



Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino



MUZEJ NOVEJŠE
ZGODOVINE SLOVENIJE



SLOVENIJA V JUGOSLAVIJI

SLOVENIA IN YUGOSLAVIA

Simpozij • Symposium

Ljubljana, 28. – 29. november 2013
Muzej novejšje zgodovine Slovenije



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Bilo je nekoč v Jugoslaviji: prizori iz političnega dogajanja

Jugoslovanska država, sedaj čedalje pogosteje označena kot druga Jugoslavija (z namenom izogniti se političnim in ideološkim oznakam), v kateri smo živeli Slovenci skupaj z drugimi južnoslovanskimi narodi in narodnostmi tudi neslovanskega porekla, je bila, kot smo ji radi rekli, naša skupna »širša domovina«. Druga Jugoslavija (Federativna Ljudska Republika Jugoslavija/Socialistična Federativna Republika Jugoslavija) je bila za razliko od prve (centralistična kraljevina) republika, organizirana kot federacija, s socialističnim političnim sistemom. Ustavno je bila »skupnost enakopravnih narodov, ki so na osnovi pravice do samoodločbe, vključno s pravico do odcepitve izrazili svojo voljo, živeti skupno v federativni državi«. Bila je »last« narodov, ki so jo ustvarili, kar so po njenem razpadu ugotovili tudi izbrani mednarodni pravniki, ter da je Jugoslavija razpadla na osnovi lastne ustave. Pogled na Jugoslavijo se je skozi čas spreminjal. Najprej je bilo prisotno nekritično navdušenje vseh, na koncu pa kritikantsko nad vsem in to tudi domala vseh. Vsakega s svojega stališča. Na drugo Jugoslavijo so bili pogledi različni od osebe do osebe, glede na generacijo in predvsem na narodno oziroma republiško pripadnost. Vsak narod je v njej našel kaj pozitivnega zase in vsak je imel kakšno zamero. Dejstva o državi so bila enotna, poudarki o njej dokaj različni, sodbe in vrednotenje pa so bili tudi popolnoma nasprotni. Vsak narod je gledal in ocenjeval svoje bivanje v tej državi iz svojega nacionalnega stališča. Druga Jugoslavija je bila država, ki ni nikogar, njenih državljanov niti tujine, težko pustila brez opredelitve.

Nastala je v času druge svetovne vojne kot nadaljevanje jugoslovanske države, a na drugačnih osnovah, kot federacija zgrajena na načelu pravice narodov do samoodločbe. Bila je rezultat revolucije, spremembe politične oblasti oziroma osvojitve oblasti političnega gibanja, ki je organiziralo odpor proti okupatorjem. Nastala je na osnovi nacionalnega soglasja, na osnovi nacionalnega nesoglasja pa je doživela svoj konec. Tako kot so se narodi združili v državo na osnovi načela pravice do samoodločbe, so se na osnovi istega načela tudi razdružili. Razdruževanje je v nekaterih predelih nekdanje jugoslovanske države spremljala vojna, ki je bila zelo kruta in tudi z genocidnimi značilnostmi. Ljubezni, v političnem žargonu imenovani »bratstvo in enotnost«, je sledilo sovražstvo. Med narodi in ljudmi.

Druga jugoslovanska država je bila organizirana federativno, po načelu enakopravnosti narodov in njihovih politično upravnih enot, t. i. republik. Te so

imele omejeno stopnjo državnosti, ki se je v celotnem obdobju glede na spremembe ustave večala.

Razlike med republikami so bile zlasti na področju gospodarske razvitosti. Jugoslavija je bila gospodarsko heterogena država; njeni sestavni deli so zato imeli različne poglede na skupno gospodarsko politiko in razvojne prioritete. Na področju gospodarstva so se najprej pokazale razlike v pogledih centralnih oblasti in republik. Vlogo republik je v njihovem razvoju omejeval centralizem, zlasti v gospodarstvu (plansko gospodarstvo, centralizirana investicijska politika). To je povzročilo nasprotovanja do državnega centra predvsem v gospodarsko razvitejših republikah, ki so zaradi načela egalitizma začele gospodarsko stagnirati in tudi zaostajati (predvsem Slovenija). Slovenija kot gospodarsko najrazvitejši del skupne države je zato jasno nasprotovala centralizmu že od konca petdesetih let. To je bilo vodilo slovenske politike do konca jugoslovanske države. Slovenija kot gospodarsko najrazvitejša republika je tesno povezovala uresničevanje nacionalnih gospodarskih interesov z nadaljevanjem decentralizacije pristojnosti in odločanja ter kreptitvijo blagovno tržnih in odnosov. Iz opozarjanja na potrebo po večji vlogi republik je izšlo politično vprašanje o vlogi in položaju republik v odnosu do zveze, kar se je kazalo v reformah federacije. Pogoje za večjo vlogo republik pri odločanju in usmerjanju svoje gospodarske politike je izboljšala ustava iz leta 1974, ki je Jugoslavijo preoblikovala v gospodarsko skupnost (skupni trg), omogočila konstituiranje t. i. nacionalnih gospodarstev in uresničevanje njihovih avtarkičnih teženj. Slovenija je znala nove razmere, na katere je v predhodnem desetletju odločilno vplivala, izkoristiti. V zadnjem desetletju obstoja jugoslovanske države je Slovenija povečala obseg medsebojne menjave z drugimi republikami in jim je prodala več blaga in storitev, kot jih je od njih kupila. Na področju kulture in izobraževanja so se centralistične težnje kazale v različnih obdobjih različno, močno pa so se okrepile v začetku osemdesetih let, kar sta slovenska javnost in politika ostro zavrnili.

Zdenko Čepič, D.Sc.

Once Upon a Time in Yugoslavia: Depictions of Political Developments

The Yugoslav state, now more and more often referred to as the Second Yugoslavia (with the aim of avoiding political and ideological implications), where Slovenians lived together with other South Slavic nations and also non-Slavic nationalities, was – we liked to call it that – our common »wider homeland«. Unlike the First Yugoslavia (Centralistic monarchy), the Second Yugoslavia (Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was a republic, organised as a federation with a socialist political system. Constitutionally it was a »community of equal nations which had expressed their

will for self-determination. Together with their right to secession they also expressed their wish to live together in a federal state«. Yugoslavia was »owned« by the nations that created it. After its demise that was also realised by prominent international lawyers – that Yugoslavia had fallen apart on the basis of its own constitution. The outlook on Yugoslavia kept changing through time. In the beginning it raised the enthusiasm of everyone, and in the end almost everybody was overly critical of everything. Everyone from their own point of view. The outlook on the Second Yugoslavia differed from person to person, depending on the generations and especially on the national or republican adherence. In Yugoslavia every nation found something positive, but everyone also blamed it for something. The facts about the common state were uniform, the emphasises about it quite different, while judgements and evaluations were sometimes completely opposite. Each nation saw and evaluated their existence in the context of this state from their national viewpoint. The Second Yugoslavia was a state which hardly left anyone – either its citizens or foreign countries – indifferent.

It was created during World War II as a continuation of the first Yugoslav state, but on different bases – as a federation established on the principle of the right of its nations to self-determination. It resulted from a revolution, a change of political authorities or the rise of the political movement which had organised the resistance against occupiers. It was established on the basis of national consensus, and on the basis of national disagreement it saw its end. Like different nations created the state on the principle of the right to self-determination, they also dissolved it on the basis of the same principle. In certain parts of the former Yugoslav state the dissolution was accompanied by war: extremely cruel and with genocidal characteristics. Love – in the political jargon dubbed as »fraternity and unity«, was followed by hatred. Hatred between nations and people.

Second Yugoslav state was a federation in the sense of the equality of nations and their political administrative units, the so-called republics. Republics had a limited degree of statehood, increasing throughout the whole period as the constitution changed. Differences between republics were especially evident in the field of economic development. Yugoslavia was economically heterogeneous; its parts had different views of the common economic policy and development priorities. In the field of economy the differences in the views of central authorities and republics became evident at first. The role of republics in their own development was limited by centralism, especially in economy (planned economy, centralised investment policy). This resulted in the opposition towards the state centre, especially in economically more developed republics, which started stagnating and falling behind (especially Slovenia) due to egalitarianism. Slovenia as the economically most developed part of the common state openly opposed centralism ever since the end of the 1950s. This was the focus of Slovenian policy until the end of the Yugoslav state. Slovenia as the economically most de-

veloped republic associated the realisation of national economic interests with continued decentralisation of competences, decision-making and strengthening of trade relations. Emphasising the need for a greater role of republics gave rise to a political question of the role and position of republics towards the federation, which was evident from the federal reforms. The conditions for a greater role of republics in the decision-making and steering of their economic policies were improved by the 1974 constitution, which transformed Yugoslavia into an economic community (common market), allowing for the establishment of the so-called national economies and the implementation of their autarkic tendencies. Slovenia knew how to take advantage of the circumstances it had influenced significantly in the previous decade. In the last decade of Yugoslavia's existence, Slovenia increased the volume of mutual exchange with the other republics and sold more goods and services than it bought. In the field of culture and education, the centralist aspirations were different in various periods, but strengthened considerably in the beginning of the 1980s, which the Slovenian public and politics rejected resolutely.

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»Država številnih prednosti« : slovensko dojemanje druge Jugoslavije

Je bila tudi druga Jugoslavija podobno kot njeni državi predhodnici v dvajsetem stoletju tista država, ki jo je slovensko prebivalstvo vzelo za svojo, razmišljalo v njenih okvirih in bilo zadovoljno z življenjem v njej? Kaj je ljudi v državi motilo, kaj skrbelo, kaj vezalo nanjo?

Dinamiko slovenskega odnosa do Jugoslavije lahko rekonstruiramo na več ravneh, v glavnem – do druge svetovne vojne – skozi politiko političnih subjektov, upošteva je njihovo specifično težo med volilnim telesom, toda ta metodološki pristop po letu 1945 v precejšnji meri odpade. V vsakem primeru pa je tovrstno ugotavljanje državljanskega utripa le približno detektiranje, ki je sicer lahko mestoma točno, a redko zaobjame vso širino družbenih vprašanj, še redkeje pa omogoča resno medčasovno primerjavo konkretnih stališč. Tovrstno početje lahko temelji le na tehtnih javnomnenjskih raziskavah, ki se v Sloveniji izvajajo vse od leta 1968, kar je v kontekstu socialističnih držav izrazita redkost. Na njihovi podlagi je mogoče zaobjeti slovenski pogled na nekatera temeljna vprašanja druge Jugoslavije in položaj Slovenije v njej.

Ljudje so Jugoslavijo vse od leta 1968 videli kot deželo številnih prednosti, ki ji je vladal človek, najbolj zaslužen za svetovni mir – Tito. Prednost, ki jo je Jugoslavija imela pred drugimi državami, pa nikakor ni pomenila, da so bili ljudje s prav vsem v državi samoumevno zadovoljni. Težave in probleme so temu navkljub zaznavali in jih v glavnem povezovali z vprašanji življenjskega standarda. Politična vprašanja so bila med ljudmi vse do druge polovice osemdesetih let izrazito v drugem planu (z izjemo zadnjih let, ko je bila pomembna in problematična nacionalistična ofenziva Miloševićevega kroga). Po več kot treh desetletjih obstoja druge Jugoslavije, leta 1978, so ljudje videli Slovenijo kot samoumeven integralni del skupne države. Odnose med t. i. razvitimi in nerazvitimi republikami so sicer posebej občutljivo obravnavali, saj je Slovenija bila najrazvitejša republika, a niso pomoči nikdar odrekli. Summa summarum so bili ljudje prepričani, da jugoslovanski okvir skupaj s pomočjo nerazvitim ni zaviral slovenskega razvoja. Slovensko prebivalstvo se je do konca osemdesetih čutilo povezano v jugoslovansko skupnost, ki sama po sebi ni bila vprašljiva, četudi je bil s položajem Slovenije v državi marsikdo nezadovoljen.

Del dojemanja druge jugoslovanske države je tudi pogled na državo po njenem razpadu leta 1991; problematika historične refleksije in spomina na nekdanjo »širšo« domovino – Jugoslavijo. Deset let po razpadu države, leta 2001, ko

so se razgrete strasti že precej umirile, so ljudje politični in gospodarski sistem pred letom 1990 in po njem ocenjevali približno enako ... Ugotavljali so (in ugotavljajo), da je bil pretekli čas bolj brezskrben, ne le v Sloveniji, tudi drugod v vzhodni Evropi. V kolektivnem spominu zlahka opazimo fenomen, ki ga imenujemo socialistična nostalgija in je skupen domala vsem državam evropskega vzhoda.

Jure Gašparič, D.Sc.

»The Land of Countless Advantages« : Slovenian Outlook on the Second Yugoslavia

Was the Second Yugoslavia – similarly as its two predecessors in the twentieth century – also the state that the Slovenian people saw as their own, thought within its contexts and were content with their life in it? What bothered people in this country? What worried them and what bound their lives to it?

The dynamics of the Slovenian relationship to Yugoslavia can be reconstructed on many levels – until World War II mainly through the policies of the political subjects, taking into account their specific influence on the electorate. However, this methodological approach has been quite useless after the year of 1945. In any case this kind of determination of the attitude of the nation only results in approximate detection, which can be occasionally precise, but which rarely encompasses all the implications of social issues, and even more rarely does it allow for a serious temporal comparison of concrete viewpoints. This kind of activity can only be based on well-founded public opinion polls, which have been carried out in Slovenia ever since 1968 and represent a true rarity in the context of socialist countries. On the basis of these polls the Slovenian outlook on certain basic issues of the Second Yugoslavia and the position of Slovenia within it can be fathomed.

Since 1968 people have thought of Yugoslavia as the land of numerous opportunities, ruled by the man who had ensured world peace – Tito. However, the advantage of Yugoslavia in comparison with other countries by no means meant that the Yugoslav people were self-evidently content with everything in that country. Despite everything they registered troubles and problems and they mostly associated them with issues connected to the living standard. As far as Yugoslav people were concerned, until as late as the second half of the 1980s political questions were significantly inferior to other issues (with the exception of the last years when the notable and problematic nationalist offensive mounted by Milošević and his supporters took place). After more than three decades since the Second Yugoslavia had existed, in 1978 people saw Slove-

nia as a self-evident and integral part of the common state. The relationships between the so-called developed and undeveloped republics may have been thought about sensitively, since Slovenia was the most developed republic, yet it never failed to provide aid. Ultimately people were convinced that the Yugoslav framework – including its aid provided to the undeveloped – had not obstructed Slovenian development. Until the end of the 1980s the Slovenian population thought of itself as a part of the Yugoslav community, which was not questionable in itself, even though many Slovenians were unhappy with the position of Slovenia in that state.

The outlook on the Yugoslav state after its disintegration in 1991 also represents a part of the understanding of the second Yugoslav state: it involves the issue of the historical reflection and memory of what used to be the former »wider« homeland – Yugoslavia. Ten years after the dissolution of the state – in 2001, when the previously heated passions had already calmed down considerably – the people saw the system before 1990 and after that year as approximately identical. They claimed (and still claim) that the past was less worrisome, not only in Slovenia, but also elsewhere in the Eastern Europe. In the collective memory we can easily discern the phenomenon we refer to as nostalgia for socialism, which is almost the same in all of the Eastern European countries.

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Kako smo živeli v drugi Jugoslaviji : oris dogajanja v luči izbranih kazalnikov

Razprava osvetli glavne mejnike in dogajanje v gospodarskem življenju Slovenije in Slovencev v času druge Jugoslavije. Avtor na podlagi izbranih kazalnikov izpostavi razlike med Slovenijo in Jugoslavijo v različnih fazah razvoja po drugi svetovni vojni. Maja leta 1945 so z nastopom nove oblasti prišli na plano novi cilji in načrti. Gospodarsko upravljanje so prevzeli komunisti, ki so med drugim začeli s pospešeno industrializacijo in uvedli centralno-plansko gospodarstvo s podržavljenjem. Slovenija je v drugo jugoslovansko državo stopila kot gospodarsko najrazvitejši del države in to vlogo je tudi zadržala. Izstopala je na več področjih, posebej na področju izvoza, po produktivnosti in učinkovitosti naložb. Njen delež družbenega proizvoda v okviru Jugoslavije je znašal med 15 in 17 odstotki, delež industrije in izvoza pa približno 25 odstotkov. Jugoslavija je v primerjavi s Slovenijo iz desetletja v desetletje bolj zaostajala. Po podatkih je zaostanek Jugoslavije za Slovenijo, gledano skozi prizmo gospodarskega razvoja, leta 1985 znašal že 17 let in pol. Do leta 1974 je sicer Slovenija imela precej omejene možnosti za uresničevanje narodnogospodarskih interesov, ustava iz leta 1974 pa je to spremenila. Slednja je na eni strani z okrepitevijo vloge republik in pokrajin ter zmanjševanjem vloge centralizma urejala organizacijo federacije in delovanje le-te, na drugi pa je z natančnim normativnim urejanjem družbeno-ekonomskih odnosov, ki so temeljili na samoupravljanju in združenem delu, poudarjala razredno, tako imenovan delavsko opredeljen značaj jugoslovanske družbe in države. Tudi omenjena ustava in številne reforme, ki so se vrstile druga za drugo, pa niso rešile težav na gospodarskem področju. Jugoslavija tako že konec osemdesetih let minulega stoletja v gospodarskem smislu ni več obstajala. Slovenija je bila v samem svetovnem vrhu po deležu zaposlenih v celotnem prebivalstvu oziroma v aktivnem prebivalstvu, kot tudi po deležu zaposlenih v industriji in rudarstvu. Tega pa niso spremljali ustrezni rezultati v produktivnosti dela, izobrazbeni strukturi zaposlenih in življenjskemu standardu, kjer smo bili daleč od svetovnega vrha. Po kolapsu Jugoslavije je Slovenija v letih 1989-1992 doživela velik padec aktivnosti in nujno preusmeritev z jugoslovanskega na zahodne trge. Kar se tiče ravni BDP, je bilo potrebno več kot 8 let za vrnitev na raven iz leta 1989. V statičnem pogledu je raven BDP v letu 1992 znašala manj kot 80 odstotkov ravni iz leta 1989, v časovnem smislu je padla na raven okoli leta 1976, torej za okoli 16 let. Gledano statistično je bil

padec BDP v Sloveniji v tako imenovani tranzicijski depresiji bistveno večji, kot smo mu bili priča v času še vedno aktualne finančne in gospodarske krize.

