptable to the Communist leadership, which envisaged the new Socialist Alliance as an instrument for putting its decisions into practice, much as they had conceived of the Popular Front before it.

Other social and political organisations underwent similar development; in 1953, the Women’s Anti-Fascist Front was disbanded and replaced by the Union of Women’s Societies. In 1951, the Youth Union (Ljudska mladina) was reorganised and a separate Union of Students (Zveza študentov) was founded. Though many of these changes were only formal in nature, they raised hopes among the wider population and particularly among educated people that the democratisation process would continue. These expectations were strengthened by an improvement in relations between the regime and the Catholic Church. In 1952, when tensions between the Vatican and Belgrade were at their height, the authorities in Slovenia had already demonstrated their openness to a more flexible policy towards the clergy and Church hierarchy. In 1953, the first post-war law on the legal status of religious communities in Slovenia was passed, consolidating their status. By no means did this mean that problems and tensions in the relationship between the Catholic Church and Communist rulers were over, but the new law provided the Catholic Church and other religious communities with a foothold, representing a new era in their relations with the secular authorities. The Slovene Communist leaders affirmed their desire to calm tensions with the Catholic Church by gradually pardoning imprisoned priests and providing state subsidies to
the theology faculty, which was organised as a private ecclesiastical school following its exclusion from the University of Ljubljana. Nevertheless, even in these new circumstances the authorities did not forego their aggressive anti-religious and anti-Church propaganda, which at every level of education and public communication proclaimed Marxism and historical materialism as the only scientific view of the world, nor did they cease to pressure civil servants of all ranks to avoid attending religious services.

The pace of change in economic, social and general living conditions was significantly slower than that of state institutions and in the political situation. Kolkhozisation, or Soviet-style collective farming, had collapsed by the start of the 1950s, but with the limit on private farms being set at 10 hectares in 1953, farmer-owners with more land than that (27.6%) again lost land. The “second agrarian reform” represented a new phase of nationalisation, with most private agricultural lands over 10 hectares in size being turned into state or co-operative assets, which speeded up the already rapid pace of rural depopulation. From 1948 to 1953, the percentage of the population involved in agriculture in Slovenia fell from 49% to 41%, and by 1961 it was down to 31.6%. The decline in agricultural activity and the migration from rural areas into towns went hand in hand with the growth and modernisation of the industrial sector. After 1952, and particularly after 1954, when the state (in part with Western aid) started a better-planned credit policy, industrial development intensified, leading to an increase in living standards. However, conditions for most of the population continued to be quite meagre, with workers’ and lower-ranking officials’ wages effectively providing no more than that required for subsistence. Political dignitaries and successful enterprise managers had special benefits such as their own shops, cars, and significantly better opportunities for holidays and breaks.

Yet despite the gradual nature of the changes, they were still too fast and too radical for some Communist leaders and many activists. A debate on the future organisation of agriculture, in spring 1953, split the Yugoslav Communist leadership, with criticisms of the reforms warning of a return to capitalism growing louder. The new mood in the Yugoslav leadership was significantly affected by changes in the Soviet Union, where a more conciliatory position had been taken towards Yugoslavia since Stalin’s death in March 1953, leading a few months later to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Moscow and the other Soviet bloc states, with ambassadors being exchanged. Following these developments, Tito convened a session of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists at the beginning of 1953, which found that the self-management reforms had set off various “anti-socialist deviances”, and called on Communists throughout
the country to reclaim the political initiative. This, of course, was a red light to the continuing process of democratisation, and critics of an overly liberal opening up to “western influences” were prominent once more in newspapers and in public.

Most of the Communist elite fell in with the new political direction, with Edvard Kardelj leading the way. Among those leaders, however, one remained openly opposed to the perceived turnaround; Milovan Djilas, the one-time dogmatic party ideologist, had became a vocal supporter of self-management and democratisation, and in autumn and winter 1953 argued in a series of polemical articles published in Yugoslav newspapers that the “only permanent objective” in the struggle for a socially and politically fair society was the “struggle for democracy.” Djilas’ ideas divided the hierarchy, and were met with a significant response from the public. This led Djilas – despite disagreement from the ruling Communist core – to take an even more radical position in late 1953 and the first half of 1954, rejecting the thesis that the Communists were the only “conscious force” of socialism. He argued that the League of Communists and its subordinate socio-political organisations were actually an obstacle to introducing true democracy; in 1953, he even took on the system’s untouchable institutions, such as the secret police – UDBA. Now Tito and his closest colleagues lost their patience with him, having avoided conflict due to the ongoing Trieste crisis and international pressures on Yugoslavia. In January 1954, Tito’s circle subjected Djilas to severe criticism, relieved him of all his functions and condemned his views throughout the country.

Milovan DJilas’ endorsement of a break-up of the Communist political monopoly and of the pluralisation of political life in Yugoslavia made him a faithful but radical interpreter of the Kardelj “self-management philosophy,” which clearly illustrated the consequences of consistently implementing democratisation. Compared to Serbia and Croatia, Djilas had surprisingly few supporters among Slovenes. Djilas’ small group of supporters in Slovenia were largely academics, as well as a few senior officials and Communist functionaries, who interpreted the delay in elite criticisms of Djilas as backing for his ideas. When Djilas officially fell out of favour, Slovene political leaders were therefore quick to join the campaign condemning his articles. Still, at least initially, the prevailing view in Slovenia was against taking broader action against Djilas and his supporters.

The main reason for the relatively lax response of Slovene and Yugoslav leaders lay in the state of international relations and the escalation of the situation in the city and Free Territory of Trieste. In 1952, the Western powers said they would allow Zone A of the Free Territory, with Trieste and its surroundings, to pass to Italy. When, in autumn 1953, they repeated these plans, there was uproar in Yugoslavia and Slovenia. In summer of that year,
Italy started to concentrate land and naval forces near the Free Territory, and Yugoslavia responded by mobilising its own forces, and the wider public. It seemed that the threat of armed attack had moved the public gaze from internal to external matters.

As in the immediate post-war period, a wave of patriotic demonstrations swept Yugoslavia, with people shouting the name of Tito and the party and expressing their willingness to give their lives for a “Yugoslav and Slovene Trieste.” But, after a few months of tension, the Yugoslav leaders decided to negotiate, and, on 5 October, Yugoslavia and Italy signed a new Treaty of London, dividing the Free Territory of Trieste. Italy acquired most of Zone A, with a few territorial adjustments, and Yugoslavia was given Zone B. As in 1947, the agreement permitted inhabitants of both zones to freely choose their citizenship. This led to over 10,000 people, largely Italians, leaving the district of Koper in 1955/56. The agreement left around 95,000 Slovenes in Italy (in the provinces of Trieste, Gorizia and Udine), who were guaranteed minority rights by the Treaty of London and a special statute. However, Italian authorities only started to adopt and implement the laws required to provide this protection in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the mid-1950s, Yugoslavia began to consolidate its international status by means of skilful diplomacy. In 1954, it signed a Defence Alliance Treaty with Greece and Turkey, which was of particular significance given that both states were Nato members. In May 1955, an independent Austria was re-established under the State Treaty, effectively its new constitution. The Treaty included an article guaranteeing the national rights and protection of the Slovene minority in Carinthia and Styria, and was ratified by Yugoslavia, resolving the border issue with its northern neighbour. According to Yugoslav data, the number of Slovenes in Austrian Carinthia after the Second World War was 50,000. They had their own societies and newspapers, and in 1945 the province passed a provincial state regulation based on the school system in Swiss cantons, introducing a bilingual school system to southern Carinthia, where most of the Slovene-speaking population lived. However, after the State Treaty was ratified, and it was seen that Article 7 of the Treaty would soon improve the status of the Slovene minority, German organisations in the province organised a forceful campaign against the bilingual schools that eventually led, in 1958, to the provincial authorities repealing the resolution on bilingual primary education. A new law was passed, requiring parents to specially register children for Slovene and bilingual schools, while also stating that the size and areas of settlement of the Slovene minority had to be revised. This led to another major clash between Yugoslavia and Austria at the end of the 1950s.

Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union were also subject to extreme ups and downs.
After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s visits to Belgrade in 1955, and Tito’s visit to Moscow a year later, relations improved, before cooling again following the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the uprisings in Poland and Hungary raised hopes among some intellectuals and more democratically minded Communists that the movement to democratise socialism was also strengthening in the Eastern Bloc, but the brutal suppression of reform processes in Hungary brought a swift end to such hopes. These events had a significant impact on Yugoslavia’s actions; in the mid-1950s, Djilas was brought before court in Belgrade and imprisoned, and a new purge and tightening of party discipline swept Communist ranks.

But worker unrest in Poland and Hungary also convinced the Yugoslav elite that they must do more to raise living standards and improve people’s everyday lives. This led to major changes in state economic policy in the mid-1950s, which moved away from the unilateral promotion of heavy industry towards a more balanced development of different economic sectors. At the same time, the government attempted to introduce more incentives to the salary system in the relevant ministries. Some moves away from the system of state-defined pay had already been taken towards the end of the 1940s, and subsequent regulations attempted to maximise productivity by permitting some level of participation in enterprise profits. In the mid-1950s, the statistical indictors improved for almost all economic sectors, although in many cases the focus was on increasing production quantity rather than quality, and the rise was largely due to foreign loans and Yugoslav borrowing from the West. The industrial upturn increased the supply of consumer products, which was further boosted by the modernising marketing network. Foreign consumer products also became more accessible to the general public, and sales of household and technical appliances increased. At the end of the 1950s and start of the 1960s, people could use their dinars to buy the first cars produced in Yugoslavia, built under licence from foreign manufacturers (initially the much-loved Fiat 600, known as a fičko, and from 1961 Citroen cars, produced in a new factory in Koper). However, the modernisation only covered a limited number of sectors rather than the entire economic system, which was still shackled by five-year plans.

Meanwhile the nascent process of democratisation stalled after Djilas had been dealt with, and the Communists – unable and unwilling to drop their established ways of operating – changed the newly founded “self-management” bodies into tools for implementing Communist policy at every level. In these circumstances, the more relaxed atmosphere of openness to Western Europe was largely felt in the cultural sphere, though not without official opposition. New aesthetic and artistic trends, which looked to modern American and French
literature – and particularly the latter – first reached expression in literature, before appearing in visual arts, the theatre and music. In the early 1950s in poetry and prose, controversy was caused among the regime’s established aesthetes by the intimate and existentialist *Pesmi štirih* (Poems of the Four, 1953, featuring works by Kajetan Kovič, Janez Menart, Tone Pavček, and Ciril Zlobec) and *Novele* (Novels) by Andrej Hieng, Lojze Kovačič and Franček Bohanec (1954). In the latter half of the 1950s, renewed outrage arose in political circles at the literary gathering within the literary magazine *Revija 57* (Review ’57) and the poems of Dane Zajec, Veno Taufer and Jože Snoj. The artists Gabrijel Stupica, Miloš Požar and Lojze Spacal were also resented by the official critics and art ideologists, as was the first major post-war surrealist and major post-war abstract painter, Stane Kregar, whose work appeared in the Modern Gallery in Ljubljana in 1953 in an independent exhibition with Riko Debenjak. Two years later, the Modern Gallery held its first international graphics exhibition, introducing Slovene artists and public to graphic art trends from around the world.

Theatre also took off, with the *Oder 57* (Stage ’57) leading the vanguard of experimental and modernist theatre groups, which staged numerous works by young Slovene and modern foreign dramatists, including plays by Eugene Ionesco (1958). The Ljubljana Opera House enjoyed a golden age, and in the mid-1950s the philharmonic orchestra and the Ljubljana Radio symphony orchestras were starting to operate on a permanent footing, which was a major addition to Slovene musical life. Slovene radio also had a dance orchestra, led by Bojan Adamič from the end of the war, which was incorporated into the new joint Radio Television Slovenia broadcasting corporation when the Slovene television station was established in 1958. The authorities looked less favourably on jazz, which had already had many fans and adherents in Slovenia before the war, but this did not stop Urban Koder founding the Ljubljana jazz ensemble in 1957. Three years later, jazz musicians from all over Yugoslavia came together at a national jazz festival in Bled. This was followed in 1962 by the first festival of Slovene popular song, while interest in rock and modern popular music from the West also increased among young people. Slovene cinema successfully avoiding excess politicisation in its first post-war film *Na svoji zemlji* (On Our Own Land, 1948) directed by France Štiglic, and became popular in the 1950s with a number of entertaining, largely apolitical films, such as *Vesna* by František Čap (1953). At the start of the 1960s, Boštjan Hladnik set his sights on more current themes in *Ples v dežju* (Dance in the Rain, 1961).

The Yugoslav and Slovene Communist leaderships were extremely ambivalent towards modern cultural trends. They were well aware that greater cultural openness was an important outlet for dissatisfaction among the general public, but also recognised that
throwing open the cultural scene threatened their own ideological monopoly. Communist heads still resorted to prohibitions as soon as they felt that individuals or their mouthpieces had intervened too freely in the domain of ideology and politics. In 1956, the review *Beseda* was banned in Ljubljana, and the same fate befell *Revija 57* in 1958. Its editors even had to present their defence to the police, and one of them – Jože Pučnik – was imprisoned for nine years, convicted of producing “enemy propaganda.” The result of the discord among Yugoslav leaders, tensions between national groups, and heightened social dissatisfaction at the end of the 1950s was a retightening of political and police control throughout Yugoslavia. In 1958, the first mass strikes by workers in post-war Yugoslavia took place in Trbovlje and Hrastnik. Around 4,000 miners decided to come out on strike because of dissatisfaction with pay and the mining management, as well as a federal economic policy that set the price of coal without any reference to growth in prices for other products and production costs. The strike caused panic in ruling circles, as it showed that the “self-management” system did not protect against social conflict, and revealed the contradictory economic interests of Yugoslavia’s east and west, and growing conflicts between the republic and the federal authorities.

Although Yugoslav leaders maintained that post-war Yugoslav society had resolved the national question once and for all, by 1957 Edvard Kardelj was addressing it once more – in the introduction to the second edition of his book *Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja* (The Evolution of the Slovene National Question). The tensions in internal policy and between the constituent nations were ascribed to the “remnants of bourgeois nationalism,” the large development differences between parts of the state, and the “centralist-bureaucratic” efforts of some of the Yugoslav leadership. In Kardelj’s view, the cultural and economic differences between the Yugoslav regions and nations and the related tensions could be eliminated by a balanced economic policy and an increase in “general Yugoslav wealth.” He stated that the resolution of the conflict between “bourgeois nationalism” and “centralist Yugoslavism,” which denied the existence of individual nations was the “task of all political forces.” Yet the closing statement of the 7th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, which met in Ljubljana in spring 1958, and the programme adopted by the Congress focused more on the situation in the international socialist movement than on internal Yugoslav disputes and divisions.

At the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s, the tensions seemed to calm, at least seen from outside. In 1959, the Federal Assembly in Belgrade adopted a new criminal code, which formally strengthened the legal position of citizens. At the same time, there were major changes in social policy. Slovenia’s first educational advice services and school for social
workers were founded on Western lines in the mid-1950s, an indirect admission by
Communist ideologists that even socialism could not solve behavioural and social problems
with political and ideological instruction alone. Despite the increasing economic problems,
living standards were still on the up, and passports were no longer the privilege of a select
few, making travel abroad much more common. By far the most popular of the Yugoslav
leaders in Slovenia – as elsewhere in the state – was Josip Broz Tito, which was not just the
result of political propaganda and official promotion of a cult of personality, but also because
of his extraordinary capacity for leadership. Tito’s authority was further consolidated by his
travels to Asia in the second half of the 1950s, which prepared the way for the ‘non-aligned
movement’, crowned in 1961 by the first meeting of leaders from the bloc of unaligned states
in Belgrade. Despite occasional resistance to authoritarian Communist methods, even in
intellectual circles there was a general conviction that opportunities for democratisation and
modernisation of Slovene and Yugoslav society should be sought within the Yugoslav socialist
system, because socially it was a ‘fairer’ society than that offered by Western capitalism or
Eastern socialism. In this atmosphere, relations between church and state continued to calm.
Slovene and Croatian bishops travelled to Rome in 1958 for the first time since the end of the
Second World War to visit the Pope, and in 1961 the Pope made the Ljubljana diocese into an
archdiocese. After 1945, the diocese grew with the addition of areas it had lost after 1920,
though it did concede some parts of Primorska, which were included in the Koper apostolic
administration, along with Yugoslav parts of the dioceses of Gorizia and Trieste, and the
Slovene part of the diocese of Rijeka.

Behind the scenes, the situation within Yugoslavia was growing tenser. The
deterioration in relations between the republics, especially between developed and
undeveloped parts of the country, was in large part due to the economic difficulties inherent in
attempting to do too much too quickly to transform the economy, as well as the growing gap
between investment, budget appetites and actual economic productivity and results. The less-
developed areas accused the more-developed of selfishness and capitalist egotism, while the
‘developed’ accused the ‘undeveloped’ of irrational profligacy and living at ‘the expense of
others’. In the latter half of the decade, the Slovene Communist leadership still firmly
supported federal economic policy, and vehemently rejected ‘nationalist’ dissatisfaction from
managers and workers, who were becoming bolder and more vocal in their complaints against
the federal authorities’ irrational handling of state funds and the patchy distribution of funds
by federal investment funds. It was becoming clearer that a lack of investment was holding
industrial and agricultural development in Slovenia behind both the adopted plans and current
capacity. This lag was particularly noticeable in the construction of transport infrastructure. The Slovene authorities managed to implement only part of the investment plans for the Slovene road network, while the realisation of other plans – such as the modernisation of the railways, and construction of the Port of Koper and Ljubljana airport – had to wait until the 1960s, due to Belgrade concentrating federal investment in other republics. Newly founded Slovene enterprises also faced major problems as they came up against established Yugoslav monopolies. These included the Splošna Plovba shipping company from Piran, which after upgrading its fleet met strong opposition from other Yugoslav shipping companies, and in 1961 the Slovene air carrier, Adria-Aviopromet, which endured a long-running dispute with federal agencies to achieve equality with the federal air carrier, JAT (Jugoslovenski aerotransport).

Nevertheless, in the boom years from 1957 to 1962, the Slovene economy did make a major leap forward, and the positive economic situation also led to a rise in living standards, changes in the appearances of towns, and the founding of new industrial towns. In 1959, the new town centre was opened in Velenje, Slovenia’s second post-war new town after Nova Gorica, while a wide range of aggressive town planning interventions ‘modernised’ the centres of Ljubljana and other towns, with little or no respect for historical heritage. Attitudes to private farming, however, were still dominated by old socialist and Bolshevik views which saw private farmers as capitalist opponents of socialism. The authorities continued to restrict private farm sales of produce and farm modernisation, and only state agricultural holdings and collectives were entitled to state funding to purchase farm machinery and implement new agricultural procedures, including use of new fertilisers.

At the start of the 1960s, an economic crisis hit, which caused supporters of the hard Communist line and “self-management” reforms in the Yugoslav leadership to dig in on their respective sides. The former group was led by Aleksandar Ranković, an influential Serbian politician and long-term Yugoslav minister of the interior, the latter headed by Edvard Kardelj, who started to lose Tito’s support after the 7th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, and for a time, in 1961/2, fell out of favour. Other disputes between leading figures were kept out of the public eye for considerable time. While the politicians remained quiet about the downhill slide in relations between the nations and republics, writers felt free to raise the issue in public, often with the tacit approval of politicians. The debate was kick-started by the Serbian writer, Dobrica Ćosić, who put forward the idea in the 1960/61 period that the borders of the Yugoslav republics were stifling co-operation and interaction between the nationalities. He wrote of the rise of nationalism and a lack of respect for “democratic
discipline” in “some republics,” and proclaimed Yugoslavism as an “internationalist practice” that was an essential element of an “inevitable global integration” and the “creation of a socialist civilisation across the planet.” The Ljubljana literary theoretician, Dušan Pirjevec, responded to Ćosić’s statements, rejecting them and arguing that “nationality [was] a vital element of human personality and the basis for human communication with the world.” He wrote: “This process will gradually (and increasingly) emphasise the category of nationality as an elementary form of affiliation,” and also stated that Yugoslavism would only persist if it was based on national diversity and permitted the “unhindered development of existing units and organisms.”

The argument between Ćosić and Pirjevec garnered considerable publicity, since the conflict between centralists and supporters of more independence for the republics and nations had long been current, not only in politics and economics, but also in the cultural sphere. Slovene representatives in federal cultural agencies and organisations were already opposing the state’s tendency to centralise culture and academic life in the second half of the 1950s. These different views on the role of the federal (Yugoslav) and national (republic) cultural and media institutions were clearly seen in the debate that accompanied the founding of the Slovene television station in 1958. Belgrade favoured a single Yugoslav television channel and was against republics setting up their own separate TV stations. The clash over media and cultural institutions developed into a general quarrel over the use of languages, which very quickly concerned much more than television programming. At the end of the 1950s, Slovene opponents of federal language policy began to speak up, criticising federal institutions for issuing official material and decisions in Serbo-Croat only. The Slovene Communist elite, ‘decapitated’ after Kardelj was pushed out of Tito’s inner circle, vacillated as it adjusted to the new circumstances, before openly encouraging ‘nationalist’ cultural demands for the first time. It also attempted to assert its own economic positions more forcefully in dealings with federal bodies. In December 1961, Slovene delegates in the Federal Assembly walked out of a session in protest, because they did not want to vote on a proposed economic plan. This was the first protest of its kind in post-war Yugoslavia, and genuinely shocking political behaviour for that time.

In the first half of the 1960s, Yugoslavia was still a police state. UDBA functioned without any effective external control, and special police methods such as surveillance and eavesdropping were the norm. Nevertheless, open expressions of dissatisfaction with economic policy, social conditions and relations between the nations were becoming louder and more numerous. The differences in social and material welfare had significantly increased
and national tensions grown, which was reflected in Slovenia by increasingly intolerant attitudes to workers from less developed areas of Yugoslavia, with the adjective ‘southern’ acquiring pejorative overtones. Migration from other republics was not yet as pronounced as it would be in later years, and the 1961 census data indicates that of the 1,591,523 people living in Slovenia at the time, only around 3.4 per cent were Croats, Serbs or other non-Slovenes. Nevertheless, the number of workers from less-developed areas of Yugoslavia did increase rapidly from the second half of the 1950s.

The Yugoslav ruling elite met frequently throughout 1962, announcing numerous systemic and political changes. In a much heralded speech that year in Split, Tito spoke publicly about the crisis in the Yugoslav leadership for the first time, and once more called for “Communists [and] socialist forces” to unite, while also threatening all those harming the values of “brotherhood and unity” and socialist achievements. Yet even Tito still could not decide between traditional centralism and Kardelj’s self-management. “Today, we can no longer simply follow a pre-determined path, but we have to take into account all the new circumstances, and adapt our course accordingly,” he said a day after celebrating his seventieth birthday in May 1962. A new Yugoslav constitution would attempt to reach the compromise that these comments anticipated.

FAILED ATTEMPTS AT MODERNISATION AND DEMOCRATISATION

The 1963 Yugoslav constitution was a genuine compromise between conservative (centralist) and more liberal (federalist) tendencies, but it also represented a victory for the ‘Croat-Slovene formation’ embodied by Edvard Kardelj and the Croatian politician Vladimir Bakarić – as the second most important author of the constitution. The constitution did not include major interventions into social and economic relations, and largely retained the centralised, politically steered economic system. In the name of the “withering away of the state” and strengthening the role of “working people” it extended the administrative and political powers of municipalities and local forms of self-management, while also increasing the number of delegates and the number of chambers in the republic and federal assemblies. Instead of two, the assemblies now had five chambers, and voters not only elected delegates as citizens and members of national communities, but also in their role as ‘producers’ or employees in the non-manufacturing sectors. This fragmentation, which emphasised the role of ‘self-managers’ and municipal communities while weakening the republics, of course benefited the federal bodies in Belgrade most. The constitution also clearly stated that only
two political organisations were responsible for organising, and participating in, political life – the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance – and both continued to operate hierarchically and centrally, despite differences in the positions of the republic leaderships.

The verbose constitution proclaimed Yugoslavia as a voluntary union of nations and a democratic “self-managing” community. The guiding principle of state organisation was – at least formally – not centralism, but decentralisation, with municipalities as the “basic cell” that allowed “working people” to “manage themselves” and “exercise their interests.” The constitution separated the offices of president of the Federal Executive Council (federal government) and president of the state, which was reserved for Tito. Although Kardelj and the other authors were aware of the compromises within the constitution’s text, they considered the ‘self-management orientation’ to be predominant. In their opinion, Yugoslavia’s new constitution was ushering in a period of ‘mature socialism’. This was the thinking behind changing the name from the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socialistična federativna republika Jugoslavija – SFRJ).

The new Yugoslav constitution was in reality rather contradictory and notoriously difficult reading, but its ‘self-management’ ethos also created the impression in public that it set out a path to political democratisation. In Slovenia, where newspapers and cultural journals had already permitted criticism of national, political and social conditions from the start of the 1960s when relations with the Yugoslav leadership had become tenser, the public deliberations that accompanied the adoption of the constitution grew into dynamic arguments on the future of Yugoslav society and socialism. These ideas – at least to begin with – were supported by part of Slovenia’s political leadership which, under pressure from centralists and conservatives in Belgrade, attempted to acquire allies among the intelligentsia at home. In Ljubljana, the authorities permitted the editors and collaborators of Revija 57, banned in 1958, to found a new journal called Perspektive (Perspectives) in 1960. Perspektive was followed by a number of other humanities and cultural journals, while existing publications – including some of the newspapers – updated their editorial policy. In the first half of the 1960s, Slovene public life experienced a new spirit of openness, permitting a dynamic exchange of opinions on current social, political and cultural issues. When, in 1963/64, the social and critical unrest spread to students and the university, the debate that had previously been the preserve of a small group of intellectuals became a spontaneous movement on a level unseen in Slovenia since the Second World War.

However, the intellectual and student criticisms of the Communist regime and authorities were not largely aimed at socialism. As the intellectually most influential group,
the editors and collaborators of *Perspektive* became the main initiators of the polemical discussions, but fiercely rejected accusations that they had political ambitions. They called themselves a diverse intellectual circle, united by a desire to see the democratisation of cultural and political life in Yugoslavia. The articles they published were based on the work of existentialist and Marxist thinkers, and addressed the actual nature of communism and the revolution, critically debating the post-war Yugoslav reality and authoritarian violence. This bold editorial policy inevitably led to conflict with Communist leaders, who closed *Perspektive* down in 1964, and dealt with its editors in the established pattern: using the police, political threats and removing ‘undesirables’ from public life. As when *Revija 57* was banned, Jože Pučnik was again brought before court, and sentenced to a lengthy imprisonment.

The Communist leaders’ fears of criticisms from the *Perspektive* intellectuals were excessive. *Perspektive* was far too open to modern, Western currents of thought for the cultural climate in Yugoslavia at the time, so the authors did not gain much sympathy from the public or writers and collaborators on other cultural reviews. Their main support came from students, who were independently participating in public life in 1963/64 for the first time since the war. The main source of student dissatisfaction was the university reforms imposed in 1959, while the economic crisis, differing ideas on Yugoslavia and Slovenia’s future, and the polemical debate in the press brought further political animation to Ljubljana’s previously largely passive university students, now over 8,000 in number. In autumn 1963 and spring 1964, hundreds of students and like-minded critics gathered publicly and elsewhere to call on Slovene politicians to speak out openly on the major issues facing post-war Slovene and Yugoslav society.

The ban on *Perspektive*, the replacement of a few of the more defiant editorial boards, and a series of other aggressive authoritarian acts in 1964 stopped the nascent movement in its tracks. But the change in political direction could not be checked for long. At the end of 1964, the 8th Congress of the ZKJ supported a proposal on a Yugoslav path to a “market economy,” which was the first to explicitly and critically discuss relations between Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. Tito took the opportunity to clearly side with the reformers, and the congress conclusions rejected the notion of a single Yugoslav nation and recognised the right of the constituent nations to “live and develop in line with the results of their own work”. To emphasise the ZKJ’s focus on decentralisation and federalism, the congress stated that in future the republic Leagues of Communists could convene their congresses before the Federal Congress and not after it. Changing the order of the congresses was intended to demonstrate
that Communists in the republics did not just exist to implement federal policy, but were major participants in policymaking.

However, the crisis could no longer be kept secret, and was reflected not only in the decline in industrial growth, but also in inflation, rising prices and excess borrowing. At the start of the 1960s, Belgrade passed numerous economic measures in an attempt to increase exports, liberalise rules on transactions in Western hard currency, and transform the banking and credit system. The new legislation was also aimed at giving enterprises greater independence in handling their revenues, which would lead to more efficient use. Yet the economic problems that accompanied the fall in production, reduction in exports and dismissal of workers continued. In 1964, Yugoslavia seemed to be facing a financial meltdown, and the prevailing view in the Yugoslav Communist elite was now that the economic system needed fundamental change, that state intervention in the economy had to be restricted, and that the market must be given more freedom.

The economic reform of 1965 represented a triumphant return for Kardelj and the ‘Slovene tendency’ within the Yugoslav leadership. Ljubljana and Belgrade proclaimed the planned changes as the furthest reaching transformation of the economic system since 1951. In reality, the reforms were largely financial in nature. The Federal Assembly passed a series of acts abolishing state investment funds – except the fund for less-developed republics – and their capital was transferred to banks. At the same time, the banking system and the banks – at least on paper – were transformed into independent enterprises. In summer 1965, the dinar was devalued (by two-thirds) against Western currencies, the prices of industrial products were changed using administrative measures to bring them closer to prices on western markets, exporting was made easier, and customs duties were used in an attempt to direct imports. The new economic legislation also offered more understanding for farmers, who could now acquire loans to buy agricultural machinery, and the doors were tentatively opened towards private enterprise in trades and catering.

The 1965 laws were supplemented in subsequent years, but the implementation of the reforms was once again ineffective. The Communist leadership remained one of the main obstacles, and was not yet ready to relinquish its right to tinker with the economy. The economic crisis increased opposition to the reforms, especially in sectors and areas in which enterprises found themselves in the red. This increased dissatisfaction among the general public, facing rising prices and increasing unemployment instead of an economic upturn, and finding themselves with a lack of social stability, something that could never be allowed in socialism, according to the assertions of official ideologists. The authorities attempted to
solve the unemployment problem by opening the borders and making it easier to acquire passports, which gave several hundred thousands of people from all over Yugoslavia the chance to seek work abroad (officially 62,347 people left Slovenia to work in West Germany, Austria and other western European countries between 1964 and 1969; the real figure was probably 30-40% higher). The social and economic problems were grist to the mill of reform opponents, who had most support in Serbia and the less economically developed republics. In 1967/68, it was already clear that the reform had failed, although lively debates on economic policy continued until the early 1970s, by which time even the greatest optimists abandoned hopes of realising the economic objectives they had set.

The relaxation of border restrictions, however, was a significant innovation that opened the path to Europe up to Yugoslav citizens. For many, this was proof that the very essence of Yugoslav communism differed from the Eastern European version. In the long term, the more liberal border policy was one of the major gains of the reforms of the 1960s, as it opened Yugoslavia (particularly Slovenia on its western borders) to foreign capital, but also to western cultural influences and ideas. Official ideologists proclaimed the mass exodus of the unemployed and the dissatisfied as a temporary phenomenon, and forecast that the “temporary workers abroad” would return, once the Yugoslav economy had undergone its much-needed transformation. At the same time, the ideologists also skilfully used the open state borders for propaganda purposes, constantly emphasising that Yugoslavia was the only Communist country in the world with open borders.

The re-establishment of Kardelj’s influence with Tito in the mid-1960s inevitably led to a showdown with his opponents in the upper echelons of power. With battle joined, the Minister of the Interior, Aleksander Ranković, made a wrong move by attempting to extend his control to the military intelligence service, in addition to the secret police (UDBA) he had already shaped into a personal power base. This was a step too far for the military chiefs, who turned to their informers to reveal that UDBA had been spying, with Ranković’s approval, on the highest-ranking Yugoslav leaders, including Tito himself. In July 1966, the central committee of the ZKJ met on the island of Brioni, “unanimously condemned ‘deformations’ in the work of the security agencies” and removed Ranković and his closest confederates. It also passed a resolution reorganising the secret police, and, in the following months, UDBA and other police agencies and the Communist parties throughout Yugoslavia were subjected to thorough purges. Thousands of people were transferred or dismissed from their jobs, with many tried and imprisoned. The purge included Slovenia, where the top-ranking officials in the Slovene UDBA were removed, as elsewhere, along with the main traces of their
clandestine activities.

The victorious reforming faction in the Communist command proclaimed UDBA’s illegal actions and abuses as the work of ‘Stalinist’ enemies of economic and political reforms, portraying their disclosures as part of their struggle for self-management and democracy. Ranković’s removal, and assurances that UDBA’s wings were now clipped, were met with relief and optimism in Slovenia, but public life became more open only slowly. The authorities still responded with extreme sensitivity and aggression against any criticism or action perceived as opposing official views and policies. Slovene politicians and the general public were therefore scandalised in 1966 by a neo-avant-garde group of literary and visual artists which took the name OHO. The group, which would later influence similar movements throughout Yugoslavia and which even exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1970, attempted to apply the principles of conceptualism, which were not only in conflict with Communist, but also traditional, views on artistic creation. The OHO group was subjected to a hail of criticism, and many of its events were blocked or closed down. The young, modernist poet Tomaž Šalamun was also subjected to vicious attacks from the established cultural elite.

Slovenia’s political leaders did their utmost to present the effects of the reforms in the best possible light, but soon had to admit that the economic transformation was not going according to plan. In the second half of the 1960s, Slovenia did achieve better economic results than the other Yugoslav republics, but the reform also halted growth in the Slovene economy and led to a slowdown lasting several years. As elsewhere, the decline in social standards brought critics of the reform to the fore, accusing supporters of the new economic policy of abandoning socialist principles and exposing Yugoslavia to ungoverned “capitalist commercialisation.”

The reformers in the federal leadership could still point to a series of undisputed political successes, despite these difficulties. One of these was the signing of a protocol between the Yugoslav government and Holy See, in Belgrade in June 1966. The protocol was the result of the reformers’ predominance in state policymaking, and an expression of changes in the Vatican’s leadership following the Second Vatican Council. By signing the agreement, the Vatican accepted the position that Catholic priests remained restricted to religious matters and could not intervene in politics. In return, Yugoslavia affirmed the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the Catholic Church in performing religious ceremonies, and recognised the Vatican’s jurisdiction over the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia in spiritual matters. The state acknowledged the Holy See’s right to freely appoint bishops, who were also
entitled to unhindered contacts with the Catholic hierarchy in Rome. The thawing of relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See had favourable consequences for the Catholic Church in Slovenia. In 1968, Pope Paul VI established a Slovene ecclesiastical province. The Church strengthened its activities, and the authorities allowed a department of Ljubljana’s Theology Faculty to be set up in Maribor, and became more active in renovating church monuments. In the 1970s, the Church also managed to secure social insurance for priests and members of holy orders. In everyday life, however, relations between believers, the Church and the authorities were still full of conflict and tension. The Communists continued to declare historical materialism as the only ‘scientific’ view of the world, and banned state employees from carrying out religious duties and expressing religious faith.

The reform wing of the Communist and state leadership continually pushed for reforms to the Yugoslav League of Communists (ZKJ) and state organisations as well as the economy. After dealing with Ranković, they moved on to a resolution transforming the ZKJ. This introduced a collective presidency, headed by Tito, and reorganised the party with an emphasis on the independence of republic-level organisations, which also increased their influence over the federal leadership. Amendments to the federal constitution in 1967/68 extended the administrative and political powers of the republics. The powers of the federal government and Federal Assembly were reduced and the strengthening of Vojvodina and Kosovo’s autonomy emphasised the division of Serbia into three parts. The weakening of the federal agencies and authorities caused greatest dissatisfaction in Serbia, but in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, it fanned national sentiment and tendencies favouring republic autonomy.

This naturally led to further debate on language policy. At the end of 1966, Slovene Slavic language specialists called on Slovene politicians to support equality for Slovene in dealings with the Federal Assembly and federal administration. Their position was supported by the republic assembly in Ljubljana, which took its demands for equality of Slovene and Macedonian with Serbo-Croat in federal bodies to the federal constitutional court. The Macedonians naturally joined the Slovenes in these demands, and some months later, issued a joint statement supporting the separation of Croatian and Serbian, which the Croats were calling for. The language debates, and Croat positions in particular, made a delicate and tense situation far worse, and drew numerous intellectuals who had previously not taken a political stance into the national polemic.

In spring 1967 – after the republic government had resigned due to disagreements with the assembly, the first such instance since the war, and the first in any Communist state –
Stane Kavčič (1919–1967) assumed control of the executive council in Slovenia. Kavčič and his allies were ardent supporters of economic and political change. They advocated looser forms of agreement between republics, with more room for manoeuvre and greater independence in foreign relations, and re-organising the financing of federal offices and institutions in line with contributory capacity. As Communists, they largely agreed that the League of Communists should retain its leading political role in Yugoslavia, but there was a general view that the socialist system and economy could not be modernised without a fundamental process of democratisation and the “opening up” of political organisations. The idea of re-organising the army, which was a major power base for centralists and Communist conservatives given the predominance of the Serbian and Montenegro officer class, caused considerable agitation among the supreme military command.

Kavčič’s government supported demands for army draftees, who generally did their military service outside their home republic, to remain within their republics, while also proposing that territorial defence units should be made subordinate to republic governments. The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 suddenly focused minds on the fact that Yugoslavia only had serious protection on its western border, with the borders towards the Communist countries of the East left practically undefended. In response, the Federal Assembly in Belgrade passed a resolution transferring some defence responsibilities from the federal to the republic level. In Slovenia, the Territorial Defence (Teritorialna obramba – TO) was founded alongside regular units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovanska Ljudska Armada – JLA in Slovene, referred as the JNA in Serbo-Croat), with Slovene soldiers led by Slovene officers. Efforts by Kavčič’s executive council to provide the TO with a command structure accountable to the republic government, which would make it independent of the federal Yugoslav People’s Army, were vehemently denounced in Belgrade. The federal army command objected to ideas that the decentralisation process should go beyond state and party structures to the army itself. Their position was that only united, supranational armed forces could guarantee the integrity of the state.

In 1968, the economic reforms effectively collapsed, and this, together with the social and political unrest moving over Europe, and the tensions following Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, combined to galvanise opponents of political change. The first outbreaks of dissatisfaction occurred in Belgrade, where students clashed with the police at the beginning of June. The clash became a demonstration, and acts of police brutality turned the demonstration into an insurrection. The Belgrade student uprising, the violence of which shocked both the ruling establishment and the entire Yugoslav public, was clearly
influenced by the student unrest in France and elsewhere in Europe. The main causes of the student protest, however, were social and economic conditions at home, and the students were supported by professors who had already criticised Communist leaders for abandoning socialism with their economic and political reforms. Together, they sided with the party traditionalists and critics of the reforms, and accused state and political leaders of opening the doors to capitalism with their acceptance of market principles, and causing social inequality and unemployment. In the confusion, Tito initially supported the students, but their unexpected revolt increased insecurities which now spread to advocates of the reform measures and liberalisation.

The Warsaw Pact’s military intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet concept of ‘limited sovereignty’, according to which members of the Socialist bloc had the right to intervene in a socialist state abandoning socialism, soon (in autumn 1968) refocused public attention from internal politics to foreign affairs. In Belgrade, where the invention was severely condemned, there were real fears that the Russians and Warsaw Pact countries might continue the campaign against ‘rebels’ and use the tensions in Yugoslavia as an excuse to intervene in its internal affairs. Unrest among Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia demanding a seventh Yugoslav republic at the end of November was therefore violently quelled, and military spending was raised significantly, despite the economic problems. Generals were increasingly welcomed into the highest political bodies, yet the political reforms and decentralisation were still not abandoned. Given Tito and Kardelj’s conviction that consensus and balance would eventually be achieved by building the Yugoslav Communist leadership on the principles of equality among the nations and republics, in 1969, the 9th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists confirmed the increasing independence of republic Communist organisations. In 1970/71, the rolling back of the federal state continued, with the republics and autonomous provinces becoming ‘sovereign entities’, joined by federal authority only in the fields of foreign affairs, defence and the common economic system.

In June 1971, the reform of the federal state culminated (under pressure from Croatian and Slovene politicians) with the adoption of amendments to the 1963 constitution, another step in the dilution of the power held by federal political and economic institutions and bodies. Formally, the most important bodies in the federation were the 23-member state presidency and the federal government. Like most other commissions and committees, both were composed using the parity principle (i.e. the same number of representatives from the republics and a fixed number of representatives from the autonomous provinces) and were
supposed to reach decisions unanimously and collectively. The constitutional amendments
defined the process of “co-ordinating common decisions and interests” in detail, which was
intended to ensure the equality of all federal units and nations. The authors of the amendments
saw the new organisation of the federation and the state as the next step towards building the
‘self-management system and democracy’, which would form – in Kardelj’s illusory vision –
a bridge that would gradually enable the Yugoslav nations to overcome their differences and
unite them in the struggle to reach the final objective: socialism.

In reality, relations between the federal units and constituent nations in Yugoslavia
continued their inexorable deterioration. National dissatisfaction was most widespread in
Croatia. In 1970, Croatian leaders convened a session of the Croatian League of Communists,
which set off in familiar fashion with condemnation of unitary tendencies and “all
nationalisms,” before laying the blame for national intolerance and Croatia’s “economic lag”
firmly with “unitarists” and post-war Yugoslav (for which read Serbian) politics. This position
gained public sympathy, but the attempt to head a movement increasingly caught up in
nationalist fervour was ill fated; rather than being its leaders, the Croatian party leaders
became its prisoners. In 1970/71, relations between Croatian and Serbian political leaders
reached their lowest ebb since the war, almost completely crippling the work of federal
institutions. Like the Croat reformers, their Serbian counterparts were finding it harder to
master the nationalists in their own republic.

Slovene politicians tried to keep out of the Serbian-Croatian dispute. Slovene leaders
found the Croats – banging the nationalist drum louder by the day – off-putting and
dangerous, and fundamentally diverged from the Serbian political elite in their views on the
role of the federal state and its republics. Slovenia therefore managed to pass through the
revolutionary year of ’68 in relative calm. After the outbreak of student unrest in Belgrade,
Slovene students in Ljubljana came out with their own demands, largely relating to
professional and study issues, but the Kavčič government moved quickly to calm the protests
with promises of improved study and living conditions. This did not stop relations between
the older and younger generations of Slovene Communist leaders from an equally swift
deterioration. Initially, the main reasons for divergence were personality clashes, and spats
over hierarchy and precedence rather than substantive or conceptual issues. Kavčič took
political decisions quickly within a very small inner circle, something that was completely
unacceptable to the old guard, with Kardelj at their head. Between 1967 and 1972, this face-
off gradually divided the Slovene League of Communists into two blocs: supporters of
Kavčič’s policies and general approval of the reform, and Kavčič’s opponents, who largely
belonged to the older generation of Communists.

Kavčič’s approach gave warning of the confrontations to come with the older Communist grandees and Belgrade leadership when, in 1968, he permitted, Ciril Žebot, the leading ideologist of Slovene Catholic émigrés in the United States, to visit Slovenia without first consulting Belgrade. Political émigrés were public enemy number one in Communist Yugoslavia, regardless of national or political identity, so decisions about contact with them fell strictly and exclusively within the remit of state security agencies and the state’s highest dignitaries. Kavčič’s decision to allow one of the Slovene Catholic émigré movement’s leading lights back to the homeland, even if only a few days, caused outrage among party grandees. In spring 1969, Kavčič became embroiled in a second major dispute. In the tense political climate, Tito offered Kavčič the post of president of the Federal Executive Council, but Kavčič turned it down, partly because he was aware that the independence he had enjoyed in Ljubljana would rapidly disappear in Belgrade. When the ‘Road Affair’ arose in mid-1969, relations between the two factions in Slovene Communism – the kavčičevci and kardeljanci – were already extremely strained. When it became clear that the Federal Executive Council, presided over by the Slovene, Mitja Ribičič, had redirected international loans intended for the development of Slovenia’s road network to Serbia, the backroom dispute became an open battle.

Kavčič’s government accused the Federal Executive Council of succumbing to political pressure when allocating the World Bank loans and ignoring economic criteria. The unconvincing attempts by the president of the Federal Executive Council, Mitja Ribičič, to suggest that the federal government’s decision had been based on the principle of the “equality of the republics and provinces” and had taken into account the fact that Slovenia had already received significant amounts of foreign loans, brought an angry counter-attack from Kavčič and his colleagues who now played the nationalist card. In contrast to some of the older members of Slovenia’s Communist leadership, they asserted that Slovenia had been significantly neglected in post-war Yugoslav policy, despite carrying the burden of modernising undeveloped areas. They claimed that this controversial decision by the federal government was proof that the neglect was ongoing, even after the economic reform of 1965. The Ljubljana-Belgrade dispute agitated Slovenia’s entire public and divided its Communist elite. Kavčič’s supporters demanded that the Federal Executive Council reverse its decision, and some delegates supported the convening of an extraordinary session of the republic assembly. For the first time since the war, ideas of Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia, and of Slovene independence, were voiced on the public stage (previously such ideas had only been
The Slovene critics were strongly opposed by Edvard Kardelj, who joined the older generation of Communist leaders in Ljubljana in a fierce rebuttal. In August 1969, the Central Committee of the ZKJ and Tito denounced the Slovene protests on behalf of the federal government, calling them an attempt to nationalistically “destroy the common state.” Around two weeks later, Kardelj addressed the Central Committee of the Slovene League of Communists in Ljubljana, to deny that Slovenia had been neglected within Yugoslavia and to condemn the criticisms made against Belgrade. The most serious post-war dispute between Ljubljana and Belgrade ended after two months with victory for the Kardelj faction and with the disciplining of Kavčič’s ‘Young Slovenes’. The way this dispute was resolved also gave a clear signal to reformers in other republics that ‘self-management’ and the independence of the republics had clear boundaries, which would continue to be set by the Communist leaders in Belgrade.

Kavčič kept his post at the head of the Slovene government, but his influence and power were now significantly curtailed. The winning side used every means – in public and within Communist ranks – to explain their positions, and also accused newspapers, radio and television of blowing the ‘Road Affair’ out of all proportion. In 1969/1970, Slovenia’s Communist leadership were already returning to the established script, with frequent references to the working classes and assertions that the only effective policy would be one based on workers’ interests. This was effectively the end of the economic reform slogans, although it took until 1972 for the Yugoslav leadership to finally disavow them publicly. The fall-out between the two main factions of Slovene politics continued to deepen until its final resolution in October 1972. The division not only produced opposing views on how to resolve the economic problems, but also on education and social policy.

Kavčič and the group supporting the 1965 reforms favoured directing Slovene economic development towards sectors that offered a rapid turnover of capital and that had already proved successful. Instead of focusing on large-scale industrial construction projects, this entailed Slovenia investing in banking, tourism, transport, trade and service industries based on knowledge, research and intellectual work. In order to achieve this, Kavčič and his supporters felt it was vital to open the door to private initiative and private investment, while exploiting Slovenia’s geographical location to the maximum, acting as a bridge to the East for its Western neighbours. Kavčič’s economic development plan was the first such plan since the war to be based on a realistic analysis of conditions and opportunities in Slovenia. But talk of flexible economic planning, opening up to private capital, and demands for greater economic
independence for Slovenia was both unacceptable and incomprehensible to the Belgrade and Ljubljana-based Communist leaders to whom it was addressed.

Education was also the subject of angry disputes between the Kavčič modernists and Kardelj traditionalists, with a clash between those endorsing pluralist, ideologically unburdened schools, and supporters of a self-management or “Marxist” model. The dispute ended in victory for Marxist orthodoxy and the tightening of Communist control over educational institutions. In summer 1971, another argument became public after 25 delegates of the republic assembly attempted to put forward their own candidate for the federal (state) presidency, instead of Mitja Ribičič, who they perceived as compromised by the ‘Road Affair’. The fact that they first considered putting Kardelj forward as their representative did nothing to help their case. By acting independently and failing to consult the five or six major figures unofficially responsible for Slovene appointment policy, they opened themselves up to strict disciplinary measures. Slovene political leaders condemned the action, and its protagonists were pressured to resign their political office and forced out of Communist ranks.

The forced penance of these ‘errant’ delegates served as the introduction to the final reckoning with Kavčič and his reformist group. At the end of 1971, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership first forced the Croatian reformers to resign. The Croatian leadership handed in its resignation at a session of the ZKJ presidium held on 1 December 1971. In early October 1972, under pressure from Tito and conservatives in their own republic, the Serbian reformists also stood down. And in November 1972, Slovene supporters of Tito and Kardelj’s restoration of “revolutionary working class authority” removed Stane Kavčič and his team, accusing them of being “technocrats...elitists [and] liberals” and condemning their unilateral support for the middle class and turning the Slovene economy to the West. Although the Slovene reformists and ‘liberals’ were not dealt with as harshly as those in Croatia, where hundreds were imprisoned and thousands thrown out of the League of Communists and their jobs, many of Kavčič’s supporters were prevented from participating in public life for over a decade after his fall. Kavčič, who was resolute in his conviction that only consistently implemented reforms and a new agreement on federal arrangements could ensure the survival of the Yugoslav state, not only saw his replacement by Communist hard-liners as a personal calamity, but also as a tragedy for Yugoslavia as a whole.

As many authors have suggested, at the end of the 1960s and start of the 1970s Communist Yugoslavia missed its final chance to peacefully modernise and democratise. The economy had already experienced as much growth and modernisation as could be achieved within the framework of ‘self-managed socialism’. Further economic transformation and
modernisation would require more decisive changes to the socio-political system, though not those conceived by Kardelj. Of course, this was beyond Yugoslavia’s Communist leadership. Despite the recouching of political concepts demanded by the split with Stalin and the Soviet Union, Tito, Kardelj and their closest collaborators remained captive to Bolshevik-Communist conceptions and patterns of understanding. The critical situation of the late 1960s and early 1970s stretched their political flexibility to its limit, and, faced with growing demands to properly liberate the economy, society and politics from their Bolshevik, and effectively still Stalinist heritage, they simply took fright. Each new step would represent a further surrender of power, but, despite over 20 years of invoking the principles of self-management and democracy, power was one thing they were not prepared to share.

The decision taken within the very core of Yugoslavia’s political leadership, to overlook the ‘democratic’ option and return to an ‘authoritarian’ policy of party rule, was very publicly supported by Slovenia’s Communist leaders. Having been among the proponents of Yugoslav Communist modernisation and democratisation after the split with Moscow, Slovene politicians were now among those overseeing their demise in the period of transformation during 1971 and 1972.

THE GLOOMY SEVENTIES

The Yugoslav regime of the 1970s was not ‘some kind of neo-Stalinism’ as it has often been described. Although the political leaders who gathered around Tito and Kardelj after the reckoning with reformists and ‘liberals’ launched a fundamental political offensive in every republic in the name of strengthening “the powers of the League of Communists and the working class,” many of the gains achieved in over two decades of change and reforms remained in place after 1972. The proponents of the new political climate emphasised Communist consolidation, but Kardelj’s support for self-management prevented a complete return to centralism. Despite the bolstered role for Communist and central state bodies, the federal units retained (and even extended) their powers even after the ‘reformers’ had been removed. The Yugoslav League of Communists (ZKJ) and other political organisations remained divided into republic and province groups, whose leadership selected their functionaries and representatives to federal bodies more or less independently. The ‘contractual’ economy, which the Yugoslav leadership intended to replace the market mechanisms, was also far from Bolshevik and Soviet economic ideas and practice.

Nevertheless, the Yugoslav system in the 1970s was a rigid and contradictory form of
communist authoritarianism. Belgrade set out the ‘new’ political direction in detail in September 1972 in a letter from the ZKJ president and executive to Communist organisations and members, which was seen as a kind of ‘holy writ’ (often referred to simply as *Pismo* or ‘the Letter’). Political grandees continually made reference to it in the coming years. The Letter still mentioned “economic and social reforms,” but called for the “planned guidance of economic and social movements” and the renewal of the “ideological and political unity of the League of Communists.” The authors of the Letter considered that to ensure that the League of Communists was able to deal with its political tasks, it should re-establish strict “ideological criteria” and check its own ranks, while ensuring that leading positions in politics, the economy, the judiciary, public administration, the media, and educational institutions were given to people who would work in the “interest of the working class.” “If you’re a Communist, you’re a soldier, as long as the revolution goes on,” Tito said in October 1972.

This policy meant that, after 1972, ‘moral-political’ fitness was once more a decisive criterion, not only for political functions, but also for other responsible positions. In Slovenia, the victorious group of politicians headed by France Popit, president of the Central Committee of the Slovene League of Communists, and Serge Kraigher, president of the republic assembly, took political control, and were joined by ‘refugees’ from the Kavčič camp. Together, they carried out a thorough purge of republic-level and lower administrative and political bodies, economic organisations and newspapers, educational institutions and the university. At the same time – as elsewhere in Yugoslavia – they founded ‘Marxist centres’ and organised ‘political education schools and courses’ to provide for the political education of the Communist leadership and (as the political jargon of the time would have it) other ‘working people’. One of the most important of the new political slogans included in the Letter was the call to fight against “social differences” and “unjustified” enrichment. To this end, commissions were set up in each republic to determine the source of personal assets, which proved both inefficient and ineffective. Almost overnight, the fledgling ranks of private entrepreneurs were outlawed and the further development of private enterprise and initiative was choked.

The example of dedication to social egalitarianism was supposed to be set by the League of Communists and political organisations, which would reassert the character of the ‘workers’ or ‘proletariat’, but this was by no means easy. Less than one quarter of the 1.5 million new members who joined the League of Communists between 1973 and 1982 in response to political pressures in Yugoslavia were actually industrial workers; the rest were
political officials, economic managers and public employees. In some areas, membership of
the League of Communists became even more important as a condition for employment or a
management post than it had been in the initial post-war years. Despite tens of thousands of
expulsions following the defeat of the ‘liberals’, the number of League of Communist
members throughout Yugoslavia rose in less than a decade (1973–1982) to a total of
2,117,083 or 9.5% of the population; in Slovenia, the growth in Communist Party
membership was slower than in the east and south of the state, but at the start of the 1980s the
Slovene League of Communists could still boast over 125,000 members (6.5% of the
republic’s population), which was the highest figure ever.