Tabela 1: Razlike med Slovenijo in Jugoslavijo v izbranih kazalnikih

Leto	Bruto materialni proizvod na prebivalca	Zaposleni na delovno sposobnega prebivalca	Družbeni proizvod na zaposlenega	Osnovna sredstva na zaposlenega	Avtomobili na prebivalca	Telefoni na prebivalca	Televizijski sprejemniki na prebivalca
Relativne razlike med Slovenijo in Jugoslavijo (JUG=100)							
1952	172	175	109	135	/	/	/
1961	187	160	127	128	366	182	191
1964	185	167	122	119	357	179	219
1979	206	171	130	120	209	187	148
1988	202	150	140	136	211	165	136
1989	200	149	/	/	203	168	132
Časovno zaostajanje bivše Jugoslavije za Slovenijo (v letih)							
1960	7,3	/	5,2	/	3,3	/	/
1964	7,4	10,7	4	/	4,8	7,8	1,2
1966	8,7	13,6	3,8	2,2	5,3	6,5	2,3
1979	11,8	20,5	9,3	4,4	8,2	5,8	6,9
1987	19,3	26,2	19,1	8,5	14,1	7	13,7
1988	20,8	27,3	20,4	9	14,9	7,1	14,9
1989	21,2	28,4	/	/	15,2	7,2	15,9

Vir: Pavle Sicherl: Kje je Slovenija? V: Aleksander Bajt: 1921-2000 : zbornik razprav s simpozija SAZU ob 10-letnici smrti. Razprave 25, Ljubljana 2011, str. 136. Kazalniki zaposlenosti (zaposleni na delovno sposobnega prebivalca), produktivnosti (družbeni proizvod na zaposlenega) in opremljenosti (osnovna sredstva na zaposlenega), kot jih je prikazal Sicherl, se nanašajo samo na družbeni sektor in ne vključujejo privatnega sektorja.

Tabela 2: Industrializacijska stopnja v Sloveniji

Leto (ob popisu prebivalstva)	Število delovno aktivnih	Število delovno aktivnih v industriji	Delež delovno aktivnih v industriji (v %)
1961	768. 424	192. 423	25, 04
1971	719. 339	270. 410	37, 59
1981	753. 167	328. 522	43, 62
1991	878. 789	314. 034	35, 73
2002	818. 304	257. 157	31, 43

Vir: Igor Vrišer: Slovenska industrija po osamosvojitvi. V: IB Revija, 2008, št. 2, str. 66.

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How We Lived in the Second Yugoslavia: description of events in light of selected indicators

The discussion sheds light on the main milestones and developments in the economic life of Slovenia and Slovenians in the time of the Second Yugoslavia. On the basis of selected indicators the author underlines the differences between Slovenia and Yugoslavia at various stages of development after World War II. In May 1945 new goals and plans were revealed with the rise of the new authorities. The economic management was taken over by the communists, who, among other things, initiated accelerated industrialisation and introduced a centrally-planned economy together with nationalisation. Slovenia entered the second Yugoslav state as economically best-developed part of the state and managed to retain this role. It excelled in many fields, especially export, productivity, and investment efficiency. Its share of the social product in the context of Yugoslavia was between 15 and 17 percent, and its share of industry and exports was approximately 25 percent. In comparison with Slovenia, Yugoslavia lagged behind more and more from decade to decade. According to the information the lag of Yugoslavia behind Slovenia, from the viewpoint of economic development, amounted to as much as 17 years and a half in 1985. Until 1974 Slovenia's possibilities for the realisation of its national economic interests was quite limited, but this changed with the constitution of 1974. With the strengthening of the role of the republics and provinces and reducing the role of centralism, this constitution addressed the organisation of the federation and its functioning. On the other hand – with precise normative regulation of socio-economic relations, based on self-management and associated labour – it emphasised the class-oriented, so-called labour-defined character of the Yugoslav society and state. However, even this constitution and numerous reforms, taking place one after the other, failed to solve the problems in the economic field. Thus already in the end of the 1980s Yugoslavia no longer existed in the economic sense. Slovenia was one of the very best ranking states globally with regard to the number of employed people or active population as well as with regard to the number of people working in industry and mining. This, however, was not accompanied by suitable results in work productivity, educational structure of the employed and the living standard, where Slovenia was very far from the leading states in the world. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, between 1989 and 1992 Slovenia saw a great decline in activity and faced an urgent reorientation from the Yugoslav to the western markets. As far as the level of GDP was concerned, it took more than 8 years to restore the level from the year 1989. In the statistical sense the 1992 GDP level amounted to less than 80 percent of the level from 1989, but in the temporal sense it fell to the level of around 1976, i.e. by some 16 years. Statistically the GDP

reduction in Slovenia during the so-called transition depression was significantly higher than we have witnessed during the current financial and economic crisis. The contribution will be prepared according to the following system, i.e. on the basis of selected indicators. Two examples are shown in the below tables.

Table 1: Differences between Slovenia and Yugoslavia according to selected indicators

Year	GDP per capita	Employed people per working age person	Domestic product per employed person	Fixed assets per employed person	Cars per person	Phones per person	TV sets per person
Relative differences between Slovenia and Yugoslavia (YUG=100)							
1952	172	175	109	135	/	/	/
1961	187	160	127	128	366	182	191
1964	185	167	122	119	357	179	219
1979	206	171	130	120	209	187	148
1988	202	150	140	136	211	165	136
1989	200	149	/	/	203	168	132
Time lag of the former Yugoslavia behind Slovenia (in years)							
1960	7,3	/	5,2	/	3,3	/	/
1964	7,4	10,7	4	/	4,8	7,8	1,2
1966	8,7	13,6	3,8	2,2	5,3	6,5	2,3
1979	11,8	20,5	9,3	4,4	8,2	5,8	6,9
1987	19,3	26,2	19,1	8,5	14,1	7	13,7
1988	20,8	27,3	20,4	9	14,9	7,1	14,9
1989	21,2	28,4	/	/	15,2	7,2	15,9

Source: Pavle Sicherl: Kje je Slovenija? [Where is Slovenia?] In: Aleksander Bajt: 1921-2000: zbornik razprav s simpozija SAZU ob 10-letnici smrti. Razprave 25, Ljubljana 2011, pg. 136. The indicators of employment (employed people per working age person), productivity (domestic product per employed person) and equipment (fixed assets per employed person), as shown by Sicherl, only take into account the social sector, not the private sector.

Table 2: Industrialisation level in Slovenia

Year (of population census)	Number of persons in employment	Number of persons employed in industry	Percentage of persons employed in industry (in %)
1961	768. 424	192. 423	25, 04
1971	719. 339	270. 410	37, 59
1981	753. 167	328. 522	43, 62
1991	878. 789	314. 034	35, 73
2002	818. 304	257. 157	31, 43

Source: Igor Vrišer: Slovenska industrija po osamosvojitvi [Slovenian Industry After the Attainment of Independence]. In: IB Revija, 2008, No. 2, pg. 66.

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Srbija u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991

Srpsko pitanje nije marginalno pitanje evropske istorije 20. veka. To važi i za period koji je započeo posle Drugog svetskog rata, a bio okončan u poslednjoj decenije 20. veka. Reč je o složenoj pojavi dinamičnog sadržaja u kojoj su prisutni unutrašnji i spoljni faktor, povezani međunarodni poredak, država i nacija, isprepletani i sliveni u jednu celinu politika, društvo, privreda, kultura. U pitanju je istorijska pojava sa svojim državno-pravnom, međunarodnom, verskom, teritorijalnom, etičkom, kulturnom, jezičkom, ideološkom i mnogom drugom dimenzijom.

Razmišljati o Srbiji i srpskom narodu u godinama 1945-1991. i pokušati razumeti pola veka srpske i jugoslovenske istorije, znači suočiti se sa temom o kojoj istoriografija, ali ni druge društvene nauke, nemaju mnogo valjanih odgovora, pouzdanog znanja i sasvim racionalnu sliku epohe koja je »izmakla«. O trajanju i opstajanju dugom pola veka postoje brojni sugestivni, stereotipni, emocionalni odgovori, proistekli iz samosvesti srpske i drugih jugoslovenskih i balkanskih nacija i potrebe za nametanjem sopstvenog samoviđenja i samopredstavljanja. U pitanju su pogledi oblikovani pod pritiskom savremenosti, politike, ideologije, bez uvažavanja onovremenih okolnosti, odnosa snaga, istorijskih prilika, prečesto i osnovnih činjenica.

Prostor na kome je razuđen živeo srpski narod u drugoj polovini 20. veka veoma je složen u geografskom, geopolitičkom, geostrateškom, istorijskom smislu. To mnoštvo pejzaža, državnih i administrativnih granica, istorijskih i kulturnih posebnosti, političkih i ideoloških uticaja ostavljalo je vidljivi pečat na srpsko društvo, određivalo stvarnost života u jugoslovenskoj socijalističkoj zajednici i činilo da srpski narod ostane policentričan i neintegrisan i na kraju 20. veka.

Posle Drugog svetskog rata jugoslovenska država je oblikovana u duhu ideja »partizanskog jugoslovenstva« koje je zagovarala KPJ. Kada je u pitanju srpski narod politika vladajuće partije bila je umnogome opterećena dogmatskim i klasnim pogledima preuzetim iz prethodnog perioda. Nekritički prihvaćena teza o »velikosrpskom hegemonizmu« i dalje je oblikovala svest partijskih struktura na celom jugoslovenskom prostoru. Nacionalna politika revolucionarnog subjekta je preko partijske strukture ispisivala administrativne granice jugoslovenskih republika i delila srpski etnički prostor. Insistirajući na unutrašnjem diskontinuitetu u odnosu na Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju jugoslovenski komunisti su

državu administrativno izgrađivali kao »federaciju ravnoteže« koja je, ćutanjem o genocidu, zabranom povratka srpskih kolonista u svoje domove na Kosovu i Metohiji i Makedoniji, nametanjem hipotekeka (»velikosrpski hegemonizam«, ćetništvo, monarhizam, informbiro, ćilasovština, UDB-a, liberalizam...), negiranjem naglašavanja srpskog nacionalnog individualiteta, sprećavanjem otvaranja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja, apsolutnom centralizacijom vlasti, federalizacijom Srbije, naćinom razgranićenja federalnih jedinica, svesno menjala položaj Srbije i srpskog naroda.

U politićkom ųivotu Srbije , mada pritajeno, nastavile su da tinjaju brojne podele i sukobi koji se mogu identifikovati na više ključnih ravni: ćetnićko – partizanskoj, građansko – komunistićkoj, jugoslovensko – srpskoj, srpsko – hrvatskoj, srpsko – albanskoj, klerikalno – antiklerikalnoj, , versko – ateistićkoj, monarhistićko – republikanskoj, komunistićko – antikomun istićkoj, modernizacijsko – konzervativnoj, srpsko – srbijanskoj, centralistićko – autonomaškoj, internacionalistićkoj – antisovjetskoj, demokratskoj – antidemokratskoj... Vreme kao da je tokom druge polovine 20. veka uvećalo postojeće sukobe. Politićka zrelost je izostajala, politićke kulture nije bilo, kontrola vlasti nikada nije uspostavljena, ustavi su nedemokratski donošeni, izbori su nekorektno organizovani, pravo nikada nije zacarilo iznad politićkog i ideološkog, represija se prećesto nadvijala nad politićkim neistomišljenikom.

Navedeno u ovom kratkom rezumu predstavlja samo deo tema koje karakterišu sloųenu istorijsku analizu o mestu i položaju Srbije i srpskog naroda u drugoj polovini 20. veka.

Dr. Ljubodrag Dimić **Srbija v Jugoslaviji 1945-1991**

Srbsko vprašanje ni eno izmed obrobniĳ vprašanj evropske zgodovine 20. stoletja. To velja tudi v obdobju, ki se je zaćelo po drugi svetovni vojni in konćalo v zadnjem desetletju 20. stoletja. Govorimo lahko o zapletenem pojavu dinamićne vsebine, v katerem so bili prisotni notranji in zunanji dejavniki, se med seboj povezovali mednarodni red, ųrųava ter nacija, ki so se nato prepletli in zlili v enovito celoto politike, druųbe, gospodarstva in kulture. Postavlja se nam vprašanje o zgodovinskem pojavu z ųrųavno-pravnimi, mednarodnimi, verskimi, ozemeljskimi, etnićnimi, kulturnimi, jezikovnimi, ideološkimi in mnogimi drugimi razseųnostmi.

Razmišljati o Srbiji in srbskem narodu med letoma 1945-1991 in poskusiti razumeti pol stoletja srbske in jugoslovenske zgodovine pomeni, da se sooćamo s temo, o kateri niti zgodovinopisje niti druge druųbene vede nimajo veliko praviĳ odgovorov, zaneslĳivega vedenja in postavljene povsem racionalne podobe

dobe, ki se je iztekla. O pol stoletja dolgem trajanju in obstajanju so na voljo številni sugestivni, stereotipni in emocionalni odgovori, ki izhajajo iz samozavesti srbskega in drugih jugoslovanskih in balkanskih narodov ter potrebe po vsiljevanju lastne samopodobe in samopredstav. Postavlja se vprašanje o pogledih, ki so se oblikovali pod pritiskom sedanosti, politike in ideologije, brez upoštevanja takratnih okoliščin, razmerij moči, zgodovinskih razmer in premnogokrat tudi osnovnih dejstev.

Prostor, v katerem je »raztelesen« živel srbski narod v drugi polovici 20. stoletja, je zelo zapleten v geografskem, geopolitičnem, geostrateškem in zgodovinskem smislu. Ta množica pejsažov, državnih in administrativnih meja, zgodovinskih in kulturnih posebnosti, političnih in ideoloških vplivov je puščala na srbski družbi viden pečat, odražala resničnost življenja v jugoslovanski socialistični skupnosti in pripeljala do tega, da je srbski narod ostal policentričen in nezdružen tudi ob koncu 20. stoletja.

Po drugi svetovni vojni je bila jugoslovanska država oblikovana v duhu ideje »partizanskega jugoslovanstva«, ki ga je zagovarjala KPJ. Pri vprašanju srbskega naroda je bila politika vladajoče stranke v mnogočem obremenjena z dogmatskimi in razrednimi pogledi, ki so bili prevzeti iz preteklega obdobja. Nekritično je bila sprejeta teza o »velikosrbskem hegemonizmu«, ki je še naprej oblikovala zavest partijskih struktur o enotnem jugoslovanskem prostoru. Nacionalna politika revolucionarnega subjekta je prek partijske strukture izrisovala administrativne meje jugoslovanskih republik in delila srbski etnični prostor. Z vztrajanjem na diskontinuiteti s Kraljevino Jugoslavijo na notranjem področju so jugoslovanski komunisti gradili »federacijo ravnotežja«. Ta je z zamolčevanjem genocida, prepovedjo vračanja srbskih kolonistov na svoje domove na Kosovo in Metohijo ter v Makedonijo, vsiljevanjem hipoteke (»velikosrbski hegemonizem«, četništvo, monarhizem, informbiro, dilasovščina, udbaštvo, liberalizem...), zanikanjem poudarjanja srbske nacionalne individualnosti, preprečevanjem odpiranja srbskega nacionalnega vprašanja, absolutno centralizacijo oblasti, federalizacijo Srbije in načinom razmejevanja federalnih enot zavestno spreminjala položaj Srbije in srbskega naroda.

V političnem srbskem političnem življenju so, čeprav prtajeno, še naprej tlele tudi številne delitve in spopadi, ki jih je mogoče enačiti na več ključnih ravneh: četništvo – partizanstvo, meščansko – komunistično, jugoslovansko – srbsko, srbsko – hrvaško, srbsko – albansko, klerikalno – protiklerikalno, versko – ateistično, monarhistično- republikansko, komunistično – protikomunistično, modernizacijsko – konservativno, srbsko – srbijansko, centralistično – avtonomistično, internacionalistično – protisovjetsko, demokratično – protidemokratično ... Kot da je čas spopade v drugi polovici 20. stoletja le še okrepil. Manjkalo je politične zrelosti, ni bilo politične kulture, nikoli ni bil vzpostavljen nadzor nad oblastjo, ustave so se sprejemale na nedemokratičen način, volitve so bile

organizirane neustrezno, pravo ni nikoli zavladovalo nad političnim in ideološkim, nad političnimi nesomišljeniki se je prepogosto izvajala represija.

V tem kratkem povzetku je navedenih le nekaj tematik, ki označujejo zapleteno zgodovinsko analizo o vlogi in položaju Srbije in srbskega naroda v drugi polovici 20. stoletja.