But this was not enough to satisfy either the older or the newer ‘soldiers of the
revolution’. In 1973, a new law was brought in to limit freedom of the press; two years later, a
new criminal code was adopted, which introduced harsher penalties for “anti-revolutionary
activity” and “enemy propaganda.” Article 133 was formulated so loosely that it could be
used to prosecute even those who were heard making verbal criticisms of the regime. The
authorities also increased their control over culture, education, the university and societies and
associations. There were fewer political trials and political prisoners in Slovenia in the 1970s
than elsewhere in Yugoslavia, but, as throughout the rest of the country, the state security
service and police gained additional powers after 1972. Slovenia’s political convicts in the
1970s and the first half of the 1980s were largely prosecuted and imprisoned for written and
‘speech crimes’ or for handling illicit books and writings.

Even after 1972, Edvard Kardelj remained one of the main contributors to Yugoslav
policymaking. “We must join the democratic battle without illusions,” he said in 1972. “When
we are weak and cannot gain victory through democratic means, we must not be afraid of
using instruments of revolutionary and state force.” However, these ideas did not mean he had
given up on attempting to create his self-management utopia. At the start of 1974, Yugoslavia
approved a new constitution, which introduced the highest level of decentralisation to date,
while also creating, amid references to the self-management rights of “direct producers” and
“other working people,” an extremely complex system of political organisation and
representation, which it attempted to base on the smallest working, production or territorial
units, in which “female [and] male citizens” were united at work or to “realise basic interests
and needs.” The new constitutional laws removed the remnants of traditional
parliamentarianism, replacing it with a system of delegation and delegates. The smallest
production units (the basic organisations of associated labour; temeljne organizacije
združenega dela – TOZD) and the smallest territorial communities elected representatives
(delegates) to municipal assemblies which selected representatives for the republic assemblies, who then, together with the municipalities, sent delegates to the Federal Assembly. This representational pyramid theoretically assured that everyone was included – from the lowest-ranking worker choosing a representative to the municipal assembly, or representing their production unit themselves, to the municipal assembly delegates, who selected their representatives at the republic and partly also the federal level. The actual result was that even the largest economic organisations and cultural and scientific institutions only directly elected representatives at the lowest, municipal level, with others taking responsibility for choosing higher-level delegates, generally very selective municipal committees and various bodies of the Socialist Alliance (Socialistična zveza delovnega ljudstva – SZDL) and League of Communists.

The new constitution defined the republics as “states based on national sovereignty and the authority and self-management of the working class,” while increasing the independence of the autonomous provinces and further consolidating Serbia’s division into three parts. Membership of most important bodies of state, particularly the Federal Executive Council, and, as far as the republics were concerned, the rotating state presidency, was formed on the basis of national parity, and the consent of all republic and provinces was needed for all major decisions of state and laws. The new constitution, however, still failed to include formal safeguards that would prevent and remove conflicts between the system’s institutions. The basic assumption of a constitution running to over 400 articles was that Yugoslavia had a classless, conflict-free society, which, when it achieved a mature level of development, would resolve differences and misunderstandings through mutual understanding. Until that state was achieved, the League of Communists, headed by Josip Broz Tito, would take care of society and its self-management system as the leading political force. The constitution affirmed Tito’s position as president of state for life. Some months after the federal and republic constitutions were adopted, the republic, provincial and federal League of Communist congresses were held, which retained the federal nature of the Communist organisation, but all swore allegiance to the ‘unity’ of the ZKJ. The federal congress even passed a resolution that the “system of socialist self-management … [was] a special form of the dictatorship of the proletariat” and proclaimed the vital role of the army, which was an important factor for “stability”, even in “times of internal state tensions.”

Kardelj, backed by his closest supporters, attempted once more to apply his political fantasies (some Western commentators later ironically described Kardelj as an “ideological tailor”) to maintaining the Communist regime’s primacy and monopoly on power, while
attempting to prevent a dangerous heightening of national conflicts in Yugoslavia. They complacently believed in the exceptional, unique nature of the political system they had created. The law on ‘associated labour’, passed by the Federal Assembly in November 1976, broke economic, social, political, cultural and educational organisations and public institutions down into the smallest possible parts. This atomisation of society and the economy, Kardelj asserted, would encourage the mass politicisation of the population and enhance their participation in “self-management decision-making.” In truth, the system was incredibly inefficient and the convoluted, complex political jargon employed by Kardelj and his acolytes was unclear and difficult for most people to understand. In the second half of the 1970s in Slovenia, almost 300,000 people carried out a very wide range of ‘self-management’ tasks or delegate functions, but all the most important political decisions were still passed within small, closed circles within the League of Communists.

Despite the apparently successful entrenchment around Tito and the party, and the militant, ubiquitous self-praise for political decisions and ‘victories’, Yugoslavia’s leaders and its republic and provincial heads were well aware that the new political balance was fragile, and the country’s state extremely uncertain. The authorities therefore organised grandiose events to celebrate revolutionary events, unveiled monuments to Partisan heroes, organised meetings of ‘brotherhood and unity’ between the nations, and incited calls for loyalty to Tito and ‘self-managed socialism’ at mass political rallies. The flood of political propaganda engulfed Slovenia as well, with political grandees and their colleagues competing in attempts to demonstrate their commitment to the regime and the revolution. Efforts to direct the common historical memory, which had slipped out of authority’s control during the period of liberalisation in the 1960s and early 1970s, were a constituent part of the ideological offensive. The regime used various committees to protect ‘revolutionary traditions’, and the ‘Marxist centres’ and historical commissions established by the political organisations to spread an extremely simplified picture of the past, restricted to the pre-history and period of the Communist revolution, resistance against the occupying forces and post-war Yugoslav development. The pressure on historians and the school history curriculum also increased, despite already being subject to far more pressure than in the immediate post-war period.

At the same time as praising the revolution, the party, and the national liberation movement, the Tito personality cult reached its apogee in the 1970s. References to the ageing president become almost a ritual obligation, and harsh terms of imprisonment were laid down for criticisms or jokes made at his expense. The courts also protected other political functionaries and high ranking state officials from criticism. Slovenia’s political leadership
had effectively no opposition after 1972, but that made them no less mistrusting than leading Communists in other republics of the academic, and particularly, humanist intelligentsia, who they had traditionally perceived as the enemy. In 1974, four professors were made examples of, being kicked out of the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and journalism, after persisting in “liberal, bourgeois” positions, and in 1978 a law faculty professor suffered the same fate. At the same time, control over periodicals and publishing in general was also stepped up. In 1975, a new law on higher education tightened control over the university, which had long been subject to close political scrutiny. The law expressly stated that higher education institutions had to produce “specialists who were actively involved in socialism and self-management … based on Marxist science.”

The Communist leadership attempted to direct scientific research in the same way that they controlled cultural and artistic creativity. Political pressure on intellectuals and artists reached its peak in the mid-1970s, when, in a publication by a circle of friends and writers in Trieste, the poet Edvard Kocbek was reported speaking on the subject of the civil war in Slovenia during the Second World War, and the mass killings of opponents of the National Liberation War after it. Kocbek’s interview caused a storm in the Slovene political leadership, since, up to that time, barely a word had been openly published on the post-war massacre of Communist opponents, with just a few indirect references in a handful of literary works. The Stane Kavčič government had already investigated the deaths, and found that the Slovene authorities had secretly killed over 10,000 people without trial after the war, but the information they uncovered remained secret. Émigré literature discussing the post-war killings was also strictly prohibited. The Slovene leaders decisively rejected Kocbek’s statements and organised a systematic media pogrom against the poet, which was joined by numerous well-known writers and academics. The authorities did not allow Kocbek to respond to these humiliating attacks, and access to public media was closed to the small group of individuals who attempted to defend him. The killings of Partisan and Communist opponents in Slovenia after the Second World War remained a forbidden topic for decades; it was not possible to speak of it in public, much less carry out research.

In the mid-1970s, it seemed that the Communist authorities, which had allowed some room for non-Communist and non-Marxist intellectuals, now wanted to effect the ideological submission of the entire intelligentsia. At the same time, churchgoers found themselves under renewed and forceful political and ideological pressure. According to statistical data, between 1968 and 1978, the number of believers in Slovenia fell from around 68% to less than 50%, while the number of people attending mass on Sunday fell from 32% to 20% (and this
downward trend did not reverse until after 1980). Nevertheless, during the 1970s (and 1980s) the secular and Church authorities managed to avoid disputes and tensions. In 1977, two years after the final definition of Yugoslavia’s border with Italy, the diocese of Koper was restored. The Slovene ecclesiastical province comprised an archdiocese and two dioceses, and its borders coincided with those of the Republic of Slovenia, except for a few towns towards Croatia.

The new law on religious communities, passed in 1976, did not significantly change their status, maintaining the strict restrictions on religions, though it did have beneficial consequences for the Catholic Church. The authorities were still not prepared to provide access to public media, particularly radio and television, but they did allow the religious press and church publishing sector to expand. They also permitted older churches to be renovated, and new ones to be built. Under the influence of Western Europe, a number of spiritual movements developed among Catholics, aimed mainly at attracting young people, which aimed to deepen the importance of personal faith and scriptural consistency.

Most people avoided making appearances and expressing personal views in public that could bring them into conflict with the authorities. Despite calls by political activists for people to join in the “self-management transformation,” many people participated in political life as little as they could. The idea of the Communists losing power in the near future seemed highly unlikely. The ruling politicians skilfully exploited fears of Soviet Bolshevism and put Yugoslav self-management forward as the only possible alternative to the hard-line approach that still had significant support among high-ranking political and military leaders. However, the reasons for the reputation and support that the Communists enjoyed (according to public opinion polling) among the majority of the Slovene population were more economic than political in origin. In the 1970s the standard of living and quality of life in Yugoslavia reached their highest post-war level. Around 60,000 Slovenes earned their living abroad, but in Slovenia unemployment was low, and labour legislation and social and health insurance provided social and job security. Incomes in Slovenia were higher than anywhere else in Yugoslavia, but significantly lower than in neighbouring Austria and Italy. Many people therefore improved their standard of living with earnings from extra work, while only doing the bare minimum in their full-time jobs.

Despite its constant professions of dedication to the interests of the working class and workers, the Yugoslav leadership did not oppose developments towards Western consumerism, since they also stated that personal standards of living were a constituent part of ‘socialism with a human face.’ The wave of consumerism that had possessed the population
following the economic reform and opening up of the Yugoslav borders in the late 1960s continued despite the re-establishment of more authoritarian rule in the 1970s. In Slovenia, as in the other republics, a new middle class was developing, which would have a major impact on shaping the values of Slovene society over the coming two decades. It included middle and high-ranking officials, political activists, and retail and business managers, while a number of private tradespeople also appeared. Their lifestyle was characterised by an acceptance of the Communist regime and its slogans as an unavoidable fact, while most of their energies were dedicated to increasing their material standard of living and family wellbeing. Under their influence, the consumerist wave was followed by a building craze, with a private house and weekend holiday home becoming the aim of one’s life’s efforts as well as important status symbols. The construction boom was made possible by cheap loans, which were increasingly easy to pay off due to rising inflation. New flats were now inconceivable without modern household appliances and a television. The biggest rise was in car ownership, which increased by over 600% in just over a decade (from 43,065 in 1964 to over 260,000 in 1975).

Goods that could not be bought at home were available abroad, especially in neighbouring Austria and Italy. After removing the ‘liberals’, the Yugoslav leadership could not close the borders again for economic reasons, as well as the fact that over one million Yugoslav workers were living abroad. Currency liberalisation allowed Yugoslav citizens to have private savings accounts in Western currencies and to travel abroad with significant sums of money. From the end of the 1960s, long lines of cars with shoppers from Slovenia and other Yugoslav republics would head for Slovenia’s western and northern borders, particularly at weekends, to buy consumer goods in Italian and Austrian border towns. The lively cross-border trade was not stopped by tensions that arose between the states at the start of the 1970s, first between Belgrade and Vienna, due to Austrian policy towards the Slovene minority in Carinthia, and then between Belgrade and Rome, due to Yugoslavia’s unilateral decision to proclaim the state border with Italy as definitive and final.

Slovene politicians and the Slovene public were particularly sensitive to pressures on the Slovene minority in Carinthia from German-speaking nationalists, and Ljubljana addressed Vienna and Klagenfurt with demands for the consistent application of the provisions for minorities set out in Article 7 of the State Treaty. Of particular importance to Slovenes were the bilingual topographic signs, such as those for the bilingual Slovene-Italian settlements in Primorska and Slovene-Hungarian areas in Prekmurje and which the Austrian authorities were also required to put up in the bilingual areas of southern Carinthia, in line with Article 7 of the State Treaty. Vienna passed a law in 1972 on the use of bilingual place
names on road signs and at the boundaries of 205 settlements and 31 municipalities in southern Carinthia, but Slovene leaders in Ljubljana were not entirely satisfied, since the signs were only erected in settlements that had a Slovene-speaking population of 20% or more according to the 1961 census. They did, however, accept the legal solution as the first steps towards implementing the State Treaty’s minority provisions. The *Ortstafelsturm* or ‘place name furore’ that met the decision on erecting bilingual signs in Austrian Carinthia and the violent removal of the signs came as something of a surprise to the authorities in Ljubljana, who had not expected Austro-German nationalists to resist the law on such a scale. This led to a far greater reaction from Slovenia to the decision taken by the federal Austrian parliament in 1974, under pressure from the Austrian Freedom Party and Carinthian ‘homeland’ organisations, on a special census of minorities intended to re-determine their numbers and area of settlement, in order to define areas subject to minority protection with greater detail.

The minority census was also rejected by Carinthian Slovene organisations, while an Austrian-wide solidarity movement in support of Carinthian Slovenes was followed with approval and close scrutiny by Slovene newspapers, radio stations and the television. In 1976, Ljubljana assessed the Austrian minority census efforts as a failure, making the census results practically useless, and also rejected the creation of ‘ethnic group advisory boards’ that Austria’s new minority law envisaged as advising the government and ministries in Vienna on minority affairs, since it considered that the boards would not have any political power. A decree on topographical names issued in Vienna in 1977, which gave bilingual names to just 91 settlements, only worsened Austria’s poor relations with Slovenia and Yugoslavia.

In 1977, the Austrian general consulate reported from Ljubljana that Slovenia had no interest in increasing contacts with Austria, since the prevailing opinion was that Austria was not prepared to resolve the minority issue, rendering more contact pointless. Nevertheless, the tensions between Vienna and Belgrade, and hence Vienna and Ljubljana, faded quite soon after the 1976/77 crises. Co-operation within the new Alps-Adriatic Working Community also strengthened contacts between Carinthia and Slovenia. In 1979, the construction of a road tunnel under the Karavanke mountains started, and the new Klagenfurt university became an important window on the world against the backdrop of Austro-German national intolerance, and contributed to expanding the already successful cultural co-operation to the academic and scientific spheres.

Relations between the minority and majority in Austrian Carinthia calmed far more slowly, but in 1988 Slovene Carinthian representatives joined the government’s ‘advisory boards’ in Vienna, which they had previously rejected. Further disquiet was caused in the
1980s by a law proposed by the Freedom Party, which legalised the separation of primary school pupils following monolingual courses from those registered for bilingual instruction. But the new minority schools also offered new features exploited by the minority, and the decrease in pupils registered by parents for bilingual instruction was lower than forecast by critics of the new legislation on bilingualism. The Slovene secondary or gymnasium school in Klagenfurt, which had its own buildings from 1975, had almost 500 pupils in every year from the mid-1980s, while Slovene societies and organisations also founded a number of private and vocational schools. The cultural and social life of the minority was – despite the unpleasant attitude of the Carinthian homeland organisations – diverse and dynamic, while the minority’s press and publishing activities were also lively.

In the meantime, everyday life in Slovenia became increasingly divided. On one side, the authorities maintained their one party system, restricting the population’s freedoms, and referring to Communist slogans, on the other, people looked more and more to the West in increasing numbers, and engaged with Western consumer ideas and ways of life. The political and economic crises heightened in the latter half of the 1970s. Spending and consumption grew faster than production everywhere, economic modernisation was too slow and the economy was uncompetitive given the outdated technology and raw materials and energy consumed, while investment was irrational and unsystematic. The number of enterprises operating in the red was increasing year by year, and government attempts to halt inflation through price controls and unpopular wage freezes were ineffective. Self-management, with its one-sided protection of workers rights without no requirement to fulfil work duties, and the endless meetings and agreements contributed to the declining commitment to work and increased sense of powerlessness. But like their Yugoslav counterparts, the Slovene political leadership remained steadfast in their optimism. They could not ignore the problems, but continually called on people to increase their dedication to work and “faster economic development.”

The approaching crash was now unavoidable. The 1974 constitution contributed to the disintegration of the Yugoslav economic system, which was divided by republic and provincial borders into eight units, while the larger systems – such as the railways, postal services and the large enterprises – were also broken up, and transformed into republic and even regional concerns. This weakened the economy, with the situation further exacerbated by the 1978 oil crisis and poor harvests, all against a backdrop of large Yugoslav debts. At the end of the 1970s inflation in Yugoslavia was approaching 30% and imports were worth over 50% more than exports.
The political crisis was further deepened by the deaths of Kardelj and Tito. Kardelj died on 10 February 1979. In their obituaries, Slovene newspapers reported that: “Edvard Kardelj’s ideas became our way of life and work.” Yet in truth, Kardelj’s Bolshevist-Proudhonist utopia had already passed its expiry date. When on 4 May 1980, fifteen months after Kardelj, Josip Broz Tito died at the Ljubljana University Hospital and Medical Centre, Yugoslavia lost one of the three pillars that, according to Kardelj’s understanding, supported it as a whole. Only two now remained: the League of Communists and the Yugoslav People’s Army.

CULTURAL CREATIVITY: FROM SOCIALIST EDUCATION TO CONTROLLED CULTURAL PLURALISM

“Under the previous regime, science and art were the monopoly of a small number of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals, but now culture must become the property of the people,” declared the new Slovene leaders after the Second World War. Communist politicians and ideologists had already largely defined their views on cultural policy and creativity during the war, taking the position that to fulfil their mission education, culture and art must all be in service of ‘reality’, the people and the revolution. In line with such views, Yugoslavia’s post-war cultural policymakers set out three main goals: to increase the population’s level of education, to promote cultural creativity that would be accessible to the ‘masses’ and allow them to participate in cultural activities, and to establish a creative cultural sphere that would strengthen socialist ‘awareness’ and identification with the new social and political order.

This formally established – in relation to constitutional provisions adopted in 1946/47 – the legal framework required for smooth cultural development, which required the authorities to support cultural and artistic work, as well as protecting respect for fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of speech, press and association. The federal organisation of the state gave the federal units (the republics) greater control over education, science and culture than over other fields. The governing powers and the Community Party laid down general, mandatory ‘guidelines’, but their implementation was down to the republic leadership, which enabled Slovenia to follow a sometimes more and sometimes less independent educational and cultural policy, depending on the governing system and ideology of the time. The existing cultural institutions acquired a clear national definition (e.g. the Slovene National Theatre, the Slovene Academy of Science and Arts – SAZU, the National and University Library – NUK), while the Slovene republic now gained institutions that had
not existed in the first Yugoslavia, such as a central state archive, the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, and the Slovene Philharmonic (Slovenska filhamonija).

In 1945, the Slovene government set up an independent Ministry of Education, which was initially responsible for education, science and culture. Following the Soviet example, leading Communists considered the main task of socialist cultural policy to be the ‘education’ and instruction of the ‘masses’ and their formation into ‘conscious citizens of the new Yugoslavia’. The Ministry of Education (Ministrstvo za prosveto), which financed education and also all cultural, artistic and scientific activity until the creation of a new Ministry of Science and Culture in 1949, was supported by district, municipal and local community people’s committees. They were responsible for cultural and education institutions, and the implementation of cultural policy in smaller and wider local communities. The authorities also established a new umbrella organisation called Popular Education (Ljudska prosveta) to promote mass educational and amateur cultural activity to replace the pre-war party-based cultural and educational societies.

As in every other sphere, the final word on educational, cultural and science policy, and what was and was not suitable for the new order was left to the Communist Party, which managed and supervised the education system and cultural activities via its Agitprop committees. The Communist Party also controlled the work of educational and cultural institutions, and newspaper and journal editorial boards, directly via its cells and members. Within their special commissions, Communists also discussed the political suitability of teachers, artists, scientists and other cultural actors, and education and cultural programmes.

The old middle-class newspapers stopped publishing in the first days after the war, and were replaced by new publications under strict political supervision. The old cultural periodicals also met the same fate, replaced in 1946 by a new literary review named Novi svet (The New World) and modelled on Soviet lines. The authorities nationalised private and party-owned printers, cultural and scientific institutions, foundations, publishers and bookshops. Stocks were carefully inspected and only books and publications that did not contradict the new ideas and convictions could be sold. The work of political opponents from home and abroad was also removed from the shelves of public libraries. The new cultural policymakers also intervened without hesitation in the programmes of cultural institutions. Although in the immediate post-war months cinemas were showing British and American films, by autumn 1945 a clear policy in favour of the Soviet Union and Communist bloc was already in place. The ‘Iron Curtain’ that ran along Yugoslavia’s northern and western border in 1945 did not only limit and prevent the movement of people, but also blocked off the
traditional cultural currents that had previously connected Slovenia with Western culture.

The Communist attitude to the past and to cultural heritage was extremely disparaging. Anything relating to the achievements of previous eras, bourgeois or aristocratic values or the influence of the church was considered suspicious and undesirable. The authorities therefore did not pay much attention to damaged historic monuments, castles and privately-owned townhouses, or to church restoration. They also took severe measures against artists and academics perceived as enemies. Artists who had opposed the Partisan movement during the war or participated in publications and events permitted and organised by the occupying forces were denounced as national traitors. Most fled abroad in 1945, while those who remained faced trial. Their work, like that of Slovene political émigrés operating abroad after the war, was completely suppressed in Slovenia and Yugoslavia. Inestimable damage was caused by the violent treatment of property belonging to those condemned, who fled or were exiled, since their looted assets included precious artworks and extensive collections of books.

The first task taken on by the new authorities in the fields of culture and education after the war was the restoration and reorganisation of the school system. Damaged school buildings were repaired, new buildings replaced those destroyed and new educational institutions were opened. Higher education underwent a major expansion. The Faculty of Medicine could now finally offer the final years of the medical programme, and in Ljubljana new faculties of economics and agronomy joined the fine arts and theatre academies. The middle-class grammar schools (meščanske šole, Bürgerschulen) were closed, and the private education institutions that had previously largely been in Church hands were nationalised. In the eyes of the post-war regime’s ideologists, school was one of the main tools in the struggle for a ‘new society’ and ‘new people’, and therefore demanded a complete overhaul with new personnel and content. The new educational objective was not only to ‘sow new ideas in young minds’ but also to spread a materialist and simplified Marxist view of the world. Despite this, the catechism continued as a school subject, and in the first post-war years was attended by over three quarters of primary school children.

Of course, it was easier to replace curricula and textbooks or provide translations of Soviet material than it was to transform teachers. The authorities worked to train a new generation of teachers as quickly as possible that would understand the ‘demands of the time’, while the older generation that had taught in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, pre-war and Fascist Italy or even Austria-Hungary were retired or re-educated on rapid training courses. The lack of teachers meant that there were still many in the schools who were not prepared to fully submit to the regime, which allowed teaching to remain at a relatively high professional level.
The purges also enveloped the university, with more lecturers expelled in the first five years after the war for ‘political unsuitability’ than in the following four decades of the Communist regime. The authorities organised educational courses and supplementary and evening schools for adults who had not completed primary education, and young people whose education was interrupted by the war or who had attended education institutions organised by the occupiers. The trade unions, Workers’ Universities and mass political organisations were also expected to provide education and political training of the people that was appropriate to the times.

The authorities did not permit societies that had operated under the auspices of political parties before the war to restart, and seized their assets. As with various forms of popular education, even the work of amateur cultural and artistic groups continued to take place within the framework of the Liberation Front (OF) and its organisations. The authorities devoted most attention to associations for academics and artists. The Communist leaders ascribed considerable importance to writers’ societies, which were expected to enforce the new views on culture and art, not only among poets and writers, but also among other cultural players.

Yugoslavia’s ruling elite began with energetic calls at the end of 1946 to follow the Soviet cultural lead, and for commitment to the spirit of Socialist Realism. Slovene politicians were also proponents of the new aesthetic slogans, but they did not meet with much response from artists themselves. The fervent enthusiasm over the restoration of peace and the rebuilding of the destroyed homeland attracted many talents, but few followed the path of Socialist Realism. The period of following Soviet cultural patterns and dedication to Socialist art was brief and, after the dispute with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia backed away from the Soviet model in the cultural sphere. Nevertheless, Communist leaders still resisted Western cultural influences after the break with Moscow, while being extremely mistrustful of their domestic intelligentsia, among whom they considered there was far too little ‘revolutionary spirit’. These criticisms, of course, were not without consequences. As they had with other repressive measures, the Communist leadership made use of the anti-Cominform purges to tackle the intelligentsia. Some writers, who they were unable to charge with opposing the regime or pro-Soviet sympathies, were imprisoned on charges of ‘decadence’, while some artists were heavily criticised in public for engaging with Western art, or even, in the case of musicians, for playing jazz in public.

The first notable sign of changes in cultural policy was an exhibition of Slovene impressionists, which opened in Ljubljana in the spring of 1949. At the end of 1949, even political leaders began to criticise unilateral emulation of ‘Soviet science’ and Soviet cultural
and artistic ideas, and American films were again shown in cinemas. The following year they were followed by films from Western Europe, and the number of translations of works by Western writers and performances of Western theatre began to grow. The changes in cultural policy took place more slowly than in other areas, with Yugoslav Communists only finally renouncing the Soviet cultural policy model in 1952, at the same time as the Agitprop was terminated.

The more relaxed atmosphere on the Yugoslav and Slovene cultural scene from the start of the 1950s, encouraged not only younger artists who addressed Western artistic ideas, but also adherents of pre-war aesthetic movements who had continued their work after the war. Different generations worked alongside each other in all artistic spheres, with their burgeoning creativity marked by a relative diversity of motif and style, ranging from traditional Realism and Romanticism to modern trends. In the 1950s, literature was dominated by poets and writers who followed Social Realism or connected themselves to its traditions, although their former belligerence had already been replaced by a sense of solidarity with the ‘little man’ and disappointment with the new social political reality. The most important representatives of the older and middle generations of post-war Social Realists were Miško Kranjč, Ivan Potrč, Ciril Kosmač and Mira Mihelič. Social Realism also had a younger generation of literary adherents in the early 1950s. In contrast with the prevailing political optimism, its representatives portrayed the human condition more psychologically, envisaging individuals with a unique, generally tragic fate, while rejecting the political and public and focusing on more intimate, and even existentialist-influenced, themes. This, the largest post-war literary generation, which had a major impact on Slovene literature in the coming decades, included the poets Ivan Minatti, Janez Menart, Tone Pavček, Ciril Zlobec, Lojze Krakar and Kajetan Kovič, and the writers Beno Zupančič, Vladimir Kavčič, Lojze Kovačič and Pavle Zidar.

At the same time, in the 1950s, a largely Catholic circle of pre-war writers, who followed Expressionism, Symbolism and other modern literary trends, returned to the fore. This included Božo Vodušek, Anton Vodnik, Edvard Kocbek, Jože Udovič and Cene Vipotnik. The expressionist and symbolist elements were similar to those found in the work of the Triestine author, Alojz Rebula, while the writer Andrej Hieng also engaged with Expressionism and Symbolism. Only a select group of representatives of the centre and ‘leftist’ wings of the large and most influential pre-war Catholic intellectual groups were able to return to the public sphere after the war.

In the mid-1950s, a new period in Slovene literature was ushered in by a group of
younger writers who rejected the personal confessional tradition and, following modernist and existentialist influences, addressed human alienation and the meaningless of life, as well as the need for freedom of moral choice and responsibility. The most prolific of the new generation were the poets Dane Zajc, Gregor Strniša and Veno Taufer and the writers Dominik Smole and Peter Božič. In addition to their prose creations, Smole and Božič also created notable modernist theatrical works, together with the dramatist, Primož Kozak. Their plays questioned the sense or lack of sense in the human world and history, while expressing a commitment to the individual’s search for truth and resistance to political violence. Their works were enthusiastically received by theatre critics and the public alike, but met opposition among Communist ideologists and authorities. Nevertheless, the political climate had already changed sufficiently for their plays to be performed at the Slovene National Theatre (Slovensko narodno gledališče) in Ljubljana at the start of the 1960s.

The fine arts of the time were also characterised by significant diversity in style and artistic motifs. After the first post-war years, when artists came under the significant influence of pre-war, socially engaged realism, and post-war socialist artistic doctrine, the early 1950s saw a new era ushered in this field as well. Despite protests from official aesthetes and theoreticians, exhibitions by domestic and foreign artists blazed a trail for more modern Western artistic views, and the possibility of study trips abroad also increased. Galleries and Slovene artists in Trieste also played an important intermediary role in opening up to the West. The younger generation of visual artists was also influenced by the best-known Slovene painter abroad, Zoran Mušič, who divided his time between Venice and Paris. The most renowned Slovene painters of the 1950s belonged to the pre-war generation, but they only rarely continued the tradition of pre-war ‘colour realism.’ Influenced by wartime tragedies and the influx of more modern artistic trends, most focused on the search for new artistic forms and concepts. At the start of the 1950s, Marij Pregelj with his illustrations of Homer’s epics and Gabrijel Stupica, with existentialist illustrations of unease and isolation, attracted the attention of both critics and public.

Graphics played a major role in the democratisation and opening up of artistic endeavour to Western ideas, which flourished under the patronage of the post-war Academy of Fine Arts and the International Graphics Biennial established in 1955. Realism remained stronger in sculpture than in painting and graphic design, since sculptors were more reliant on commissions from the authorities. Established members of the pre-war generation of sculptors had already successfully overcome the bounds of Realism, while their first post-war pupils rejected Realism and played with new stylistic and constructionist ideas. The leading figure in
architecture and town planning was Edvard Ravnikar, a pupil of Plečnik and Le Courbusier, who favoured modern, polycentric spatial planning that was open to functionalist ideas.

Composers faced major problems, as there were far fewer opportunities for producing modern musical works. Communist aesthetic critics had little interest in modern musical trends, and in the immediate post-war tended to favour classical and Soviet and Eastern European music, and domestic compositions inspired by military motifs. Members of the younger generation of composers born before the war who attempted to move away from traditional musical expression and to link into more modern trends in recent and contemporary music only managed to reach an appreciative public with difficulty. But in the second half of the 1950s, conditions also changed in this sphere. The first post-war musical group to focus on the compositions of the great 20th-century composers who had worked in Communist regimes, from Stravinsky to Schoenberg, was founded in 1957. Just three years later (1960), younger, more modern composers came together in the group ‘Pro musica viva’. One of the most popular vocal groups was the male Slovenski oktet (Slovene Octet), whose success with a repertoire of folk songs and artistic compositions led to over 100 similar groups around Slovenia being founded. The Ljubljana opera house experienced its most successful post-war period, enjoying major international success.

The end of the Agitprop did not, of course, mean that the authorities were relinquishing their control over cultural life, but rather looking for new, less obvious ways to apply their influence. They attempted to direct cultural events via ideological commissions within the Socialist Alliance and the League of Communists. Political involvement in cultural, scientific and educational institutions and their programmes was also ensured by ‘social management’, since political bodies and organisations used political criteria when appointing members to the management boards and expert councils of cultural institutions. Administrative decentralisation transferred responsibility for cultural institutions to the municipal level. This increased the capacity to supervise cultural activity, since downgrading central cultural institutions to the municipal level prevented the formation of national cultural elites and projects, while at the same time transferring responsibility for implementation of cultural policy to municipal officials, who were generally easier to control.

Yet while the system of cultural management established in the 1950s was seen as effective by the authorities, Communist efforts following Belgrade’s split with Moscow to define a new aesthetic and cultural reality as an alternative to the Soviet and Western artistic models were significantly less successful. The leading Slovene cultural ideologist, Boris Ziherl, remained faithful to Marxist and Leninist dogma even after the split with Moscow,
uncompromisingly rejecting modernist artistic trends, while engaging in debate, with an increasing lack of authority, with younger writers and art critics. This led in the second half of the 1950s to the long-serving president of SAZU, Josip Vidmar, establishing himself as the most influential Slovene art theoretician, who in principle supported artistic freedom and autonomy, but also adapted his idealistic and moralist aesthetic ideas to Communism’s materialist concepts. The idea that the authorities should ‘give greater freedom’ to cultural institutions, publications and creators, and permit them to open up to ‘new ideas’ also found support from within the Slovene and Yugoslav political elite, who continued to keep this ‘freedom’ within strictly drawn boundaries, and strongly oppose anyone who subjected the basic ruling policies and ideologies to scrutiny.

In this way, despite the more open atmosphere in the 1950s, the authorities never stopped their violent intervention in the cultural sphere. They used public criticism, threats and withdrawals of monetary support to interfere in the editorial policy of newspapers and journals, the programmes of theatres and publishing houses, and even in film scripts and projects. They also severely rejected the Catholic intelligentsia and limited the work of the Society of Hermagoras, the only Slovene publishing house they did not nationalise after the war. Individuals who wandered too far from official aesthetic and ideological ideas also faced major difficulties and bans on appearing in public, though the tragic fate of Jože Pučnik, who was sentenced to a lengthy imprisonment due to articles published in Revija 57 was rather exceptional, since at that time Slovene political leaders were already tending to avoid taking such extreme measures against ‘people who thought differently’.

At the end of the 1950s and start of the 1960s, the increasing tensions within the Yugoslav leadership, was matched by a decrease in tensions between the authorities and cultural figures. The cultural review *Perspektive* (Perspectives) started in 1960, and in the first half of the 1960s saw the return to public life of Edvard Kocbek, who had been ostracised since 1952, with a number of short reviews and a new independent work of poetry, *Groza* (Dread). The authorities also changed their attitude to jazz and popular music, for which they had previously expressed disapproval. The popular press and entertainment programmes on radio and television were gradually judged with a more open mind, and after lengthy instructions and considerable resistance from Marxist traditionalists, in the second half of the 1950s, workers’ cultural societies also opened their doors to a wider range of entertainment.

As relations between those in political and cultural spheres calmed at the start of the 1960s, so did conditions within the university, which the Communists had finally managed to reorganise to their satisfaction between 1957 and 1960. The university and academic
institutions were under strict political supervision from 1945, which was not relaxed even after most of the regime’s genuine or perceived opponents had been removed from faculties and institutions. The authorities judged academic and scientific institutions by different criteria, permitting different levels of internal independence. The pressure on the university was much greater, for example, than on the Slovene Academy of Science and Arts, or the Slovenska Matica, which was re-established in 1950. The open mistrust the Communist ideologists expressed in the humanist intelligentsia was reflected in greater financial support for technical and natural sciences than humanities and social studies. The university underwent a series of reorganisations, but its make-up and status within the education system was only fundamentally changed with the reforms in the second half of the 1950s. The reforms, which the authorities forced through, despite opposition from university teachers and bodies, had a fateful impact on the life of what was still Slovenia’s only university in Ljubljana, since they reduced the quality of studies, and had a negative impact on selection of teaching staff. The university reform coincided with the introduction of an eight-year primary school curriculum, with gymnasium school studies restricted to four years, and the elimination of the traditional *matura*, the secondary school final examination, and the classical gymnasium schools, which the Communist ideologists scornfully rejected as “bourgeois” and “elitist.” At the end of the 1950s, vocational education colleges (*višje šole*) were established in Maribor, which would form the core of the city’s future university, and were used effectively by Communist politicians in the battle against opponents within the University of Ljubljana of the school and university reforms.

The brief ‘truce’ that occurred between Slovene politicians and critical intellectuals at the start of the 1960s was largely due to increased centralising pressure from Belgrade. In the mid-1950s, Serbia in particular began to support closer Yugoslav cultural and academic cooperation, which clearly had a positive side, with the results of these efforts including major state-wide cultural events, such as the Yugoslav Film Festival in Pula, the Dubrovnik Summer Festival, and the Yugoslav Theatre Festival in Novi Sad. Yet some sections of the Serbian cultural community and politicians were not satisfied with more dynamic cultural cooperation within the state, and called for the formation of a unified ‘supra-national’ Yugoslav socialist culture, which would not be based on different national traditions and republic borders. This led to attempts in the second half of the 1950s to centralise cultural, educational and science policies, and bodies responsible for integrating cultural activities within the state. Slovene politicians initially only opposed these centralising tendencies in the cultural and academic spheres individually and with caution, but by the end of the 1950s they started to
openly oppose them. The disputes over federal cultural and academic policy reached their peak in 1960/61, when relations between Ljubljana and Belgrade were already under considerable strain. But the following year, the gradual cooling of disputes between ‘centralists’ and federalists’ within the Yugoslav ruling elite pushed discussions on cultural integration and differences in Yugoslavia into the background, as the central political debate now centred on what would become the 1963 Yugoslav constitution.

The Slovene leadership used the preparatory period for the new constitution to again place its intellectual critics under pressure, which only increased once the constitution had been ratified. It continued to see its main opponents as the contributors from the former Revija 57, who had regrouped around Perspektive in 1960, and under the influence of existentialist and more modern readings of Marxism, taken up a range of positions on issues affecting Communist and Communist policy. Even so, the Perspektive review was not closed down in 1964 because of theoretical articles or literary contributions straying from official ideology, but due to specific political criticism of Communist agricultural and social policy. The political leadership in Ljubljana was convinced that closing Perspektive down would not cause much public outcry, yet vocal protests were raised even by intellectuals who had not previously agreed with the review’s editors and writers.

The tense atmosphere engendered by the aggressive measures against Perspektive dissipated following the ratification of the new constitution and the victory of the reformists within the state leadership. The new constitution was followed by numerous federal and republic laws that expanded press freedom, relaxed rules on founding societies and reduced the opportunities for political interference in the editorial policy of newspapers, reviews and publishers. From the mid-1960s, the number of cultural and sociological reviews increased, with Christian intellectuals who had previously been denied their own review congregating around some of them. Publishing houses also had more room to manoeuvre, which increased the available range of Slovene and translated foreign literary works. There was more literature aimed at recreational reading, and bookshops began to stock books that had not previously been permitted. In 1964, the poet, Edvard Kocbek, whose work the authorities had banned for many years, received the highest Slovene cultural prize, the Prešeren Award. But, Communist leaders remained extremely mistrustful of people who had opposed the Partisans during the war, or belonged to anti-Communist émigré groups. Poems by France Balantič, who had opposed the Partisans and been killed during the war, had already been printed in Ljubljana in 1966, but when bookshops began to sell them, political leaders reacted, and the publishing house was even forced to destroy the entire print run of Balantič’s poems.
The more relaxed political atmosphere and the growth in the standard of living did not only affect the cultural and creative sphere, but also saw increasing numbers of people attending cultural events and increasing cultural consumption. Theatre and cinema attendance actually fell compared to the 1950s, due to the television boom (the number of television subscribers increased from 3,000 to 218,000 over the 1960s alone). However, theatres began to follow the lead of experimental theatrical groups and update their repertoire, opening up to more modern ideas on direction, and still attracted large audiences.

Filmmakers also began to address modern social and existential themes. In 1960, the director Jože Babič wrote his name in the annals of Yugoslav cinema, as the founder of socially critical film. Boštjan Hladnik and Matjaž Klopčič followed the French new wave, while France Štiglic, whose film *Dolina miru* (Valley of Peace, 1956) won international recognition at the Cannes film festival, twice took the best Yugoslav film award at the Pula festival in the early 1960s.

The Ljubljana radio orchestra became the leading symphony orchestra, and both opera houses remained popular: the Ljubljana opera house drew audiences with appearances by vocal soloists and a ballet ensemble put together after the war by Pia and Pino Mlakar. The Maribor opera also modernised its repertoire, and succeeded in filling its auditorium. Jazz and popular musicians, who faced considerable difficulties immediately after the war, enjoyed more freedom after 1950 as the official pressure reduced somewhat. In 1959, the well-loved Louis Armstrong made his first appearance in Slovenia at the Ljubljana Exhibition and Fairgrounds, while the first Yugoslav jazz festival, held in Bled in 1960, garnered considerable interest. The number of rock groups also grew, the most popular managing to gather a large number of young fans. The rock groups were the first to develop an image for themselves, modelled, of course, on Western groups, and featuring long hair, tight trousers or jeans and jackets plastered with slogans. The rock groups and their emulation of Western fashion trends initially triggered a number of public protests, but the authorities were already more tolerant and did not support efforts to clampdown on or ban rock concerts.

The Slovene branch of the international writers’ association PEN was revived in the early 1960s, having closed down at the start of the Second World War. In 1965, Bled organised a world PEN congress in Bled, hosting world-famous poets, writers and dramatists. The authorities supported the congress and attempted to present Yugoslavia to the global literary elite as a country of creative openness and freedom. In reality, they were far from reconciled with the modern and avant-garde influences of the West. Like their older colleagues, the generation of artists that came to public notice at the start of the 1960s
displayed a very diverse range of aesthetic and literary ideas. Some continued to pursue Realism and traditional ideas about art, adapted to modern sensibilities, while others, often very demonstratively, incorporated more contemporary artistic concepts and trends into their work. The poets being published in the first half of the 1960s included Niko Grafenauer, Svetlana Makarovič, Tomaž Šalamun, Ervin Fritz, Andrej Brvar, Marko Kravos and Gustav Januš. In the second half of the decade, they were joined by representatives of a third post-war generation, which enjoyed a creative flowering in the 1970s, such as Milan Jesih, Ivo Svetina, Milan Dekleva, Andrej Medved and Boris A. Novak. The prose writing scene was as diverse as the poetry. In the 1960s and 1970s, Branko Hofman, Marjan Rožanc, Jože Snoj, Florijan Lipuš, Mate Dolenc, Dimitrij Rupel, Drago Jančar and Marko Švabič all produced prose works that attracted the public’s attention. Younger writers took longer to make their mark on drama than in poetry and novels. Dušan Jovanovič, Rudi Šeligo and Milan Jesih produced a series of modern plays during the 1970s, while in the 1980s Drago Jančar turned his hand to drama, and became a favourite of the critics and public.

The relaxed and dynamic atmosphere of the 1960s had a major impact on creativity in music and the fine arts. Primož Ramovž established himself as the elder statesmen of the stylistically diverse group of composers whose work kept pace with modern European trends. The musicians and composers were far more regular visitors to musical performances abroad than previously, and gained valuable study opportunities and experience all over the world. Modernist and avant-garde themes were successfully incorporated into the visual arts, despite resistance from critics and the authorities. The most prominent representative of Modernism in painting was Janez Bernik, whose original artistic expression gained him an international reputation and numerous awards at home and abroad. The European and American artistic movements to make the most visible inroads into the Slovene artistic scene during the 1960s and 1970s were pop art, neoconstructivism and conceptualism. Graphic art also continued to flourish, while non-figurative trends only slowly crept into sculpture, though even the main proponents of figurative sculpture would head into abstract territory. The growing consumerism also led to the rapid development of graphic and industrial design.

The authorities encouraged and celebrated ‘naïve’ artists as an alternative to Modernism and contemporary art. Their reaction to more modern artistic work was dismissive and intolerant. In 1968, a group of literary figures from the middle and older generations publicly opposed modernising trends in literature, setting out their protest in a declaration with the expressive title: “Demokracija da – razkroj ne!” (Yes to Democracy – No to Disintegration!). The signatories to the declaration said the work of younger authors was a
sign of decadence and an unwarranted divergence from Slovene poetic tradition. They also
described it as nihilist and anti-socialist and rhetorically asked where the money for such
“literature” came from in a “socialist society”. Although the clash bore all the hallmarks of an
inter-generational conflict, the accusations of ‘negative phenomena’ in poetry and literature
made by Slovene political institutions and organisations in support of the declaration gave it a
clear political dimension. Culture and cultural policy were addressed at the congress of the
Slovene League of Communists in December 1968, which supported “freedom of artistic
expression,” but called on Communists in cultural institutions, newspapers and publishers to
remain faithful to Communist ideological, aesthetic and political positions.

One of the most vehement critics of modern artistic and philosophical trends was Josip
Vidmar, who was president of SAZU for 24 years (1952–76). Throughout the 1960s, Vidmar
stepped up his critical offensive against modern art and philosophy, which became a more
political condemnation around 1970, with his remarks on the incompatibility of “surrealism,
existentialism, phenomenology, structuralism and reism” with socialism. Dušan Pirjevec, a
professor of comparative literature at the University of Ljubljana, responded to Vidmar’s
views by rejecting the ideological and utilitarian reading of poetry. He said that in “modern
times” poetry and art were losing their national or any other purpose. At the same time, in a
special issue of the literary review Problemi, dedicated to “the question of nation in
Slovenia,” he expanded his thoughts to the nation and asked whether even ideas such as
nation and nationality were losing their traditional meaning and importance under the
influence of modern “rationalisation and functionalisation.” In his view, the nation as an
eschatological, messianic project had come to an end and ceased to be the “totalising mega-
group that gives man his true meaning.”

Pirjevec formulated his ideas of nation against a backdrop of increasingly tense inter-
ethnic relations in Yugoslavia, while efforts to modernise Slovenia had already entered a cul-
de-sac. However, his warnings of the dangers inherent in persisting with “old forms of
national organisation” were not well received, even among the critically minded intelligentsia.
For most academics, Pirjevec’s ideas were too radical, while the most ardent supporters of
traditional concepts of nation dismissed him as a national nihilist, so only a few of Pirjevec’s
closest allies offered even indirect backing for his views. “Slovenes cannot really think of
themselves as people, but always as Slovenes,” stated the writer Primož Kozak with
resignation in his reflections from the United States.

After the political volte-face in 1972, more open discussion of the social and national
issues was no longer possible. The change in atmosphere affected cultural policy as well,
which returned to almost forgotten models of cultural policy from the first half of the 1950s. Ideas on the ‘socialisation of culture’ were current once more, which were supposed to open up select cultural achievements to the widest possible circle of ‘working people’ via an organised campaign. The results of this campaign, which was intended to restore the ‘enlightening’ educational function of culture, included exhibitions, cultural events and special theatre season tickets aimed at the widest possible audience, as well as large-scale formation of amateur cultural groups and trade union libraries, but the campaigning spirit was more harmful than beneficial to the organisation of amateur culture. At the same time, political pressure was stepped up, with education, publishing and the public media bearing the main brunt. In 1974, the 10th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists in Belgrade announced a fundamental reform of secondary education. Its aim was to achieve greater integration between all levels of education, directing them towards vocational education. The reform included the abolition of gymnasium schools, which severely encroached on the policy of providing a general secondary education. The reform plans were met by significant resistance in Slovenia, as a consequence of which the introduction of ‘directed education’ took longer in Slovenia than elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The law on vocationally oriented education was only passed by the Slovene assembly in 1980, and the reorganisation of secondary schools was less radical than in other republics, although gymnasium schools were abolished. The new law on higher education (1975) was an essential component of the changes, weakening links between the university’s faculties, and clearing the way for greater political intervention in the university. The new law also laid the groundwork for transforming the Maribor Association of Higher Education Institutions into Slovenia’s second university.

The legal restrictions on the freedom of the press introduced in 1973, and the increased penalties for “enemy activity” two years later, reduced opportunities to publicly express criticism, and even cultural reviews avoided politically delicate subjects, since the authorities responded severely to any defiance. They interfered without any misgivings in editorial policy and the editorial decisions of publishing houses, which they forced to suppress and change manuscripts and even printed books. The university and academic institutions were also coming under fire. The 1975 law on higher education introduced the principle that a university lecturer must not only be a good professional, but also of “morally and politically unimpeachable character.” The authorities used a pragmatic financing policy to control research and influence the development of scientific fields. Sociology and the humanities remained subject to special political supervision, with history and philosophy coming under particularly close scrutiny; modern non-Marxist philosophical currents such as
phenomenology and the work of Heidegger were banned from the university until the 1990s.

Despite the return to activist texts and the political pressure, the leaders and proponents of the ‘anti-liberal revolution’ could not completely suffocate the cultural dynamism brought about by the politically more relaxed 1960s. In the mid-1970s, the publication of the novel *Noč do jutra* (Night till Morning) by Branko Hofman was halted despite already having been printed; the book addressed the treatment of political prisoners sent to the Goli Otok prison island after Yugoslavia’s split with Moscow, and was not published until 1981. An unconventional novel by Vitomil Zupan published at the same time (*Menuet za kitaro*, 1975) which offered a drastically different view of the Second World War from that offered in official explanations received a few harsh, politically coloured criticisms, but was otherwise sold in bookshops without censure. Theatre retained a prestigious place in cultural life, with a movement known as ‘total theatre’ reaching its peak at the end of the 1970s with spectacular performances addressing the ties between revolution and art. Slovene cinema remained more traditional in focus. Among the films casting a critical view over post-war society and politics and attracting the attention of film audiences and critics were a number that dealt with the war and post-war politics in Slovenia and Yugoslavia.

Organisers of art exhibitions also found themselves on the end of unfavourable political assessments in the ideologically intolerant atmosphere of the 1970s. Critics who were close to the authorities accused a major exhibition of post-war Slovene art put on in 1979 by the Modern Gallery in Ljubljana of being too “exclusively modernist.” At the beginning of the 1980s, the ‘nova podoba’ (New Image) movement and Postmodernism became established art movements. Visual artists of all generations moved to some extent towards New Image painting, while sculptors also engaged in the new interest in objects and the human figure. Postmodern influences were also seen in architecture from the 1970s. Architectural thought underwent a significant reassessment, with proponents of Postmodernism establishing themselves at the university and influencing a large number of the youngest generation of town planners and architects.

Cultural life began to change once more in the first half of the 1980s. Slovene officials responded to tensions within the federal leadership following Tito’s death by permitting a gradual, and initially very cautious, liberalisation of public life. The first sign of a thaw was the publication of books that had been banned from the bookshops for the past decade or two. A collection of France Balantič’s poems was finally released in 1984, having been continually prevented by the authorities because of the author’s opposition to the Partisans. In 1983, a novel by Igor Torkar on the previously taboo subject of the post-war Dachau trials was
published. After two years of vacillation in the corridors of power and an unwelcoming response from the media, in 1982, *Nova revija* (New Review) began publication, as the home of younger intellectuals who had aligned themselves with former contributors to *Revija 57* and *Perspektive*. Although the authorities only permitted *Nova revija* to go ahead on condition that it would only address “cultural issues”, it rapidly developed into a committed intellectual journal. Its pages contained a wide range of literary, philosophical and political ideas and it became a unique forum for freethinking articles in a period still dominated by political intolerance.

A series of new laws passed by the Slovene assembly at the start of the 1980s improved administrative and financial conditions in a range of cultural spheres, despite the growing political and economic crisis. The funds allocated to culture increased in relation to other social activities. The new legislation made private cultural organisations possible and also permitted the founding of private publishing houses, theatres, architectural studios, galleries and film production groups. This served to encourage cultural creativity and the pluralisation of cultural life. The 1980s was one of the most fruitful periods in the post-war history of Slovene theatre, with productions of original Slovene plays including a number of works addressing the issues of totalitarianism and revolution. The Slovene Philharmonic (*Slovenska filharmonija*) took on the mantle of the central symphony orchestra, and gained a large and enthusiastic following. Slovene cinema also enjoyed its most productive era, with over 40 feature films made by Slovene directors and producers between 1980 and 1990. The work of younger filmmakers, in particular, reflected a similar conceptual shift to that being seen in literary and theatre circles. With varying degrees of success, their films addressed themes of revolutionary violence, ideological intolerance and the tragic consequences of the inter-war conflicts, or with a candour unusual for Slovene at the time, cast a no more optimistic light on the issues of modern life, social decay and the increasing national exclusivism.

The most original development of the 1980s was the rise of a ‘youth sub-culture’; non-institutional socialising and creativity among young people had not been encouraged during the 1970s. The authorities had permitted rock groups and concerts, with various restrictions, but openly opposed the punk movement. The first punk groups appeared in Slovenia in 1977, and punk developed as a style of dress, behaviour and identification for young people that caused revulsion and opposition not only from political organisations but also from the public at large. The police intimidated and persecuted punks, and newspapers even accused them of a dalliance with Nazism. In 1981, three punks were imprisoned after being found guilty of
attempting to establish a Slovene Nazi party. The charge was later proved to have based entirely on forgeries produced by journalists. The violence achieved its objective, nevertheless, with the punk movement broken and forced off the public stage.

This did nothing to prevent the growing popularity of older rock groups or the formation of new, with one of these – Laibach – gaining notice and notoriety from its very beginning. The members of Laibach, whose German name alone was enough to cause public protests, openly differentiated themselves from other bands by refusing to follow established subcultural norms, instead basing their work on a simulation of totalitarianism with spectacular glorification of collectivism, discipline and the creation of a ‘new world’ and ‘new man’. They appeared in public in uniforms with stylised Nazi and Communist symbols and bombastic musical performances, which raised doubts even among critics well-inclined to the subculture of whether the Laibach project was an attempt to address totalitarianism or simply to play with its ideas and images. The authorities initially blocked or banned the band’s performances, but the liberalisation of public life meant they soon acquired an audience and fans. In 1983, Laibach, the IRWIN art collective, and the Scipion Nasice Sisters Theatre group came together in an artistic collective called Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK, the German phrase means ‘New Slovene Art’), which gained success at home and abroad despite public resistance and disapproval in the media.