Ljubodrag Dimić, D.Sc. Serbia in Yugoslavia 1945-1991

The Serbian question is not an unimportant or minor issue of the 20th-century European history. That also holds true of the period starting after World War II and ending in the last decade of the 20th century. We are discussing a complicated phenomenon of dynamic contents, bringing together internal and external factors as well as international order, state and nation, politics, society, economy and culture. It is an issue of a historical phenomenon with all of its state-legal, international, religious, territorial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, ideological, and many other dimensions.

To think about Serbia and the Serbian nation between 1945 and 1991 and trying to understand half a century of Serbian and Yugoslav history means to face a topic with regard to which neither historiography nor other social sciences can provide many real answers, undisputable knowledge, or completely rational outlook on the past period. Many suggestive, stereotypical and emotional answers, stemming from the self-confidence of the Serbian and other Yugoslav and Balkans nations as well as from the need to enforce their own self-image and self-representation, exist about the period of time half a century long. The issue has also been addressed under the pressure of the present, politics and ideology, without taking into account the circumstances at the time, the distribution of power, historical circumstances, and much too often even the basic facts.

The space where the »disembodied« Serbian nation lived in the second half of the 20th century is very complicated in the geographical, geopolitical, geostrategic and historical sense. This abundance of landscapes, state and administrative borders, historical and cultural particularities, as well as political and ideological influences left a clear mark on the Serbian society, defining the reality of life in the Yugoslav socialist community and resulting in the Serbian nation remaining polycentric and disunited even at the turn of the 20th century.

After World War II the Yugoslav state was established in the spirit of the idea of the »partisan Yugoslavism«, supported by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. As far as the question of the Serbian nation was concerned, the politics of the ruling Party were in many aspects burdened by dogmatic and class-related views, based on the past. The theory of the »Greater-Serbian hegemonism« was

accepted uncritically and the perception of the Party structures of the whole Yugoslav space kept establishing itself. Through the Party structures the national policy of the revolutionary subject drew the administrative borders of the Yugoslav republics and divided the Serbian ethnic space. By insisting on the internal division with regard to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav communists built a »federation of balance«, consciously altering the position of Serbia and the Serbian nation by concealing genocide, prohibiting the return of the Serbian colonists to their homes in Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia, imposing various burdensome concepts (»Greater Serbian hegemonism«, the Chetnik movement, monarchism, Cominform, Đilasism, membership in the State Security Administration, liberalism, etc.), denying the Serbian national individuality, preventing the addressing of the Serbian national question, centralising the authorities absolutely, federalising Serbia, and demarcating the federal units in a certain way.

In the Serbian political life many divisions and conflicts continued, even though out of sight. These divisions can be identified at several key levels: Chetniks – partisans, bourgeoisie – communists, Yugoslav – Serbian, Serbian – Croatian, Serbian – Albanian, clerical – anti-clerical, religious – atheist, monarchy – republic, communist – anti-communist, modern – conservative, Serbians living in Serbia – Serbians living outside Serbia, centralist – autonomist, internationalist – anti-Soviet, democratic – anti-democratic, etc. It looked as if the existing conflicts strengthened in the second half of the 20th century. Political maturity and political culture were non-existent. The authorities could act arbitrarily, constitutions were adopted in a non-democratic manner, elections were organised in an unsuitable way, law never ruled the political and ideological, and too often political opponents were subject to repression.

The aforementioned issues in this short summary represent but a fraction of the topic addressing the complicated historical analysis of the role and position of Serbia and the Serbian nation in the second half of the 20th century.

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Bosna i Hercegovina (1943.-1993.) – kratak pregled

Posljednje dvije godine Drugog svetskog rata bile su vrlo važne za Bosnu i Hercegovinu jer je postojalo neslaganje u vezi s njenim statusom, odnosno dvojba vodstva Komunističke partije Jugoslavije između autonomne pokrajine i konstitutivne republike u budućoj socijalističkoj federaciji. Na Drugom zasjedanju AVNOJ-a riješeno je pitanje statusa Bosne i Hercegovine, a tijekom cijelog socijalističkog perioda citirane su odluke i izvodi iz Deklaracije Drugog zasjedanja ZAVNOBiH-a, a datum njegovog održavanja – 25. studeni – slavljeno je kao Dan državnosti BiH, koji se danas obilježava samo u dijelu Federacije BiH s bošnjačkom većinom.

U socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji Bosna i Hercegovina bila je u skupini nerazvijenih republika, ovisna o finansijskim sredstvima Fonda za nerazvijene. Do sredine šezdesetih godina postigla je značajan napredak u svim vrstama djelatnosti. Osim toga, kao središnja republika Jugoslavije, a između Hrvatske i Srbije, bila je zbog višenacionalnog sastava stanovništva neizostavno naglašavana kao primjer očuvanja bratstva i jedinstva jugoslavenskih naroda i narodnosti. Osim toga, u javnom mnijenju vladalo je mišljenje da je bosanskohercegovački prostor srce obrane od spoljne agresije na Jugoslaviju, ali i najčvršći čuvar komunističke vlasti. Dolaskom kriznih 80-ih godina, Bosnu i Hercegovinu potresalo je nekoliko gospodarskih afera i sudskih procesa, a jugoslavenski politički i gospodarski nesporazumi uglavnom su se reflektirali u njenoj svakodnevici, gdje je višenacionalnost predstavljala sve veći teret.

Politički događaji s kraja 80-ih i početka 90-ih godina 20. stoljeća razorili su u potpunosti bosanskohercegovačko društvo građeno tijekom socijalizma i doveli su do četvorogodišnjeg rata u kojem su se desili brojni ratni zločini, genocid i razaranje zajedničkih institucija bosanskohercegovačke vlasti i kulture. Mada je već u rujnu 1991. započela agresija na bosanskohercegovački teritorij, 6. travnja 1992. na dan priznavanja neovisnosti Bosne i Hercegovine počeo je rat koji je samo za jednu godinu (1993.) prerastao u srpsko – bošnjačko – hrvatski sukob, a u dijelu Bosne i u međubošnjački. Do studenog 1995. (Daytonski sporazum) rat je odnio oko stotinu tisuća života, ostavio veliki broj invalida i raselio brojno stanovništvo unutar Bosne i Hercegovine i izvan nje, u inozemstvo. Danas, Bosna i Hercegovina – podijeljena ili sastavljena od dva entiteta, ovisno o tumačenju, pripada zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, novouspostavljenog naziva za politički i gospodarski neefikasne zemlje.

Iz današnje perspektive, istraživanje socijalističkog razdoblja u povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine otvara mnoga pitanja, a na većinu njih nema utemeljenih odgovora u domaćoj historiografiji. Mada od šezdesetih godina u domaćoj znanstvenoj javnosti postoji ideja da se napiše povijest Bosne i Hercegovine do danas nije ostvarena.

Dr. Vera Katz
Bosna in Hercegovina (1943-1993): kratek pregled

Zadnji dve leti druge svetovne vojne sta bili za Bosno in Hercegovino zelo pomembni zaradi nerazumevanja njenega položaja oziroma dvoma vodstva Komunistične partije Jugoslavije glede tega, ali bo v bodoči socialistični federaciji predstavljala avtonomno pokrajino ali konstitutivno republiko. Na drugem zasedanju AVNOJ (Antifašistično vijeće narodnog oslobođenja) je bilo vprašanje položaja Bosne in Hercegovine sicer formalno rešeno, a so bile v vsem socialističnem obdobju navajane predvsem odločitve in sklepi iz deklaracije drugega zasedanja ZAVNOBiH (Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine) 25. novembra 1943 v Mrkonjić Gradu. Ta dan je obeleževan kot Dan državnosti BiH, ki pa se danes slavi samo v delih Federacije BiH, kjer živijo većinoma Bošnjaki.

V socialistični Jugoslaviji je bila Bosna in Hercegovina v skupini nerazvityh republik in s tem odvisna od finančnih sredstev Sklada za nerazvite (Sklad federacije za kreditiranje hitrejšega razvoja gospodarsko manj razvityh republik in Kosova). Do sredine šestdesetih let je dosegla pomemben napredek v vseh dejavnostih. Poleg tega je bila kot zemljepisno osrednja jugoslovanska republika med Hrvaško in Srbijo zaradi večnacionalne sestave prebivalstva neizbežno poudarjena kot primer ohranjanja bratstva in enotnosti jugoslovanskih narodov in narodnosti. Prevladovalo je tudi mnenje, da bosanskohercegovski prostor predstavlja srce obrambe pred zunanjo agresijo na Jugoslavijo in s tem najmočnejšega čuvaja komunistične oblasti. V kriznih osemdesetih letih je Bosna in Hercegovino pretresalo nekaj gospodarskih afer in sodnih procesov, medtem ko so jugoslovanski politični in gospodarski nesporazumi odsevali većinoma v njenem vsakdanu, kjer je njena večnacionalnost predstavljala vse večjo težavo.

Politični dogodki ob koncu osemdesetih in v začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja so bosanskohercegovsko družbo, kakršna se je oblikovala v socialističnem obdobju, tudi pripeljali do štiriletne vojne, v kateri so se zgodili številni vojni zločini, genocid in rušenje skupnih inštitucij bosanskohercegovskih oblasti in kulture. Čeprav se je agresija na bosanskohercegovsko ozemlje pričela že septembra 1991, je vojna izbruhnila 6. aprila 1992, na dan priznanja neodvisnosti BiH. Vojna je le v enem letu (1993) prerasla v srbsko-bošnjaško-

-hrvaški vojaški spopad, v delu Bosne pa celo v medbošnjaški. Do novembra 1995 (Daytonski sporazum) je vojna vzela okoli sto tisoč življenj, pustila veliko število invalidov in razselila številno prebivalstvo tako znotraj BiH kot tudi v inozemstvo. Danes Bosna in Hercegovina, ki je razdeljena oziroma jo sestavljata dve entiteti, odvisno od tolmačenja, spada med države Zahodnega Balkana. Ta predstavlja novonastali naziv za politično in gospodarsko neuspešne države.

Iz današnje perspektive raziskovanje socialističnega obdobja v zgodovini Bosne in Hercegovine odpira številna vprašanja, vendar nanje domačem zgodovino pisje večinoma ne ponuja odgovorov. V domači znanstveni javnosti sicer že od šestdesetih let obstaja ideja o izdelavi sintetične zgodovine Bosne in Hercegovine, vendar ta do danes še ni napisana.

Vera Katz, D.Sc.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (1943-1993): A Short Overview

The last two years of World War II were very important for Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not understand its position or doubted whether it should become an autonomous province or constitutive republic in the future socialist federation. At the second session of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) the question of the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina was solved. However, throughout the socialist period the decisions and conclusions from the second session of ZAVNOBiH (State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were referred to, and the date of 25 November 1943 (Mrkonjić Grad) is the Statehood Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, though, it is only celebrated in the parts of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Bosniak population is in the majority.

In the socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the group of underdeveloped republics and depended on the financial resources from the Underdeveloped Fund (federal fund for providing loans in order to facilitate the development of economically underdeveloped republics and Kosovo). Until the mid-1960s it achieved important progress in all aspects. Furthermore, as the (geographically) central Yugoslav republic, located between Croatia and Serbia, it unavoidably represented a model of preserving the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities due to its multi-national population structure. The opinion that Bosnian-Herzegovinian space represented the heart of the defence from any external aggression against Yugoslavia and that it was the strongest guard of the communist authorities was also prominent. During the 1980s crisis Bosnia and Herzegovina was shaken by a few economic affairs and judicial processes, but everyday life there was mostly affected by the Yugoslav

political and economic disagreements, and its multi-nationality represented an increasingly severe problem.

The political events at the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s involved the whole of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, shaped during the socialist period, in a four-year war, during which numerous war crimes, genocide and destruction of the common institutions of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities and culture took place. Although aggression against the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory began already in September 1991, the war officially started on 6 April 1992, on the day of the recognition of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian independence. In only one year (1993) this war developed into a military conflict between Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, and in parts of Bosnia also in a conflict between Bosniaks. Until November 1995 (Dayton Agreement) this war claimed around 100,000 lives, resulted in a large number of persons with disabilities, and displaced the population within Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as beyond its borders. Today Bosnia and Herzegovina, divided into two entities, belongs – depending on the interpretation – among the states of the Western Balkans, which is the newly-coined expression for politically and economically unsuccessful countries.

From today's perspective the exploration of the socialist period in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina opens many questions, but Bosnian-Herzegovinian historiography does not possess well-founded answers for most of them. Even though in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian scientific community the idea of writing the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has existed since the 1960s, to date this has not been achieved.

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Blagovna menjava Slovenije z drugimi jugoslovanskimi republikami v letih 1945-1991

V drugi jugoslovanski državi je bil v načelu in tudi po ustavi blagovni promet med republikami svoboden in se ni mogel omejiti z republiškimi zakoni. V praksi pa je bilo trgovanje med republikami dokaj omejeno. Ne samo zaradi njihovih avtarkičnih teženj, temveč tudi zaradi težav pri opredelitvi in uzakonitvi pojma enotnega jugoslovanskega trga, ki je bil, razen v ekonomsko političnem pomenu, povsem nedoločljiva kategorija.

V centralno planski gospodarski organiziranosti je bila Slovenija primorana trgovati z jugoslovanskimi republikami, ki so predstavljale veliko tržišče. Njena podjetja so na »južnih trgih« lahko dolgo časa plasirala svoje proizvode in storitve, po katerih na zunanjih, konvertibilnih trgih ni bilo povpraševanja ali so zanje ponujali precej nižje cene. S finančno ugodnimi transakcijami, to je z nakupom poceni surovin in prodajo precej dražjih pol in končnih izdelkov ter storitev, so slovenska podjetja ustvarjala denarne presežke. Del teh sredstev je Slovenija vložila v nadaljnji razvoj in v izboljšanje življenjske ravni, precejšen del pa se je v obliki raznih davščin in prispevkov vrnil v zvezne sklade in sklade drugih, zlasti manj razvitih republik. Ker je znala izrabiti prednosti gospodarske razvitosti in usposobljenosti trgovinskega osebja, je bila v obravnavanih letih struktura njene blagovne menjave z drugimi republikami ves čas ugodna. Medrepubliški blagovni tokovi so zato delovali kot spodbujevalec njega hitrejšega gospodarskega razvoja in rasti neto družbenega proizvoda.

Z izjemo krompirja je bila Slovenija deficitarna v osnovnih kmetijskih pridelkih in proizvodih. Potrebe po žitu, živini oziroma mesu, maščobah, sadju in zelenjavi, pa tudi po posameznih semenih je v največji meri pokrivala z uvozom iz drugih delov države. Količine v posameznih letih so bile odvisne od letine. Slovenski proizvajalci so v drugih republikah prodajali proizvodne presežke. Med posameznimi prodajnimi artikli so tako po količini kot po vrednosti menjave izstopali industrijski izdelki in blago široke porabe.

Zbrani podatki o medrepubliški menjavi pokažejo, da je bilo že v sedemdesetih letih skoraj 70 odstotkov vse blagovne menjave opravljene znotraj posamezne republike. V naslednjem desetletju se je delež nabav izven republiških meja še zmanjšal. Za Slovenijo je veljalo, da je okoli 90 odstotkov njene medrepubliške menjave potekalo s Hrvaško, ožjo Srbijo ter Bosno in Hercegovino. V drugi polovici osemdesetih let so vedno bolj omejeno medrepubliško menjavo

blaga in storitev spremljali predvsem fiskalni in parafiskalni pretoki denarja. Ti pa so bili za Slovenijo neugodni, saj je vsako leto zabeležila visok presežek odливov nad prilivi iz družbenega proizvoda. S Srbijo so se začeli gospodarski stiki trgati leta 1989, s preostalimi republikami pa po desetdnevni vojni junija 1991.

Jože Prinčič, D.Sc.

Exchange of Goods Between Slovenia and Other Yugoslav Republics in the Years from 1945 to 1991

In the second Yugoslav state the commerce between the republics was – in principle as well according to the constitution – free and could not be limited by the laws of individual republics. However, in practice trade between the republics was quite limited. That was not only due to their autarkic tendencies, but also due to the problems of defining and enacting the concept of a single Yugoslav market, which was – except in the economically political sense – a completely indeterminable category.

In the centrally-planned economic system Slovenia had to trade with the Yugoslav republics, which represented a large market. For a long time certain Slovenian companies could place their products and services, for which there was no demand in external, convertible markets or significantly lower prices were offered for them, at the »southern markets«. With financially beneficial transactions – that is, purchase of cheap raw materials and sale of significantly more expensive intermediate and finished goods and services – Slovenian companies were able to ensure profits. Slovenia invested a part of these resources into further development and improvement of living standard, while a significant part returned to federal funds and funds of other, especially less-developed republics, in the form of various taxes and contributions. Because it knew how to take advantage of its economic development and qualifications of its trade personnel, in the years under consideration the structure of its exchange of goods with the other republics was constantly beneficial. Therefore the flows of goods between the republics functioned as a catalyst of the swifter Slovenian economic development and growth of its net social product.

However, with the exception of potatoes, Slovenia had a deficit of basic agricultural commodities and products. It mostly covered its demand for wheat, livestock or meat, fats, fruit and vegetables, as well as various seeds with imports from other parts of Yugoslavia. The amounts in the individual years depended on the harvest. Slovenian producers sold their production surpluses in the other republics. In terms of quantity as well as value of exchange, industrial products and consumer commodities stood out.

The information collected about the exchange between the republics shows

that already in the 1970s almost 70 percent of all exchange of goods was carried out within individual republics. In the following decade the percentage of purchases outside of the borders of individual republics decreased further. As far as Slovenia was concerned, around 90 percent of its exchange between republics took place with Croatia, narrower Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the second half of the 1980s the increasingly limited exchange of goods and services between the republics was accompanied especially by fiscal and parafiscal cash flows. These were inconvenient for Slovenia, which had a high surplus of outflow in comparison to inflow from social product. Slovenia's economic contacts with Serbia started severing in 1989, and with the other republics after the »Ten-Day War« of June 1991.