Despite punk and rock lyrics that were critical of the authorities and Communist ideology and symbols, the movements within the youth subculture did not offer any clear political objectives, though their unconventionality and diversity were an important factor in the pluralisation and democratisation of public life. In response to the police violence against punks in 1982, the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (Zveza socialistične mladine Slovenije – ZSMS) began to open up to the new youth groups, as it developed the idea that it should no longer turn its back on young people choosing different paths to those prescribed by the political establishment. Although the ZSMS leadership was initially cautious, in 1983 they started to welcome ecological and peace groups into the fold, followed by spiritual, and lesbian and gay groups which formed the core of new civil society movements. These also engaged with the political scene, supporting the shortening of military service and civil service alternatives, opposing the death penalty and calling for a change to the article of the penal code that permitted prosecutions on the grounds of a “verbalni delikt” (a verbal transgression or speech crime). Their demands were supported by the youth press and particularly the weekly journal Mladina (Youth), which in 1983 took on a very delicate issue, questioning the point of the spectacular annual celebrations of Tito’s birthday. The opening up
of the ZSMS and the youth press to civil movements was harshly criticised within the federal youth ‘headquarters’ in Belgrade, and various attempts were also made by Slovene political leadership to block the move, yet the public mood had already changed so much that proponents of violent measures against ‘the youth alternative’ and of the ZSMS’s gradual political independence were now very much in a minority.

As ever, the Communist leaders still saw their intellectual critics as more formidable opponents than the youth and civil society movements, despite their smaller numbers and lower profile. After 1980, politicians were increasingly split on the question of how to respond to the positions of, and initiatives from, this intelligentsia, so their reactions would be often disproportionately severe, but followed by periods of greater tolerance and openness to dialogue. The republic presidency and socio-political organisations, still led of course by the Central Committee of the League of Communists, were responsible for making conceptual and political assessments of what was acceptable and what was not. The Slovene Writers’ Association became the central organisation for the intellectual critics of the regime, having developed into an open and politically engaged association since the end of the 1970s. It supported and directed all the most important campaigns to democratise the public arena, supported the open discussion of taboo themes, defended freedom of speech and of ideas and vehemently opposed violent measures against critical or ‘different’ thinkers. Within the Yugoslav framework, it took a stance against the centralisation of the education system, and went on to oppose centralist and nationalist developments within the Serbian Writers’ Association. This did not stop members of the society defending Serbian, Croatian and other Yugoslav colleagues in cases of political oppression.

Although the Slovene authorities continued to apply in the 1980s the legal provisions on verbalni delikti and offences against the state and state officials, and banned the publication of articles and critical journals, the public arena in Slovenia was significantly more open and free than elsewhere in Yugoslavia. In these circumstances, Slovene cultural, youth and student newspapers made space for Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian writers who were blocked from the media at home, while publishing houses not only printed books by literary figures that publishers in their home republics could not or would not publish, but even works by dissident writers. Nova revija had particularly close links with the intellectual opposition in other republics, and in 1988 attempted to establish dialogue with Serbian intellectuals on constitutional changes and Slovene ideas about the future of the Yugoslav state. As the published discussions revealed, despite a number of points in common, there were significant differences between the Slovene and Serbian opposition, which could no
longer be bridged. Slovene intellectuals remained convinced that their Serbian counterparts were trapped in Communist ways of thinking, that their ideas on modernisation and democratisation remained within a socialist framework, and that they were underestimating the importance of the national question by supporting a strong, closely integrated and rigidly organised Yugoslav state. Serbian intellectuals in return called Slovene demands for the transformation of the Yugoslav federation into a confederal union of national or ethnic states historically outdated, and out of step with Western European and global trends towards supranational forms of integration. The brief exchange of views clearly revealed that even after seven decades there had been no real progress among intellectuals and cultural figures in the debate on the fundamental questions of how to organise a Yugoslav state. The dilemma on whether Yugoslavia should be a community of supranationally organised citizens or a federal union of equal nations together guaranteeing the rights of their citizens remained just as current an issue on the brink of Yugoslavia’s dissolution as it had been at the very start.

Questions about the future of Slovenia, Yugoslavia, and socialism also divided Slovene intellectuals and critics of Communist policy throughout the second half of the 1980s. Members of the youth and civil society movements, predominantly young intellectuals, saw opposing ‘state oppression’ as their principal cause, and in their writing and proclamations supported the pluralisation of the public arena above all, free expression of diversity, respect for human rights and freedoms and supervision of the police, army and other state bodies of control. They did not address more actively the fundamental problems of the constitutional transformation of the Yugoslav state and the crisis in the socialist order, convinced as they were that it was still possible to correct and democratise both Yugoslavia and socialism. The position taken by the Nova revija group, the Writers’ Association, and leading members of the sociology society in the second half of the 1980s was significantly different. Their main contention was that Tito’s Yugoslavia and Communism were approaching their end, and that Slovenia’s state and political organisation, and the Slovene relationship with the Yugoslav state, should be built on completely new foundations.

In 1988 a select group from the Writers’ Association and sociological society prepared a series of propositions for a new Slovene constitution, which referred to fundamental human rights, the right of nations to self-determination, and Slovenia’s historically asserted ‘difference and independence’, and supported the transformation of Slovenia into a modern, democratic state and its freedom to decide on the form and the way in which it would associate with the other Yugoslav republics in future. This was the first time in over forty years of post-war Yugoslav history that one part of civil society and the critical public,
independently and autonomously, used their constitutional right to participate in the exercise of constitutional authority. The writers’ draft constitution may well have initially seemed unrealistic and perhaps even lacking in seriousness, and attracted little attention. In contrast, the references to national self-determination and sovereignty were met by a wave of criticisms and accusations of nationalism, which were adamantly repeated by representatives of the youth and civil society movements most of all. As events moved further along their relentless course – indisputably influenced more by Serbian than Slovene nationalism – events during the years to come revealed that the writers’ theses on a new Slovene constitution was far more realistic than many had imagined.

YUGOSLAVIA BEGINS TO UNRAVEL

When, on 5 May 1980, Tito’s mortal remains were taken by train from Ljubljana to Belgrade, crowds numbering hundreds of thousands gathered on the streets of the Slovene capital, and lined the railway line all the way to the Slovene-Croatian border. No doubt many people came simply due to political expediency, yet the crowds were also full of those who had come spontaneously, out of genuine respect for the deceased president and well aware that his admittedly anticipated departure could well have extremely unfavourable political consequences. At the time of his death, Tito was highly respected even in Slovenia, despite his authoritarianism and his long-deteriorating health during the second half of the 1970s. However, just as in the years leading up to his death Tito himself had realised that the post-war Communist politics of the Yugoslav nations had not succeeded in binding them into a stronger community, when he died, many a Slovene and a Yugoslav realised that his departure heralded a period of great uncertainty, with the real problems only just beginning.

Following Tito’s death, Slovene newspapers constantly repeated two slogans: “Work more and work better,” and “Follow Tito’s path.” The first was supposed to be a call for greater discipline at work, market competition and economic liberalisation, while the second promoted the self-management system, the federal state, and the 1974 constitution. At the start of 1980, the fact that Yugoslavia’s economic situation had passed beyond the critical could now longer be concealed. Only a month after Tito’s death, the federal government in Belgrade, under pressure from international banking institutions, devalued the dinar by 30%, in order to obtain new loans. Devaluation, however, did not accelerate exports as its proposers had wished. Instead, it hindered imports, which caused additional difficulties in obtaining raw materials and essential consumer goods. The federal authorities in Belgrade tried to reduce
consumption with unpopular and poorly considered measures, and by making it more difficult for people to travel abroad, thereby stemming the flow of foreign currency out of the country. Car travel had already been restricted in 1979 due to petroleum shortages. In 1982, special petrol coupons were introduced (a private car owner could buy only 40 litres of petrol per month). The greatest dissatisfaction – especially in Slovenia – was caused by the decision to introduce a charge known as the border-crossing deposit. The regulation, which was in force for a little over two years (from autumn 1982 until the end of 1984), required the owner of a valid passport to pay a relatively high charge every time they crossed the state border. Admittedly, the sum was refunded by the state after a year (hence it was called a deposit), but the measure significantly affected local cross-border traffic, and at the same time gave the people the impression that the state leadership was gradually trying to scrap one of the most important privileges enjoyed under Tito – the right to freely travel abroad.

The attitude of Slovene leaders to federal politics and Belgrade continued to be indecisive and contradictory. Slovene representatives still held important state and political functions in the Yugoslav leadership and the federal bodies in the first half of the 1980s. The long-standing secretary of the executive committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Stane Dolanc, became the federal minister of the interior in 1982, and Mitja Ribičič was elected president of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the same year, Sergej Kraigher, meanwhile, led a special commission to prepare proposals for reforms, which would ensure the “stabilisation” of the Yugoslav economy. However, Slovene policy was defensive and vacillating: its representatives were striving for more orderly handling of state funds, for market relations and ‘short accounts’ between federal units, while making compromises in Belgrade, yielding to demands for solidarity and solving problems together, and rejecting any ideas about systematic political changes. In this way, the Kraigher commission’s stabilisation programme – despite calls by economists for the establishment of a true market and the end of political interference in the economy – persisted with the economic system of the 1970s. Meanwhile, the federal government, which included Slovene ministers, adopted a whole series of restrictive measures, which administratively fixed the costs of services and products, and regulated the sale of goods and raw materials in short supply. Enterprises were at the same time restricted in their disposal of foreign currency. The new law on foreign currencies specified that enterprises exporting abroad must transfer 76% of the foreign currency they earned to an account at the federal National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ), which the bank could then use according to its own judgment and in accordance with the needs of the state. This triggered a wave of protests in Slovenia and Croatia. All the same, in May 1983, the federal
assembly decided to ‘socialise’ Yugoslav foreign debt, which meant that the debts had to be paid off by anyone with money, regardless of whether they had taken out loans or disbursed them.

The fickleness of the Slovene delegates in Belgrade led to a rapid growth in discontent in Slovenia, not only with federal but also Slovene politics. The Slovene economy was experiencing fewer difficulties than the economies of the other republics, unemployment was growing more slowly and disruptions in supply were not as frequent or as severe as elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Restrictive measures, which applied to all the republics equally, therefore increased the dissatisfaction of the population and strengthened traditional reproaches that Slovenia was paying for the poor performance of the rest of the country. In the winter of 1983, managed power cuts followed the petrol rationing, while the introduction of the border-crossing deposit was backed up by stricter customs regulations, making it harder to make purchases abroad. Restrictive measures on transactions in foreign currency held in private bank accounts decreased people’s confidence in domestic banks and encouraged them to transfer their foreign currency savings to Austrian or Italian banks just over the border. Economic differences between the Yugoslav republics and the autonomous regions kept growing. In 1985, OECD evaluations ranked Yugoslavia and Serbia on a par with Turkey in terms of gross domestic product per capita. Kosovo was level with Pakistan, Croatia with Greece, and Slovenia with Spain or New Zealand.

The crisis continued to escalate throughout the country during the 1980s; inflation increased, and the size of the state’s foreign debt grew from one year to the next, standing at over a quarter of the entire Yugoslav foreign currency inflow by 1982/83. The decision by the state leadership that, despite the economic difficulties, Yugoslavia would host the 14th Winter Olympics in Sarajevo in 1984 seemed like a bad joke in light of the situation. The majority of public opinion in Slovenia and Croatia was therefore opposed to the Olympics in Sarajevo. They were joined by a considerable number of politicians. However, through the exertion of political pressure, and by contracting Slovene and Croatian enterprises to build the sports facilities and hotels, the organisers succeeded in seeing off most of their critics.

The search for a path out of the economic difficulties and debt led to increasingly vocal criticism in the east and the south of the country of the constitution and the complex system of self-management negotiations. When, in the spring of 1981, unrest broke out in Kosovo, Serbian critics of the 1974 constitution again placed the question of the constitutional position of Serbia and its regions on the agenda. The federal police and Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovanska Ljudska Armada – JLA, referred to as the JNA in Serbo-Croat) quashed
the Kosovar Albanian uprising quickly and brutally while state leaders assured domestic and foreign journalists that the demonstrations had been provoked by “pro-fascist” and “anti-revolutionary” groups, which had been formed abroad. But pressure from Serbian critics of the constitution and the federal make-up of the nation did not die down. Serbian newspapers and other media began an aggressive campaign against the Albanians and anyone who tried to defend them.

Criticism of the extremely complex delegate and self-management systems, and the never-ending consultations between federal units, were of course well-founded. The social and political arrangement, supposedly Kardelj’s brainchild, was a veritable bureaucratic maze, which left people with no practical choice but to make provisional agreements, to search for legal loopholes and to infringe regulations. At the same time, it gave those charged with reaching agreements a feeling of powerlessness, as the republic and federal bodies of the League of Communists still made all the key decisions. For Serbian and Montenegrin opponents of the constitution and the law on associated labour, the only possible alternative to federalism and Kardelj’s self-management lay in limiting the autonomous jurisdiction of the federal units and in renewing centralism. They talked of a need for a renewed strengthening of “the power of the working class” and Yugoslav unity which clearly indicated outdated Bolshevik patterns. The approach to ‘disciplining’ errant federal units and citizens held by at least some members of the Serbian, federal and military leaderships was made all too clear by the military and police violence in Kosovo.

Some Slovene politicians expressed disapproval of the violence against the Kosovar Albanians, but the leadership obediently accepted the federal and Serbian explanation that the Kosovo unrest was the work of opponents of the “revolution” and was targeting the “integrity of Yugoslavia.” It reacted in more decisive fashion to Serbian demands for changes to the constitution and the political system, prepared only to accept some minor amendments, while rejecting any idea of more fundamental changes to the constitutional and political order. Slovene leaders could not have a decisive impact on the situation in the Yugoslav leadership as long as they pursued a policy of compromises and blinkered persistence with the 1974 constitution and Kardelj’s system. When it came to decisions on everyday matters, especially those concerning the economy, they were (together with the Croats) always in the minority.

Following the death of Tito and the quashing of the insurrection in Kosovo, Serbian and Yugoslav centralists increased the pressure on ‘nationalists’ and political opponents elsewhere in the country. At the same time, a historical controversy broke out between Belgrade and Zagreb over Serbian victims of the Ustaša terror and the role of the Croatian
Catholic Church during the Second World War. This added fuel to polemical debate on the recent and more distant past which had engulfed Serbia, Croatia and, in part, Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of the 1970s. It also began to undermine the hitherto united ‘official’ account of the Yugoslav partisan resistance and twentieth century communist history. Advocates of political and ideological ‘unity’ in the state and ZKJ leadership used forceful means to try and stop the growing tide of memoirs, media articles, and literary and historical writing, which tackled hitherto taboo or forbidden subjects. But federal attempts to bring the intelligentsia into line did not succeed. In Zagreb and Sarajevo, the authorities did succeed in (temporarily) quieting the voices of criticism and opposition, but the situation was different in Belgrade and Novi Sad, where the Serbian intelligentsia reacted very severely to political pressures, and in Ljubljana, where the Slovene leadership in 1982 gave the go-ahead for the publication of the very critical review, Nova revija. The careful ceding of ground by the political elites in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Ljubljana to educated critics was, of course, not a sign of greater liberalism, but largely the fruit of political calculations. Some Serbian and Slovene politicians – in contrast to their less flexible colleagues in Croatia and Bosnia – strove, in the prevailing tensions, to strengthen their position at home and to call a truce with the opposing intelligentsia. In Slovenia, the result of such a policy was slow and faltering, but increasingly evident, liberalisation of public life, which could be seen particularly in a greater freedom of the press as well as in public discussions on subjects which it had not been possible to discuss openly. In 1982, speakers at the congress of the ZSMS (Socialist Youth League of Slovenia), spoke in favour of introducing community service as an alternative to military service for the first time, and one year later, under the leadership of Janez Janša, a group was founded to prepare a proposal for the “socialisation of security and defence” and to encourage public discussion on the “armed forces”. The Yugoslav People’s Army leadership resolutely rejected both campaigns by the Slovene youth organisation.

The views of Slovene politicians on how far the process of liberalisation should go and the accepted level of force, were still varied and far from set in stone. At a time in which some leaders in Slovenia were beginning to open up channels of dialogue with opposition intellectuals, Stane Dolanc as federal Minister for the Interior gained notoriety for defending ruthless police repression (experienced at first hand by Kosovar Albanians; during Dolanc’s term as minister, the number of political prisoners in Yugoslavia grew noticeably). At the same time, the secret police – the UDBA – in Slovenia as elsewhere in the country, continued collecting information about politically ‘undesirable’ and ‘suspicious’ individuals and groups, and confidentially informed the leading republic officials and political bodies about
occurrences of ‘anti-state activities’. The Council for the Protection of the Constitution (Svet za varstvo ustavne ureditve) decided on proceedings against individuals and groups labelled ‘unsuitable’ or ‘dangerous’, and could also prosecute them, all in the absence of any firm legal basis. The council comprised leading republic officials. Political and ideological opinions about what was and was not politically acceptable were voiced publicly by everyone, from the republic presidency to the committees of the political organisations, all of which were of course controlled by the republic-level leaderships of the League of Communists, which had the final say in any sensitive matters. Up until the second half of the 1980s, the authorities maintained strict control over the press, and banned books and suppressed newspapers that diverged from official dogma. They also charged people who read or brought into the country forbidden foreign, especially émigré, literature.

Under these circumstances, the Slovene political leadership was unable in the first half of the 1980s to create a ‘national programme’ of its own that would define its relationship with the federation in detail. When, in 1984, France Klopčič, one of the oldest Slovene Communists still alive, warned the Communist leadership in Ljubljana that the “historical moment” had come when it must thoroughly reconsider its politics and set its targets anew, his suggestion was rejected. This was short-sighted in the extreme, since Slovenia was being rocked by tumultuous debate over the centralisation of academic, cultural and educational policies in the country, precisely at the time that Klopčič made his suggestion. The state and political leadership in Belgrade became increasingly in favour of standardising school curricula throughout the country. The humanities would follow a common core syllabus at all levels which would be compulsory for all. Individual nations would be represented in the common curriculum – in history, geography, art, music and literature – by national themes and content, depending on what portion of the total population they represented. Demands for the unification of the Yugoslav education system were supported by Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, but in Serbia above all, where the ‘common core curriculum’ was an attempt to limit Kosovar (Albanian) autonomy in the field of education. For those who supported the common core, the efforts to create common syllabuses, which would be compulsory for all nations and federal units, were an integral part of the struggle for political and ideological unity. However, from the point of view of the republics and regions, it was a significant limitation of their autonomy, as decision-making in cultural, academic and educational matters was one of their traditional autonomous rights.

The discussion on unifying the education system and about the ‘common core’ was limited to fairly narrow educational circles until the middle of 1983. However, in 1983, when
the poets Janez Menart and Ciril Zlobec began a broad discussion in newspapers about the planned reform, this caused an even greater stir in Slovenia than the rapidly falling standard of living, growing inflation and the most unpopular economic moves. The wave of protest was widespread and included many ZKS members, which forced the Slovene political leadership to react, and finally reject the proposed centralisation of education. Disputes also split the Yugoslav Writers’ Association. The Congress of Yugoslav Writers, held in Novi Sad in 1985 after a 10-year gap, took place in an atmosphere of heightened national intolerance, with Slovenes and Serbs engaging in particularly heated confrontations.

Despite growing dissatisfaction, there was still no opposition worthy of mention in Slovenia up until the mid 1980s. The Catholic Church, led by archbishop and metropolitan Alojzij Šuštar, who was named head of the Archdiocese of Ljubljana in 1980, campaigned for its traditional demands: for Catholics to be granted equal rights in society, for social insurance to be made available to priests and for more freedom to be accorded to church-run charities, while also calling for greater media openness and for the state to respect church holidays, especially Christmas. However, it strove to achieve these aims by engaging in discussion with the authorities, avoiding conflict and confrontation. This also suited the ZKS leaders, who called for dialogue with the Church while continuing to suppress the public expression of religious sentiment. The Slovene political leadership, therefore, did not consider the Church a dangerous opposition institution. Those considered potentially politically dangerous were groups of critics in certain trade unions and professional associations, and the leadership also spoke with concern about the increasing popularity of civil and youth movements, and labelled the intellectuals grouped around Nova revija as completely “adversarial”.

In these circumstances, public opinion in Slovenia in the mid 1980s was still very contradictory: on the one hand it was critical of the Communist authorities, the wavering and irresolute nature of Slovene politics and the federal pressures, while on the other hand it was still in favour of a solution for the political and economic crisis within the framework of the existing political system and the state of Yugoslavia. In 1986, opinion polls showed that almost 60% of those asked trusted the ‘system of socialist self-management’, and despite growing tensions between individual nations, a convincing majority still saw no obstacles in the way of making friends with Yugoslavs of different national origin. But public feelings were rapidly changing. The League of Communists was rapidly losing its reputation, and resistance to its ideological slogans was growing just as quickly. From the mid 1980s onwards, opinion polls showed a clear increase in people wanting the right of private business initiative, the abolition of the maximum amount of land that could be owned by farmers, and
measures allowing individual’s to increase their income. At the same time, the number of dissatisfied people who realised they had no influence at all in politics, and therefore supported demands for political democratisation, also grew.

The increasingly unfriendly relations between the nations meant national sentiment was running high. In the early 1980s, immigration from central and eastern parts of Yugoslavia, and the increasing use of foreign words in everyday language led the guardians of the ‘purity’ of the Slovene language to voice their concern. They founded a ‘linguistic commission’ within the framework of the Socialist Alliance which was to preserve and improve the quality of Slovene expression. This protection of the Slovene language was ridiculed and sharply criticised elsewhere in Yugoslavia (especially in Serbia and Bosnia). Discussions on language had not yet died down when the public was disquieted by demographic statistics on population changes in Slovenia – a falling birth-rate, an ageing population and an increasing number of suicides. There followed demands for a more systematic and active demographic policy. All this of course strengthened the feelings of uncertainty which were provoked by the critical economic situation and the increasingly uncompromising rows between the leaderships of the republics and the nations, and between their representatives in the state leadership. In the mid-1980s, inflation reached 80%, while purchasing power and the standard of living fell from day to day. The discussion on the political and economic transformation of the country had become stuck. What was initially a dispute between those defending the constitution and its opponents increasingly became a dispute between two republics: Slovenia and Serbia. Reflecting this atmosphere, Slovene opinion polls after 1985 began showing increasing numbers calling for greater Slovene autonomy within Yugoslavia. An increasing number also believed that Slovenia, were it to withdraw from Yugoslavia altogether, would enjoy new and much more favourable opportunities for development.

In the mid-1980s, there was no longer any doubt that the plans for the ‘stabilisation’ of the economy had failed. In 1985, a federal commission set up to analyse the political system also finished its task without any success, as it proposed only a few minor changes and was in favour of keeping the 1974 constitution. This decision disappointed everyone – from those supporting democratisation to centralists and adherents of a ‘firm’ Communist hand. Only the Slovene leadership gave it qualified support. It found itself increasingly isolated in its efforts to preserve Kardelj’s legacy and his efforts to unite self-management, federalism and one-party Communist rule. Politicians in Belgrade and the rest of Serbia, of course, had completely different views. They argued that the controversial constitution, which demanded
consensus between the federal units for every significant state decision, was the main cause of ineffectiveness, not only of the political, but also the economic system.

Public opinion in Serbia – including the views of a large number of politicians and intellectuals – was strongly affected by events in Kosovo, where relations between the Serbian and Albanian populations were becoming increasingly tense, despite judicial and police efforts to clamp down on Albanian ‘separatists’. In the mid 1980s, demands for the abolition of Kosovar autonomy were supported also by some of the most respected Serbian intellectuals and combatants from the Second World War; the question of changes to the constitution, the renewed ‘union’ of Serbia and the ‘renewal of Yugoslav unity’ became – for the Serbian media, and a large proportion of the population and the political elite – a kind of litmus test revealing who was for Yugoslavia and who was against. In 1986, a group of 16 members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences presented their views on the situation in Yugoslavia and on the Serbian nation. Their Memorandum contained several well-founded and widespread criticisms of the Communist regime and the Yugoslav political system, but its main thesis was distinctly biased. The authors of the Serbian academic memorandum maintained that Communist Yugoslavia was the result of a Slovene-Croat closed shop, and that the Serbs had been excluded from the decision-making process at key historical moments in the formation of Yugoslavia and thus subordinated. The lagging of Serbia’s economy and the fact that it was split into three parts were put forward as clear evidence. The academics attributed the political and economic crisis to the 1974 constitution, and the “confederal” state arrangement, saying it had placed the Serbs in a catastrophic position in the 1980s.

The writers of the Serbian Memorandum demanded the democratisation of political and cultural life in the state, yet at the same time supported demands for a return to “democratic federalism.” The Memorandum, which was published in the media before it had even been finalised by the Serbian Academy, first polarised the Serbian political scene, and then the rest of Yugoslavia. Serbian political leaders, who were accused by academics of betraying national goals, rejected it outright and labelled its authors ‘nationalists’. In the eyes of a considerable portion of the Serbian public, the intellectuals and the political elites, the Memorandum was a convincing analysis of the Yugoslav and Serbian national situation, and in this context it was a document which was to become the guiding light of a new, more aggressive Serbian politics. A major change indeed took place in Belgrade the following year. The leadership of the Serbian League of Communists was assumed by a more radical nationalist grouping, and with it a new star named Slobodan Milošević took his place in the
Serbian political firmament.

Political developments in Slovenia were running in completely the opposite direction. In the mid 1980s, civil movements, whose aim was to change the way politics was run, no longer contented themselves with rejecting the authorities’ calls for political discipline and respect for ideological values, but started to openly oppose them. They drew attention in numerous ways to the outdated nature of the Communist revolutionary mythology and the undemocratic political system. Some of these actions were directed against the wastefulness of the Yugoslav People’s Army. The more ironic ones, targeting mass political manifestations, such as the celebration of Tito’s birthday, caused outrage in the east and south of Yugoslavia as well as among Slovenes, and were seen as a desecration of years of untouchable Communist mythology. But at the same time, the circle of people sympathising with these actions, and showing their support through civil protests and organised youth groups, rapidly grew. The weekly magazine *Mladina* wrote favourable reports on their projects and events, and became critical of current political and economic matters. This meant it had outgrown its status as a youth magazine and had become a mass opposition periodical. After 1985, when it also turned its attention to the problems of repressive legislation, the question of post-war Communist tyranny and opposition movements elsewhere in Yugoslavia, it became one of the most-read Slovene periodicals.

Following the dispute surrounding attempts to centralise education and culture, the Slovene Writers’ Association also became an important initiator of anti-regime protests. In 1985, the Commission for the Freedom of Thought and Writing (Komisija za zaščito mišljenja in pisanja) was founded within its framework. The commission was led by the poet Veno Taufer. Some scientific and educational institutions, such as the Slovene Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAZU) and the universities in Ljubljana and Maribor passively looked on, remaining loyal to the weakening Communist government. The Catholic Church – traditionally the strongest opponent of communism – also stayed out of the fray. *Nova revija* was the main proponent of intellectual and theoretical criticism of the regime, and its circle of collaborators and readers grew rapidly. Other literary and cultural journals and student newspapers also began publishing increasingly uncompromising critical opinion and commentaries. In the second half of the 1980s, the coalescing Slovene opposition groups continued to call for the democratisation of political, cultural and economic life, but the national question remained in the background – with the exception of the usual complaints about discrimination against Slovenia and its economically exploitation. This was because they believed the nation’s desires would be fulfilled, and the tensions in the state would
subside, if relations between the federal units were liberalised and they together opened up to Western Europe.

One of the main national issues agitating and dividing the Slovene public in the mid-1980s, was the question of ‘national reconciliation’. The discussion was started in 1984 by the sociologist Spomenka Hribar, who wrote a preface to a special anthology dedicated to the memory of the poet Edvard Kocbek. She called for the settling of differences between political parties that had been in conflict during the Second World War, for a monument to be set up in memory of all who had fallen during the Second World War, and for “reconciliation” between Slovenes in Slovenia and the diaspora. The authorities prevented the book’s publication (it was banned until 1987), but they could not prevent the idea of reconciliation between Slovenes of different convictions and opinions from spreading. Despite the indignant protests of the political leadership, and even a considerable portion of the population to begin with, it became a central theme of Slovene politics.

Differences in the dynamics and the nature of the democratising processes in individual Yugoslav republics, especially between Serbia and Slovenia, had a fatal impact on the federal state and further accelerated the process of disintegration. However, the Yugoslav leadership, as well as the leaderships of most of the republics, were simply unable to understand this. In 1986, Branko Mikulić became President of the Federal Executive Council. He was a Croat from Bosnia and an ‘apparatchik’ of the younger generation of Tito’s politicians, famous among the Yugoslav political elite for having organised the Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. Mikulić was forced by the international monetary institutions to implement new money-saving measures, but he was not prepared to make a more resolute transformation of economic policy. Faced with a chronic lack of money and growing discord between the republics, his government resorted to increasing the size and power of the federal administration. At the same time, it transformed the federal institutions and bodies, including the central bank (National Bank of Yugoslavia) into tools for solving economic difficulties as they arose, for buying social peace and feeding the various appetites of the large budget consumers – from the military to the ‘undeveloped’ regions. At the end of 1986, those supporting the strengthening of the central state government also predominated in the federal presidency. The federal presidency sent a proposal for constitutional changes to the Federal Assembly. The proposal would transfer a series of powers, hitherto held by the republics and the regions, to the federal level. At the same time, it abandoned the inefficient search for consensus among the federal bodies in favour of majority voting, and opened the doors to extra-budgetary financing of the Yugoslav People’s Army. All the political leaderships of the
republics, including Slovenia, agreed with the proposed constitutional changes, as well as the basis for discussion. In Ljubljana, they hoped that the period of public debate would enable some changes, but they again bowed to pressure from the Serbian leadership. Through fear that conflict with the ‘centralists’ in the Yugoslav east and south would again leave them isolated, they again chose to follow the old policy of half-baked agreements and compromise.

At the 1986 republic and provincial congresses of the League of Communists, most of the older generation of leaders were replaced by younger political functionaries. In April, the Slovene Communists met and elected their new leaders. Milan Kučan, a 45-year old member of the more liberal section of the party, became president of the League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS). He had co-operated closely with Stane Kavčič at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, but when Kavčič fell from grace, Kučan joined the conservatives and thereby ensured his political survival. This change in the ZKS leadership did not at first produce any great change in policy, as the new leaders still resorted to the old compromises when trying to resolve the most urgent economic or political problems. Neither were there any changes in Slovene relations with Belgrade. Nevertheless, at the end of 1986, the authorities were already showing signs of greater flexibility when for the first time they allowed the Archbishop of Ljubljana to make a Christmas address on the radio. The unexpected Christmas homily angered staunch Communists, who expressed their dissatisfaction throughout Slovenia and Yugoslavia. Slovene critics of Archbishop Šuštar’s public addresses accused the authorities in Ljubljana of dangerous concessions to the Church. Yugoslav newspapers, meanwhile, declared the archbishop’s radio talk, which lasted a few minutes, a “new Slovene provocation.” In such circumstances, the Slovene leadership could not go one step further and declare Christmas a public holiday. However, they stood behind their decision to make Christmas an unofficial religious public holiday and in 1987 Archbishop Šuštar was joined in his Christmas address (this time on television) by the president of the Slovene Socialist Alliance, Jože Smole.

The partial Slovene recognition of Christmas as a holiday was supposed to show the Slovene and Yugoslav public that the Slovene leadership was taking democratisation seriously. Yet Slovene leaders still lacked a more decisive national political stance in the beginning of 1987, when a discussion on changes to the constitution began in the Federal assembly. In February 1987, Nova revija created outrage by devoting a special issue to reflections on the Yugoslav crisis and the future of Slovenes. It contributed a series of essays under the heading “Contributions to the Slovene National Programme” which were united in expressing the idea that Slovenes in Yugoslavia were now stuck in a cul-de-sac; if they were
to finally become an “independent and autonomous national entity”, then they had to make the transition from a stateless people, to a nation with its own state. This first required an end to Communist Party dominance, and a democratic legal and political order, which would allow everyone to express “their opinion, demands, and will without fear,” in the words of the philosopher Tine Hribar. The writers at *Nova revija* were not yet suggesting the end of Yugoslavia; they did, however, come to the conclusion that the federal state system was a “historical compromise.” The federal state must therefore, as philosopher Ivan Urbančič stressed, ensure the independent and smooth development of the “small and relatively weak nations,” and not conduct itself as a “dominant force,” whose aim is to “unify and homogenise.”

The Slovene and Yugoslav authorities vehemently rejected the opinions expressed in *Nova revija*. In Slovenia, criticism and condemnation in the usual style was initially forthcoming from political organisations, with the ZKS leading the way. It was followed by public rebuttals reminiscent of the early post-war years from various political forums, newspapers, radio and television stations, workers’ collectives, and even groups of individuals. There were particularly fiery reactions in the other Yugoslav republics and in Belgrade, where the views expressed in *Nova revija* were denounced as a “new memorandum of nationalists and the right wing.” For the Yugoslav, Serbian and military authorities, the articles were yet more proof of the spreading of ‘counter-revolutionary’ and ‘anti-Yugoslav’ sentiment in Slovenia. For this reason, they stepped up the pressure on the Slovene political leadership, and called on it to severely censure *Nova revija’s* writers and editors. However, the authorities in Ljubljana were not prepared to launch an offensive against the opposition intellectuals and limited themselves to forcing replacement of the editor-in-chief, and supporting the criticisms aimed at the review. The Slovene leadership was well aware that harsh measures against *Nova revija* would strengthen the opposition and public disenchantment. They also rejected federal calls for legal proceedings against the writers and editors because yielding to such pressure would set a dangerous precedent, which would make the federal authorities even bolder in their attempts to limit the powers of the republics and interfere with their internal affairs.

Slovene politicians in 1987/88 found themselves squeezed into a very tight corner, and the pressure was not relenting. Serbia and the federal authorities were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Slovenia resisting centralisation and being too ‘lax’ in its relations with civil movements and the opposition. Meanwhile, in Slovenia, the political initiative was taken up by the opposition intelligentsia, which openly campaigned for the abolition of the Communist
Party’s monopoly on power and the introduction of a democratic system that would enable citizens to express their political will freely. In March 1987, the Slovene Writers’ Association organised a public discussion, which rejected proposed constitutional changes, saying they tended towards unitarism and centralism. Meanwhile, a number of legal experts and respected intellectuals prepared a petition, signed by over 10,000 members of various civil movements and other citizens, calling on the republican assembly not to support the amendments to the federal constitution. But the Slovene political leadership paid no attention to the public criticism and on 20 March 1987, the republic assembly in Ljubljana adopted the amendments.

This did not win Slovene politicians any more friends in Belgrade, and in Slovenia they lost even more authority and face. Meanwhile, in Serbia, a more radical nationalist movement was gaining power. In order to win public sympathy and support, it skilfully and unscrupulously took advantage of social dissatisfaction and strained national relations in Kosovo. The new president of the Serbian League of Communists, Slobodan Milošević, was becoming increasingly vocal in his calls for the “unification” of the Republic of Serbia. He paid no attention to state organs and the elected institutions of both autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina. At the start of 1988, Milošević, surrounded by a narrow circle of his closest adherents, had achieved almost single-handed control over Serbia, and Serbia was being taken over by a nationalist fervour, which spread amongst the Serbs in Bosnia and Montenegro, and was unparalleled in Serbian history. All the same, the new Serbian leader was supported even by US diplomats, who were convinced that his efforts to create a “strong Serbia in a strong Yugoslavia” would lead to more stable internal Yugoslav relations, and Milošević had sympathisers and supporters among the Yugoslav state and military leaders.

After Tito’s death, the Yugoslav People’s Army remained a ‘state within a state’. With over 260,000 soldiers and around 100,000 members of the League of Communists, it was not only militarily powerful but also an influential political force. State and military propaganda merchants extolled it as the successor to the partisan and ‘revolutionary’ tradition, and as the indispensable guardian of Tito’s legacy and the Communist regime. It was therefore beyond criticism. The public could only learn as much about the views of its leadership, its activities and life in the barracks as it was allowed to know by the military leadership through army newsletters, reporters and the public media – everything else was considered a ‘military secret’. In the 1980s, the Yugoslav People’s Army was one of the rare, if not the only Yugoslav state institution, which still functioned in a completely centralistic and hierarchical manner. Meanwhile, its leaders did their utmost to retain its pan-Yugoslav appearance, even though the mid-ranking officer class was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins (over 80%).
Despite this, the Yugoslav army was more a Communist than a Serbian institution, and the highest commanders openly sympathised with those defending centralism and a ‘firm’ Communist grip. The military leadership, which had tight links with those in the state and Communist leadership supporting a “unified and strong Yugoslavia,” therefore supported Milošević’s demands for the centralisation of the federation, and resolutely opposed those in favour of republican autonomy and political liberalisation, declaring them ‘counter-revolutionary’ and opponents of a collective state.

The leading generals in Belgrade were particularly dissatisfied with the situation in Slovenia. Since the beginning of the 1980s, tension between the military leadership and that of Slovenia had been growing due to Slovene opposition to the Yugoslav People’s Army’s appetite for funds from the budget and unscrupulous weapons trading, with sales to military dictatorships and Third World countries caught up in wars. Young people in Slovenia – supported by the ZSMS – were particularly active in campaigning for the abolition of the federal army’s special status, and for it to be placed under political control. They criticised the political and ideological rigidity of the military regime, and campaigned for community service as an alternative to military service. But the military leadership was not prepared for any kind of dialogue and would not tolerate any criticism. Through its own media and the Serbian media, and before the highest state and party organs, it accused the Slovene leadership of supporting “anti-military sentiment.” It declared any critical opinion against the army as a form of “special war,” which threatened the unity of the country and was undermining its social order.

In the spring of 1988, the conflict reached a critical point. On 25 March, the military council (the advisory body of the federal defence ministry), in agreement with the federal Council for the Protection of the Constitution and a special group from the state and federal Communist presidency, found that the attacks on the army coming from Slovenia, threaten the “sovereignty” and the “constitutional order of Yugoslavia.” It called upon the Slovene leadership to put the situation in Slovenia “in order”, and threatened to arrest Slovene critics of the army. The direct cause of these accusations and threats had been articles in the Ljubljana daily Delo and the weekly Mladina, which had attacked defence minister Branko Mamula for his visit to Ethiopia, and for Yugoslav arms sales to this African country, ravaged by civil war and starvation.

The Slovene leadership was shocked by the criticism coming from the military leadership and rejected it. The ZKS president, Milan Kučan, rebutted the military claims about a ‘counter-revolution’ in Slovenia, and at the same time reproached the army
commanders for having far exceeded their authority by engaging in political commentary on the situation in Slovenia. The Yugoslav Communist leadership had agreed that the military pressure on Slovenia should remain a secret, but the Mladina journalists were able to obtain the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists at which the top military representatives had criticised Slovenia, and reported on it extensively. The Yugoslav army command – unaccustomed to public disputes – could no longer contain itself. It demanded that the Slovene leadership investigate how Mladina had managed to obtain on the confidential material and punish those responsible. To prove that the confidentiality agreement had not been broken, an investigation was set up in Ljubljana, and at the end of May, members of the Slovene national security service arrested two suspects – the Mladina columnist Janez Janša and the non-commissioned officer, Ivan Borštner, who had handed the Mladina journalists one of the secret documents. At the start of June, they also imprisoned Mladina journalist David Tasič.

The Slovene and military authorities were aware that the arrests would trigger public protests, but the protest movement that followed far surpassed their expectations. By campaigning for community service as an alternative to military service and by criticising the Yugoslav People’s Army, Janez Janša had achieved considerable popularity. The arrests and the anticipated trial before a military court created the impression that the military leadership was beginning to carry out its threats and lock up Slovene opponents, bypassing the Slovene authorities. At the beginning of June, in Ljubljana, a Committee for the Protection of Human Rights was set up, and this was supported in the following weeks by over 1,000 different organisations and over 100,000 individuals. The Committee for the Protection of Human Rights organised a number of protests, which were the first since 1945 to took place without government control. With the slogan “Freedom, Democracy, Legal Protection”, it mobilised mass participation from the Slovene population. The largest protest, at which between 15,000 and 20,000 people gathered, took place on 21 June in Ljubljana. The protest rallies became a genuinely popular movement in July, when the military authorities put Janša, Borštner, Tasič, and the editor of Mladina, Franci Zavrl, on trial before the military court in Ljubljana. The decision by the military authorities that the ‘trial of the four’ would take place in the “language of the Yugoslav People’s Army,” i.e. Serbo-Croat, and in camera, increased public anger. The demonstrations, which passed peacefully and without incident, were also attended by members of the Association of Second World War Combatants, and the Catholic Church held masses for those imprisoned. Despite the protests, the military court condemned the arrested to prison sentences of between one and a half to four years.
In the spring of 1989, the Supreme Court in Belgrade slightly reduced the sentences, and the Slovene leadership further mitigated the punishment of the three civilians, releasing them before their sentences had expired. Slovene leaders were well aware that the Trial of the Four was also a threat against them, and that by holding the trial in Ljubljana, the Yugoslav army was additionally weakening its already shaky authority. Consequently, although no attempt was made to prevent the trial from going ahead, protests were lodged with Belgrade because it was taking place in Serbo-Croat, and the Slovene leaders also made efforts to bring it to an end as soon as possible. The arrogance of the military leadership and the aggressive media campaign, which Serbian television and newspapers were running in support of the army and against the Slovene leadership, brought Slovene Communist politicians closer to the opposition for the first time. This is how, in the middle of 1988, a gulf between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia opened up – a gulf that could not be bridged.

APPROACHING INDEPENDENCE

In the second half of the 1980s, Yugoslavia found itself in a blind alley. The political and economic crisis was deepening; the state and federal Communist leaderships were overly concerned with the struggle for power. The Serbian Communists, led by Slobodan Milošević, had taken the initiative in this struggle and were combining Communist and nationalistic slogans. In 1988, they continued the process of consolidating and ‘uniting’ Serbia. In Belgrade, they initiated a process to revise the Serbian constitution and to abolish autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina. As the easier prospect, they first turned their attention to Vojvodina, making a first attempt in July to topple the Vojvodina leadership, which resisted the abolition of autonomy. The failure of this first attempt led the Serbian leadership to organise a ‘protest meeting’ in Novi Sad in October which was attended by over 100,000 participants from all over Serbia. The Vojvodina leaders stepped down and surrendered the city to Milošević’s followers.

Vojvodina was followed by Montenegro, which Milošević’s followers ‘conquered’ in January 1989 – again at the second attempt. The Kosovar Albanians resisted the longest. However, in February 1989, Serbia adopted a new constitution, which did away with most of the autonomous powers of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The Serbian leadership then forced the local and federal party leaderships to declare a state of emergency in Kosovo, where 1,300 miners were demanding the preservation of regional autonomy by going on hunger strike. The army and the federal police violently suppressed the Albanian protests and at the end of
March, surrounded by tanks and policemen and heavily armed soldiers, the Kosovo regional assembly finally approved the constitutional changes.

Milošević’s swift rise to power and the rapid ‘unification of Serbia’ would not have succeeded without the support of the state and federal party leadership and the army. When the state, party and army leaderships in Belgrade realised that the Serbian ‘meetings’ were also threatening their influence and authority, Serbia was already united, and Milošević was its undisputed leader. However, while giving way to Milošević and Serbia, the Yugoslav leadership remained uncompromising in its relationship with Slovenia, and in autumn – after the military ‘Trial of the Four’ – it even increased the pressure on its leaders. Slovene politicians, who only ever received support from Croatian representatives in the highest Yugoslav bodies, and even that was cautious and intermittent, rejected the criticisms and threats, and at the same time – convinced that all the possibilities for negotiation had not yet been exhausted – made new compromises. This was met with indignation from the opposition, which accused the Slovene leadership of continuing its policy of “bargaining and capitulation,” and also heightened discord between Slovene leaders, who were increasingly divided not only over the question about how to behave in Belgrade, but also about how far to give way to public criticism and opposition groups back home.

In the second half of 1988, opposition groups in Slovenia began to organise and move towards forming a collective front. As it was not yet legally possible to form a party, the new associations were initially set up within the framework of the Socialist Alliance. The first was set up in May 1988, as a professional association – the Slovene Farmers’ Union (Kmečka zveza). From early 1989 onwards, they were followed by the Slovene Democratic Alliance, the Social Democratic Alliance of Slovenia, the Slovene Christian and Social Movement, the Greens and other associations. The political pluralisation of Slovenia divided the Slovene political elite, which for the most part was not yet able to accept the fact that one-party communist rule was coming to an end. But the relentless pressure from Belgrade left Slovene leaders with little choice. Towards the end of 1989, they began to realise that the communist regime was nearing its end elsewhere in Europe and in the Soviet Union, and that it was necessary to begin thinking about alternative scenarios for the future. The leadership of the ZKS (Slovene League of Communists), which had for some time been announcing its “step down from power,” had to accept political plurality under such circumstances and gave the go-ahead for the creation of political associations, under the condition that they were not organised as independent political parties.

The Slovene authorities, the newly formed associations and other opposition groups
appeared together in public for the first time at the end of February 1989, when protests were organised in Ljubljana in support of the striking miners in Kosovo. Until then, the Slovene leadership had not openly supported the Albanians, although it had expressed disagreement with Serbian politics and was therefore labelled Serbia’s second greatest enemy – after the Albanians – by the Serbian media and Serbian politicians. The rally was addressed by the president of the ZKS, Milan Kučan, and the president of the Socialist Alliance, Jože Smole, as well as by representatives of the opposition associations. However, most of the speakers limited themselves to expressing solidarity with those on strike in Kosovo, emphasising the social and humanitarian aspects of the conflict in Kosovo, and condemning the violence and threats to call a state of emergency. All the same, Belgrade reacted to the protests in Cankarjev Dom with more hostility and more aggressively than ever before. The very next day, the Serbian authorities organised an enormous rally in Belgrade at which they demanded the declaration of a state of emergency in Kosovo, and accused the Slovenes of destroying Yugoslavia together with the Albanians. The Slovene political scene was also condemned by Yugoslavia’s Communist leadership. The situation was not aided by the fact that Slovene representatives in the Federal Assembly loyalty voted for the introduction of a state of emergency in Kosovo. During the following days in Serbia, there were calls for a boycott of Slovene products and restrictions on economic links with Slovenia, while at the same time direct political relations with Ljubljana were ‘frozen’.

For a short time in the spring of 1989, it seemed that the threats and pressure from Belgrade would bring the Slovene government and opposition closer together. But the differences in their hopes and expectations were too great. While the Slovene leadership stuck to demands for “political pluralism without parties;” the main opposition groups and the ZSMS, which had been liberating itself politically for some time, were heading towards the creation of independent political parties and a multi-party system as part of a natural progression. And, just as their views differed regarding the political system, the authorities and opposition had different views on Slovenia and Yugoslavia’s future. Slovenia’s political elite and a considerable section of Slovenia’s intelligentsia still could not imagine Slovenia outside Yugoslavia and proposed its transformation into an ‘asymmetric federation’, which would allow individual federal units to make their own decisions about the domestic legal and political order. In contrast, most of the opposition believed that Slovenia should become a sovereign state as soon as possible and only then decide on any connections “with south Slav and other nations within the context of a renewed Europe.” The government and the opposition could not agree on a common programme to shape the future direction of Slovene
policy. Most of the opposition groups therefore united in support for the May Declaration, which summarised their main demands: a sovereign state for the “Slovene nation,” with decisions on future alliances with other nations to be made later, and democracy founded on political pluralism, and respect for human rights and liberties. One month later, the Socialist Alliance adopted a much vaguer Fundamental Charter (Temeljna listina), which similarly referred to “human rights,” “Slovene sovereignty” and “national self-determination,” but at the same time demanded the preservation of Yugoslavia and its transformation into a “genuine” federal and democratic community.

For the Slovene leadership, one of the last opportunities to bring about deeper changes in Yugoslavia was the new federal government, which was led from March 1989 onwards by the Croatian economist and politician Ante Marković. He prepared an ambitious programme of economic measures, which the new government hoped would quell inflation (already over 1,000% per year), strengthen the external liquidity of the country and its foreign currency reserves, while ensuring the functioning of the market and law and order. However, the new federal prime minister underestimated the differences between the Yugoslav political and national entities. Government measures, which limited the amount of money in circulation as well as investments and exports to the eastern European and Soviet markets, all caused general dissatisfaction in the east and south of the country. The moves to increase the powers of the federal bodies in Belgrade and that of the National Bank of Yugoslavia were met with opposition and criticism in Slovenia and Croatia. It was only a year after coming to power that the federal government was able to boast its first visible successes, though the political situation in the country continued to deteriorate. In the second half of the 1980s, the standard of living in Yugoslavia fell to that of the 1960s. The Slovene government had little possibility of leading a more independent economic policy in such circumstances and within the rigid Yugoslav economic system. All it could do was to attempt to prevent the uncontrolled flow of western currency to Belgrade and abroad, while ensuring the undisturbed supply of basic consumer goods and raw materials in Slovenia.

Within the limits of the economic system, the government tried to direct as many Slovene exports as possible towards the West. During the last decade of Yugoslavia’s existence, Slovenia (accounting for only 8.3% of the population of Yugoslavia) generated 16.5% of Yugoslavia’s total gross domestic product and 20% of its total exports. However, the Slovene economy, especially the large industrial plants and the foodstuffs, textiles and pharmaceutical industries, were still very strongly tied to the rest of Yugoslavia. It is therefore understandable that there were no Slovene economists voicing support for Slovenia leaving
Yugoslavia. However, many critics of the Yugoslav economy demanded greater Slovene economic autonomy, the application of market conditions, and permission for companies and republics to form direct ties between themselves and abroad – without the need for mediation by Belgrade and the federation. Towards the end of the 1980s, Slovenia indeed became more open to foreign capital and especially to bilateral economic co-operation with its neighbours.

In May 1989, Janez Drnovšek became the president of the rotating federal presidency, though this did little to strengthen Slovenia’s hand in Belgrade. Drnovšek, who had been in the diplomatic service for some time, and then a delegate to the Federal Assembly, was elected as the Slovene member of the rotating federal presidency by virtue of his complete political anonymity, and in opposition to the candidate put forward by the ZKS leadership. His appointment coincided with Slovenia’s turn to hold the rotating presidency. He began his mandate in conciliatory style, supporting moves to placate the conflicting sides, respect for rules when implementing the state of emergency in Kosovo, and working to bring about its end as soon as possible. However, he did not succeed in curbing Serbian violence, and on 28 June 1989 attended the large Serbian celebrations to mark the 600th anniversary of the Serbian battle in Kosovo, making no visible protest.

In the summer of 1989, the Slovene leadership started to implement the concept of an ‘asymmetric federation’ on its own. A special constitutional commission in Ljubljana prepared amendments to the Slovene constitution that fundamentally changed Slovenia’s relationship with Yugoslavia, emphasising the rights to “self-determination” and “separation.” These also specified that a state of emergency could only be declared in the Slovene republic with the consent of the republic’s assembly. Slovenia’s financial commitments to Belgrade were redefined and the republic’s bodies and delegates would decide for themselves which federal laws (especially those concerning the economy) should apply in Slovenia. The proposed constitutional amendments also dealt with questions of human rights, political liberties and the use of the Slovene language, and declared the France Prešeren poem Zdravljica (A Toast) as Slovenia’s national anthem, set to music by Stanko Premrl.

The amended Slovene constitution also no longer contained provisions on a leading role for the League of Communists. This opened the way for the transformation of opposition political groups into proper political parties. The proposed amendments to the Slovene Constitution triggered vehement criticism and protests in Serbia and among the Yugoslav leadership, as well as dividing the Slovene Communists. Yielding to opposition groups and “relinquishing power too quickly” was particularly opposed by some members of the older Communist generation. However, the Slovene leadership, which had been joined in 1988 by
Janez Stanovnik as president of the republic presidency, did not cede to protests by Communist stalwarts or to the demands by federal political bodies to postpone voting on the amendments. On 27 September 1989, the amendments to the constitution were solemnly adopted by Slovenia’s assembly – to the accompaniment of the new Slovene national anthem. The session was also attended by Janez Drnovšek as president of the federal presidency, who thereby publicly expressed his solidarity with the Slovene political movement.

A wave of anti-Slovene demonstrations swept Serbia and Montenegro in the days following the adoption of the Slovene Constitution. The demonstrators called for the arrest of Slovene leaders, demanded weapons and proclaimed the changes to the Slovene Constitution as ‘treason’. Objections from Ljubljana reminding the Serbian leadership that it too had acted “asymmetrically” by unilaterally altering the Serbian constitution, were simply overlooked in Belgrade. In the middle of November – a few days after the Berlin Wall came down – an association of Serbs in Kosovo announced that on 1 December 1989 (on the anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), they would organise a large “meeting of truth” in Ljubljana at which 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins would set the record straight about Kosovo and Yugoslavia for Slovenes. The gathering, supported by the federal presidency, was resisted by Ljubljana in every possible way. The Slovene Ministry of the Interior prohibited the rally and the Slovene position received support from Croatia, which did not allow participants in the ‘march on Slovenia’ to travel across its territory.

In Belgrade, the prohibition of the gathering in Ljubljana was declared as conclusive proof that “Slovenia [was] under the rule of tyranny.” The leadership accused the Slovene authorities of severing the traditionally friendly ties with the ‘Serbian people’, and called on economic and political organisations to boycott (this time for real) Slovene products and cut economic and cultural ties with the westernmost Yugoslav republic. In the following days, cooperation between Slovene and Serbian companies was cancelled en masse, which not only damaged both republics but also struck a blow against the federal government, which had proclaimed a “free and united Yugoslav market” as the cornerstone of its programme. But Ante Marković and his government were not overly worried about the severing of economic relations between Slovenia and Serbia. In December, the president of the Federal Executive Council optimistically presented an anti-inflation plan, which the federal government had prepared according to the advice of the US economist, Jeffrey Sachs. In the first half of 1990, the Federal Executive Council – the federal government – did succeed in lowering inflation with a combination of restrictive and liberal measures, and with a solid rate for the dinar. However, it did not succeed in stopping the country and its economic and political system
from disintegrating. At the end of January 1990, the political system lost its second pillar following Tito’s death. On 20 January, the 14th Congress of Yugoslav Communists took place in Belgrade. Serbian and federal politicians, as well as army representatives, again attempted to “discipline” their Slovene “comrades.” But the Slovene representatives walked out of the congress after their proposals for a confederation and the democratisation of the state had been voted down, and the 14th and last Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia came to a premature end; the League of Yugoslav Communists never met collectively again.