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Uveljavljanje slovenščine kot uradnega jezika po drugi svetovni vojni

Vprašanje uradnega jezika v federativno preoblikovani Jugoslaviji je nakažovalo na odnos zveznih oblasti do enakopravnosti narodov v državi. Za Slovence z najvišjo stopnjo pismenosti in najvišjimi stopnjami drugih kazalcev, ki kažejo na kulturno razvitost naroda, je bilo jezikovno vprašanje še posebej občutljivo, saj so šli v stoletju pred koncem 2. svetovne vojne skozi različna obdobja, ki so slovenskemu jeziku enkrat namenila nekoliko več pomena, drugič pa so slovenščino potisnila preko roba uradnega v povsem zasebno sfero.

V povojnih ustavah, zvezni iz leta 1946 in slovenski iz leta 1947, položaj uradnega jezika še ni bil natančno definiran, prav tako pa se položaj ni zbistril ob spreminjanjih ustavnega sistema v naslednjih desetletjih. Slovenščina se je uveljavila kot uradni jezik v Sloveniji, njen položaj v zveznih organih pa je bil nedorečen, zato je prihajalo do nejasnosti in tudi sporov, ki so zbujali očitke o šovinizmu. Še najslabše je bila enakopravnost jezikov spoštovana v tistih zveznih ustanovah, ki so delovale na celotnem ozemlju države, npr. v vojski, na železnici itd.

Najprej so izobraženci sprožili vprašanja jezikovne politike pri kulturni ustvarjalnosti, ob začetku šestdesetih let pa so temu vprašanju večjo pozornost posvetili tudi v slovenski politiki. Leta 1962 je npr. postalo vprašanje aktualno ob ponovnem ustanavljanju PEN centrov v Jugoslaviji, leta 1965 pa je prvič uradno izjavo z zahtevo po še širši uveljavitvi slovenskega jezika izdal tudi slovenski politični vrh, tj. izvršni odbor Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije. Sledile so še bolj občutljive zadeve in leta 1966 so bile sprožene razprave o zapostavljanju slovenščine na račun srbohrvaščine v jugoslovanskih oblastnih organih in v vojski. Na kritike se je ob krepitevi moči federalnih enot odzvala tudi zvezna oblast in jezikovni politiki namenila več pozornosti. Ob tem je seveda naletela tudi na povsem realne ovire, npr. na pomanjkanje ustrezno izobraženih prevajalcev.

Sredi sedemdesetih let se je položaj navidezno umiril, a se je problematika (ne)enakopravnosti jezikov v Jugoslaviji na javno sceno vnovič vrnila v kriznih osemdesetih letih.

Aleš Gabrič, D.Sc.

Assertion of the Slovenian Language as the Official Language After World War II

The question of the official language in the federally transformed Yugoslavia indicated the attitude of the federal authorities towards the equality of the nations in the state. For Slovenians with their highest literacy rate and highest rates of other indicators related to the national cultural development, the question of language was especially sensitive, since in the century before the end of World War II they had gone through various periods when the Slovenian language was either somewhat more important or pushed out of official use into the completely private sphere.

In the post-war constitutions – the Federal Constitution of 1946 and the Slovenian Constitution of 1947 – the position of the official language had not yet been precisely defined, and the situation did not become any clearer during the changes of the constitutional system in the following decades. Slovenian came into use as the official language in Slovenia, but its position in the federal bodies was unspecified, which resulted in uncertainty as well as disputes, resulting in reproaches with chauvinism. The equality of languages was especially disregarded in those federal institutions which functioned in the whole territory of Yugoslavia, for example in the army, railroad, etc.

Initially intellectuals raised the questions of the language policy in the field of cultural creativity, and in the beginning of the 1960s greater attention was also paid to this in the Slovenian politics. For example, in 1962 the issue became topical during the reestablishment of PEN centres in Yugoslavia, and in 1965 the first official statement and demand for a wider assertion of the Slovenian language was also made by the Slovenian political leadership, the so-called Executive Committee of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Slovenia. Even more sensitive matters followed and in 1966 discussions began about the neglect of the Slovenian language on account of Serbo-Croatian in the Yugoslav authority bodies and in the army. In view of the strengthening of federal units, the federal authorities responded to the criticism and paid more attention to the language policy. Of course, here it came across completely realistic obstacles, for example the lack of suitably educated translators.

In the middle of the 1970s the situation seemed to calm down, but the problem of the (un)equality of languages in Yugoslavia returned to the public scene during the crisis in the 1980s.

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Odlepljanje : jugoslovanstvo in ne-jugoslovanstvo v besedilih slovenskih intelektualcev v osemdesetih letih

Avtor izhaja iz misli, da je v osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja v slovenski javnosti potekal proces odlepljanja slovenstva od jugoslovanstva. Za preverjanje te trditve, predvsem pa za boljše razumevanje fenomena, je potrebna obsežna historično-diskurzivna analiza. Kljub temu ima ta teza dobro utemeljitev v samih tekstih, napisanih v osemdesetih letih. Produkcija člankov, referatov, esejev, elaboratov in programskih tekstov na temo slovenskega narodnega vprašanja oz. problematike nacionalizma/narodov, je bila v osemdesetih letih zelo bogata. V spominski literaturi, publicistiki in tudi večini zgodovinopisja se izpostavlja vloga posameznih osebnosti in njihova vpetost v politični sistem. Avtor meni, da bi morali iz metodoloških razlogov začasno »pozabiti«, kdo je pisal določen tekst (kakšne so bile njegove funkcije, zveze, ugled) in se vprašati, kaj nam pove samo besedilo. Ne zato, da bi zanemarili politični in družbeni kontekst, prav nasprotno, da bi kontekst bolje razumeli. In da bi bolje razumeli pomen besedil za nacionalistično zaznavanje družbenih razmerij.

Po mnenju ameriškega zgodovinarja Johna Pococka je glavna naloga zgodovinarja političnih idej identificirati in rekonstruirati politični jezik. Slovenski intelektualci, ki so delovali v različnih forumih (npr. Društvo slovenskih pisateljev, Nova revija, Plenum kulturnih delavcev OF itd.), so uporabljali specifičen kulturno-politični jezik oz. izrazje. Opazna je močna zavest o njihovi lastni pomembnosti. Intelektualci nastopajo kot duhovni voditelji naroda. Stil pisanja je običajno visoko intelektualen in prefinjen, celo namenoma težko razumljiv, vendar kljub temu oseben in polemičen. Pogosta je uporaba zgodovine za argumentacijo ambicioznih tez o naravi in karakterju slovenskega naroda. Iz zgodovinskega konteksta pa vzamejo le tisto, kar jim ustreza. Slovenski teoretiki naroda tako niso bili nevtralni, načeloma nepristranska filozofska oz. sociološka teoretska orodja uporabljajo v »narodne namene«. Vse težave pozne socialistične družbe se povezujejo s položajem slovenskega naroda (npr. inflacija, tehnološko zaostajanje, mednarodni odnosi). Značilno je izvirno mešanje različnih ravni. Temeljite analize teoretskih razprav kažejo, da se prepletajo z osebnimi izkušnjami in anekdotami, zgodovinski primeri se prepletajo z opisom težav socialistične družbe.

Kakšna je vloga Jugoslavije v teh besedilih? Biti slovensko zaveden, a jugoslovansko kritičen je postajalo moderno. Nekatere negativne občečloveške lastnosti so obravnavane kot tipično jugoslovanske (neuspešnost, lenoba, igno-

ranca), nekatere pozitivne pa kot tipično slovenske (pridnost, razvitost, kulturnost). Kljub temu preseneča predvsem odsotnost Jugoslavije. Jugoslavija se v teh tekstih omenja samo takrat, ko je to res nujno. Kot da bi se je sramovali. Slovensko jugoslovanstvo se v njih počasi »odleplja« kot star plakat na ulici, »odpada« od slovenstva prav s pomočjo odsotnosti. Slovenski intelektualci se rajši kot z Jugoslavijo ukvarjajo sami s sabo. Njihova domovina je Srednja Evropa, Evropa, svet, Zahodna civilizacija, »književna republika«, krščanstvo in predvsem Slovenija, nikakor pa ne Jugoslavija. Seveda obstajajo izjeme, ki iščejo mesto slovenskega naroda v SFRJ z utrditvijo in jasnim definiranjem pravice do samoodločbe naroda (npr. Janko Pleterški) ali z redefinicijo odnosov med republikami federativne Jugoslavije (npr. France Klopčič).

Marko Zajc, D.Sc.

Detachment: Yugoslavism and non-Yugoslavism in the Texts of Slovenian Intellectuals in the 1980s

The author builds on the idea that during the 1980s the process of detaching the Slovenian from the Yugoslav took place in the Slovenian public. An extensive historical and discourse analysis should be carried out in order to verify this theory and especially in order to better understand this phenomenon. Nevertheless this thesis is well-supported by the very texts written during the 1980s. In that period the production of articles, papers, essays, elaborates and programme texts dealing with the issue of the Slovenian national question or the problem of nationalism/nations was very prolific. Memoirs, the press, as well as the majority of historiography underlined the role of individual personalities and their involvement in the political system. The author believes that due to methodological reasons we should temporarily »forget« who wrote a certain text (what their functions, connections and reputation were) and ask ourselves what the texts themselves can tell us. Not in order to disregard the political and social context – quite the opposite, with the aim of understanding this context better, as well as to better comprehend the importance of these texts for the nationalist perception of social relations.

According to American historian John Pocock the main task of the historian of political ideas is to identify and reconstruct the political language. Slovenian intellectuals, active in the context of various forums (e.g. Slovenian Writers' Association, Nova revija magazine, Plenum of the Liberation Front Cultural Workers, etc.) used specific cultural-political language or terminology. A strong awareness of their own importance is evident. The intellectuals act as the nation's spiritual leaders. The style of writing is usually highly intellectual and refined, even intentionally hard to understand, but still personal and controver-

sial. In order to present arguments for ambitious theories about the nature and character of the Slovenian nation, the authors of these texts would frequently resort to history. However, they would only take what suited them out of the historical context. Thus Slovenian national theorists were not neutral and they used what are in principle impartial philosophical or sociological theoretical tools for »national purposes«. All the problems of the late socialist society are associated with the position of the Slovenian nation (i.e. inflation, technological lag, international relations). Original mixing of various levels is a characteristic feature. Detailed analyses of theoretical discussions reveal that these are intertwined with personal experience and anecdotes, and historical examples blend with the descriptions of the problems of the socialist society.

What is the role of Yugoslavia in these texts? To be a Slovenian patriot but critical towards Yugoslavia gradually became fashionable. Certain negative generally human traits are seen as typically Yugoslav (lack of success, laziness, ignorance), and certain positive characteristics are deemed as typically Slovenian (diligence, development, culture). Nevertheless, what is most surprising is the absence of Yugoslavia. In these texts Yugoslavia is only mentioned when absolutely necessary. As if the authors were ashamed of it. Slovenian Yugoslavism gradually »peels away« like an old street poster, it »detaches« from Slovenianism precisely by means of absence. Rather than on Yugoslavia Slovenian intellectuals focus on themselves. Their homeland is Central Europe, Europe, the world, the Western civilisation, »republic of literature«, Christianity, and above all Slovenia, by no means Yugoslavia. Of course, there are exceptions looking for a place for the Slovenian nation within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through strengthening and clearly defining the right to national self-determination (e.g. Janko Pleterški) or through redefining the relations between the republics of the federal Yugoslavia (i.e. France Klopčič).

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Obljube in dejstva o samostojni državi ali nekaj vprašanj za osamosvojitelje

Suverena, demokratična pravna in socialna država Slovenija bo temeljila »na človekovih svoboščinah, delu in podjetništvu, na socialni pravičnosti in varnosti za vse, na ekološki odgovornosti ter najboljših demokratičnih slovenskih in evropskih tradicijah.«

(Iz izjave Skupščine Republike Slovenije o dobrih namenih, sprejete 21. novembra 1990)

Tema o razpadu Jugoslavije in osamosvojitvi Slovenije je nujno večplastna, tudi protislovna (noben zgodovinski proces ni absolutno pozitiven in tudi ne absolutno negativen, ocene pa se največkrat dajejo s stališča trenutnih razmer). Poleg tega zgodovina ni laboratorij in ne moremo preveriti, kakšen bi bil proces zgodovinskega dogajanja, če do razpada Jugoslavije in osamosvojitve Slovenije ne bi prišlo. Ali če bi prišlo na drugačen način, kot je. Lahko po načelu t. i. *if history* le predpostavljamo. V Sloveniji ima zastavljanje takih vprašanj neizbežno tudi ideološko konotacijo. Poglejmo na problem z dveh vidikov:

1. Ocene in samoocene o vlogi Slovenije v razpadu Jugoslavije.
2. Tedanjih napovedi, predpostavk in obljub z današnjega vidika.

1. Ocene in samoocene o vlogi Slovenije v razpadu Jugoslavije časovno lahko razdelimo na tedanje (aktualno-politične) in kasnejše (deloma politične, deloma družboslovne, humanistične, zgodovinske in druge.) Tedanje ocene velikega dela jugoslovanske javnosti, politikov, novinarjev in drugih piscev (z delno izjemo Hrvaške) so bile, da se Slovenija želi odcepiti in da bo to povzročilo razpad Jugoslavije. Ocene, kdaj naj bi se ta proces začel, so bile različne, najpogosteje začetek vidijo v približno sočasnem vzponu nacionalne (nacionalistične opozicije) v Sloveniji in začetku reformističnih procesov v ZKS z nastopom Milana Kučana. Nekatere ocene sicer izhajajo iz stališča, da je bila odcepitev cilj vseh povojnih slovenskih političnih garnitur. Oceno o krivdi Slovenije je (z niansami v interpretaciji) v glavnem prevzel tudi velik del evropske politike in diplomacije, še bolj velja to za ZDA. Ta interpretacija zanemarja notranje procese v Jugoslaviji, na katere je lahko Slovenija vplivala le deloma, pa tudi zunanjepolitične (konec hladne vojne, propad socializma, razpadanje vzhodno-evropskega bloka in Sovjetske zveze, integracijski procesi v Evropi). Kasneje se je to stališče zaradi nadaljevanja vojne v Jugoslaviji in še posebej zaradi intervencije sil NATA proti Miloševiću (1999), začelo spreminjati in Milošević

je (tudi zaradi smrti Franja Tuđmana in Alije Izetbegovića, preden ju je doseglo haško sodišče) postal glavni krivec za krvavi razpad Jugoslavije. Je pa stališče o slovenski krivdi ali vsaj odgovornosti kljub temu še vedno pogosto, ne samo v diplomaciji, pač pa tudi v družboslovju in humanistiki. Ne nazadnje je slovenska politična elita v kasneje hitro pozabljeni Izjavi o dobrih namenih, sprejeti tik pred plebiscitom, dala naslednjo obljubo: »S tem sprejema Republika Slovenija svoj delež odgovornosti za demokratizacijo na celotnem področju sedanje Jugoslavije tudi pred mednarodno javnostjo.«

V Sloveniji tezo o Sloveniji kot »razbijalki Jugoslavije« že od začetka zanikajo tako politika kot humanistične in družboslovne stroke. Ne sicer v celoti: del je skušal obdržati kritično oz. bolj problematizirano distanco, a pod vplivom medijev in politike prevladuje mitiziran pogled na osamosvojitve, v katerem je Slovenija izključno žrtev tedanjih razmer. Pri čemer, paradoksalno, tezi o odcepitvi (in s tem začetku razpada Jugoslavije) implicitno, včasih pa tudi eksplisitno, pritrjuje krog ljudi, ki si pripisuje glavne zasluge za osamosvojitve. Še najbolj nazorno ga ponazarja stavek predsednika Demosa dr. Jožeta Pučnika po plebiscitu: »Jugoslavije ni več, Jugoslavije ni več!«, ki je bil prva neposredna negacija Izjave o dobrih namenih (Pučnik je v nasprotju z Izjavo o dobrih namenih in v obrambo nacionalno čiste Slovenije - taka naj bi postala iz ekonomskih razlogov - nastopil že pred plebiscitom, 17. decembra 1990 v Ljutomeru). Odcepitev naj bi se sicer po tej mitizirani verziji začela s 57. številko Nove revije. V najbolj radikalnih interpretacijah naj bi bila osamosvojitve izpeljana tudi v boju s projugoslovanskimi »domaćimi izdajalci« na čelu z Milanom Kučanom.

Ker je koncept nacionalnih in etnično čistih držav, ki so izšle iz nekdanje Jugoslavije v mednarodni politiki, zbuja dvome, naj bi v slovenskem primeru šlo za »pasivni« nacionalizem, torej za reakcijo na srbski nacionalizem, sočasno pa tudi za reakcijo na nedemokratske razmere v Jugoslaviji in tudi v Sloveniji. V resnici je bilo nacionalno vprašanje, kar je nazorno pokazal kasnejši razvoj v samostojni državi, postavljeno pred demokracijo, koliko je bil ta nacionalizem »pasiven«, pa je kasneje pokazal primer izbranih, ne nazadnje pa tudi dejstvo, da priseljenci iz nekdanjih jugoslovanskih republik v Sloveniji še danes nimajo pravic manjšin, pa dolgoletno oviranje gradnje džamije ter še vrsta drugih primerov, temelječih na predsodkih in ksenofobiji.

V pravnem smislu je neugoden zven besede odcepitev zamenjala diplomatska definicija tedanjega predsedstva o razdružitvi, kar je (na srečo Slovenije in Hrvaške) v svojo interpretacijo razpada Jugoslavije vključila tudi Badinterjeva komisija. Sicer pa velja tudi spomniti, da ima Slovenija kot samostojna država do podobnih pravic drugih narodov, kot jih je ob osamosvojitvi zahtevala sama, zelo dvoličen odnos.

2. Tedanje razprave, napovedi, predpostavke in obljube pa tudi strankarski programi so izhajali iz prepričanja, da Slovenija ne sodi v balkanski civilizacijski krog, pač pa v (srednje) evropskega, da bo Slovincem v samostojni državi bistveno bolje, ker denar ne bo odtekal v Beograd, imela naj bi učinkovito kapitalistično gospodarstvo, v katerega naj se politika ne bi vtikala, bistveno manj naj bi dajala za vojsko kot je morala za JLA, bila naj bi celo nevtralna ali brez vojske, neprimerno manj naj bi bila zadolžena, standard naj bi bil višji. S samostojno državo naj bi se znebili histerizacije političnega prostora in permanentnih izrednih razmer, večstrankarstvo naj bi avtomatično prineslo tudi demokracijo, skratka Slovenija naj bi bila na vseh področjih od šolstva, kulture, medijev in vseh drugih družbenih segmentov bistveno na boljšem, postala naj bi nekakšna »balkanska Švica.« V resnici je odhod iz »balkanskega civilizacijskega kroga« (ki se v zadnjih letih skozi kulturo in umetnost postopoma obnavlja, za večino Slovencev pa je nekdanji srbohrvaški jezik še vedno prvi tuji jezik) pomenil intelektualno in kulturno osiromašenje, saj ni bil avtomatično zamenjan z evropskim, standard se je zvišal za ozek del elit, ne pa za večino prebivalstva, hkrati je prišlo do razpada družbene kohezivnosti. Zadolženost Slovenije je danes višja, kot je bila za časa cele Jugoslavije skupaj, za vojsko daje več in obremenjena je s prodajo orožja in korupcijskimi aferami, militarizacija ni manjša, ampak kvečjemu večja, slovenska vojska je na nekaterih kriznih žariščih v službi ZDA in v resnici okupacijska vojska. Stanje demokracije je višje zgolj formalno, histerizacija družbe pa je večja kot v jugoslovanskih časih, ali vsaj ne bistveno manjša. (Podobno kot v jugoslovanskih časih se je po osamosvojitvi znašla celo na robu državnega udara). In kar je najhuje: Slovenija je zabetonirana v osamosvojitvena razmerja in izgublja poosamosvojitveno generacijo, ki bodisi beži iz države, bodisi vegetira brez prihodnosti. S kritiko dvajsetletnega razvoja se, ironično, vsaj kar zadeva ekonomsko stanje in demokracijo večinoma strinjajo tudi resnični ali domnevni osamosvojitelji in najbolj goreči zagovorniki nacionalne države kot »konca« zgodovine. Le da vzrokov ne vidijo v lastnem pohlepu, privatizaciji osamosvojitve, korupciji in klientelizmu, ki so ju ustvarili, pač pa v jugonostalgiji, prevladi starih sil, zarotah, ki naj bi preprečile, da bi t. i. pomladna opcija začete procese pripeljala do konca.

Božo Repe, D.Sc.
**Promises and Facts about the Independent State or a Few Questions
for the Emancipators**

The sovereign, democratic, social state of Slovenia, governed by the rule of law, will be based »on people's freedoms, work and enterprise, social justice and security for all, ecological responsibility and the finest Slovenian and European democratic traditions.«

(From the Statement of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia on Good Intentions, adopted on 21 November 1990)

The topic of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and attainment of Slovenian independence is always multilayered and contradictory (historical processes are never absolutely positive or absolutely negative, and evaluations are most often made from the viewpoint of current circumstances). Furthermore, history is not a laboratory, so we cannot check what the process of the historical development would have been if the dissolution of Yugoslavia and attainment of the Slovenian independence had not taken place. Or if it had happened in a different way. According to the principle of the so-called »if history« we can only presume. In Slovenia these questions also have unavoidable ideological connotations. Let us look at the problem from two viewpoints:

1. Evaluations and self-evaluations of the Slovenian role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia

2. Contemporary predictions, presumptions and promises from the current point of view.

1. Temporally the evaluations and self-evaluations of the Slovenian role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be divided into contemporary (topical, political) and subsequent (partly political, partly pertaining to social sciences, humanities, history, etc.). The evaluations of the major part of the Yugoslav public, politicians, journalists and other writers (with the partial exception of Croatia), made at the time, were that Slovenia wanted to secede and that this would result in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The estimates about when this process supposedly started varied. Most often the approximately concurrent rise of the national (nationalistic) opposition in Slovenia and the onset of the reformist processes in the League of Communists of Slovenia with the rise of Milan Kučan were identified as the beginning. Some estimates build on the viewpoint that secession was the goal of all post-war Slovenian political circles. The opinion about the Slovenian guilt was (with nuances in interpretation) also adopted by the majority of the European politics and diplomacy, and even to a greater degree by the United States. This interpretation fails to take account of the internal processes in Yugoslavia, which Slovenia could only influence

partially, as well as foreign-political processes (the end of the Cold War, decline of socialism, dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, integration processes in Europe). Later this viewpoint – due to the continuation of the war in Yugoslavia and especially because of the intervention of the NATO forces against Milošević (1999) – started to change. Milošević (also due to the death of Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović, before they could be summoned by the International Court of Justice in Hague) became the main culprit responsible for the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the conviction of the Slovenian guilt or at least responsibility is still frequently encountered, not only in diplomacy, but also in social sciences and humanities. After all, the Slovenian political elite made the following pledge in their Statement of Good Intentions, adopted immediately before the referendum and quickly forgotten after that: »Thus the Republic of Slovenia accepts its share of responsibility for the democratisation in the whole territory of what is now Yugoslavia, also in front of the international community.«

In Slovenia the theory of it being the »disintegrator of Yugoslavia« has been denied by the politics as well as experts in humanities and social sciences ever since the beginning. Not completely, though: some people tried to keep a critical or more problematised distance, but under the influence of the media and politics the mythicised outlook on the Slovenian attainment of independence prevails, picturing Slovenia exclusively as the victim of the circumstances at the time. Paradoxically the theory of secession (and thus the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia) is implicitly or sometimes explicitly confirmed by the circle of people who take most of the credit for Slovenian emancipation. This is most evidently illustrated by the statement of Dr. Jože Pučnik, the president of Demos (Democratic Opposition of Slovenia), made after the referendum: »Yugoslavia is gone, Yugoslavia is gone!«, which was the first direct negation of the Statement of Good Intentions. (Even before the referendum, on 17 December 1990 in the town of Ljutomer, Pučnik had spoken in breach of the Statement of Good Intentions and the defence of nationally pure Slovenia – the reasons for that were supposedly economical). According to this mythicised version of events the secession supposedly began with the 57th issue of the *Nova revija* magazine. According to the most radical interpretations, the attainment of Slovenian independence was also carried out in a struggle against pro-Yugoslav »Slovenian traitors«, headed by Milan Kučan.

As the concept of nationally and ethnically clean countries, stemming from the former Yugoslavia, rose doubts in the international politics, in the Slovenian case nationalism was supposedly »passive« – a reaction against Serbian nationalism and simultaneously a reaction against the non-democratic situation in Yugoslavia as well as Slovenia. But in fact the national issue was more important than the issue of democracy, which was clearly shown by the subsequent

developments in the independent country. To what degree this nationalism was »passive« was later shown by the case of the so-called The Erased, by the fact that the immigrants from the former Yugoslav republics living in Slovenia do not have any minority rights even today, by the long-term obstruction of the building of a mosque in Ljubljana, as well as by a long list of examples based on prejudice and xenophobia.

In the legal sense the inconvenient implication of the word »secession« was replaced by the word »dissolution«, which was a diplomatic definition of the contemporary presidency. Fortunately (for Slovenia and Croatia), this was included in the Badinter Commission's interpretation of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Furthermore we should note that Slovenia as an independent country has a very hypocritical attitude to the similar rights of other nations as it demanded for itself during its emancipation process.

2. The contemporary discussions, predictions, presuppositions, promises as well as programmes of political parties built on the conviction that Slovenia did not belong to the civilisation of the Balkans. Instead it was supposedly (Central) European. Slovenians would do much better in their own country, because money would not flow to Belgrade. It would allegedly have an efficient capitalist economy without the interference of politics, it would allocate far less resources for its armed forces as it had had to do in case of the Yugoslav People's Army, it would even be neutral or without an army, far less indebted, and the living standard would be higher. After the independent state was established, Slovenia would supposedly get rid of the hysterics involved in the political space and the permanent state of emergency. The multi-party system would allegedly automatically result in democracy. In short: in all the fields – education, culture, media, and all other social segments – Slovenia would be better off by far, and it would become a kind of »Switzerland in the Balkans«. But in truth the exit from the »civilisation of the Balkans« (which has been gradually restoring in the recent years through culture and art, and for most Slovenians the former Serbo-Croatian language is still the second language) resulted in intellectual and cultural impoverishment, as it was not automatically replaced by the European space, the standard only improved for certain narrow elites, not for the majority of the population, and simultaneously the social cohesion has dissolved. Today Slovenian debt is higher than the total Yugoslav debt had ever been. It allocates more money for the army. It is burdened by weapons sales and corruption affairs. Militarization has not diminished, more likely it is the other way around. Furthermore, in certain hot spots Slovenia is in the service of the United States, acting as an actual occupation army. The level of democracy is only formally higher, and hysterisation of society is only greater than in Yugoslavia, or at least it has not significantly receded. (After Slovenia had attained independence, it even found itself on the brink of a coup d'état, similarly as in the Yugoslav

times.) And what is worst: Slovenia is immobilised by its emancipation relations and it is losing the generation which grew up after its emancipation: either people are running from the country or they stagnate without any future. Ironically, the actual or supposed emancipators and most fervent supporters of the national state as the »end« of history mostly agree with the criticism of the twenty-year-long development, at least as far as the state of economy and democracy is concerned. The only difference is that they do not see the reasons in their own greed, privatisation of the emancipation process, corruption and clientelism, which they have created. Instead they feel threatened by the nostalgia for the Yugoslav state, dominion of old forces and conspiracies aimed at the prevention of the so-called Spring Option's efforts to complete the processes it had started.

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Iz juga na sever : migracije v Slovenijo v kontekstu izgradnje urbanih okolij na primeru Nove Gorice

Nova Gorica je zrasla po koncu druge svetovne vojne, ko je območje postalo mejna regija med Italijo in Jugoslavijo. Svoj edinstveni značaj je pridobila zaradi načina nastanka – zaradi urbanizacijskih strategij, industrijskega razvoja ter priseljevanja ljudi z vseh strani Jugoslavije. Ker je bilo mesto mlado, so prvi prebivalci oblikovali multikulturno skupnost, v kateri ni bilo tiste napetosti med priseljenci in prvotnimi prebivalci, ki smo je sicer vajeni. A po razglasitvi slovenske neodvisnosti leta 1991 so tisti prebivalci Nove Gorice, ki etnično niso bili slovenskega izvora, postali »tujci« v lastnem mestu.

Ta pojav v Novi Gorici poraja vprašanja integracije, asimilacije ali etničnega izločanja, posebno zato, ker so priseljenci izbrali različne načine izražanja svoje narodne identitete. Prispevek kaže, da je ohranjanje identitete potekalo na različne načine; strategije ohranjanja identitete so bile osnovane na tradicijah, ki jih je v določenih primerih bilo potrebno ponovno vzpostaviti, kajti ob prihodu v Slovenijo so bili nekateri priseljenci premladi, da bi sploh opazili spremembe v svojem okolju, še posebej zato, ker so se ves čas premikali zgolj znotraj meja ene same države, takratne Jugoslavije.

Glavne razloge za priseljevanje v Slovenijo v dobi SFRJ lahko delimo na ekonomske, osebne in družinske, politične in »drugo«. Ekonomski priseljenci so tvorili večino; tisti, ki so v Sloveniji videli možnost izboljšave svojega ekonomskega položaja ali družbenega položaja svojih družin. Družine, ki so sledile ekonomskim priseljencem, tvorijo drugo veliko priseljsko skupino. Osebni razlogi za priseljevanje so bili mnogoteri, odvisni od vsakega posameznika ter njegovega specifičnega položaja. Skupina, ki jo lahko kategoriziramo kot »drugo«, je vsebovala državne uradnike (vojska, administracija, carina), ki si niso sami izbirali lokacije priseljevanja – v Slovenijo so bili dodeljeni glede na navodila državne administracije. Te preместitve vojaškega osebja na mejna območja slovenske države v prvem obdobju po drugi svetovni vojni so bile edini resnično velik priseljski val v Slovenijo. Nalogo obrambe državne meje so izpolnjevali predvsem mladi vojaki iz Srbije ter Hrvaške.

Priseljevanje v Slovenijo je naraščalo nenehno, a počasi do sedemdesetih let, ko pa se je zaradi slovenske ekonomske rasti število priseljencev tako rekoč podvojilo. Večina priseljencev je prihajala iz Bosanske Krajine, Bosanske Posavine, vzhodne Srbije ter iz juga Srbije ter drugih območji. Ta migracijski val je najverjetneje bil večji in širši, kot pričajo uradni dokumenti popisa prebivalstva

pred letom 1991, kajti premiki so se dogajali znotraj enovite države in priseljenci niso bili primorani prijaviti svojega prihoda v druge dele države. V vsakem primeru so procesi priseljevanja korenito spreminjali in oblikovali multikulturno sestavo prebivalstva.

Na primeru priseljevanja v Novo Gorico je možen vpogled v kompleksno tematiko migracije v Slovenijo iz drugih jugoslovanskih republik pred 1991 ter ustvarjanje urbane identitete pred in po letu 1991. Obenem prikazuje tudi razvoj obmejne regije kot mostu, ki je združeval *vzhod* in *zahod*, *tihotapstvo* in *potrošništvo*.

Kaja Širok, D.Sc.

From South to Nord : Migration in Slovenia in the Context of Construction of Urban Environments : the Case of Nova Gorica

The town of Nova Gorica was built after the Second World War when the region was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. The complex historical development of Nova Gorica- with its urbanization strategies, industrial development and subsequent waves of immigration to from all over Yugoslavia have created a peculiar city with a unique identity. Since the city is relatively young, its first inhabitants established a multicultural community which was void of the frictions that typically occur between locals and newcomers. After Slovenia's declaration of independence in 1991, however, lots of people in the town, as well as throughout Slovenia, suddenly became »foreigners« because of their non-Slovenian ethnic origin.

This phenomenon in Nova Gorica prompts questions of integration, assimilation or ethnic exclusion, especially as immigrants choose different ways of expressing their national identity. As this presentation is going to demonstrate this was done in different ways. Identity strategies have been based on tradition which was in some cases rebuilt, since at their arrival in Slovenia some immigrants were too young to notice changes in their new environment, especially when they were only moving within the borders of what was then one country, Yugoslavia.

The main reasons for emigration to Slovenia can be classified as economic, personal and family matters, political and »other reasons«. Economic migrants formed the majority of those who emigrants; those who saw the possibility for improvement of their economic position or their entire family's social status. Families who followed the economic immigrants comprised the second major migration group. The personal reasons for migration were hugely varied, changing from person to person and depending on their situations. The migration group classified under »other reasons« consisted mainly of state employees

(of the national army, administration, and customs). They did not choose their migration location since they were sent by decree to various parts of Slovenia by the state administration. These transfers of the Yugoslavian army to the borders of the Slovenian state presented in the first period after the Second World War the only major migration wave in Slovenia. The mission to safeguard the state border was executed by young soldiers, mainly from Serbia and Croatia.

Migration to Slovenia was increasing slightly but constantly until the 1970s, but after extensive economic growth in Slovenia in the middle of the 1970s the number of immigrants virtually doubled. The majority of immigrants arrived from Bosanska Krajina, Bosanska Posavina, eastern Serbia and communities in the south of Serbia. We presume that the picture of migration processes in Slovenia from the other parts of the former federal state is incomplete and inadequate. The migration waves were likely larger and wider than was registered in censuses before 1991, for the migration process was taking place inside a uniform state and immigrants were not required to register their arrival in a new environment. In any case, the migration processes significantly changed the national composition of the population.

Presenting the case of the town of Nova Gorica the presentation will show the complex themes of migration to Slovenia from other Yugoslav countries before 1991 and the creation of urban identity before and after 1991. At the same time it will also explain the development of the border region as a bridge from East and West, smuggling and consumption.

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Življenjska raven Slovencev v drugi Jugoslaviji

O vprašanju življenjske ravni v pravem pomenu besede ni moč govoriti do leta 1952, ko je bil v veljavi sistem zagotovljene preskrbe. Kako izboljšati življenjske pogoje prebivalstva v Jugoslaviji, s tem tudi v Sloveniji, je na sredini petdesetih let sprva poudarjeno postala ena od prioriternih nalog socialistične družbene ureditve Družbeni plan gospodarskega razvoja LR Slovenije, načrtan v okoliščinah preobrazbe slovenske družbe iz ruralne v industrijsko družbo leta 1958, je povzročil, da se je ekonomska politika preusmerila v bolj uravnotežena vlaganja in poskrbela za razvijanje dejavnosti, ki vplivajo na življenjsko raven. Industrija se je v prid proizvodnje blaga široke potrošnje začela gibati po letu 1956.