The fact that end of the League of Yugoslav Communists did not cause a major political shock illustrates how weak the authority of the federal Communist organisation had become. But the gulf between the Serb-Montenegrin bloc, in which the Communists retained their power and influence, and the west of the country, where they were losing it very fast, continued to grow. In January 1990, the first multi-party elections following the Second World War were held in Slovenia, on the basis of the new legislature governing elections which had been adopted by the republic’s assembly. The Slovene Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Alliance of Slovenia and the Christian Democrats had already joined to form the coalition known as the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratična Opozicija Slovenije – Demos) in November 1989. The coalition was later also joined by the Farmers’ Union, the trades-based Liberal Party and the Greens. The Socialist Alliance and the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (ZSMS), which also attracted a large membership from civil movements, transformed themselves into independent parties. In February 1990, at its final congress, the ZKS also shed its skin and formed the Party of Democratic Reform (Stranka demokratične prenove). The main theme of the pre-election struggle was the question of Slovenia’s relationship with Yugoslavia. The opposition parties and the Communists had already come very close in their search for an answer. They spoke about a “confederation” through which Yugoslavia would become a “community of independent countries,” and opinion polls showed that a majority of the population was in favour.

Conditions during the election build-up were very unequal for the different parties, as the former Communists as well as the Socialists, and the candidates of the former ZSMS enjoyed considerable advantages. Nevertheless, the Demos coalition won the parliamentary elections in April 1990, taking 126 seats out of a total of 240. The Party of Democratic Reform (the former Communists) received the most votes. Of the Demos parties, the Christian Democrats polled highest (13.3%), and their leader, Lojze Peterle, was chosen as head of the first non-communist Slovene government since 1920, when the Slovene Provincial Government had been abolished. The presidential election and election of the
members of the republic presidency were organised separately. In the second round, the majority of the vote (58.6%) was won by the former ZKS president, Milan Kučan. His opponent was the president of Demos, Jože Pučnik. Demos was a mixed group with some taking the pragmatic view that Slovenia had no choice but to leave Yugoslavia, while others held more conservative opinions; their reappearance on the Slovene political scene also represented the return of old ideological divisions. This made relations within the coalition difficult from the very start, causing tensions between its partners, who were forced by the crisis to seek consensus.

In the spring of 1990, multi-party elections were also held for the first time in Croatia. Around forty different parties were created in the time leading up to the elections, but the elections were won by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Its core consisted of those who at the beginning of the 1970s had been victims of Communist purges and the anti-liberal policies of the Yugoslav leadership. Among them were former Partisans such as Franjo Tudjman, who assumed power with great self-confidence and a broad streak of pragmatism. He assured the Serbs in Croatia that the new Croatian government would respect their rights while he worked towards Yugoslavia’s transformation into a confederation. However, the Serbian and military leaderships still stubbornly rejected any such idea and declared the multi-party elections in the two western-most republics unconstitutional and illegitimate. Borisav Jović, a close collaborator of Milošević, who became the new president of the federal state presidency on 16 May 1990, demanded that “extreme measures” be taken in the country as soon as he took office. The leadership of the Yugoslav People’s Army, which had been hit particularly hard by the disintegration of the Yugoslav League of Communists, was considering intervening in both disobedient republics by force, and had already stepped into action. Without waiting for a decision by the federal assembly or the appropriate body, it issued a confidential order for the seizure of weapons held by the Territorial Defence (Teritorialna Obramba – TO) and their secret transferral from municipal to army depots. The disarming of the TO was very successful in Croatia and non-Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in many Slovene municipalities there was resistance to giving up the weapons, and the Slovene leadership managed to keep about 30% of weapons in Slovene hands.

Despite pressure from Belgrade and increasingly difficult relations between Serbs and Croats, the formation of new Slovene authorities continued undisturbed. In May 1990, the newly elected Slovene assembly sat for the first time. It elected a government led by Lojze Peterle, which included members of the Demos parties and some non-party ministers,
including some who had been active members of the former ZKS. The contradictory nature of the situation was reflected in the fact that the new ministers still swore the old delegate oath, which made reference to respect for the socialist order. Most of them had no experience as ministers, and their subordinates in the ministries were often quite opposed to them – at least initially. This led to problems that became the subject of critical comment in newspapers, and on radio and television. The media did not particularly support the new government, and reported on political changes in Slovenia with considerable mistrust.

However, Peterle’s government quickly found its footing and there were no major hiccups in the operations of the ministries and the administration in Slovenia. Peterle’s government continued talks with Belgrade and by autumn 1990, when it became clear that the reforming efforts of Ante Marković’s federal government had run aground, it largely supported his economic policy. Nevertheless, the new Slovene government continued to prepare for Slovenia’s independence. The attempt to disarm the TO was a clear sign that negotiations were not part of the plans of the Yugoslav military and Serbian leaderships. The Slovene Ministry of Defence therefore began, in agreement with the highest bodies of the republic leadership, secretly forming its own armed units (it was simply not possible to do this legally), which would protect Slovenia against forceful intervention by the Yugoslav People’s Army. Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior did all it could to ensure the Slovene Police could work more independently, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked to establish Slovenia’s diplomatic presence abroad.

In the summer and autumn of 1990, the Slovene republic assembly in Ljubljana adopted a series of statements and resolutions regarding independence. On 2 July, it declared that the “political, economical and legal system” in Slovenia was founded on the republic’s constitution and laws alone, and federal laws and regulations were only valid if they did not contradict those of the republic. In a special declaration, it also pledged that within a year it would adopt a new constitution for the republic, and decided that Slovene delegates would no longer participate in the work of the Federal Chamber within the Federal Assembly in Belgrade. Less than a week later, a service was held at the place in the forests of Kočevski Rog (southeast Slovenia) where the bodies of opponents of the Partisans and Communists who had been murdered after the Second World War lay buried. The ceremony was intended to embody ‘national reconciliation’ and show respect for all victims of the Second World War, as well as post-war Communist atrocities. What had seemed completely impossible only six years earlier when Spomenka Hribar first proposed a memorial commemorating all victims of the wartime conflicts and the Communist regime, became possible in the new circumstances.
President Kučan and Alojzij Šuštar, the Archbishop of Ljubljana, shook hands and called all Slovenes to reconciliation. Of course, this was of mainly symbolic significance, but for the new Demos government it was an act that morally condemned post-war Communist crimes and illustrated its commitment to national reconciliation.

In Yugoslavia as a whole, however, a return to peace was becoming increasingly unlikely. Serbia took direct control over Kosovo in mid-May, and at the end of June it dissolved the regional assembly in Priština. In August 1990, the first clashes between the Croatian authorities and Serbs in Croatia occurred. It was clear that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians would be followed by a conflict between Serbs and Croats, and that Croatia was becoming a new crisis hotspot. Nevertheless, in early October, Slovenia and Croatia now jointly proposed that Yugoslavia become a confederation, modelled on the European Community. The proposal was again resolutely rejected in Serbia where the leadership stuck to its own proposal for a ‘modern federation’ with a strong central government. The Yugoslav People’s Army caused new, extreme tensions between Ljubljana and Belgrade by ordering its units to occupy the premises of the TO leadership in Ljubljana. It seemed for a moment as if there would be an armed clash between the Slovene TO and the Yugoslav army. This further increased the uncertainty caused by the chaotic political and economical situation. Marković’s economic programme had already failed, the foreign exchange market had stopped operating, launching a wave of foreign currency withdrawals from personal savings accounts.

In the deteriorating situation, the Slovene parties decided they would carry out a plebiscite on Slovene independence. In the second half of November, the assembly adopted the rules for the plebiscite, to be held on 23 December. Voters were able to state whether or not they wanted Slovenia to become an independent country. Over 93% of those entitled to vote took part in the plebiscite, and 88% of these voted in favour of Slovene independence. However, the result of the plebiscite did not only arouse enthusiasm, but also increased the level of anxiety and uncertainty. The authorities in Ljubljana were legally bound to implement the result of the plebiscite within six months, but there was no breakthrough in talks between Slovenia and the Yugoslav, Serbian and federal military leaderships. The changed circumstances in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where multi-party elections saw non-Communist, national parties winning votes, affected Serbian leaders, and at the beginning of 1991 they at last agreed to direct discussions between the leaders of the individual republics. The first talks took place in January in Belgrade, and were followed by further discussions, but no real progress was made.

While the negotiations were getting nowhere, the Yugoslav state continued to unravel
and seemingly nothing could be done to stop it. Milošević’s Communists, who adopted the name the Socialist Party of Serbia, achieved a convincing victory in the Serbian elections in December. This encouraged them to strike another fatal blow against the federal prime minister Ante Marković and the Yugoslav financial system. After a secret decision by the Serbian assembly, reached without the knowledge of the federal authorities, the Serbian National Bank in January 1991 issued securities and banknotes worth over 18 billion dinars (around 2 billion German marks and over half the annual state primary issues), with which it purchased foreign currency, paid wages and pensions, and subsidised struggling Serbian companies. The Serbian ‘raid’ on the Yugoslav monetary system clearly demonstrated the federal government’s lack of authority. The Slovene and Croatian leaderships severely criticised the federal bodies and decided not to recognise new commitments to the federation and the new debts abroad. Ljubljana announced the introduction of a Slovene currency, for which preparations began in autumn 1990, and stated that Slovenia would stop sending foreign reserve assets, basic sales tax and collected customs duties to Belgrade, and would only contribute participation fees to the federal budget. The dispute over Slovenia’s payments to the federal treasury and collecting customs duties only further deepened the differences between the Slovene and federal governments. In May 1991, the federal government threatened for the first time to enforce the collection of customs duties throughout the federation by force – even with the help of the police and the army if all other means failed.

The federal presidency, which (at least formally) commanded the Yugoslav People’s Army, had little more authority than the federal government, and it too was irreconcilably split. Until May 1991, the presidency was led by the Serbian representative, Borisav Jović, who continually upped the pressure on the two ‘disobedient’ western republics. The federal presidency ordered the Yugoslav People’s Army to disarm the special units of the Croatian police, which had been formed in Croatia after the army had seized the TO weapons, a decision that brought Croatia to the brink of an armed clash with the Yugoslav army. Resistance among Serbs from Krajina, who opposed Croatian moves towards independence, was also growing rapidly. Following clashes between the Krajina Serbs and Croatian militias, which claimed the first casualties, peace was restored by the army after a decision by the state presidency. The Yugoslav military leadership, in collaboration with Serbian leaders, entertained the idea of declaring a “state of emergency” and carrying out a military coup, and even looked for support for such measures amongst opponents of Gorbachev and perestroika in Moscow. The close link between the Serbian and federal military leaderships was revealed when the Serbian authorities sent federal troops in to quash the first mass demonstrations in
Belgrade by the Serbian opposition, in March 1991.

In February of that year, the Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović and Macedonian leaders declared that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia would not remain within Yugoslavia if Slovenia and Croatia left. However, there was little co-operation between the four republics as their domestic situations, as well as the views of their leaders regarding a possible solution to the Yugoslav drama, were too different. Zagreb and Ljubljana were a little closer to each other. Both capitals adopted a number of common declarations and even prepared common defence plans in the event that the Yugoslav People’s Army intervened in one (or both) of the republics. But at the same time, it was clear right from the beginning that due to the tense relations between Zagreb and the Croatian Serbs, it would be more difficult for Croatia to split from Yugoslavia than it would be for Slovenia. Croatia’s President Tudjman decided in March 1991 that he would have one-on-one talks with Milošević. The two leaders met in Karadjordjevo in Vojvodina, and agreed (as Tudjman naively believed), that Serbia would not support the wishes of Croatian Serbs to split away, and that if Yugoslavia should fall apart, then Croatia and Serbia would divide Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the meeting was secret and its content only approximately known, Tudjman’s talks with Milošević further convinced Slovene leaders that Slovenia had to attain independence on its own and must also achieve international recognition as a fully independent country.

The looming political change was so radical that many people in Slovenia still wavered, hoping that a miraculous resolution might arrive. Most Slovene political leaders agreed that the breakup was inevitable after so many failed attempts to reach agreement, but the former Communists, some members of the civil movements, many writers and artists, and even some members of the republic presidency continued to warn of the dangers of hastening or exacerbating the situation. Demos too was aware of the many problems which Slovenia would have to face if it unilaterally declared independence, but saw practically no alternative. The army leadership, which was not prepared to accept either the fall of communism or the breakup of the country, openly threatened military intervention, while the federal bodies, including Marković’s government and the state presidency, were completely unable to function due to the lack of agreement between the republics. In Ljubljana, it was clear that Slovenia’s declaration of independence would meet with stern opposition not only in Belgrade but also abroad. The leadership therefore started a major diplomatic campaign to gain support from the most important European countries and the US. Most disagreements in the government coalition arose from financial and economical matters, because some of the Demos politicians opposed the policy of gradual change in the economy as supported by the
deputy prime minister, Jože Mencinger. They supported dealing more radically with Communist and Communist-appointed enterprise directors, as well as ideas for reform put forward by the US economist, Jeffrey Sachs, who had advised Marković’s government. Disagreement over denationalisation and privatisation pushed other economic matters to the sidelines and this meant that Slovenia’s economic preparations for independence lagged behind the political ones.

In May 1991, Ljubljana informed the federal assembly in Belgrade that Slovenia would declare independence by 26 June at the latest. The message again outlined the reasons for Slovenia’s departure from Yugoslavia and called for talks over unresolved questions regarding the transfer of power, legal succession and future forms of Slovene co-operation with the Yugoslav republics. A referendum on independence was also held in Croatia on 19 May, with 94% of the electorate (the Serbs boycotted the voting) voting for independence from Yugoslavia. Zagreb announced that Croatia would declare independence together with Slovenia at the end of June. It was only at this point that the federal government, headed by Marković, reacted more vigorously. It seems that right until the end they did not believe that the Slovene (and Croatian) threats of independence were serious. In early June, Marković tried once more to convince Slovene representatives that Slovenia should postpone its planned declaration of independence and continue to participate in talks on a new formation for the Yugoslav state. When the Slovene delegation rejected Marković’s proposal, the federal prime minister himself travelled to Ljubljana to speak to the Slovene assembly. He warned the Slovene assembly delegates and politicians of the consequences of “unilaterally” declaring independence and warned that the federal government would use all means at its disposal to resist changes to the internal and external borders.

Yet, the Slovene leadership persisted with its decision on independence and pointed out that even after Slovenia had gained independence, it would still be able to discuss its obligations to Yugoslavia and any future alliances with other Yugoslav republics. The point of no return had been passed.

INDEPENDENCE ACHIEVED

Though in the spring of 1991 it seemed that at least some of the Serbian leaders, headed by Milošević, were prepared to accept Slovenia’s departure from Yugoslavia, in May and June the Yugoslav army and the federal government had both resolutely rejected the possibility. Despite supporting Serbian policy, the generals in Belgrade defended the integrity
of Yugoslavia because they were to varying degrees aware that Slovenia’s departure would herald the beginning of the end for the Yugoslav state. Against this backdrop, Serbian leaders ensured tensions were heightened further in mid-May – when Croatia was due to appoint the president of the rotating presidency – by rejecting the Croatian candidate, Stipe Mesić. At the most critical moment, Yugoslavia was left without its most senior state leader, and the Yugoslav People’s Army without a civilian commander. This was a matter of serious concern for the countries of Western Europe and the US which stepped up pressure on Belgrade and the leaders of the quarrelling Yugoslav republics to reach an agreement. The US Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Belgrade on 21 June to meet the Yugoslav leadership and the presidents of all the republics. He repeated the American line that the federation must be kept alive until a new agreement was reached between the republics. The Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman, was hesitant, as he was not yet prepared to risk military conflict with the Yugoslav army, and believed that Croatia was not yet ready to leave Yugoslavia. The Croatian leadership nevertheless insisted that Croatia would leave Yugoslavia together with Slovenia. The leaders of both republics agreed that they would declare independence – as planned – on 26 June, but secretly agreed that the assemblies in Ljubljana and Zagreb would actually do this one day earlier – on 25 June – in case Belgrade attempted to obstruct independence.

On the evening of 25 June, the delegates of the Slovene assembly adopted the Basic Constitutional Charter on the Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia (Temeljna Listina) and the Constitutional Law governing its implementation. The Charter declared Slovenia an independent country and the Constitutional Law transferred powers previously held by the federation to the organs of the republic, which also assumed control of Slovene territory, Slovene air space and the national borders. “Our aim is not to create a closed national state,” said Milan Kučan, the president of the Slovene presidency, in his celebratory speech to the assembly; “for us, independence is a means to move forward on an equal footing with other nation states and peoples…” At the mass rally held on the evening of 26 June in the square in front of the Slovene parliament building in Ljubljana, the old flag of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was symbolically lowered and the tricolour with the new Slovene coat-of-arms, which the assembly had confirmed two days earlier, was raised.

Belgrade reacted to the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence with ultimatums. At Marković’s behest, the federal government had already labelled the independence of both republics “anti-constitutional” and “illegitimate” on the night of 25 June, and received the support of the Federal Assembly. Marković, who was determined to ‘discipline’ Slovenia before any other republics followed its example, decided to take action
on his own – without the state presidency, which had no president and was not functioning, despite the presidency being the only body with the authority to command the Yugoslav People’s Army. The federal government authorised the federal Ministry of Defence to secure the country’s external and internal borders, and the generals did not hesitate. On 26 June, federal military units shut down Slovene air space and federal tank regiments moved towards the border crossings with Italy and Austria. At the same time, military commanders in Belgrade were planning a broader campaign. Having taken control of the borders, the army was to turn towards Ljubljana, remove Slovenia’s political leaders and the most vocal proponents of Slovene independence, and set up a new leadership in the Slovene capital that would be prepared to co-operate with Belgrade.

The Yugoslav People’s Army command and the federal government were convinced that the army would fulfil its tasks without difficulty, which illustrates how poorly informed they were of the situation in Slovenia. Yugoslav army divisions did succeed in taking control of most of the border crossings with Austria and Italy during the first two days, but when the Slovene national protection units, the Territorial Defence (TO) and the Police began resisting them, the poorly planned campaign by the Yugoslav army collapsed. The soldiers, who had been told that they must protect the border against the Austrians and the Italians, were completely unprepared for an encounter with Slovene armed forces and the Slovene people. In some places they tried to fight, in other places they refused, and there were a number of instances in which Slovenes tragically found themselves on both sides of the battle line – in both Yugoslav and Slovene uniforms.

The armed conflict lasted almost ten days. The Slovene leadership was relatively well informed of the plans of the Yugoslav military command, so the well-organised resistance surprised and divided the political leaders in Belgrade and they were no longer able to agree on further strategies. It suited the ‘hawks’ among the generals and in the Yugoslav state leadership that Croatia and President Tudjman did not actively support the Slovene resistance against the Yugoslav army intervention, but they did not expect a protracted war with Slovenia and were unprepared. Slovene leaders succeeded in attracting international attention by means of a diplomatic and media campaign. A three-member mission of the European Community intervened in the conflict as early as 28 June. Senior Slovene representatives and the head of the Yugoslav government, Ante Marković, agreed at a meeting with European envoys in Zagreb to postpone further moves towards independence by Slovenia, and to call a ceasefire, but the conflict went on. The Yugoslav military leadership even sent an ultimatum to the Slovene leadership on 30 June, in which it demanded the immediate suspension of
defence activities. On the same day, Ante Marković and his delegation came to Ljubljana, but it was clear that he no longer had any influence over the commanding generals. The authority of the newly elected Croatian president of the federal presidency, Stipe Mesić, was even weaker. Under pressure from the European diplomatic trio, he finally assumed his duties on 1 July. The conflict in Slovenia continued into the first days of July. A gradual end to the hostilities was only achieved once the Slovene leadership – following consultations with the German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and negotiations with Mesić – unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 4 July.

The views of the Slovene leaders about how radically they should lead the military operations and how much to concede to negotiators in Belgrade and Brussels differed, but all agreed that the Slovene decision on independence was final, and stood united during negotiations with the envoys from the Yugoslav government and presidency. The Yugoslav leadership had no such unity. The army commanders, in particular, saw the defeats and the disintegration of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Slovenia as an unprecedented humiliation, which left them no room for compromise. The federal army units were made up of various nationalities and they rapidly fell apart during the battles with the Slovene TO and Police. An increasing number of them surrendered to the Slovene armed forces. The military leadership therefore at first rejected appeals for a ceasefire and Yugoslav army units only began retreating to the barracks after the Slovenes unilaterally declared a ceasefire. Slovene customs officials and police officers maintained control of the border crossings, which they were supposed to organise in accordance with federal rules until a final agreement could be reached between federal and Slovene bodies.

Yugoslav diplomats tried to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis, but despite its disapproval of Slovene and Croatian independence, the European Community was aware that the situation was extremely dangerous and continued its involvement. The use of military force was opposed particularly vehemently by the Austrian foreign minister, Alois Mock, and the German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and after pressure from the European Community, negotiations began at the Brioni islands on 7 July. Alongside the senior Slovene representatives and representatives of the Yugoslav government and the state presidency, the negotiations were attended by three European envoys, and representatives of Croatia and Serbia. The European trio was headed by the Dutch foreign minister, Hans van den Broek.

The European envoys came to the Brioni islands with a draft agreement for the parties in conflict to sign. Hans Van den Broek labelled the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence “unilateral” and was determined to keep Yugoslavia intact. He demanded that
The Yugoslav leadership ensure the army returned to barracks and respect the “constitutional order,” by which he meant above all restoring the function of the state presidency and recognising Mesić as its president. At the same time, he called on Slovene and Croatian politicians to postpone any implementation of independence resolutions for three months, during which more detailed talks about the future of Yugoslavia would take place. These were the main points of a statement agreed upon by those who attended the Brioni conference on 8 July. The statement mentioned the right of nations to self-determination, but obliged the two ‘rebel’ republics (Slovenia and Croatia), the Yugoslav leadership and the remainder of the former federation to sit down at the negotiation table and solve the contentious issues peacefully. Slovenia and Croatia agreed to postpone the implementation of the independence acts for three months, and during this period the state presidency – as well as the federal government – was to carry out its duties as defined in the constitution. The presidency was supposed to regain control over the Yugoslav People’s Army.

The Slovene politicians returned to Ljubljana worried. It was clear that Europe and the US remained firm in their disapproval of Slovene independence, and both Washington and Brussels still hoped to keep Yugoslavia intact (only Austria and Germany showing sympathy for the Slovene point of view). The Brioni agreement triggered criticisms in Slovenia, describing the settlement as tantamount to capitulation. But there were no other options and the Slovene assembly had little choice but to ratify the agreement. The views held by the Slovene leaders, who said the agreement was ‘flexible’ and left room for various interpretations which could also work in Slovenia’s favour, soon proved correct. The Serbian leaders and the military leadership had been talking since the beginning of July about the possibility of the Yugoslav People’s Army withdrawing from Slovenia. Such a unilateral retreat was, of course, opposed by Croatian representatives, with Stipe Mesić, leading the way. Belgrade was unwilling to consider their demand that Yugoslav soldiers should also leave Croatia if they left Slovenia. The conflict in Croatia was spreading rapidly and turning into all-out war. Yet, despite the determined opposition of President Mesić, the federal presidency decided that the Yugoslav army units would leave Slovene territory within three months.

The sudden decision to withdraw the army from Slovenia not only surprised the European diplomats, but also the federal prime minister, Ante Marković, who had been completely sidelined, together with the Yugoslav government. Slovene leaders were aware that on leaving Slovenia, the army would increase its pressure on Croatia, but Tudjman had shown himself to be an unreliable ally and Croatia was descending into a war whose end was
no longer in sight. Although the war in Slovenia had lasted less than ten days, there were 44 casualties on the Yugoslav army side, 19 on the Slovene side, and 10 foreigners in Slovenia at the time were also killed. There was also considerable damage caused in the areas where battles had taken place. This made both the population and the politicians even more convinced that all ties between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia had been severed for good and that various compromise solutions could no longer be considered.

However, the view of the Western countries on the Yugoslav crisis changed only slowly. Slovenia’s foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel, who visited many European capitals and the US as part of Slovenia’s active foreign relations campaign, warned that achieving international recognition for Slovenia’s independence would be a “lengthy process.” Slovenia also found itself in considerable economic difficulties. While there was no real problem with the supply of everyday necessities and food, exports and industrial production stagnated. The National Bank of Yugoslavia blocked Slovenia’s access to primary issues, foreign loans, foreign currency and dinars, constricting its money supply and making imports difficult. The tense situation meant relations within Slovenia’s ruling coalition again approached crisis; since the very beginning, the coalition had been racked by major ideological differences.

The uncertainty of the situation made it poor timing for a government crisis. Negotiations to solve the Yugoslav situation were supposed to start in early August, but the possibility of a peaceful agreement between the federation and the republics grew smaller and smaller by the day. The defeat of the coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (24 August) caused considerable disappointment among the Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav generals who were in touch with the opponents of perestroika in Moscow, but it had no great effect on their policy. The major international powers still would not accept the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, but they could no longer ignore the new realities in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In August 1991, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the twelve European Community states – despite protests from the federal government and the Serbian leadership, which rejected international intervention in the Yugoslav conflict – supported the idea of a peace conference for Yugoslavia. The council also accepted a French proposal to set up a commission to study the legal aspects of Yugoslavia and its republics following the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. This commission was led by the president of the French constitutional court, Robert Badinter.

The International Conference on Yugoslavia began on 7 September 1991 in The Hague and continued to meet until November. The European Community entrusted leadership of the conference to the former British foreign minister, Peter Carrington. The negotiations in The
Hague revealed that the federation and the republics had not come any closer to reaching an agreement since the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence. Serbia blamed both ‘secessionist’ republics for the crisis and insisted on Yugoslavia’s continuity. Croatia was ready to accept a loose confederation, but the increasingly bloody conflict at home made it threaten to leave the conference. The representatives of the federal government continued their vain appeals for the federation to reconstitute itself, while Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro supported the idea of some sort of federation of independent states. Slovene representatives rejected the idea of a “union of states,” but (under pressure from Europe) proposed the foundation of a mini-conference on “security and cooperation” and an economic association (along the lines of EFTA), which would be made up of independent states – the former Yugoslav republics. The European envoys also exerted pressure on Slovenia to extend the moratorium on independence which would expire on 7 October, but the Slovene side did not agree to this. Carrington presented his proposal for a solution to the crisis one day before the conference on 18 October. He acknowledged that the republics had a right to independence and sovereignty, with an international identity (if they so wished), but persisted with the idea of at least a loose federation, which would enable their economic, as well as to a certain extent their international and legal, co-operation.