Podatki o porabi slovenskih gospodinjstev za čas 195 –1990 kažejo, da so razpoložljiva sredstva (proračuni) gospodinjstev, namenjena za osebno potrošnjo, postopoma in stalno naraščala. Delež sredstev za posamezne kategorije dobrin v potrošni košarici se je razvijal v smeri postopnega dviga življenjske ravni. Razmerja med dejavniki oblikovanja življenjske ravni (minimalni življenjski stroški, gibanje plač in kupna moč) med 1955-1990 kažejo, da sta kupna moč in življenjska raven vse do leta 1980 naraščali in se izboljševali. Po letu 1980 pa so realne plače in kupna moč začeli nazadovati. Gospodinjstva so v vsem obdobju največji delež družinskega proračuna namenjala za nakupe osnovnih življenjskih potrebščin; delež teh je sčasoma upadal, a je še vedno ostajal najpomembnejši. Najnižji je bil v sedemdesetih letih: v povprečju je znašal 72,8 %. Ljudje so v sedemdesetih letih za osnovne življenjske potrebščine porabili v povprečju za okoli 10 % manj sredstev kot leta 1960 ali konec osemdesetih let. Takrat je prišlo do bistvenih sprememb v obsegu in strukturi razpoložljivih in porabljenih sredstev za osebno porabo. V strukturi življenjskih stroškov se je zmanjšal delež izdatkov za hrano, obleko in obutev ter povečal delež za trajnejše potrošniške dobrine, za gradnjo ter vzdrževanje stanovanj in delež prihrankov. Ljudje so več trošili tudi za pijačo, tobak, kulturo in izobrazbo ter higieno. Hkrati se je izboljšala tudi kvaliteta porabe živil. Zmanjšala se je poraba žit (moke, kruha, testenin) in maščob; zvečala pa se je poraba mesa in mesnih izdelkov ter rib, olja, mleka, sira, jajc, sadja in vrtnin. Prišlo je do velikega zanimanja in porabe industrijskih izdelkov višjega standarda, kot so televizorji, gospodinjiski aparati (električni štedilniki, hladilniki, pralni stroji) in osebni avtomobili.

V kriznih osemdesetih, ko je pojmovanje boljšega življenjskega standarda kot razvojnega cilja pri prebivalstvu presešlo zgolj gmotno plat in je vključeva-

lo tudi druge sestavine življenja, je na trgu blaga široke porabe Slovenija imela kolikor toliko ugodno konjunkturo. Sredstva za osebno porabo prebivalstva so se krčila, a so tisti s privarčevanimi sredstvi padec kompenzirali iz prihrankov; na splošno so ljudje manj varčevali, zaradi neugodne kreditno monetarne politike in restriktivne politike potrošniških posojil se niso zadolževali, povečevali pa so se tudi različni socialni prejemki. Ljudje so menili, da so se v primerjavi s sedemdesetimi v osemdesetih letih njihovi življenjski pogoji poslabšali. Slabše so bile možnosti za pridobitev stanovanja, zaposlitve in težje je bilo preživljati družino. Bolj so morali biti varčni in gospodarni ter se omejevali pri nakupu opreme, obleke itd. Možnosti izobraževanja in kulturnega življenja so se izboljšale oziroma so bile približno enake. Ta občutja ljudi potrjuje tudi statistika.

Marta Rendla

Living Standard of Slovenians in the Second Yugoslavia

Until 1952, for as long as the system of guaranteed supply was in place, we cannot talk about the issue of the living standard in the true sense of the concept. In the middle of the 1950s the question of how to improve the living standard of the Yugoslav (and thus also Slovenian) population became one of the priority tasks of the socialist regime, and a lot of emphasis was placed on it. The Social Plan of the Economic Development of the People's Republic of Slovenia, outlined in the circumstances of the Slovenian society transforming from a rural into an industrial society in 1958, resulted in the economic policy focusing on more balanced investments and ensuring the development of the activities affecting the living standard. After 1956 the industry shifted towards producing general consumption goods.

The information about the demand of Slovenian households for the period between 1955 and 1990 indicates that the available household resources (budgets), intended for personal consumption, grew gradually and constantly. The percentage of resources intended for individual categories of goods in the shopping basket kept developing in the direction of the gradual improvement of living standard. The ratio between the factors that shaped the living standard (minimum cost of living, development of wages and purchasing capacity) between 1955 and 1990 indicates that the purchasing capacity and living standard kept increasing and improving until 1980. However, after 1980 the real wages and purchasing power started regressing. Throughout the period households allocated the major percentage of household budgets towards purchasing the basic life necessities. The percentage of these gradually decreased, but still remained the most important. It was at the lowest point in the 1970s, amounting to an average of 72.8 %. On average, in the 1970s people used around 10 % less resources for

the basic life necessities than in 1960 or at the end of the 1980s. At that time essential changes took place in the scope and structure of the available and spent resources for personal consumption. As far as the structure of living expenses is concerned, the percentage of expenses for food, clothing and footwear decreased, while the percentages allocated to the more permanent consumer goods, housing construction and maintenance as well as savings increased. People also spent more money for beverages, tobacco, culture, education and hygiene. At the same time the quality of food consumption also improved. The consumption of cereals (flour, bread, pasta) and fats decreased; while the consumption of meat, meat products and fish, oil, milk, cheese, eggs, fruits and vegetables increased. Higher-standard industrial products like televisions, kitchen appliances (electric stoves, refrigerators, washing machines) and cars were in great demand and their consumption increased.

During the 1980s crisis, when the understanding of a better living standard as a developmental goal by the population transcended the mere material side and also started taking other aspects of life into account, Slovenia enjoyed relatively positive trends in the general consumption goods market. The population's resources for personal use dwindled, but those who had savings used these to compensate for the decline. In general people saved less, refrained from taking out loans due to unfavourable credit and monetary policy and the restrictive policy of consumer loans, and various social benefits were on the increase as well. People believed that in comparison with the seventies, in the eighties their living standard declined. The possibilities for acquiring housing and employment worsened, and it became harder to sustain a family. People had to become more economical and limit themselves in the purchases of equipment, clothing, etc. The possibilities in the field of education and cultural life improved or remained at the approximately same level. These feelings of the people are also confirmed by the statistics.

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Nekaj besed o slovenskem športu v jugoslovanski stvarnosti

Šport povezuje ljudi in narode, jih pa tudi razdvaja, saj je šport predvsem tekmovanje in s tem konkurenca, kar pomeni, da se ugotavlja, kdo je boljši. Je tekmovalnost, ta pa ima tudi »nacionalno« razsežnost. Šport je imel v Jugoslaviji tudi politično razsežnost. Politika je v šport posegala z različnimi reorganizacijami, ki so bile odvisne od sprememb v političnem sistemu. V določenih obdobjih so bili državni organi v športu in njegovi organiziranosti močno prisotni; v slovenski ustavi iz leta 1947 je bilo tako izrecno poudarjeno, da država skrbi za športne dejavnosti.

Slovenski šport je vse do osemdesetih let spadal brezpogojno v okvir jugoslovanskega športa, z naraščanjem jugoslovanske krize pa se je postopoma večal odmik slovenskih športnikov od vsejugoslovanske stvarnosti. Kljub temu, da med športniki različnih jugoslovanskih republik (praviloma) ni prihajalo do napetosti političnega značaja, so tudi slovenski športniki doživljali slovenska politična nesoglasja s srbskim nacionalizmom in se zaradi tega oddaljevali od jugoslovanskega okvira.

Čeprav je bila Slovenija v drugi Jugoslaviji ekonomsko najbolj razvita republika, so bili na športnem področju v slovenski »domeni« zgozlj zimski in nekateri posamični letni športi, v moštvenih športih pa so slovenski klubi imeli v glavnem obrobno vlogo. V elitnih, zveznih ligah je igral le po en nogometni ali košarkarski klub. V reprezentancah moštvenih športov z žogo so Slovenci imeli redke odlične posameznike, nekoliko bolj konkurenčni so bili slovenski predstavniki v nekaterih individualnih športnih panogah. V športnem pogledu so ves čas prevladovali Srbi in Hrvati, dodatno pa so na to vplivale tudi krovne športne organizacije, ki so imele sedež praviloma v Beogradu. Športno politiko so krojili v Srbiji, v razpredeni športni mreži pa so bili Srbi bolj naklonjeni svojim ljudem. Dodatno jim je pomagala boljša infrastruktura, več denarnih sredstev iz državne, zvezne blagajne in medsebojna povezanost pri ključnih strateških odločitvah glede športnikov, klubov in zvez.

Po drugi svetovni vojni so se v Sloveniji najbolj uveljavili športi, ki so bili priljubljeni že med obema vojnoma. V ospredju sta se poleg nogometa (in telovadbe/gimnastike) pojavila še atletika in smučanje, ostali športi pa so se po vojni »prebijali« med priljubljenejše glede na organizacijo in dostopnost (košarka, rokomet, odbojka, hokej idr.). Med »mlajšimi« športi se je najbolj uveljavila košarka. Nekateri drugi športi (npr. rokomet) so kljub uspehom po vsesplošni

priljubljenosti ostali zadaj. Pomemben element priljubljenosti športov je predstavljala njihova razširjenost med množicami. Nogomet se je lahko igral že na vsakem travniku, za košarko pa je bila potrebna utrjena podlaga (kar sicer ni zahtevalo tako velikih finančnih vložkov), smučanje pa je že med vojnama pridobivalo na priljubljenosti in razširjenosti ter za svoj razmah sprva ni zahtevalo večjih denarnih sredstev (dokler se ni pojavila ustrezna smučarska oprema in celotna infrastruktura na smučiščih). Na drugi strani so pomembno vlogo odigrali mediji (in sponzorji), ki so v nogometu, košarki in smučanju – to velja za Slovenijo od osemdesetih let dalje – ali tudi v hokeju »prepoznali« svoj večji interes. Športi, ki so po priljubljenosti zaostajali, so se spopadali tudi s pomanjkanjem denarja, ustrezne infrastrukture, ali pa so bili bolj specifični in jih širša javnost ni tako dobro sprejela. Šport so tudi v Sloveniji pogojevali različni dejavniki in vplivali na odziv javnosti do različnih športnih disciplin. Na priljubljenost športov v Sloveniji pa so vsekakor vplivali tudi njihovi trenutni uspehi.

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A Few Words about Slovenian Sport in the Yugoslav Reality

Sport brings people and nations together, but also divides them, as it is mostly about competing and thus about competition, which means that attempts are made to establish who is better. This competitiveness also has »national« dimensions. In Yugoslavia sport also had political dimensions. Politics intervened in it with various reorganisations depending on the changes of the political system. In certain periods of time state authorities were strongly present in sport and its organisation. Thus the Slovenian constitution of 1947 expressly emphasises that the state shall take care of sports activities.

Until as late as 1980s Slovenian sport unconditionally belonged in the context of Yugoslav sport. However, as the Yugoslav crisis unfolded, Slovenian athletes started gradually distancing themselves from the all-Yugoslav reality. Despite the fact that political tensions between the athletes from various Yugoslav republics (mostly) did not take place, Slovenian athletes still experienced the Slovenian political disputes with Serbian nationalism and thus kept distancing themselves from the Yugoslav context.

Although Slovenia was economically the most developed republic in the Second Yugoslavia, in the field of sports Slovenians only »dominated« winter sports and certain individual summer sports, while in team sports they mostly stayed on the side lines. Only one football or basketball club played in the elite federal leagues. Rare outstanding individuals in ball sports teams were Slovenian. Slovenian representatives were somewhat more competitive only in certain individual sports disciplines. As far as sport was concerned, Serbs and Croats

had always been dominant. This was also additionally influenced by the umbrella sports organisations, whose registered offices were, as a rule, in Belgrade. Sports policies were decided on in Serbia, and in the widespread sports network Serbs were more favourably inclined towards their own people. They additionally benefited from better infrastructure, more monetary resources from the state or federal budget, as well as from the mutual connections involved in the key strategic decisions with regard to athletes, clubs and associations.

In Slovenia after World War II the sports which had already been popular in the interwar period asserted themselves the most. Besides football (as well as gymnastics), athletics and skiing also became prominent, while after the war other sports »broke through« and became more popular depending on organisation and accessibility (basketball, handball, volleyball, hockey, etc.). Of the »younger« sports basketball became most popular. Certain other sports (for example handball) remained less popular despite successes. The degree of how widespread they were among the masses represented an important element of the sports' popularity. Football could be played on any meadow, basketball called for a hardened surface (which may not have demanded extensive financial investments, though), and skiing already started becoming more popular and widespread in the interwar period, as initially it had not required significant funding (until suitable skiing equipment and the whole ski slope infrastructure appeared). On the other hand the media (and sponsors) also played an important role. They »identified« their major interest in football, basketball, skiing – this has held true of Slovenia since the 1980s – and also hockey. Less popular sports faced the lack of money, suitable infrastructure, or they were more specific and not as well received by the wider public. In Slovenia sport depended on various factors, which in turn influenced the response of the public to various sports disciplines. Furthermore, momentary successes in certain sports most definitely influenced their popularity in Slovenia.

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Odnos Slovencev do Jugoslavije v času okupacije med letoma 1941 in 1945

Posledica aprilske katastrofe leta 1941 je bila razkosanje in okupacija Jugoslavije. Za osne sile in za zagovornike »novega reda« je bila Jugoslavija le versajska tvorba, tako da so npr. ob razdelitvi njenega državnega premoženja govorili le še o »bivšem jugoslovanskem prostoru«. Po njihovem mnenju naj bi šlo namreč za debelacijo Jugoslavije. Takega gledanja na jugoslovansko vprašanje pa niso sprejele zavezniške sile in so podobno kot tudi druge vlade v begunstvu (npr. poljska, češkoslovaška itd.) jugoslovansko kraljevo v Londonu še naprej priznavale kot legitimnega in legalnega jugoslovanskega zastopnika. Tako je med zavezniki protiosne koalicije formalno-pravno (de iure) vseskozi obstajala kontinuiteta jugoslovanske države.

Posebno težak je postal z aprilsko vojno položaj slovenskega naroda, ki ni bil le okupiran, temveč tudi razkosan med okupatorje, ki so prihajali iz sosednjih držav. Kakšna prihodnost je bila namenjena slovenskemu narodu v načrtih, ki so jih zasnovale osne sile, je bilo razvidno ne le iz raznarodovalnih ukrepov okupatorjev, temveč tudi npr. iz pogodbe o nasledstvu, kjer Slovenija oziroma Slovenci, za razliko od Hrvaške in Srbije, sploh niso bili omenjeni, kar je še dodatno potrjevalo mnenje, da za Slovence kot etnično enoto dolgoročno ni prostora v »novem« evropskem redu. Z ustanovitvijo NDH so bili prekinjeni fizični stiki z drugimi jugoslovanskimi narodi in Slovenci so ostali sami in tudi bili prepuščeni sami sebi.

V takem težavnem položaju je okupacija predstavljala za prebivalce Slovenije povsem nov položaj. Sčasoma so se vsi zavedli, da je z aprilskim zlomom konec predvojnega političnega in nasploh vrednostnega sistema. To pa seveda še ni samodejno in pri vseh pomenilo tudi sprejemanje spremembe predvojnega razmerja politične moči. Tako se je po drugi strani odpirala tudi možnost za nov razmislek o nadaljnjem narodovem življenju in je bilo potrebno na novo definirati nacionalne cilje. V slovenski javnosti je nastal vtis, da je cela vrsta vprašanj še zelo odprtih in dajejo možnost za izpolnitev »vseh« nacionalnih zahtev. V tem pogledu je bilo najbolj izpostavljeno prav vprašanje meja, sprva tudi državni okvir, kasneje pa predvsem notranja ureditev skupne države. V tem pogledu je prevladoval nezmerni optimizem, ki ni upošteval širšega mednarodnega okvira in konstelacije sil, ki je pomembno, v nekaterih vidikih pa tudi odločilno vplival na položaj in bil marsikje v nasprotju s pričakovanji.

Kljub temu, da se je v Sloveniji razvnel tudi notranji spopad med nasprotnima taboroma, se je tekom okupacije na obeh straneh razvil podoben narodnopo-

litični program. Ta je še vedno bil Zedinjena Slovenija (to je združitev celotnega etničnega ozemlja v enoto), nepresežen narodnopolitični ideal iz leta pomladi narodov 1848, v federativno oblikovani obnovljeni in razširjeni jugoslovanski državi. Sicer pa je bila geneza programov in njuno razumevanje (zlasti glede stopnje federativnosti) pri sprtih taborih različno. Poleg javno deklariranega narodnopolitičnega programa, skupnega vsem ključnim političnim dejavnikom, pa se je pojavilo tudi nekaj izjem. Za vse je bilo značilno odklanjanje vsakršne srednjeevropske kombinacije, kjer bi morali Slovenci živeti skupaj z Nemci, Madžari in/ali Italijani, pa tudi odločno zavračanje obnovitve habsburške monarhije.

Bojan Godeša, D.Sc.

Attitude of Slovenians towards Yugoslavia During the Occupation between 1941 and 1945

The catastrophe of April 1941 resulted in the division and occupation of Yugoslavia. In the opinion of the Axis Powers and those arguing for the »New Order«, Yugoslavia was nothing more than an »artificial creation from Versailles«, therefore during the distribution of its state property it was only referred to as the »former Yugoslav space«. According to their view the situation only called for the vanquishing of Yugoslavia. However, this attitude to the Yugoslav question had not been adopted by the Allied Forces, which kept acknowledging the legitimacy and legality of the Yugoslav representation of the Yugoslav King's government in London, similarly as the other governments-in-exile (e.g. Polish, Czechoslovak, etc.). Therefore among the Allies of the anti-Axis coalition, formally and legally (de iure) the continuity of the Yugoslav state was uninterrupted.

With the April War the situation of the Slovenian nation, which was not only occupied but also divided between the occupiers from the neighbouring states, became especially hard. The future intended for the Slovenian nation in the plans outlined by the Axis Powers was not only evident from the occupiers' denationalisation measures, but also from, for example, the agreement on succession, which – unlike Croatia and Serbia – refrained from even mentioning Slovenia or Slovenians. This was an additional argument for the opinion that in the long term Slovenians as an ethnic unit were not meant to exist in the »New« European Order. With the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia the physical contacts with the other Yugoslav nations were severed. Slovenians remained alone and their future was up to themselves.

In such difficult circumstances the occupation represented a completely new

situation for the inhabitants of Slovenia. Gradually everyone became aware that with the April War the pre-war political and value system in general was over. Naturally, this did not imply, in the opinion of everyone, that the change of the pre-war distribution of the political power would have to be accepted. Thus on the other hand new possibilities presented themselves for a new outlook on the further life of the nation, and therefore the national goals had to be redefined. An impression was created in the Slovenian public that a whole range of issues had been left open and that they provided an opportunity for the realisation of »all« national demands. In this sense the questions of the borders, initially also the state framework, and later the internal system of the common state were the most important. Immoderate optimism prevailed, failing to take into account the wider international framework and constellation of forces, which importantly and in some aspects also decisively influenced the situation and were opposite to expectations in many regards.

Despite the fact that an internal conflict between two opposing camps also broke out in Slovenia, during the occupation a similar national-political programme developed on both sides. It still involved the United Slovenia (unification of the whole of ethnic territory into a unit), an uncontested national-political ideal dating back to the Spring of Nations of 1848, which could manifest itself in the restored federally organised and extended Yugoslav state. However, the genesis of the programmes and their understanding (especially with regard to the degree of federalism) differed in the two conflicting camps. Besides the publicly proclaimed national-political programme, common to all of the key political actors, a few exceptions also arose. Everyone refused any Central European combinations where Slovenians would have to co-exist with Germans, Hungarians and/or Italians; and the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy was refused resolutely as well.

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»Obračun s klasnim neprijateljem«: slučaj srpskog građanstva 1944-1950.

Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, kao glavna snaga nove, revolucionarne vlasti, je u prvih nekoliko godina posle Drugog svetskog rata, preduzela veliki broj raznovrtnih mera kojima je, u skladu sa sopstvenom vizijom i pogledima i po uzoru na sovjetsko iskustvo, gradila »novu državu« i »novo društvo«. Izgradnja »novog« bazirala se na rušenju »starog« u čijem središtu je bilo građanstvo sa svojim pogledom na uređenje države i društva. Komunisti su u jugoslovenskom odnosno srpskom građanstvu videli glavnog klasnog i političkog neprijatelja i ratnog izdajnika, koga je trebalo kao klasu uništiti kako bi se stvorilo društvo slojalne pravde. Uz to, komunisti su srpsko građanstvo, a i srpski narod iz predratnog perioda, posmatrali kroz prizmu »velikosrpskog hegemonizma« i »velikosrpskog šovnizma«, što je nosilo i specifičan način rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja. Revolucionarna vlast je »obračun s klasnim neprijateljem« sprovodila kroz »eksproprijacija eksproprijatora«, odnosno kroz razvlašćivanje građanstva. To je značilo preduzimanje niza mera kojima je oduzimana politička, ekonomska i društvena moć građanstva. KPJ je, i pored osvajanja vlasti, bila prinuđena da taj cilj prikriva, isto kako je to činila u ratu. Umesto narodnooslobodilačke, sada je koristila narodnofrontovsku frazeologiju. Na to su uticali unutrašnji, i još više, međunarodni razlozi. Osim toga, jugoslovenski komunisti, ni u ratu a ni posle njega, nisu razvlašćivali građanstvo u otvorenom klasnom obračunu već u »borbi« protiv ostataka fašizma i u procesu čišćenja društva od saradnika okupatora, protivnika nove vlasti i protivnika izgradnje »novog društva« zasnovanog na socijalnoj pravdi i jednakosti. Zbog svega toga, revolucionarna vlast je na jedan evolutivan i elastičan način, u više faza, »eksproprijacija« građanstvo. U tome nije bilo razlike između srpskog građanstva i građanstva ostalih jugoslovenskih naroda. Svuda se ona odvijala na sličan način i imala je iste posledice. Određena specifičnost, pa i razlika, vidljiva je pre svega u pogledu činjenice da je Srbija bila ranije oslobođena i da su prve mere »obračuna« s građanstvom započele upravo u njoj. Sa te strane, moguće je govoriti i o oštrijem postupanju prema srpskom građanstvu. Osim toga, neki podaci svedoče da je kaznena politika bila oštija prema srpskom nego na primer prema hrvatskom građanstvu. Još izrazitije razlika vidljiva je između srpskog i građanstva ostalih jugoslovenskih naroda u rešavanja nacionalnog pitanja. Tadašnji politički aktivni građanski predstavnici smatrali su, da je deljenjem srpskog naroda u nekoliko federalnih jedinica, cepan i srpski narod i teritorija koje su oni smatrali da su srpske nacionalne teritorije.

Mag. Nataša Milićević

»Obračun z razrednim sovražnikom«: primer srbskega meščanstva 1944-1950

Komunistična partija Jugoslavije je kot glavna sila nove, revolucionarne oblasti v prvih letih po drugi svetovni vojni sprejela veliko število različnih ukrepov, s katerimi je v skladu z lastno vizijo, vendar po vzoru sovjetskih izkušenj, gradila »novo državo« in »novo družbo«. Graditev »novega« je temeljila na rušenju »starega«, v središču tega pa je bilo meščanstvo s svojimi pogledi na ureditev države in družbe. Komunisti so v jugoslovanskem oz. v srbskem meščanstvu videli poglavitnega razrednega in političnega sovražnika ter izdajalce iz vojnega časa, ki jih je treba kot razred uničiti, da bi se lahko ustvarila družbeno pravična država. Poleg tega so komunisti srbsko meščanstvo in tudi srbski narod iz predvojnega obdobja gledali skozi prizmo »velikosrbskega hegemonizma« in »velikosrbskega šovinizma«, kar je dodatno vplivalo na svojevrsten način reševanja srbskega nacionalnega vprašanja. Revolucionarna oblast je »obračun z razrednim sovražnikom« izvajala na način »ekspropriacije ekspropriatorja« oz. z razlaščenjem meščanstva. To je pomenilo izvajanje vrste ukrepov, s katerimi je bila meščanstvu odvzeta politična, ekonomska in družbena moč. KPJ je bila kljub osvojitvi oblasti prisiljena ta cilj prikrivati, tako kot je to počela v času vojne, le da je namesto narodnoosvobodilne sedaj uporabljala ljudskofrontovsko frazeologijo. Na to so vplivali notranji, še bolj pa zunanji, mednarodni razlogi. Poleg tega jugoslovanski komunisti niso niti v vojni niti po njej razlaščevali meščanstva v odkritem razrednem obračunavanju, temveč pod krinko »boja« proti ostankom fašizma. Hkrati je potekal tudi proces čiščenja družbe, iz katere so želeli izločiti sodelavce okupatorja, nasprotnike nove oblasti in nasprotnike graditve »nove družbe«, zasnovane na socialni pravičnosti in enakosti. Zaradi vsega tega je revolucionarna oblast na evolutiven in elastičen način v več fazah »ekspropriirala« meščanstvo, pri čemer ni delala razlik med srbskim in meščanstvom drugih jugoslovanskih narodov. Povsod je razlaščenje potekalo na podoben način in je imelo enake posledice. Določena posebnost in s tem tudi razlika je bila predvsem v tem, da je bila Srbija osvobojena pred ostalimi in so zato prvi ukrepi »obračuna« z meščanstvom potekali prav tam. Zaradi tega je mogoče govoriti tudi o ostrejšem postopanju proti srbskemu meščanstvu. Nekateri podatki pričajo, da je bila kazenska politika ostrejša do srbskega kot na primer do hrvaškega meščanstva. Še izrazitejša razlika pri reševanju nacionalnega vprašanja je vidna med srbskim meščanstvom in meščanstvom drugih jugoslovanskih narodov. Tedanji politično aktivni meščanski predstavniki so menili, da delitev srbskega naroda v več federalnih enot pomeni ločitev naroda in območij, ki so jih dojemali kot srbsko nacionalno ozemlje.

Nataša Milićević, M.Sc.

**»Retaliation Against the Class Enemy: the Case of Serbian Bourgeoisie
Between 1944 and 1950**

In the first years after World War II the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as the main embodiment of the new revolutionary authorities introduced a large number of various measures, aimed at building a »new state« and »new society« in accordance with its own vision and as well as views compatible with the Soviet experience. The construction of the »new« was based on the destruction of the »old«, and bourgeoisie with its own outlook on the state and society regime was in the centre of that. The communists saw the Yugoslav or Serbian bourgeoisie as the main class and political enemy as well as collaborators during the war. They saw them as a social class that should be destroyed in order to create a socially just society. Furthermore the communists saw the Serbian bourgeoisie as well as the Serbian nation as it existed in the pre-war period from the viewpoint of »Greater-Serbian hegemonism« and »Greater-Serbian chauvinism«, which could also be interpreted as a way of solving the Serbian national question. The revolutionary authorities carried out the »showdown with the class enemy« by »expropriating the expropriators«, or by dispossessing the bourgeoisie. That involved the execution of a range of measures, depriving the bourgeoisie of its political, economical and social power. Despite its rise to power the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was forced to conceal its real goal, just like it had done during World War II. Instead of national liberation it now resorted to the People's Front terminology (phraseology). This was a result of internal as well as of – to even a greater degree – international factors. Furthermore, during the war and after it the communists refrained from expropriating the bourgeoisie in open class-related retaliation. Instead they »fought« against the remainders of fascism during a process of cleansing the society of collaborators, opponents of the new authorities, and opponents of the building of the »new society« based on social justice and equality. Due to all of this the revolutionary authorities »expropriated« the bourgeoisie in several stages, in an evolutionary and elastic manner. With regard to this there were no differences between the Serbian bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie of the other Yugoslav nations. Everywhere expropriation took the same forms and resulted in the same consequences. A certain peculiarity was only visible in terms of the fact that Serbia had been liberated sooner and that the measures of the »retaliation« against bourgeoisie started there. In view of this it is also possible to refer to the actions against the Serbian bourgeoisie as more severe. Furthermore, some information attests to the fact that the penal policy towards the Serbian bourgeoisie was more severe than in case of, for example, Croatian bourgeoisie. There was an even more obvious difference be-

tween the Serbian bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie of other Yugoslav nations, as far as the resolution of the national question is concerned. The contemporary politically active representatives of the bourgeoisie believed that with the division of the Serbian nation into several federal units the Serbian nation and the territories seen as Serbian national territory had been divided.

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Otopela ost revolucije: strukturne spremembe represivnega aparata v Socialistični republiki Sloveniji ter njegovo dojemanje v slovenski javnosti

Problemski okvir izraza represija zajema različne pojme, sodobna inačica pa naj bi predstavljala za človeka stresno situacijo, ki ga potiska na družbeni rob: zaradi napadov nanj, na njegovo premoženje, svobodo, delo in ustvarjalne možnosti, nacionalno pripadnost in družbeni položaj. Širok spekter, ki ga ta definicija omogoča, se navadno kljub vsemu oži na vse oblike državne represije, nanje pa je po splošnem prepričanju slovenska družba postala resnično občutljiva v osemdesetih letih, v času demokratizacije in začetkov osamosvajanja od »širše represivne domovine«. Državni aparat je že v svojem bistvu zasnovan represivno in zaradi tega je potrebno segment represivnih organov, ki so delovali na območju Slovenije v času trajanja druge Jugoslavije, zastaviti v nekoliko širšem konceptu. Kljub temu da je že sama državna uprava v svojem smislu represivna, pa imajo nekateri njeni sestavni deli bistveno bolj poudarjen represivni značaj, zato se prispevek osredotoča nanje. Iz celote se tako nakazujejo trije segmenti, ki so deležni podrobnejše analize. Ti so pravosodje, varnostni organi in vojaške strukture. Glede na ustroj in ustavne spremembe druge Jugoslavije je nujno povezovati delovanje teh organov v sklopu njihove vpetosti v zvezne strukture. Samostojnost delovanja vseh struktur na republiški ravni je sicer s procesom decentralizacije skozi večino obstoja druge jugoslovanske države naraščala, vendar pa je zvezna zakonodaja s teh področij bistveno vplivala na nastanek republiške, kar je onemogočalo razvoj opaznejših posebnosti v njihovem delovanju in nastajanju, edino večjo izjemo lahko opazimo pri razvoju republiških obrambnih struktur po letu 1968, saj je najbolj samostojna Teritorialna obramba zaživela prav v Sloveniji.

Jurij Hadalin, D.Sc.

The Blunt Edge of the Revolution: Structural Changes of the Repressive Apparatus in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and Its Perception by the Slovenian Public

The problem context of the term »repression« involves various concepts, and its modern version is supposed to represent a situation stressful for people, pushing them to the edge of society – because of attacks against them, their property, freedom, work and creative potentials, national adherence and social position.

Nevertheless, the wide spectrum resulting from this definition usually narrows down to all forms of state repression, which – according to the general opinion – the Slovenian society became truly sensitive about in the 1980s: in the time of democratisation and beginnings of its emancipation from the »repressive wider homeland«. In its essence the state apparatus is designed in a repressive manner, therefore the segment of the bodies of repression operating in the territory of Slovenia during the Second Yugoslavia should be addressed in a somewhat wider concept. Despite the fact that the very state administration is repressive in its essence, certain integral parts of it have a significantly emphasised repressive character, therefore this contribution focuses on those. Thus three segments stand out from the whole, and they have been analysed in greater detail: justice administration, security bodies and military structures. With regard to the system and constitutional changes of the Second Yugoslavia it is vital to connect the operations of these institutions in the context of their integration into the federal structures. With the process of decentralisation, taking place during most of the time of the Second Yugoslavia, the independence of the operations of all structures at the level of the republics grew. However, the federal legislation in these fields significantly influenced the adoption of the republican legislation, preventing the development of more notable particularities in their operations and development. The only significant exception is noticeable in the development of the republican defence structures after 1968, since the most independent Territorial Defence developed precisely in Slovenia.

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Neke značajke percepcije jugoslavenskog partizanskog pokreta u suvremenoj Hrvatskoj

Hrvatska je ostvarila svoju nezavisnost tijekom nasilnog raspada socijalističke Jugoslavije. Osamostaljenje je predstavljalo raskid s prethodnom državom i njezinim sistemom, pa je došlo i do reinterpretacije suvremene hrvatske povijesti, kao i hrvatske povijesti tijekom Drugoga svjetskoga rata. Vladajuća Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ) na čelu s Franjo Tuđmanom bila je nacionalistički pokret, a također i protujugoslavenski i protukomunistički. Istovremeno su mnogi važni članovi HDZ-a, uključujući Tuđmana osobno, zapravo bili veterani partizanskog pokreta, a nakon 1945. sudjelovali su u novim komunističkim vlastima. Može se reći da je za vrijeme Tuđmanove vladavine došlo do svojevrstne rehabilitacije ustaške Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH), na koju se gledalo kao na »povijesnu težnju hrvatskog naroda« da ima svoju samostalnu državu, dok se zanemarivala povezanost NDH s Njemačkim Reichom i Kraljevinom Italijom, kao i zločini za koje su bile odgovorne vlasti NDH. No, istovremeno s ovim Tuđman je insistirao i na važnosti novostvorenog »hrvatskog antifašizma«. Taj novi »hrvatski antifašizam« bio je povijesno utemeljen u činjenici da je na područjima koja su danas u sastavu Republike Hrvatske tijekom većeg dijela Drugoga svjetskoga rata postojao snažan partizanski pokret. No, kada se 1990-ih govorilo o »hrvatskom antifašizmu« nerijetko se zanemarivalo da je o bio sastavni dio šireg jugoslavenskog partizanskog pokreta. Također se zanemarivalo da je partizanski pokret u hrvatskim krajevima, kao i na cijelom jugoslavenskom području bio pod vodstvom Komunističke partije Jugoslavije. Umjesto komunističke ideologije, u »hrvatskom antifašizmu« istican je antifašizam kao takav, odnosno kao načelno i međunarodno priznata pozitivna vrijednost, iako točan sadržaj tog pojma nije jasno definiran. Za Tuđmana je također bila vrlo važna ideja »nacionalno pomirenja«. Prema toj ideji i Hrvati koji su se tijekom Drugoga svjetskoga rata borili na strani NDH, kao i oni koji su se borili u partizanima, počinili su pogreške i zločine i imali su zablude. Osim toga oni su se nerijetko borili u bratoubilačkom sukobu. No, na temelju »nacionalnog pomirenja« sve te prethodno povijesne žrtve, stradanja i pogreške su konačno prevladani i stvorena je samostalna Republika Hrvatska. Nakon Tuđmanove smrti njegova vladavina je u Hrvatskoj nerijetko bila kritizirana kao nedemokratska i nacionalistička, i kao razdoblje kada je NDH bila nekritički i revizionistički rehabilitirana. Istovremeno je »hrvatski antifašizam« ostao službeni i sastavni dio

suvremene Republike Hrvatske. U ovom prilogu dat će se samo neki podatci o navedenoj temi i pokazati nepodudarnosti između povijesnih činjenica i historiografskih interpretacija s jedne strane, i politički i ideološki motiviranih tvrdnji s druge strane, a u vezi s »hrvatskim antifašizmom«.