Just over three months after the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence and the Brioni meeting, the European Community had fundamentally changed its stance. This development was partly the result of Slovene diplomacy, but even more of Serbian aggression, the war in Croatia and the increasing tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Milošević and Serbia were uncompromising in The Hague and resolutely rejected Carrington’s proposals, so the conference closed, on 5 November, without success, as Serbian forces fiercely attacked Vukovar and Dubrovnik. The European Community reacted to the failure to achieve peace by introducing sanctions, which affected all the former Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia. Although European diplomats in The Hague were predicting that they would recognise Slovenia and Croatia, the views of the EU-12 on the independence of the two former Yugoslav republics still varied considerably. Germany and Austria (and after the failure of the talks in The Hague also Italy) openly called for recognition. But Paris and London – like the US and the UN – believed even at the beginning of December that they should not rush to grant recognition (particularly to Croatia), because it would only deepen the crisis. On 7 December, the Badinter Commission completed its work and came to the conclusion that Yugoslavia was in the “process of dissolution.” This meant that even in legal terms, federal Yugoslavia no longer existed. The European Community, which was
preoccupied with a major summit in Maastricht, initially postponed its decision on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Later, it was agreed that EC members would together recognise Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992. Germany, however, recognised both countries on 19 December.

By this time, Slovenia had already experienced an independent existence for some time. The new Slovene currency, the tolar (SIT), was introduced in early October, marking Slovenia’s monetary independence. On 26 October, the last ferry carrying Yugoslav federal troops left Koper. Now the attention of the political parties, the old and new state institutions, and the public could increasingly focus on questions of domestic politics, economic problems and new legislation. On 20 November, the assembly delegates voted in a new law on denationalisation. This regulated the return of, or compensation for, farmland, forests, businesses and capital that had been nationalised under the Communist rule to former owners or their heirs. The provisions on returning nationalised property ‘in kind’, in particular, ensured that the deliberation and adoption of the law was accompanied by many clashes and heated debate. Just over a month later – on the anniversary of the 23 December plebiscite – the new Slovene Constitution was ceremonially adopted in Ljubljana, representing a clear break with the socialist past. The Constitution defined Slovenia as a modern, democratic, social state based on the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The constitutional act which governed its implementation determined that elections to the new two-chamber parliament must be carried out within a year at the latest.

This accelerated the transformation of the Slovene political scene and the creation of new party divisions. Ideological and personal differences, and above all different views on economic policy and privatisation, also caused increased the differences within the governing Demos coalition itself. Once EC ministers had decided in mid-December that they would recognise Slovenia, the main aim of the coalition had been reached and the Demos parties were incapable of creating a new common programme for the future development of Slovenia. By the end of December 1991 the impasse had led the leaders of all the Demos parties to decide to dissolve the forum.

At the start of 1992, the young state of Slovenia entered a new phase of development. By the end of 1991, it had been recognised by ten countries, but after 15 January 1992, following recognition by the EC member states, the number rapidly increased. Party political preparations for the elections and the battle for votes were already underway. Communism and the Yugoslav state, which was slipping further and further into a cruel and bloody war, were being consigned to Slovenia’s past. However, the optimistic view – that one story was
coming to an end, and another completely fresh story beginning – soon proved premature, as the legacy of the past proved greater than had initially seemed.

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO EU MEMBERSHIP

The disintegration of the Demos coalition weakened Lojze Peterle’s government, which fell at the end of April 1992. The new government coalition was led by the Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno Demokratska Stranka, later Liberalno Demokracija Slovenije – LDS), which had been founded in 1990 by the former leaders of the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (ZSMS) and the Young Communists; the party leader was the former president of the Yugoslav presidency, Janez Drnovšek. The rapid fall of Peterle’s government thwarted the plans of the Demos politicians. They had hoped after the adoption of the constitution in December 1991 that the first parliamentary elections in independent Slovenia could be held in spring 1992. The elections required new voting legislation as well as cross-party consensus on the voting system, but discussions on the voting system dragged on until autumn, when most assembly delegates supported a system of proportional representation. In the election held on 6 December 1992, 25 parties and 10 non-party lists competed for 90 seats in the new National Assembly. The LDS won the highest number of votes (23.5%), followed by the Christian Democrats (14.5%) and the United List (former Communists). The presidential elections took place at the same time, with Milan Kučan being returned to his post, having gained by far the largest vote (67%) among the eight candidates.

The election winners, the LDS, assembled a new coalition government headed by Janez Drnovšek. The coalition also included the Christian Democrats (Slovenski krščanski demokrati – SKD), the United List (Združena lista – ZL) and the Social Democrats (Socialdemokratska stranka Slovenije – SDSS, later SDS). The SDS only won 3.3% of the vote, but the party included some of the most prominent leaders of the Slovene independence movement (e.g. Jože Pučnik and Janez Janša). In 1994, however, a quarrel broke out between Janez Janša, who was Minister of Defence in the new coalition, and the LDS. Janša was deposed and the SDS joined the opposition. This increased the polarisation between the parties and the differences between the former Demos parties. With the strengthening of the LDS, the SDS and the revived Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka – SLS, successor to the Slovene Farmers’ Union of 1988), the political scene divided into two roughly equal blocs during the mid-1990s. The first bloc was dominated by parties stemming from political organisations that had operated under the Communism regime, while the other bloc comprised parties formed in the events leading up to Slovenia’s independence (calling
themselves the parties of the ‘Slovene Spring’). In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the first bloc (the LDS and the ZL) gained a little over 37% of the vote, while the ‘Slovene Spring’ bloc won more than 45% of the vote. Compared to the 1992 elections, the most successful parties were the SDS and the SLS, which both significantly increased their share of the vote. The SDS increased its share of the vote from 3.2% (1992) to 16.1% (1996) and the SLS progressed from 8.7% (1992) to 19.4% (1996). Nevertheless, the absolute winner of the elections was again the LDS, who were strengthened in 1994 by the inclusion of some of the former Democrats, Socialists and Greens. They gained 27% of the vote in the 1996 election, and Janez Drnovšek and the LDS were again able to form a government, this time in coalition with the SLS and the Democratic Party of Pensioners (Demokratična stranka upokojencev – DeSUS).

The rapid growth in support for the opposition parties, especially for the SLS and SDS, was partly the result of the democratisation of public life, and partly due to social, economic and political changes resulting from the new social and political order that followed Slovenia’s independence. By 1993, a law had already been passed broadening the extent of ‘local self-government’ and enabling the creation of new municipalities, but their number grew only slowly due to the considerable opposition to attempts to divide old municipalities. The introduction of local powers of self-government was also impeded by a rigid, centralist state. This caused dissatisfaction at the local level. In the first elections after the new Local Self-Government Act was adopted in 1994, independent and SLS candidates were the biggest winners. The SLS and SDS also successfully gained votes through debates that engaged the public on national issues. Since the early 1990s, the reappearance of the Catholic Church in public life had caused major divisions. After independence, the Church, which under the Communist regime had been pushed to the sidelines of society and politics, attempted to increase its influence in politics, the economy and education, as well as trying to regain the property taken from it in the nationalisations that had followed the Second World War. The Church’s aspirations were supported by the ‘Slovene Spring’ parties, which improved their standing in the eyes of the traditionally Catholic sections of society. Yet these demands divided public opinion because, after the long period of Communist secularism, even many Catholics thought that the Church should focus on its spiritual work and not involve itself in politics, business and education, which, according to the constitutional separation of church and state, should remain exclusively the domain of the state. Nevertheless, between 1991 and 1993 some Catholic secondary schools were re-opened and, in 1992, the Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana again became a full member faculty of the University of Ljubljana; and from
1994 onwards, it also had a department within the University of Maribor.

The state of the economy was one of the main causes of public concern, and deepened the divisions between the governing coalition and the opposition. Slovenia may have been the most technologically and economically developed of the Yugoslav republics at the time of Yugoslavia’s collapse, but in the early 1990s it encountered serious economic problems. The break-up of the Yugoslav federation and its market, combined with the opening up of the domestic market to foreign goods, saw demand for Slovene products fall, with many large industrial concerns going bankrupt. This led Slovenia’s gross domestic product to fall by more than a quarter in the early 1990s, while industrial production fell by more than half, and banks struggled to remain solvent. The LDS-led governing coalitions tried to solve the critical economic situation through monetary measures, by strengthening the national currency (the tolar), a moderately liberal economic policy and ensuring that the process of ownership and structural transformation took place gradually. In this way, the government managed to reduce inflation from over 200% in 1992 to 13.5% by the mid-1990s, while generating new economic momentum and halting the growth in unemployment. Over 100,000 people lost their jobs between 1989 and 1993 as a result of the economic crisis, with many more taking early retirement. This caused mass dissatisfaction and a wave of strikes that only calmed as the economy began to grow again in the latter half of the 1990s.

Denationalisation and privatisation had a major impact on economic and social transformation after the fall of Communism. The 1991 Denationalisation Act was met with significant opposition and dissatisfaction due to the provisions on the return ‘in kind’ of property confiscated by the Communism regime to the original owners or their descendants. The process was complex and lengthy because the tenants or users of denationalised apartments, buildings, land, business premises and forests were not prepared to simply relinquish rights they had gained under socialism. The public and the political parties were polarised in particular by the question of returning forests to the Catholic Church. The parties agreed relatively quickly, however, that Slovenia would not return forests to foreign nationals who had owned forests in Slovenia prior to 1945. Political negotiations over the form privatisation should take lasted longer, as even the leading economists proposed different models of privatising the formerly ‘socially owned’ property. At the end of 1992, the National Assembly finally adopted a law regulating the gradual ownership transformation of public enterprises (subsequently amended on several occasions), which stipulated that a number of state funds would retain a 30% ownership stake in the formerly ‘socially owned’ enterprises, a 20% stake would be divided into ownership certificates and distributed among Slovene
citizens who could use them to buy shares or invest in newly created investment companies, while 40% would be offered for an employee buy-out or sold publicly. The selected privatisation model encouraged the large-scale inclusion of employees in the privatisation process, made the ‘wild privatisation’ of enterprises more difficult, and ensured they could remain in Slovene hands. However, it accelerated the fragmentation of ownership and, by giving priority to employees and Slovene citizens, obstructed the inflow of foreign capital and investment. And although Slovenia was claimed to be one of the least corrupt former-Communist countries, the privatisation of its economy was nevertheless subject to considerable abuse, with some individuals amassing great fortunes illegally, and pressure applied to small shareholders to sell their shares, which increased the concentration of capital in the hands of a management-entrepreneurial elite, made up partly of former Communist directors and partly of newly emerging players.

The unpredictable behaviour of the Slovene People’s Party (SLS), which formed part of the government, while retaining close links with the opposition, burdened the government coalition assembled by Janez Drnovšek after the 1996 elections with serious internal disputes. Despite this, the government enjoyed broad public support, especially during the first two years of its mandate. The coalition’s popularity was due mainly to the favourable economic development. In the second half of the 1990s, the Slovene economy grew at over 4% per year, while the unemployment rate settled at 14%, and began to fall towards the end of the decade. With an effective policy of reducing inflation, the inflow of foreign investment also began to increase. The transformation from a socialist to a market economy was accompanied by a gradual reorientation from industry to services and the creation of small private companies. In 1995, the tolar became fully convertible, and the bank rehabilitation programme, started in 1993 and carried out with state support, finally concluded a few years later. Alongside these more or less stable economic conditions, Slovenia retained a relatively high level of social security and a high quality system of public health care. In towns and villages with sounder economic foundations, the attitude towards the environment and cultural heritage changed appreciably. This was seen in the heightened care for the cleanliness and external appearance of these settlements. The government successfully modernised primary and secondary education, but paid less attention to science and the universities, where the number of employees actually fell by the end of the 1990s. The introduction of market conditions into the cultural sphere caused dissatisfaction throughout the sector. Following independence, the expectation had been that the cultural institutions and projects – considering the central role of culture in Slovene national development – would enjoy particular favour from the new
authorities. However, the parties and political circles were increasingly taking the position that in the new order, the government and the state could neither interfere with cultural creativity – as in the times of socialism – nor continue to be its sole supporters and guardians. The government coalitions did continue to finance public cultural establishments and major cultural events and projects, but despite reducing the budget for culture, they failed to provide a clearer definition of their cultural policies or to promote private investment in cultural institutions and activities through planned tax relief. With the expansion of cultural production and the rapid growth of many private publishing companies, theatres, galleries, museums and television and radio stations, efforts to commercialise culture and to adapt it to consumer tastes increased.

On the foreign policy front, Slovene politicians worked after independence to achieve European Union and Nato membership as quickly as possible, to establish Slovenia within the United Nations and other important international political and economic organisations, and to settle unresolved issues with neighbouring countries. Slovenia’s mission in Brussels was one of the first Slovene diplomatic offices abroad. An agreement on co-operation between Slovenia and the European Union was signed as early as 1993, aiding the Slovene economy’s reorientation towards European markets. For a brief period, Silvio Berlusconi’s government in Rome obstructed the agreement on Slovenia’s association with the European Union, finally signed three years later; Berlusconi’s government insisted that the accession agreement could only be signed if Slovenia opened up its property market to citizens of EU member states. When, in 1997, Ljubljana gave in to Italy’s demands and relaxed the property market with a change to the constitution, negotiations on Slovenia’s full-member status of the EU formally began. The government’s concession to Italian and ‘European’ pressure caused public consternation, but still failed to weaken the broad support for EU accession. Public opinion was more divided over the question of Slovenia’s membership of Nato. This was initially supported by the majority of the population. In 1994, Slovenia became a member of the Partnership for Peace, and this was followed two years later by membership of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In the second half of the 1990s, however, public opinion began to change and opinion polls indicated that increasing numbers believed that Slovenia had nothing to gain from Nato membership, and that it would be better if Slovenia remained neutral and actively supported the formation of the European security and defence system. However, all the large political parties decided to support Nato membership and, at the end of the 1990s, the Slovene government increased its efforts to join the alliance.

During the 1990s, Slovenia successfully joined the Council of Europe, the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and most major international economic and financial associations. It also played an active role in central European economic and political initiatives and organisations. In Ljubljana, much importance was ascribed to Slovenia’s position in the United Nations, and Slovenia’s election as one of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 1997 was welcomed as a major Slovene foreign policy achievement. In relations with Austria and Italy, the government attempted to avoid conflict over unresolved issues that were making life difficult for the Slovene minorities in Carinthia and in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region respectively, and this earned the coalitions and parties public criticism at home. In the mid-1990s, relations between Slovenia and Italy worsened due to Italian attempts to revise international agreements which had been reached during the time of Yugoslavia, and the demands made by Berlusconi’s government for the return of property to Italian citizens who had left Slovene Istria and Primorska after the Second World War. The opening of Slovenia’s property market, however, brought a rapid improvement. At the end of the 1990s, relations between Ljubljana, Vienna and Klagenfurt also cooled due to Austrian demands for the recognition of a German minority in Slovenia (which had been virtually non-existent since 1945), and for the return of property seized after the Second World War from Germans who had emigrated or been expelled from Kočevje or Štajerska (Gottschee or lower Styria). But the two countries resolved the dispute in 2001 by signing an agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation, which mentioned support for “members of the German-speaking ethnic group in Slovenia.”

It was much more difficult for Slovenia to settle its affairs with Croatia, as the governments in Ljubljana and Zagreb could not even agree on the exact course of their shared land border, let alone the sea border. A number of issues relating to the succession from the former Yugoslavia also remained unresolved. It was only in the late 1990s that Slovenia began to pay more general attention to relations with the other countries that had emerged from the former Yugoslavia; before that, the only notable co-operation had been with Bosnia-Herzegovina, since over 50,000 refugees had fled to Slovenia during the war. After the end of the war, Bosnia became an important market for the Slovene economy. Ljubljana only followed a policy of greater Slovene engagement in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the end of the 1990s, once it seemed that there were no more serious obstacles to Slovenia’s membership of the European Union and Nato. In 1999, it therefore joined the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and a year later (six months before Milošević extradition to The Hague) established diplomatic relations with the Serb-Montenegrin remainder of Yugoslavia. While the normalisation of relations with Belgrade and Slovenia’s increased political interest
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was supported by all the political parties and the vast majority of the population, the proposal in 2000 for Slovenia to sign an agreement with the Holy See caused the most serious political clash to date. Pope John Paul II visited Slovenia twice in the second half of the 1990s and was warmly welcomed by Catholics, but this did not bring the signing of an agreement settling legal matters with the Vatican any closer. Opponents of the draft agreement, which also divided the ruling LDS party, accused the government of conceding too much to the Catholic Church and of failing to stand by the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state. Discussions on the agreement dragged on until 2004, when the National Assembly at last ratified the agreement in a partly amended form.

The changing relationship between Church and state was, of course, only one of the unresolved issues dividing Slovene political and public opinion during the late 1990s and at the start of the new millennium. Serious disagreement between the opposition and the governing coalition was also caused by the demands of the SDS and their ‘Slovene Spring’ allies for changes to the electoral system. The SDS party believed that replacing the existing proportional voting system with a majority system would have a favourable effect on integrating the ‘Spring parties’ and facilitate the formation of an opposition coalition capable of winning elections. They claimed that the majority voting system had numerous advantages, allowing “more direct selection of parliamentary deputies, a higher quality composition of the parliament and a more effective government.” The ruling LDS, the former Communists and the leaders of some of the smaller parties objected to these ideas and argued that a proportional system offered “a more balanced representation of different social groups in parliament, more compromise in decision-making and less risk to the development of democracy.” The SDS and its allies did not gain enough support in the National Assembly to change the voting legislation, so they campaigned for a referendum to be held. The referendum was called four weeks after the 1996 parliamentary elections. The turnout was only a little over a third of the electorate, with voters choosing among three different proposed changes to the voting system. The highest vote was for a majority system (44.5%) but this was not the absolute majority required by referendum legislation. The SDS maintained that the voters in the referendum had shown convincing support for a majority system and that the National Assembly should move to change the electoral legislation. The Constitutional Court agreed with this view in 1998. However, the governing coalition and the ZL (United List) continued to oppose a majority system, and the National Assembly adopted no more than a handful of amendments to the existing, proportional system. Party disputes on the electoral
system went on for several years and even led to a split in the LDS prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Since independence and the fall of Communism, keenly felt public and party controversy had been caused by issues relating to the recent past, Yugoslav Communism and events in Slovenia following the Second World War. The critics of the Yugoslav and Slovene Communist regime included many daring for the first time, in the democratic atmosphere that followed 1990, to talk openly of their political views and their experiences of the tyranny of the Communist regime. The more militant opponents of the post-war regime, who considered Communism to be a criminal system – with the Yugoslav Communist regime no exception in this respect – called on the new Slovene authorities to deal more decisively with the Communist past. For them, changing accepted views of the Second World War, the Partisan resistance and collaboration was an essential part of dealing with the past. The most passionate advocates of revising what they called ‘Communist history’ denied that the Slovene anti-occupation movement in the years 1941–1945 had any significance whatsoever. They claimed it was merely a Communist movement and maintained that members of the Slovene anti-Partisan forces and their political leaders were not collaborators but anti-Communist fighters. This unleashed angry public disputes, which were further fuelled by the discovery of mass graves containing the victims of the post-war massacre of the Home Guard (Domobranci)) and opponents of Communism. However, the government and the political parties did nothing to speed up the identification of the victims or to provide a more dignified burial. The LDS, the ZL and some of the smaller parties largely rejected the general criticisms of Yugoslav Communism and the Partisan movement during the Second World War. Public opinion was also generally opposed to a radical overhaul and revision of interpretations of the recent past.

Ahead of the 1997 presidential election, the SDS and the SKD (Christian Democrats) proposed to the National Assembly a lustration law and a declaration condemning the Communist regime, but they did not gain sufficient support. Milan Kučan was re-elected as president without any difficulty (winning 55.6% of the vote). In the second half of the 1990s, opinion polls began to show that the primarily negative view of Communist Yugoslavia that had prevailed during the early post-independence years was gradually changing, as more and more of those polled said that they had relatively good memories of it. The attitude of certain parties and a considerable portion of the population towards their Serbian, Croatian and Albanian-speaking fellow citizens, who had moved to Slovenia during the time of Yugoslavia, however, remained less tolerant. Most of them did succeed in acquiring Slovene citizenship in
the early 1990s with little difficulty, but a little over 18,300 of them, who failed to provide the necessary documents before the legal deadline, were erased from the register of permanent citizens by the authorities without notice, with all rights as citizens rescinded. In 1999, the Constitutional Court found that the ‘erasure’ had been illegal, but the political parties could still not agree about on how to legally resolve the status of the ‘Erased’. In the following years the majority of them managed to acquire Slovene citizenship, while political parties continued to argue about how to resolve the issues of those remaining, and compensation for the Erased for the time their rights were denied, but without success.

In 2000, the SLS left the governing coalition, due to disagreements with the LDS, and teamed up with the Christian Democrats, who had steadily lost voters throughout the 1990s due to their lack of clearly defined policies. This left the governing coalition without a majority in the National Assembly and a new government was formed by the SDS and the joint SLS+SKD (Christian Democrats and Slovene People’s Party). Christian Democrat Andrej Bajuk became prime minister, with the greatest influence on his policies coming from the SDS, led by Janez Janša. Bajuk’s government had less than six months at its disposal, with new parliamentary elections scheduled for the middle of October, but it still attempted to introduce extensive changes, which were accompanied by the replacement of civil servants and directors of state-controlled companies, and tackled areas as sensitive as education, tax collection and state finances. However, these measures did not increase the popularity of the governing parties and at the parliamentary elections, on 15 October 2000, the LDS again won the largest share of the vote (36.3%). The new government was again formed by Janez Drnovšek, and it included the LDS, the ZL, the joint SLS+SKD, and DeSUS. Drnovšek led the party until 2002, when he was elected President of Slovenia. He was succeeded as prime minister by the finance minister, Anton Rop, who also became the new president of the LDS.

Even after 2000, the overriding focus of Slovene politics was to meet the economic, political and other criteria for European Union entry as quickly as possible. The government paid close attention to the economic situation, which was – despite somewhat slower economic growth in 2002/2003 – relatively good. For a short period after 2000, the LDS leadership went along with the ideas of liberal advocates of more rapid privatisation and the sale of state assets. The government’s willingness to sell off state holdings in some of the larger companies and banks (especially the largest bank – Nova Ljubljanska Banka) to foreigners triggered enormous opposition from the public, the opposition and experts, who argued that selling successful companies and banks was pointless and contrary to national interests. The LDS then settled on a more cautious policy of gradually opening up to foreign
investment and capital. In 2003, the government decided that Slovenia was ready for membership of the European Union, despite criticism from the ‘Slovene Spring’ opposition, which claimed that government policy was ineffective and the Slovene government too slow in reducing the development deficit behind the EU average. In the middle of December 2002, Slovene representatives, together with those of nine other candidate countries, successfully completed accession negotiations at the European Council summit in Copenhagen. On 16 April 2003, all ten new EU members signed the accession treaty in Athens. Slovenia’s EU membership was still supported by a convincing majority of the population, whereas public support for joining Nato was less certain, which led all the major political parties to agree that Slovenia’s citizens should express their opinion on joining the EU and Nato in a referendum. The turnout of the referendum held on 23 March 2003 was 60.4%, with 89.6% of these voting for Slovenia to join the EU, and 66.1% supporting Nato membership. Slovenia became a Nato member on 29 March 2004 and a full member of the EU on 1 May of the same year.

But while Slovenia had achieved its main foreign political goals by the middle of 2004, the domestic political situation became increasingly divided by conflict. The governing coalition, headed by the LDS, which had been in power almost continuously since 1992, was steadily losing the support of its voters due to the intransigence with which it enforced its views, the continual and never fully explained corruption scandals, unresponsive public administration and an ineffective judicial system, as well as numerous unfulfilled promises. On the other hand, economic growth was over 4% in 2004, inflation had fallen to 3.6% and the number of registered unemployed had dropped to 10.5%. Opinion polls showed that under these circumstances people were largely satisfied with the material state of affairs, but were much less happy with the development of democracy, with the work of state bodies and especially with the functioning of the National Assembly. Parliamentary deputies and leading party figures often engaged in lengthy and unproductive debates, and when they failed to reach an agreement, resorted to the possibility of a ‘popular referendum’, as prescribed in the constitution, even on issues such as the legal regulation of the right to artificial insemination, the privatisation of the railways, and Sunday and holiday-opening for shops.

In the second half of 2003 and the first half of 2004, the issue of immigration from the former Yugoslav republics again set off heated debate among political parties. This was still connected with the Erased. Since the 1999 verdict of the Constitutional Court, which had found that the erasure was illegal, around 14,000 of the Erased had acquired residence, and some had even acquired Slovene citizenship, but around 4,000 of them remained without documents or rights. In 2003, the Constitutional Court again decided that the authorities must
arrange their legal status retroactively and without delay. The National Assembly, with the support of the government majority, passed a law to enact the court order. But the ‘Spring parties’ and the Slovene National Party (SNS) did not agree with the adoption of the law and the measures it laid down, claiming that the Erased were largely themselves to blame for their unresolved status, and that they should therefore be dealt with on a case-by-case basis to find out whether or not they met the criteria for permanent residence. They also called for a new constitutional law to limit the possibility of the Erased demanding compensation for the time in which their rights as citizens were denied. Since the government and the opposition were unable to reach an agreement, the ‘Spring parties’, led by the SDS (which changed its name from the Social Democratic Party to the Slovene Democratic Party in 2003), demanded a referendum. The referendum was held on 4 April 2004, and had a turnout of just 31.5%, but almost 95% of those voting opposed the government’s law. This left the legal status of those of the Erased still without permanent residence or citizens’ rights in Slovenia unresolved. The government’s attempt to finally resolve the problem had ended in defeat.

In the spring of 2004, just over six months before the parliamentary elections, the governing coalition was again – as in 2000 – abandoned by the joint Christian Democrats and Slovene People’s Party, which a year earlier had reverted to the name Slovene People’s Party (SLS). However, this time its departure did not cause a government crisis, since the other governing parties retained a strong enough majority in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004 clearly indicated that LDS political domination was nearing its end after almost 12 years at the centre of Slovene politics. The turnout for the European elections was just 28.4%, but the highest share of the vote (23.6%) was surprisingly won by Nova Slovenija (New Slovenia – NSi), which had been founded in 2000 by Christian Democrats dissatisfied with the merger of the SKD and SLS. The LDS came second with 21.9% of the vote, while the SDS came third with 17.7%. The LDS leadership consoled itself by claiming that the election results were largely due to the low turnout, but the ‘Slovene Spring’ opposition, headed by the SDS, was boosted by this electoral success and in the months leading up to the parliamentary elections controlled the tempo and subject of pre-election debate and discussions. The SDS won a convincing victory at the parliamentary elections on 3 October 2004, gaining 29.7% of the vote, with the Liberal Democrats second on 22.9%. The ‘Slovene Spring’ coalition had a majority in parliament and comprised the SDS, the SLS, Nova Slovenija and DeSUS. The SDS president, Janez Janša, became the new prime minister.

In this way, Slovenia underwent a major political turnaround immediately after joining
the European Union. After almost 15 years of independence, and a relatively successful political, social and economic transition, Slovenia now faced its new European future with a domestic political scene that was still deeply divided.
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