Dr. Nikica Barić

Nekaj značilnosti dojemanja jugoslovanskega partizanskega gibanja v sodobni Hrvaški

Hrvaška je svojo neodvisnost uresničila med nasilnim razpadom socialistične Jugoslavije. Osamosvojitve je pomenila prelom s prejšnjo državo in njenim sistemom, zato je prišlo tudi do reinterpreteracije sodobne hrvaške zgodovine in z njo tudi hrvaške zgodovine druge svetovne vojne. Vladajoča Hrvaška demokratska skupnost (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica -HDZ) na čelu s Franjem Tuđmanom je bila nacionalistično gibanje z protijugoslovanskim in protikomunističnim značajem. Hkrati so mnogi pomembni člani HDZ, tudi Tuđman, pravzaprav bili veterani partizanskega gibanja, po letu 1945 pa so sodelovali z novimi komunističnimi oblastmi. Mogoče je reči, da je v času Tuđmanove oblasti prišlo do svojevrstne rehabilitacije ustaške Neodvisne države Hrvaške (Nezavisne Države Hrvatske - NDH). Na NDH se je gledalo kot na »zgodovinsko težnjo hrvaškega naroda« po lastni samostojni državi, vendar se je ob tem zanemarjalo njeno povezavo z nemškim Rajhom in Kraljevino Italijo, kot tudi zločine, za katere so bile odgovorne njene oblasti. Hkrati s tem pa je Tuđman vztrajal tudi na pomembnosti novonastalega »hrvaškega antifašizma«. Ta novi »hrvaški antifašizem« je temeljil na zgodovinskem dejstvu, da je bilo na območjih v okviru današnje Republike Hrvaške v določenih obdobjih druge svetovne vojne prisotno močno partizansko gibanje. Ko se je v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja govorilo o »hrvaškem antifašizmu« se je pogosto zanemarilo, da je predstavljal sestavni del širšega jugoslovanskega partizanskega gibanja. Pozabljalo se je tudi, da je bilo partizansko gibanje tako hrvaških krajih kot tudi na vsem jugoslovanskem območju pod vodstvom Komunistične partije Jugoslavije. Namesto komunistične ideologije je v »hrvaškem antifašizmu« poudarjan antifašizem kot tak oziroma kot načelno in mednarodno priznana pozitivna vrednota, čeprav natančen pomen tega pojma ni točno definiran. Za Tuđmana je bila zelo pomembna tudi ideja »narodne sprave«. Po tej zamisli so tako Hrvati, ki so se med drugo svetovno vojno borili na strani NDH, kot tudi tisti na partizanski strani, delali napake in storili zločine ter bili zavedeni. Poleg tega so se pogosto znašli tudi v bratomornem spopadu. Na osnovi »narodne sprave« naj bi bile zgodovinske žrtve, trpljenje in napake končno presežene in ustvarjena samostojna Republika Hrvaška. Po Tuđmanovi smrti je bil njegov režim na Hrvaškem pogosto kriti-

ziran kot nedemokratičen in nacionalističen. Obveljal je za obdobje, v katerem je bila NDH nekritično in revizionistično rehabilitirana. Ob tem je »hrvaški antifašizem« ostal uradni in sestavni del sodobne Republike Hrvaške. V tem prispevku bodo podani le nekateri podatki o »hrvaškem antifašizmu« in prikazane neskladnosti med zgodovinskimi dejstvi in zgodovinsopisnimi interpretacijami na eni ter politično in ideološko motiviranimi trditvami na drugi strani.

Nikica Barić, D.Sc.

Some Characteristics of the Perception of Yugoslav Partisan Movement in Contemporary Croatia

Croatia gained independence during the violent break up of socialist Yugoslavia. Croatian independence was a split with former state and its system and it brought a reinterpretation of contemporary Croatian history and also of Croatian history during World War II. The ruling Croatian Democratic Union led by Franjo Tuđman was nationalistic, anti-Yugoslav and anticommunist, but at the same time many of its important members, including Tuđman himself, fought as Partisans during World War II and were former Communists. It can be said that during Tuđman's rule Ustasha Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH*) was partially rehabilitated as a result of »historical desire of Croatian people to have its own independent state«, while NDH's alliance with German Reich and Kingdom of Italy as well as crimes committed by NDH were often omitted from public memory. At the same time Tuđman also insisted on the importance and value of the newly defined »Croatian antifascism«. The new »Croatian antifascism« was historically based on the existence of a strong Partisan movement within the present day Croatian borders. But the fact that the Croatian partisan movement was integral part of the Yugoslav partisan movement was often ignored. The fact that the Partisan movement in Croatia, as well as in Yugoslavia, was led by Communist party of Yugoslavia was also ignored. Instead of Communist ideology, the new »Croatian antifascism« nurtured »antifascism« itself as a generally and internationally accepted positive value although its content was not clearly defined. For Tuđman the idea of »national reconciliation« was also of great importance. According to this idea, both Croats who fought for NDH and in the Partisan movement committed mistakes and blunders and committed crime and also fought each other in fratricide war, but all these internal Croatian conflicts have finally been resolved by creation of the independent Republic of Croatia. After Tuđman's death his rule was often criticized as undemocratic and nationalistic, and as a period when NDH received uncritical and revisionist rehabilitation. At the same time »Croatian Antifascism« remains the official element of the contemporary Croatia.

This article gives some information about this topic and shows the discrepancies between the historical facts and historiographical interpretations and politically and ideologically based assertions dealing with the »Croatian antifascism«.

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Nacionalno ali nadnacionalno zgodovinopisje? Jugoslovansko »zgodovinopisje delavskega gibanja« in slovenske posebnosti

V socialistični Jugoslaviji je bilo zgodovinopisje pomembno orodje legitimizacije oblasti komunistične stranke. Njegovi prednostni nalogi sta postali iskanje tradicij »naprednih gibanj« v preteklosti in dokazovanje linearnost zgodovinskega razvoja, usmerjenega k nenehnemu napredku. Zgodovinopisje bi se moralo napajati s historičnim materializmom in se usmeriti k marksističnemu proučevanju »zgodovine ljudskih množic«, svoje raziskave pa s starejših obdobj razširiti na novejšo dobo, zlasti na zgodovino delavskega gibanja in komunistične partije.

Strategija oblasti do zgodovinopisja se je konec petdesetih let nazorno izrazila v politično motiviranem ustanavljanju institucij, ki so se ukvarjale z novejšo in sodobno zgodovino. Domala v vseh jugoslovanskih republikah so nastali inštituti za zgodovino delavskega gibanja, ki se jim je v začetku šestdesetih let pridružil še zvezni inštitut za proučevanje delavskega gibanja. Hkrati so bile pri zveznem in republiških centralnih komitejih ustanovljene zgodovinske komisije, ki naj bi usmerjale delovanje novih inštitutov in zgodovinopisje delavskega gibanja. Na pobudo CK ZKJ je Inštitut za proučevanje delavskega gibanja v Beogradu leta 1963 izdal *Pregled istorije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Pregled zgodovine Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije)*, ki naj bi pomenil sintezo dotodanjih raziskav in hkrati postavil temelje projektu zgodovine delavskega gibanja narodov Jugoslavije, zasnovanem leta 1962 z nastankom koordinacijskega odbora pri zgodovinski komisiji CK ZKJ. Slovenski zgodovinarji, v prvi vrsti France Škerl, so v *Pregledu* zaznali številne pomanjkljivosti, povezane z neupoštevanjem ali skromnim upoštevanjem slovenskih posebnosti, zmotilo pa jih je predvsem zanemarjanje specifik odporniškega gibanja v Sloveniji med drugo svetovno vojno, ki je bil prilagojen slovenskim razmeram in se je zlasti v začetnem obdobju razvijal precej avtonomno. V čedalje bolj zapletenih političnih razmerah v Jugoslaviji je začel del slovenske politike zgled za svoje delovanje očitno iskati tudi v Osvobodilni fronti, zato ni naključje, da je bilo leta 1966, ob 25-letnici njene ustanovitve, organizirano prvo znanstveno posvetovanje o Osvobodilni fronti, na katerem so z referati ali v diskusiji poleg zgodovinarjev sodelovali tudi slovenski politiki.

Ambiciozni projekt zgodovine delavskega gibanja narodov Jugoslavije, ki je bil zasnovan kot marksistična sinteza jugoslovanske sodobne zgodovine, je

medtem skoraj zastal. Pestile so ga številne težave, ki niso bile povezane le s financiranjem projekta ter pomanjkanjem strokovnega in hkrati politično sprejemljivega kroga sodelavcev, temveč so izvirale predvsem iz čedalje bolj zaostrenih medrepubliških in mednacionalnih odnosov. Sodelavci iz različnih republik med seboj pogosto niso našli skupnega jezika, iskre pa so se kresale zlasti med Ljubljano in Beogradom ter, z nekoliko drugačnih izhodišč, tudi med Zagrebom in Beogradom. Metod Mikuž, ki je bil predviden za enega ključnih piscev jugoslovanske zgodovine delavskega gibanja, je že leta 1966 v pogovoru z Mitjo Ribičičem poudaril, da načrt skupne zgodovine delavskega gibanja sploh ni realen. »Zgodovino naj obdela vsak jugoslovanski narod sam, potem pa bomo videli, kaj imamo skupnega«, je menil Mikuž, podobno pa je razmišljal tudi del slovenske politike. Projekt jugoslovanske zgodovine delavskega gibanja se je iz šestdesetih zavlekel v sedemdeseta in osemdeseta leta, a dlje od objav dokumentov, bibliografij, *Hronologije radničkog pokreta i SKJ* leta 1980 ter dopolnjene *Istorije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* v letih 1977 in 1985 ni prišel.

Mateja Režek, D.Sc.

National or Supranational Historiography? The Yugoslav »Historiography of the Workers' Movement« and Slovenian Particularities

In the socialist Yugoslavia historiography was an important tool for the legitimisation of the Communist Party rule. Its priority tasks became searching for the traditions of »progressive movements« in the past and proving the linearity of historical development, aimed at constant progress. Historiography should build on historical materialism and orient itself towards the Marxist exploration of the »history of the people's masses«, as well as extend its research from the older periods to the more recent times, especially to the history of the workers' movement and the Communist Party.

In the end of the 1950s the strategy of the authorities with regard to historiography became apparent in the politically-motivated establishment of institutions dealing with contemporary and modern history. Institutes for the History of the Workers' Movement were established in almost all Yugoslav republics, and in the beginning of the 1960s they were also joined by the federal Workers' Movement Research Institute. At the same time historical commissions were established with the federal and republican central committees with the aim of managing the activities of the new institutes and historiography of the workers' movement. At the initiative of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CK ZKJ), in 1963 the Workers' Movement Research Institute in Belgrade published the *Pregled istorije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (*Overview of the History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia*), which

supposedly represented a synthesis of the research carried out to that day as well as the foundation for the history of the workers' movement of the nations of Yugoslavia project, outlined in 1962 with the establishment of the coordinating committee of the CK ZKJ historical commission. Slovenian historians, especially France Škerl, detected numerous deficiencies in the *Overview*, related to the disregard or modest regard for Slovenian particularities, and they were especially concerned by the lack of attention to the specific aspects of the resistance movement in Slovenia during World War II, which had been adapted to the Slovenian situation and had developed quite autonomously, especially in the initial period. In the increasingly complicated political circumstances in Yugoslavia a part of the Slovenian politics obviously started looking towards the Liberation Front as a model for its operations. Therefore it is not a coincidence that in 1966, at the 25th anniversary of its establishment, the first scientific discussion about the Liberation Front was organised. Historians as well as Slovenian politicians participated, either by presenting papers or taking part in the discussion.

Meanwhile the ambitious history of the workers' movement of the nations of Yugoslavia project, which had been envisioned as a Marxist synthesis of the contemporary Yugoslav history, came to almost a complete halt. It was beset by many problems, not only related to financing and lack of expert and simultaneously politically acceptable circle of associates, but also stemming from the increasingly tense relations between the republics and nations. The participants from different republics were often unable to find common ground, and disagreements were especially frequent between Ljubljana and Belgrade as well as – due to different reasons – also between Zagreb and Belgrade. Already in 1966 – in an interview with Mitja Ribičič – Metod Mikuž, who was to be one of the key writers of the Yugoslav History of the Workers' Movement, underlined that the plans entailing the common history of the workers' movement were not at all realistic. »Every Yugoslav nation should analyse its own history itself, and then we shall see what we have in common,« Mikuž thought, and a part of the Slovenian politics thought along similar lines. The history of the workers' movement of the nations of Yugoslavia project dragged out from the sixties to the seventies and eighties, but it never went further than the publication of documents, bibliographies, *Hronologija radničkog pokreta i SKJ (Chronology of the Workers' Movement and League of Communists of Yugoslavia)* in 1980 and the extended *Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavija (History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia)* in 1977 and 1985.

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Zgodovina in politika: primer Inštituta za zgodovino delavskega gibanja Hrvaške (1961-1990)

Primer odnosa zgodovinoписja in politike v času druge Jugoslavije je Inštitut za zgodovino delavskega gibanja Hrvaške. Je le en primer, saj jih je več, vsaj v vsaki republici nekdanje države je kakšen podoben. Dejstvo, da je Inštitut deloval v času diktature ZKJ oziroma ZKH, in da je bila ZKJ ena od njegovih ustanoviteljic, je seveda vplivalo na to, da se je Inštitut v glavnem ukvarjal s proučevanjem zgodovine delavskega razreda, partizanskega gibanja in Komunistične partije Jugoslavije/Hrvaške. Razvoj inštituta kaže na neizogibno prepletanje političnih in ideoloških ciljev vladajoče stranke z metodologijo in znanstvenimi pravili zgodovinoписja. Svoboda znanstvenega raziskovanja je bila omejena takrat, ko se rezultati niso ujemale z mnenji najvišjih voditeljev ZKJ/ZKH, predvsem pa z mnenjem vodilnega hrvaškega komunističarja Vladimirja Bakarića. Z Bakarićem je bil prvi direktor inštituta Franjo Tuđman v nenehnem sporu, kar je povzročilo njegov odstop, pravzaprav prisilno zamenjavo in odhod z inštituta. Glavni problem ni bil v Tuđmanovi kompilacijski metodi lastnega ustvarjanja in izkoriščanju rezultatov mlajših raziskovalcev, še manj pa v politični angažiranosti njegovih raziskovanj, kar je bilo razširjena metodološka usmerjenost takratnega zgodovinoписja, ampak v njegovih mnenjih, ki niso bila enaka tolmačenju ZKJ/ZKH. Sporna so bila vprašanja vloge Hrvatov, HSS in reševanja hrvaškega nacionalnega vprašanja v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, kakor tudi število žrtev v taborišču Jasenovac v času NDH. Glavna vsebina vseh političnih obtožb je bil »hrvaški nacionalizem«. Tudi kasneje je prišlo do političnih intervencij, toda za zgodovinarje z manjšimi posledicami. Od srede osemdesetih let je politična in gospodarska kriza imela za posledico liberalizacijo, demokratizacijo in konfederalizacijo ter razpad Jugoslavije. V takšnih pogojih se je inštitut leta 1990 preimenoval v Inštitut za sodobno zgodovino. To je bilo popolnoma novo obdobje v njegovem razvoju, ki ga je zaznamoval razpad Jugoslavije in nastajanje samostojne Hrvaške z večstrankarskim sistemom, v katerem se je prostor za politične intervencije zelo zožil.

Zdenko Radelić, D.Sc.

History and Politics: the Example of the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement of Croatia (1961-1990)

The Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement of Croatia represents an example of the relationship between historiography and politics during the time of the Second Yugoslavia. This is only a single example, since more similar cases can surely be found in each of the republics of the former state. Naturally, the fact that this Institute operated during the dictatorship of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (ZKJ) or League of Communists of Croatia (ZKH) and that ZKJ was one of its founders resulted in the Institute mostly focusing on studying the history of the working class, partisan movement and Communist Party of Yugoslavia/Croatia. The development of the Institute indicates the unavoidable intertwining between political and ideological goals of the ruling party and the methodology and scientific rules of historiography. The freedom of scientific research was limited whenever the results did not correspond to the opinions of the highest leaders of ZKJ/ZKH, especially that of the leading Croatian communist Vladimir Bakarić. Franjo Tuđman, the first director of the Institute, was in constant dispute with Bakarić, which resulted in his resignation, actually forced replacement, and his leaving the Institute. The main problem did not lie in Tuđman's compilation method of his own work and exploitation of the results of younger researchers, and even less in the politically engaged nature of his research, which was the widespread methodological orientation of historiography at that time, but in his own opinions which did not correspond to the views of ZKJ/ZKH. What was disputable were the questions of the role of Croats, Croatian Peasant Party, and the solution of the Croatian national question in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as well as the number of victims in the Jasenovac concentration camp in the time of the Independent State of Croatia. The main characteristic of all political accusation was »Croatian nationalism«. Even later political interventions took place, but not with as many consequences for the historians. Since the middle of the 1980s the political and economic crisis resulted in liberalisation, democratisation, confederalisation and dissolution of Yugoslavia. In these circumstances the Institute renamed itself as the Institute of Contemporary History in 1990. This was a completely new period in its development, marked by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and creation of independent Croatia with a multi-party system, where the room for political interventions diminished significantly.

Beleške

Beleške

Čl. 1. Federativna ljudska republika Jugoslavija je zvezna ljudska država republikanske oblike, skupnost enakopravnih narodov, ki so na temelju pravice do samoodločbe, vključno pravico do odcepitve, izrazili svojo voljo, da živijo skupno v federativni državi.



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